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Chapter 17 The CCP's Policy and Tactics on Rural Secret Society Work During the Agrarian Revolutionary War

i see chinese secret society 孔祥涛 11475Words 2018-03-18
After the failure of the Great Revolution, with the expansion of the vagrant class, the foundation of China’s secret societies expanded even more, and they were fiercely divided in the fierce class struggle.However, the newly established Nanjing National Government after the National Revolution turned to imperialism externally, brutally oppressed the working people internally, and implemented fascist dictatorship. This shows that the people of the whole country have not obtained the slightest political and economic liberation. It is impossible for the gentry to buy all the secret social organizations, they can buy and use only a part or a very small part of them, and most of them are still in the position of illegally resisting the government and society.Therefore, during the Agrarian Revolutionary War, secret society organizations were still a force that cannot be ignored, and the relationship with them is a problem that the CCP needs to solve theoretically and politically.In this regard, the CCP proceeded from uniting all forces that could be united. On the one hand, it adopted a united policy on the secret society in the countryside, trying to gain its strength to strengthen the Red Army of Workers and Peasants and the revolutionary armed forces; Strive for ways of educational transformation and disintegration, seize their leadership or eliminate them.These correct policies and strategies enabled the rapid expansion of the Red Army, the continuous consolidation of the party, government and army construction in the base areas, and the rapid improvement of the revolutionary situation.However, during this period, three consecutive "Left" errors occurred within the CCP, which directly affected the party's attitude and policy towards the secret society, and brought many disadvantages to the revolution.

1. The guiding ideology of the CCP uniting with secret societies to launch armed riots. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the party witnessed the fact that the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class used secret society forces to suppress the revolution. The party felt the necessity and urgency of studying the secret society.Especially as the center of gravity of the revolution shifts from the city to the countryside, it is even more important to correctly answer the question of secret societies theoretically and policy-wise.Because first of all, the proletariat wants to march into the countryside. An important issue in implementing the "armed separatism of workers and peasants" is to deal with the bandits of the party and handle the relationship with them well, otherwise it will be difficult to stand firm.In the vast rural areas where the enemy's rule is relatively weak, due to the limited power of government intervention and the large room for maneuver, it has always been the place where party bandits are most active. In May 1929, Deng Qianyuan believed in the "Report on the Work on the Border of Hunan and Jiangxi" that "the first force that endangers the border regime is the bandits." It is impossible to collect them all. The natural situation on the border is a place that is conducive to Tibetan bandits. If the bandits cannot be eliminated, the bandits will definitely become our enemies. If the Kuomintang is beneficial and guides them to attack us, then we will also Dangerous."This passage is enough to show that it is unrealistic for the Communist Party to establish an armed separatist regime between workers and peasants without solving the problem of party bandits.The second reason is that if the Red Army and base areas surrounded by counter-revolutionary forces want to grow and develop, it is difficult to rule out the participation of party, bandit and green forest armed forces.

On November 25, 1928, Mao Zedong mentioned the source of the Red Army in his report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. one third. "If there is no such supplement, the number of soldiers will be a big problem." Although the joining of these people affected the political quality of the Red Army, the Red Army "was fighting every day, with heavy casualties, but the vagrants had combat effectiveness, so it was not easy to find vagrants to supplement." Therefore, the Chinese Communists, represented by Mao Zedong, paid great attention to solving the problem of secret societies in theory and policy in the process of opening up a new road for the Chinese revolution.As early as July 20, 1927, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the Central Announcement Nongzi No. 9 "The General Strategy of the Peasant Movement at Present", it initially summarized the party's experience and lessons in working with armed groups such as the Northern Red Spear Society and the Broad Sword Society. He pointed out: "The party must send appropriate comrades into its lower-level masses, lead them to fight for their interests, and gain their beliefs—let them gradually separate from the reactionary leaders and become the armed forces of the revolution. It is absolutely impossible to attack their reactionary leaders from the very beginning. Leaders may propose to change their organizational form and get rid of superstitions, such mechanical and hasty means cannot win the support of the masses. At the same time, as in the past, only contacting their leaders or using the signs of military leaders to appeal is also ineffective."

As for the party bandits in the south who advertised "robbing the rich and helping the poor", "if we can lead them on the correct revolutionary track, they will definitely be able to become powerful helpers of the agrarian revolution." The nature of candidate warlords" Therefore, we must not only understand the "active role" of party bandits in the peasant revolution" but also understand the possibility of their reaction. Our purpose is to enhance their revolutionary and revolutionary training so that they under the leadership of the Peasants Association to become a powerful helper of the Agrarian Revolution". On August 3, the central government ordered the four provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Jiangxi to "take the peasant association as the center and call on all social forces (such as bandit associations) close to the peasants to carry out riots around it." The "Resolution on the Recent Peasant Struggle" passed by the emergency meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 7 further pointed out: "The poor peasants should be the main force in the peasant riots, united with the generally unemployed poor peasants and other forces."

On August 25, the Central Committee emphasized again in a letter to the Anhui Provisional Committee: "The bandits and hooligans are all unemployed farmers, and they are all farmers who are active in the agrarian revolution. The spirit of revolution, but we should not have a mentality of "using" them, but should regard them as our brothers, and then we can truly guide them to participate in the agrarian revolution. Allow ultra-revolutionary gangsters to join." The "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Plan for the Riots in the Two Lakes" published by the "Central Newsletter" on September 12 further stipulated: "For the policy on bandits, we should use our slogans to publicize them, organize them under the peasant association, or under the revolutionary committee. Next, make them part of the important secondary forces during the riots, and reorganize them after the riots are successful. As for the anti-Tang motley army (except Xu Kexiang), if they can take a neutral attitude towards the riots, they can use their neutrality to quickly To develop riots, we must try to get close to the soldiers and publicize them. After the riots are successful, we will disband or reorganize such troops. But this does not mean that we must sacrifice our fundamental ideas in exchange for their neutrality. The motley army and bandits with anti-insurgency tendencies, even though they are anti-Tang, should be dealt with immediately."

According to the spirit of the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, when organizing armed uprisings and autumn harvest riots, all localities attached great importance to the forces of the Union Party.When Mao Zedong launched the Autumn Harvest Riot on the Hunan-Kiangsi border and retreated to the countryside, he united the party and the masses, and "two or three groups of bandits spontaneously demanded to cooperate with the workers' and peasants' army."At the same time, the Hunan Provincial Party Committee also clearly instructed: "For the bandits and the party - we should cooperate closely with the party. Wherever we are active, we must join the party, publicize the revolution in the land to them, and invite them to work together. The confiscated property of the local tyrants and evil gentry can be distributed to them. The agricultural association may allow them to do so, but they must not be allowed to destroy our organization."

Party members can join bandits, and bandits can also join special branches of party organizations. Jiangsu was one of the areas with relatively concentrated land in the country at that time, and class conflicts were very sharp, so there were many societies and parties everywhere.In this regard, as early as the period of the Great Revolution, the CCP clearly instructed that all kinds of secret groups among the peasants should "(a) try their best to have relationships with their leaders, and use this relationship to get close to their masses and work in order to seize Their masses help the development of the peasant associations; (b) do not oppose the superstitious dogmas in their groups for the time being, but must try to change the content of their creeds so that they can become a boost to the revolution." "Limen" went to the activity organization".Therefore, under the guidance of the CCP, some secret society organizations got involved in the peasant movement. In July 1926, farmers in Pudong, Tangqiao and other places set off a wave of opposition to exorbitant donations under the organization of secret associations such as the Qinghong Gang; a few leaders of the Qinghong Gang in Taixing joined the KMT-CCP ​​cooperation.After the failure of the Great Revolution, these party organizations still existed, and they were active in Suqian, Huai'an, Siyang, Lianshui, Liyang, Zhenjiang, Danyang, Jintan and other places. In this regard, the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China made a plan for peasant riots. After a specific analysis, he pointed out that "bandits are concentrated and there are many gangsters" in the Jiangbei area. The peasant riots there should "correspond to the bandit movement"; Landlords. They are revolutionary against taxes, against bandits, and sometimes even against landlords. But in the economic struggle among peasants, the practice of resistance to rent and "land to the tiller" will be rejected by such leaders "Therefore, "we should promote their revolutionary actions while trying to win over their masses, and we should not be perfunctory with the leaders."This analysis is in line with the actual situation at the time, and it is also correct for the strategy of meeting the party.

In Anhui, the Liuhuo County Committee of the Communist Party of China followed the instructions of the central government and adopted a joint policy towards the local Daohui organization in the process of developing peasant associations and mobilizing peasants to hold armed uprisings. On April 26, 1928, the Liuhuo County Committee made a report to the Anhui Provisional Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China on how to deal with the Daohui.The report stated: "Before the county party committee was reformed, several comrades were sent to work in Xiabu, but they couldn't reach the masses in Xiabu. From our observation, we want to influence the masses of the Daohui, unless we go to work in it and adopt the same form as them, otherwise it will be difficult for them to accept our propaganda."

The Provincial Provisional Committee approved the report of the Liuhuo County Committee in a timely manner, expressing its agreement with the strategy adopted against the Daohui, and emphasized: "Don't make the Agricultural Association and the Daohui an opposing group. On the one hand, we must make the people inside the Daohui feel the same Express sympathy (The Agricultural Association is for the benefit of everyone, and the knife association should be the same) On the other hand, the actions of the Agricultural Association will affect the knife association. We can set up incense halls without violating the above principles and the need to win the masses. Accept apprentices."

"Try to send some comrades to implement it, participate in it to play a role in differentiation, arouse their class consciousness, launch class struggle, and go deep into the agrarian revolution propaganda." According to the reaffirmation of the Provincial Provisional Committee, Liuhuo County appointed a group of capable Communist Party members to infiltrate the Big Sword Society, use methods such as "worshiping brothers" which are easily accepted by local farmers, to connect with each other, carry out revolutionary propaganda to the congregation, and expose the members of the society. The leader's deceit to win the lower-level congregation to the side of the revolution.After several months of hard work, the Daohui in Dushan and Mabu in Lu'an County, Yanzihe and Huangsumo in Huoshan County quickly became divided, and the congregations increasingly leaned towards revolution.By October, Lu'an County had established 5 district committees, Liu and Huo counties had 28 party branches, 207 members of the Communist Party, and 1,500 members of the farmers' association.Jinjiazhai, Dushan, Lianghekou and other places have become the center of the development of the peasant movement, and in the struggle of mobilizing peasants to resist rent, debt and tax, they formed a secret peasant armed force and punished a group of heinous gentry and landlords. .

In the North China region of the Central Plains, the CCP also sent a large number of comrades back to their hometowns in response to the active nature of the gun clubs during the Great Revolution, and used the gun clubs to organize workers and peasants to stage armed riots. In March 1928, when the Henan Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China launched the Gushi Dahuangpo Uprising, Communist Party members Zhang Xiangzhou and Xu Zhiyu organized seven peasant associations with more than 200 members in the name of organizing the Red Gun Club. In December 1929, the "Resolution on Political Tasks" passed by the First National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Hubei and Henan, required local party organizations to "pay attention to gun clubs, benevolence clubs, light egg clubs, Qinghong gangs... ... work"; in the "Regulations on the Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries", it is emphasized that "all the masses who participate in reactionary groups (such as the Shoveling Communist Party, the Lianzhuang Association..., and those who wake up halfway will be exempted from punishment"; in the "Resolution on Mass Issues", it is pointed out: "On The nature of the gun club and the experience of the gun club movement in the past prove that if the gun club movement is ignored or a wrong strategy can affect the whole work, it can even affect the life of the local party." Since the CCP adopted a relatively clear policy of coalition against congregational parties and bandits, after the failure of the Great Revolution, when party organizations in various places launched armed uprisings and autumn harvest riots, they more effectively united and united the congregational masses and green forest troops who were willing to participate in the revolutionary riots. As a result, the Kuomintang reactionaries were hit to varying degrees, the revolutionary camp was expanded, and favorable conditions were created for the establishment of the Red Army and rural revolutionary bases in various places. 2. The CCP’s policies and strategies for education and transformation of the secret society. After the armed uprisings and autumn harvest riots in various places, in view of the general situation of the enemy’s strength and our weakness and the characteristics of the enemy’s occupation of the central city, the CCP began to attack the rural areas where the enemy’s strength is relatively weak. In order to preserve and accumulate revolutionary forces, carry out the agrarian revolution, establish revolutionary base areas in the countryside, and finally take the road of encircling the cities from the countryside.At the same time, the very serious problem of vagrants' associations and bandits in the countryside has deeply troubled the opening, consolidation and development of base areas, and has affected party building and army building.Therefore, how to unite all the forces that can be united and use all the forces that can be used (including the power of party bandits) to enable the weak forces to survive and develop in the severe environment of white terror around them is the Party's strategy in the context of rural guerrilla warfare. A long, complex and arduous task that must be tackled.In this regard, the "Sixth National Congress" of the Communist Party of China in 1928 made a more detailed analysis of the problems of party bandits and other issues based on the new situation and the experience and lessons of previous struggles, and made a special resolution.In the resolution on the tactics of the militias it was stipulated: "The party shall propagate the agrarian platform among the militias, build up cadres and absorb their masses." Pointed out: "The social composition of the militia bandits is related to the poor peasants. In some places, farmers become bandits because they cannot make a living. Most of the militias are peasants hired as regiments. Therefore, we should step up our work inside and publicize the land. Political platform, set up secret organizations such as party branches, absorb some armed masses, and divide them from the leadership of the gentry and landlords.” In the strategy of gun associations such as the Big Sword Association and the Red Gun Association, it is also pointed out: "In many places, the Red Gun Association and the Broad Sword Association have great influence among the peasant masses, and most of their leadership is in the hands of the gentry, landlords and rich peasants. These organizations do have a mass nature and an objective revolutionary role against the warlords. The party must continue to intensify its work among the masses at the lower levels in order to seize leadership in these organizations, and it must propagate the party's main ideas among the poor and middle peasants in these organizations. slogans, make it the central force of the party in these organizations, and gradually change their organization.” In conclusion, "in religious and superstitious peasant armed organizations (the Red Gun Society, etc.) we should work under the slogan of democratization and capture the masses. At the same time, we should expose the behavior of their leaders, separate them from the masses, and put them in isolation. .We must stick to the method of reorganizing such armies, reorganizing them into the standing Red Army. Only if they show discipline in battle and are faithful to the new regime, can they be retained in their entirety." According to the principles and policies of the "Sixth National Congress" of the Communist Party of China on the secret society, in the process of shifting the focus of work, opening up rural base areas, and consolidating the base areas, party organizations in various places have adopted different historical origins, natures, and characteristics. Different ways and methods were used to fight for education and reform, correctly dealt with the relationship between the bandits, green forests and armed forces of the participating parties, and won the masses of the Honghui, Three Points, Gun Clubs and other associations in many areas into the revolutionary ranks, and successfully targeted some The bandit armed forces in the green forest have been transformed and reorganized, thus removing obstacles to the party building, political building, and military building in the base area.This is mainly manifested in: First, to fight for the education and transformation of the party's green forest armed forces that have a certain connection with the CCP in history and tend to be revolutionary.In the process of Mao Zedong opening up and consolidating the Jinggangshan revolutionary base on the Hunan-Jiangxi border, he succeeded in educating and transforming the Green Forest Armed Forces headed by Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, making it an integral part of the People's Army.The second is to fight for the transformation of party organizations that lack clear political goals and are very feudal and destructive.Represented by fighting for the transformation of Duan Qifeng, a habitual bandit of Donggu Three Points Association in Ji'an County.The third is the transformation of the party armed organizations that could not bear the oppression and insisted on fighting the feudal warlords, the Kuomintang reactionaries and the landlord reactionary forces for a long time.Represented by the former Hunan and Hubei Front Committee of the Communist Party of China to win, transform and incorporate the magical armed forces on the frontiers of Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan and Guizhou.The fourth is to combine the division and disintegration of the bandit armed forces controlled and utilized by the Kuomintang reactionaries and landlords and gentry with necessary strikes.Represented by the CCP’s Red Spear Society that attacked the border between Hubei, Henan and Anhui and the Arctic Society in the Honghu area. In short, after the failure of the Great Revolution, in the process of opening up and building the rural revolutionary base areas, in order to unite all the forces that can be united and develop its own strength to the greatest extent possible, it took active and flexible measures against the vagrants and party bandits who were dissociated from society. This not only removed a major social obstacle that actually existed in the process of establishing base areas, but also strengthened the revolutionary forces and made the base areas more consolidated. In the process, the CCP The CCP organization has also formed a general policy of "capturing its masses, opposing its leaders, and destroying its organization", and has accumulated a lot of experience in striving to reform the CCP bandits.There are: (1) Policies and strategies for the Qinghong gang, ponies, hooligans, and bandits: First, to expand political propaganda, we should expand our political influence and penetrate deep into their masses, capture their masses, and make them against its leader.For this reason, the Party must use the land policy program and various struggles of the revolutionary masses against the landlord gentry and the reactionary ruling class of the Kuomintang to win them over to the revolutionary side.The second is to turn the possibility of the ruling class using them to oppress workers and peasants into a force against the ruling class.The third is that the party must actively propagate to the masses of secret societies that the only way out for them is to overthrow the ruling class and participate in the worker-peasant revolution.Fourth, the party must use the power of the workers and peasants to resolutely eliminate the bandit leaders who are determined not to be reformed and thus harm the interests of the poor and the poor, and who do not accept the revolutionary platform. s things.The fifth is to tell their masses that the Red Army is the army of the poor and the Communist Party is a party that seeks the interests of the workers and peasants. The poor workers and peasants turned to the side of the workers and peasants to eradicate the bandit leaders who oppressed them just like the landlords, landlords and the Kuomintang.Sixth, the bandits, green-red gangs, and gangsters who are sincerely changed should be instructed on the right way out in life. They also have the right to share the land and be citizens of the Soviet or members of the workers' and peasants' associations.Seventh, we should try our best to make the bandits stop burning and killing, so that they can resolutely carry out the agrarian revolution.Eighth, they cannot be recruited casually in the military. When the following conditions are met (the bandits are willing to be reorganized by the Red Army, the revolutionary forces can overcome the bandit forces, the bandits have no collusion with the ruling class, and they are not old bandits who have lost their class identity), they can be commanded with the Red Army in other names. Acting in unison, the bandits are absolutely not allowed to wave the red flag casually, and they should be made to wave the red flag with revolutionary significance (such as the People's Self-Defense Forces) to do work such as eradicating the landlords and landlords.At the same time, send comrades among the bandits to capture their mass and change their quality.Ninth, with regard to the blue-red gangs, hooligans, and bandits who are already in the trade unions, peasant associations, or Soviet organizations, or even within the party, it is necessary to examine what class they originally came from, and to examine the opinions of the masses on their past behavior and whether they are now Resolutely implement the revolutionary political platform, stand on the side of the interests of workers and peasants or the gentry, landlords, and the Kuomintang to decide whether they can stay in the trade unions, peasant associations, or Soviet Egyptian parties. Of course, the conditions for these elements to join the party or trade unions and peasant associations are higher than other Farm laborers and poor peasants are more cautious and strict. (2) Policies and strategies for gun clubs: In peacetime, the main purpose is to eliminate their reactionary organizational program with the political program of agrarian revolution, divide their masses in the struggle, and seize their leadership.Specific methods: First, use various social occupations and social relationships to send people into the gun club to organize mass work, and lead the masses to fight against the gentry and landlord teachers, so that they will not be used by the landlord teachers; The farmers’ committee was organized in the locality, and the masses of the gun club were called to participate in order to accept the leadership of the revolution and break away from the influence of feudalism, thereby disintegrating the organization of the gun club. Propaganda, using leaflets, slogans, propaganda, notices, letters and other effective methods to propagate to the masses at the lower levels, to divide them, and to encourage the masses to join the Red Army; the fourth is to use the masses who have come out of reactionary areas to do propaganda work, and they must not be killed; The fifth is to use the gun club leaders won over to work in reactionary areas; the sixth is to use the consolation team to comfort the families of the gun clubs when they open up the gun club villages, absolutely prohibit burning and killing, and pay attention to its organization; seven is in the white villages Our political influence has reached a mature stage, and we must consider the objective situation, that is, change the organization of the gun club into a red organization or a gray organization; eighth, the leaders of the reactionary gun club with masses cannot be killed immediately, and they must be suppressed after they declare their crimes to the masses of the gun club Ninth, the local gun clubs that are opposed to red and white should use both armed suppression and political propaganda, but the principle is to solve the problem without armed forces; tenth is the most fundamental, the party's correct use of the general strategy of the agrarian revolution, and the expansion of the agrarian revolution and the soviets influence, it is easier to divide the masses of gun clubs.The main points of the gun club’s political propaganda are: first, the gentry and landlords set up the gun club to protect their own homes, and there is no benefit for the poor to join the gun club; second, after the poor joined the gun club, they went out to stand guard and set out to fight Third, Xuedong almost has the right to life and death over students. After the poor join the gun club, they will not only be exploited by the tyrants and landlords, but also be added to it. It is a kind of oppression; the fourth is to break the students' mentality of seeing bullets as impenetrable, and to expose all the lies of the teachers; the fifth is to explain the views of the Communist Party, the Soviet's political program and decrees, and the action program of the Red Army guerrillas, and expose all the rumors of the gentry and landlords. Slander; the sixth is to send guerrillas, spy teams, assault teams, etc., to attack the center of the gun association, eliminate its leaders, disband its organization, and try to attract its masses to the revolutionary side.In wartime, the main purpose is to disintegrate the organization of the gun club, solve the armed forces and leaders of the gun club, and capture the masses of the gun club.Because the gun club claims to be "invulnerable", the battle is fierce at the beginning, but as long as one is knocked down, a group of people will be frightened, and they will turn around and run away. At this time, a fierce pursuit should be given.Therefore, the tactics of the Red Army should be: first, combat troops must cooperate with swords and spears, preferably long-handled red guns and foot harpoons, and should carry more hand grenades, such as machine guns and hand-held ones; The shooting must be calm and the firepower must be concentrated, so that several of them can be knocked down at the beginning of the shooting; the third is to avoid firing prematurely, and wait for them to enter the area where our guns are most powerful before starting to shoot; the fourth is to fight in the mountains When deploying troops, the deployment of forces must be arranged for sideways attack or encirclement within the possible range, but do not expose the target prematurely; fifth, when they are in danger, the Red Army must pay special attention to technology. The method of burrowing into the city wall can be used to attack the water encirclement by using the method of draining the water from the trench; the sixth is to use the main points of propaganda and various effective methods in the battle, and try to give written and oral propaganda and agitation to the masses of the gun club, so as to stimulate their enthusiasm. Internal differentiation; seven is to concentrate fire on their leaders on the battlefield (when the teacher is fighting, he is often at the forefront, holding a short knife and holding a command flag, and Xuedong, the captain, etc. wear boxes and earthen guns to supervise the battle) If they are found to be wavering Or retreat, that is to say, it must be pursued fiercely, but it is necessary to concentrate its forces and have a reserve team to prevent its counterattack. After publicizing and giving a good influence, it can be released back.All these policy strategies and experiences have greatly enriched the theoretical treasure house of the party's united front. 3. The CCP’s Correction of "Left" Mistakes in the Rural Secret Society Work Although the rural secret society work has achieved varying degrees of success in the process of armed riots and opening up revolutionary base areas, due to the opposition of Party organizations at all levels and the Red Army The party bandits lack correct estimates, and there are still some erroneous views when striving to educate and transform the secret society, which to a certain extent interferes with the party's correct handling of the party's bandits and vagrants in theory and policy. At that time, a erroneous tendency was to exaggerate the revolutionary nature of the members of the Great Party, unconditionally woo and recruit bandits, and believe that "Tufeism (Tufeism) is also a powerful source of motivation in the revolution." The Hooligan Party "is objectively a revolutionary force." One, should not be underestimated" and even asserted: "Whoever is afraid of 'bandits and hooligans' tarnishing the 'scientific revolutionary party' in China is not a revolutionary, but a reformist philistine." Disregarding principles for members of the party gangsters, blindly accommodating, and not paying attention to political and ideological education and transformation. "Let them go to the Soviet organs, and even go to the party and the guerrillas to monopolize the riots and oppress the poor, thinking that they will get better jobs by colluding with bandits, or in the name of the fake Red Army Communist Party, the bandits who set up votes dare not openly use workers and peasants. The power of revolution to sanction him, do not resolutely eliminate their leaders, do not lead their lower-class masses, find the correct class way out, or even act like them." At the same time, they believed that "hooligans can fight, we should not exclude them", "all religions and minorities can be accommodated, and those who break the law will be punished" "as long as the officials lead well, the organizational composition of the soldiers does not matter" "don't fight hooligans now, there will always be riots It's not too late to crack down on hooligans," etc.Under the guidance of this erroneous thinking, various lumpenproletarian political concepts and ideologies flooded the Red Army for a period of time, which also seriously hindered the completion of the Red Army's tasks. After the resumption of the Anhui Provisional Committee of the Communist Party of China in February 1928, it indulged in the bandit knife movement, while ignoring the organization and propaganda work of the rioting masses, and failed to achieve the expected results. On June 5th, Ren Bishi wrote a letter on behalf of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to instruct the Anhui Provincial Provisional Committee, pointing out that the Daohui and the bandits should not imagine that "the whole becomes our armed forces"; Come to the workers and peasants.In April of the same year, under the influence of "Left" blind activism, the Manchuria Provisional Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China ignored the work of mobilizing the basic masses of workers and peasants. and develop.Therefore, "in the past, the leaders of a small number of local party organizations united with the bandits of the knife society, and the fantasies of the entire bandit organization of the knife society turning to the revolutionary side are all opportunistic strategies." Another erroneous tendency is to hold a completely negative attitude towards the party bandits and vagrants without analyzing them, and "capture or kill anyone who joins or has been a member of the Qinghong gang, hooligans, and bandits", forcing them to completely enter the camp of the gentry. In October 1927, the Central Committee emphasized that efforts should be made to "promote the division and collapse of the bandits and hooligans participating in the Peasant Movement" and that "you can use them to neutralize the motley armed forces before they riot, but they must be dealt with immediately once the riot is launched."The Party's "Sixth National Congress" further developed this idea, pointing out: "Alliance with bandits or similar groups can only be applied before an armed uprising. After an armed uprising, it should be disarmed and severely suppressed. Local order and avoiding the resurgence of counter-revolutionary leaders. Their leaders should be treated as counter-revolutionary leaders, even if they help armed uprisings. Such leaders should be completely eliminated. It is extremely dangerous to allow bandits to penetrate into the revolutionary army or government. These elements must be expelled from the revolutionary army and government agencies, that is, its most reliable part, and they can only be used to work in the enemy's rear, and they must not be placed within the sphere of the Soviet government." Therefore, after the "Sixth National Congress", although the Red Army successively published the "Letter to the Brothers in the National Soldiers" and "The Letter to the Brothers in the Green Forest" to call on them to participate in the Red Army and the Agrarian Revolution, but the effect was not great. At that time, some people believed that the vagrants in China, like the lumpenproletariat in European capitalist countries, were completely counter-revolutionary gangs, without any possibility of revolution.They believe that they cannot have any connection with gangsters, otherwise they will not become a "scientific revolutionary party." Therefore, they advocate that fighting gangsters is the same as fighting Kuomintang reactionaries.This policy of indiscriminately and blindly rejecting the Communist Party bandits resulted in the Party's work shifting from the extreme point of over-emphasizing the revolutionary nature of the Socialist Party to the other end of completely denying its revolutionary possibility. The struggle against the "AB Regiment", "Big Sword Society", and "Brotherhood" continued one after another, and the eradication of counter-revolutionaries was seriously expanded, which caused great harm to the development of the party and the Red Army.For example, in February 1928, the Shanghang area in western Fujian launched an armed struggle, and the bandits were beaten like the Kuomintang. As a result, the bandits joined forces with the reactionary landlords to jointly attack the Soviet area.In Jinggangshan, when Mao Zedong led the main force of the Fourth Red Army to attack southern Jiangxi in the spring of 1930, due to the interference of "Left" ideology and the contradictions between natives and tourists in Ninggang area, they were brought into the party and the Red Army, which caused Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai to establish Jinggangshan in the early days. Influential people who had worked hard in the base area were killed by their own comrades. As a result, a large number of his subordinates were pushed to the enemy, and the reactionaries joined forces to attack the base area, destroying the organization of Ninggang County.After the third "Left" leaning line was fully implemented in the base areas, the situation became more serious in the base areas. As a result, the Red Army and Red Guards had to use considerable strength to fight against gangsters and gangsters, or to avoid their sharp edges, resulting in revolutionary forces being suppressed. Isolated passive situation. In order to correct the above-mentioned erroneous tendency, develop the armed forces of the Red Army and carry out the agrarian revolution, the Chinese Communists represented by Mao Zedong not only theoretically solved the road of Chinese revolution, but also paid great attention to solving the problem of party bandits theoretically and politically. In May 1930, in the "Letter from the Front Committee to the Border Special Zone Committee of the Four Counties of An, Yu, Hui, and Gan", Mao Zedong concentrated on analyzing the social status of the basic members of the party bandits - the homeless proletarians (customarily called hooligans) And its role, brilliantly clarified the party's theory and policy principles for the homeless proletarians.The letter pointed out: "The party in your place should not only prevent the invasion of the rich peasants, but also prevent the intrusion of the gangsters. We are not standing on the bourgeois side to oppose the gangsters. In places where the rich peasants have gained power, they are against the gangsters. They are fighting the gangsters. We beat the local tyrants in the same way. Our views are completely opposite to those of the rich peasants, and we sympathize with the class status of the gangsters. We recognize that the gangsters are revolutionary, and at the beginning of the struggle in the countryside, the gangsters were the pioneers of the revolution. We What they oppose is the ideology of rogues—the political ideas of rogues. They burn, gamble, eat and drink. They are guerrilla policies of rogueism. They are not busy building political power and distributing land, but raising red flags Running around. These ideas and actions are against our ideas and actions, so we must resolutely oppose these ideas and actions. We must allow the hooligans to share the land, allow the hooligans to participate in proper work, and allow them to There is the right to vote in the Soviets, the right to be elected ... Our strategy against the hooligans is to actively win them over and use their strength in the struggle against the ruling class." However, "don't want them to form the majority in the Red Army, Red Guards and Soviets; don't want them to hold leading positions everywhere, unless they are people who have washed away their wrong views in the struggle. It is the same as preventing rich peasants".Mao Zedong's incisive exposition laid an ideological basis for the party to solve the homeless problem. In June 1930, the Fourth Red Army entered Fujian for the third time.In the middle of the year, Mao Zedong hosted a joint meeting of the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Army and the Special Committee of West Fujian in Nanyang, Changting, that is, the "Nanyang Conference". The meeting discussed political, military and economic issues, and made an important resolution on the hooligan issue—" The resolution "The Problem of Hooligans" first analyzed the source, social status and role of hooligans, and pointed out: "Because of the brutal exploitation of imperialism in semi-colonial China, the peasants and handicraftsmen went bankrupt, resulting in huge unemployed people, and there could be no large-scale ethnic groups. Industry absorbs them, and this unemployed mass has no way out, thus creating a mass of hooligans." In order to fight for their social status, these "rogue masses" formed various secret associations, such as the Green Gang and Red Gang along the Yangtze River, the Three Points Association in Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Guangxi, and Nanyang, the Gelaohui in Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Shaanxi and Gansu, and the Fujian, Guangdong, and Nanyang Associations.致公党,福建的符子会,苏皖鲁豫的大刀会,顺直一带的在理会,东三省的胡匪,北方各省的红枪会及其同类团体,南方各省的三合会及天地会,洞庭湖沿岸的汉留会,上海的三K党,南昌的兰花会,湖南的青龙会,长沙的蝴蝶采花团等,名目不一,到处都有,但组织很散漫不统一,又多带封建性” .流氓的阶级地位和社会职业决定流氓无产者具有以下一些特性:(1)反组织(反纪律的反团结的、个人自由的);(2)个人享乐主义(大嫖、大赌、大吃、大着);(3)雇佣性重;(4)破坏性重;(5)阶级意识模糊;(6)反群众;(7)反社会主义;(8)盲动主义(大烧、大杀、大抢);(9)流寇主义(没有政权观念)据此,“可以断定流氓是没有积极的革命性的,反之,一般说来他们具有充足的反革命性。他们在不得已时,可以投机加入革命队伍,但他们始终是动摇的,随时有叛变做反革命走狗的可能”因此,党对流氓的总策略应该是:“把流氓从统治阶级底下夺取过来,给以土地和工作,强迫其劳动,改变其社会条件,使之由流氓变为非流氓。” 具体地说,一是在政治上,“在特殊环境之下可以临时利用他们,使之脱离统治阶级的地位,然后再对他们加以适当处置,或临时利用他们的力量去破坏统治阶级”但无论怎样,不能对其“有丝毫让步”二是在军事上,“在流氓其有反革命阴谋时,或有反革命可能时”“都必须毫不犹豫地消灭他们,不但消灭他们的首领,必要时还须消灭他们群众的一部以至全部”三是在思想上,对于流氓组织成分产生的诸如流寇主义、单纯军事观点、逃跑主义、烧杀政策、肉刑制度、惩办制度、个人享乐主义、个人英雄主义、极端民主化等错误观念,“一定要用大力去排除,同时对于那些流氓习惯还少的人应该加以适当的教育”四是在组织上,“要认清与流氓意识争取领导权,是现在红军中最严重的任务”只有在党内刷洗流氓成分,克服流氓意识,“才能保障红军这个工具为工农阶级所用,而不致被流氓领导了去走入歧路,使革命走向失败”。 南阳会议关于流氓问题的决议虽仍有某些“左”的影响,但总的政策原则是对的,这为争取和改造会党土匪组织,纯洁党的队伍,建设红军起了积极的作用。此后,各根据地和红军在斗争实践中进一步探索对游民无产者的政策,指出:“在紧靠暴动前,工人农民及其他民众,被地主资产阶级压迫剥削因而失去职业和土地,连续依靠不正当方法为主要生活来源满三年者,叫做游民无产者。” 对于这些人,党的政策是“争取其群众,反对其首领及其他依附剥削阶级积极参加反革命的分子”而争取其群众的主要办法是“使他们回到生产上来,照一般革命民众的例,分配土地和工作,并给予选举权”。这一规定正确划分了游民无产者的成分,使党对游民无产者的政策建立在更加符合实际的基础上,从而为党和红军在游击战争的艰苦环境下,正确处置会党土匪分子提供了科学依据,雄辩地说明了以毛泽东为代表的中国共产党路线和政策的正确。
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