Chapter 15 Chapter 13 The Future of Renminbi and the US Dollar and China's Role in the New International Financial Order
The G20 London Summit held in April 2009 was an important milestone for China's participation in international affairs.At this meeting, China put forward several new ideas, planned the reform of the global financial system and promoted the formation of a series of important international cooperation.China has shown a new attitude that is different from people's previous impressions. It actively participates in international affairs, has its own propositions, and expresses them clearly.The meeting is a milestone for China, but it is only the beginning.
In the weeks leading up to the summit, a series of speeches by the Governor of the People's Bank of China, the Minister of Finance and some other government officials covered a wide range of issues in the international financial and economic fields.For example, the article published by Governor Zhou Xiaochuan on the eve of the summit triggered a big discussion at home and abroad about the status of the US dollar as an international reserve currency.Most of the ideas in this paper have been widely mentioned in China in recent years, but this is the first time that they have been publicly raised internationally.To a certain extent, this reflects China's confidence in its own economy, while at the same time losing confidence in the long-time leader in international rules affairs, the United States, is up to the job.There is national anxiety over the loss of foreign exchange reserves as the dollar continues to weaken.
In this chapter, we will focus on the G20 London Summit and China's proposals at the meeting, so as to understand what kind of new international financial order China hopes to establish.China's proposals include a new regulatory system, new ways to monitor economic policy developments across countries and a new vision for an international reserve currency, along with a desire for a greater role for the yuan.However, none of the above proposals will be easily realized, and some are even very remote in our lifetimes.Therefore, it is important to find out which plans are feasible.Here, we need to understand two points: First, the international financial system was not built in a day, nor will it change in a day.It is an extremely complex system involving multiple commitments across many countries, regions and market participants, and has evolved over decades.The rise of China as an important force in the world economy will inevitably mean the arrival of changes, but such changes must go through consultations with other countries, conform to the interests of other members, and be recognized by the market, and these will take time.Second, although the current economic policy of the United States and the printing of money by the Federal Reserve have attracted a lot of criticism and dissatisfaction, the existing international financial system has been tested for decades.Most importantly, China has also benefited from it.Over the past few years, the IMF has provided assistance to struggling countries and stabilized China's export market and raw material import market.China's large foreign exchange reserves can be invested in a relatively safe market, that is the US bond market.If the size of the US bond market is not so large, China will have to invest in gold or other real assets, which will not only bear greater market risks, but also will not receive interest income.Most importantly, China benefits from an open international trading system established under the US-backed Bretton Woods system and supported by the current international financial system.In an open world trade environment, China's export industry has been able to sell a lot of goods to American consumers and gain wealth.
So before getting frustrated with the problems posed by the current crisis, we need to recognize that an open global economy is good for China, and that blindly pursuing change is also risky.
In March 2009, the Chinese government embarked on a trip to the G20 London Summit with a number of goals.Here, I briefly list the various goals that China hopes to achieve at the summit, and then give my understanding of these goals.The Chinese government's goals include:
1. Seek developed countries to provide more stimulus to the world economy.Before the G20 summit, Finance Minister Xie Xuren stated that major developed economies need to take measures to stimulate global demand, while developing economies, including China, should pay more attention to boosting internal demand and employment, and are committed to developing their own financial markets .In other words, China wants to make sure the world doesn't look to China alone to save the global economy.
2. Improve the level of international financial market supervision and promote coordination and cooperation between the IMF and other international institutions.Minister Xie also called for stronger supervision of over-the-counter financial products and “bank-like financial institutions” such as investment banks, hedge funds, and “special purpose entities.”China seems to believe that financial products and markets with systemic risks need to be regulated, which is also consistent with other countries, especially European countries.Minister Xie also favored the regulation of international credit rating agencies, the failure of which was one of the causes of the crisis.
3. Strengthen the supervision of the macroeconomics of various economies around the world, especially Europe and the United States, including the establishment of a "global macroeconomic early warning system" to detect early economic problems in some economies that may spread to the world.Many Chinese officials have expressed dismay at the failure of the IMF and other international financial regulators to monitor the United States.Adding to the displeasure of the Chinese government is the fact that the IMF has been focusing on the undervalued renminbi (under pressure from Washington) while ignoring the larger problems in the US economy (which, as I noted in Chapter 12, is not entirely To be fair, the US believes that the undervalued RMB exchange rate is an important reason for the global economic imbalance, and the negative savings rate in the US is another problem, but the US has no interest in solving its own problems).Minister Xie also called on the IMF to strengthen the supervision of international capital flows.
4. Ensure that G7 members do not succumb to domestic trade protectionism.China needs an open international trade environment to protect exports. Many fear that a repeat of what the United States raised trade barriers to "protect" its markets during the Great Depression of the 1930s will be repeated in this financial crisis.
5. As the summit approaches, it seems that China is willing to provide financing to the IMF as long as the voting rights and IMF reform issues that China has been concerned about have been answered.China is also interested in improving the status of developing countries, including itself, in the IMF and other international financial institutions.
6. Seek U.S. guarantees to maintain dollar strength and borrowing credit.It is proposed that all countries jointly coordinate the exchange rate level and maintain the "relative stability" of the world's major currencies.China's focus on the dollar's movements stems from two reasons.First, the depreciation of the US dollar will shrink China's US$1.5 trillion foreign exchange reserves in the form of US dollar securities assets.Second, a weaker dollar will put more pressure on the yuan to appreciate against the dollar, which is exactly what the Chinese government does not want to see.Adding to China's concerns is a new looser monetary policy that the U.S. Treasury Department is launching on the occasion of the summit, known by economists as "quantitative easing."In layman's terms, "quantitative easing" is to stimulate the US economy by printing money.This will likely lead to a weaker dollar in the medium to long term (assuming other countries don't do the same).Still, it remains unclear exactly what China wants the United States to do.Do you want the US government to increase or decrease economic stimulus?Given that the U.S. government has officially guaranteed the sovereign credit security of its national debt, what kind of further guarantees does China still hope to seek?What kind of dollar policy does the Chinese government want the US government to implement?Do you really want the US government to intervene in the market to push up the dollar?It is hard to believe that any of the above possible expectations could be met.Even if it cannot be achieved, the Chinese government hopes to use this to remind the US government of the key points in the bilateral relationship, to highlight its concerns to the US government, and to clarify its position.
7. Open the discussion on the status of the US dollar as an international reserve currency.The debate on the status of the US dollar as an international reserve currency originated from the signed articles published by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, that attracted widespread attention in the weeks before the summit.It is certainly a big deal that the country with the largest dollar reserves in the world is talking openly about ending the institutional arrangement for the dollar as an international reserve currency.Governor Zhou is not alone in making this point.Prior to this, Minister of Finance Xie Xuren also put forward the idea of accelerating the construction of a diversified international currency system, which was strongly supported by Russia and some other economies.Of course, this is a long-term issue, and there are many pressing issues that need to be resolved at this summit, so there is not much formal discussion on the choice of international reserve currency.But people have obviously begun to pay attention to this issue. Some people think that Governor Zhou’s idea of using “Special Drawing Rights” (SDR for short) as an international reserve currency is completely unrealistic; some people think that this is completely political; and Some see the proposal as worthy of serious consideration, as some form of gradual withdrawal of the dollar from international reserve currency status will be inevitable.
8. Minister Xie also urged developed countries to realize the promised goal of official development assistance accounting for 0.7% of their national income as soon as possible.This has long been the cry of developing countries and Western aid agencies (despite numerous indications that international aid has not had a positive effect).But Minister Xie did not mention that China has received considerable assistance from the World Bank, Japan and other international institutions over the past 30 years.
Above we have summarized the goals of the Chinese government to participate in the G20 London Summit.Below we will look at the goals in more detail and also look at what has actually been achieved.
China hopes G7 members can further stimulate demand.This is also in the interests of the United States, which hopes that Europe (especially German-speaking countries) will increase economic stimulus.The United States is deeply dissatisfied with the conservative stimulus policies adopted by Germany, the world's fourth largest economy.The German government believes that stimulating economic growth by encouraging consumer spending and increasing government budget spending is the chief culprit for triggering the global economic crisis.Germany prefers to wait for the effects of the first round of stimulus measures to appear before making plans.As a result, individual country fiscal stimulus packages did not change much at the London summit.According to IMF estimates, as of February 2009, the economic stimulus plans implemented (or under planning) by the G20 members accounted for the average proportions of the GDP of the member countries in the past three years: 0.5% in 2008, 1.5% in 2009 and 1.5% in 2009. 1.25% in 2010 (though the 2010 stimulus plan has not yet been finalized).
Despite not adding to its stimulus package, China has achieved three major indirect outcomes that will help stabilize the world economy.In recent years, 30% of China's GDP growth has been driven by external demand, which will have an important impact on China's economic growth prospects.For China, it is a victory to help big developing countries fight for their interests and calm the international financial market's worries about the crisis in emerging markets.
The first indirect result for China is the IMF's decision to triple its aid to $750 billion, a move that will benefit China indirectly as it means more money will be used to help struggling emerging market economies The economy of the whole body (such as Mexico, South Korea, Eastern Europe, etc.) stabilized.
Of course, no country is willing to borrow from the IMF. Unless it is absolutely necessary, it generally prefers to find other sources of financing (including borrowing from Arab countries or China).This can be explained from three levels.
First, the government is unwilling to admit that its economy needs external assistance because of its sympathy.
Second, (like any good bank) the IMF looks at the economic plans of the borrowing country when it makes a loan, usually to see if the government has taken measures to reduce public spending, otherwise the fiscal budget will not be balanced, let alone repay the IMF's borrowing .The process is grueling and politically unpopular.But many times, just like a doctor performing an operation on a patient, pain is unavoidable.
Third, countries that borrow from the IMF worry about what other countries think.If the international financial market suspects that a country borrows from the IMF, market participants will take it as a strong signal that the country's economy is in trouble, and then sell the country's currency and other assets on a large scale.Obviously, this will make the country's economic situation worse and more urgently need IMF help.Such concerns in borrowing countries make IMF lending even more unpopular.
Although no country wants to borrow money from the IMF, sometimes it has no choice.During the Asian financial crisis, foreign exchange reserves were depleted in many countries, including South Korea and Indonesia.As investors, as well as domestic households, converted large quantities of their currencies into dollars, the central bank was left with no dollars to sell, causing panic in markets and causing a sharp depreciation of the currency.Just imagine, if a country’s currency suddenly depreciates by 50%, the repayment ability of any local company’s foreign currency loans will drop by 50%, which may lead to business closures and a further slowdown in the economy, causing more people to sell their currency, forming a vicious circle.The IMF loan can not only provide the required financing, but also allow the market (and the local people) to see the government's determination to implement reforms, stabilize and restore the economy.This is one of the advantages of IMF loans.But sometimes, there is often a wait between when the news of the application for an IMF loan triggers market panic and when everything is ready and the loan is disbursed smoothly.
In 2008-2009, we faced the situation that the ammunition of the IMF was no longer sufficient to resist the large-scale crisis that may erupt at present. The IMF's original 250 billion US dollars of funds can be used to help countries with payment difficulties, but this is far from enough.By 2009, emerging market economies had borrowed US$2.8 trillion from multinational banks and international credit markets.At the same time, they have $4.5 trillion in foreign exchange reserves that can be used to repay borrowings.This seems to be fine, but there is a big potential problem, that is, half of these foreign exchange reserves are owned by China, and China's foreign currency debt is not large.In other words, other emerging market economies do not have sufficient foreign exchange reserves to repay their debts, and are facing the possibility of liquidity crunch and balance of payments crisis. In early 2009, the liquidity situation in countries such as South Korea, Mexico, Russia and Eastern Europe was already precarious.In addition, multinational banks that issued loans also began to face domestic liquidity problems, and they called back loans one after another, and no longer allowed loan extensions.This immediately exacerbated the liquidity pressure in developing economies.An IMF without adequate funding would mean that a solvency crisis in one country would quickly spread to another.
Faced with this situation, since the end of 2008, the IMF began to seek new funding sources from some developed countries that expressed their support for its operation.Japan and the European Union are injecting $100 billion each, and the United States appears to be getting involved.By the time of the G20 summit, half of the promised additional $500 billion will be available soon.This is a victory for China, which will benefit the country's export industry given the growing importance of developing countries for Chinese exports.The sooner the problems of developing countries are resolved, the better for China.
The specific method of capital injection is still under discussion, and most of the capital injection should take the form of "bilateral loan agreement".But China's $40 billion capital injection may take a different approach.Given that China's foreign exchange reserves are close to $2 trillion, it is not a heavy burden for China to inject 2% of them into the IMF.However, China seems to want to adopt another method different from the traditional "bilateral loan agreement" - using the capital contribution to purchase SDR bonds issued by the IMF (the issue of SDR will be discussed in detail below).This will be a pioneering work.We can't understand why China is so fond of bonds.One possible reason is that IMF bonds pay higher interest rates than US Treasuries because the interest on IMF bonds depends on the bond-weighted rates of the 4 constituent currencies in the SDR currency basket.The second possible reason is that SDR bonds are a useful experiment.One reason (among many others) that the SDR has failed to become a true reserve currency at the moment is that there is a dearth of investable assets denominated in SDR. SDR bonds may be the first step in creating such a market (although there is a long, hard way to go after that. Also, it is not clear that the IMF is particularly well-suited to be a long-term bond issuer).In theory, you could stash it under your bed—an important feature of being a reserve asset.A third possible reason is that this method of capital injection means that the People's Bank of China (as an investor in foreign exchange reserves) will replace the Ministry of Finance (which is responsible for China's affairs in the IMF) in controlling the capital injection China provides to the IMF.That may be more convenient, given that the People's Bank of China controls foreign exchange reserves.Fourth, this may open up a way for China to diversify its reserve assets, although this approach is too roundabout.It is also worth noting that China has not announced any specific commitments (as of the writing of this book in November 2009), although it is widely believed that China will contribute $40 billion to the IMF based on existing fund shares.One possible scenario is that China is still seeking further commitments from the IMF to increase China's voting power before committing to a capital injection.India appears to be taking a similar position.
The second notable result is that the IMF decided to issue an additional US$250 billion of SDRs to member countries.Some see the move as tantamount to injecting huge liquidity into global markets, tantamount to printing money.ECB executive board member Juergen Stark slammed the move as ill-considered and potentially inflationary.At the same time, there are also views that the additional issuance of SDR does not involve real funds, so it will not have practical significance.In order to analyze this problem, it is necessary to first understand the specific operation of SDR, which will also help us understand Zhou Xiaochuan’s idea of using SDR as an international reserve currency (we will expand on this in detail below).
The SDR is a special reserve asset created by the IMF in 1969.Initially, the IMF allocated SDR shares according to the contribution of each member country. The original intention of the SDR was to serve as a supplement to the post-war Bretton Woods system (under this system, other countries implemented a fixed exchange rate system pegged to the US dollar, and the US dollar was linked to gold).At the time, both dollars and gold were in very limited supply.Therefore, the establishment of SDR can make global reserve assets expand with the expansion of international trade scale and the increase of demand for foreign exchange reserves.If the gold standard continues to be adopted, there will not be enough gold reserves to support the expansion of the scale of the international economy and the scale of international trade.At that time, SDR was denominated in gold, and 1 SDR was equal to 0.888671 grams of pure gold and equal to 1 US dollar.By 1971, as the world entered the era of floating exchange rates and the establishment of the US dollar as an international reserve currency, this need disappeared.As a result, the SDR was redefined, delinked from gold, and linked to a basket of currencies instead.Currently, the basket of currencies consists of the US dollar (44%), the euro (34%), the Japanese yen (11%) and the British pound (11%).The composition of the currency basket is reviewed every five years to ensure that the currencies in the basket play an important role in the international trade and financial system.The last review of the SDR currency basket was in November 2005, and the next review will be conducted at the end of 2010.
Since then, the SDR has largely been dormant.It is only used as the book assets of member countries in the IMF and the unit of account for the IMF to provide loans to member countries.In fact, there is no SDR asset, and SDR cannot be used for trading, and no one uses SDR as a unit of measurement for a certain physical asset. Of course, no one hides SDR under the bed as a valuable treasure. The central banks of the IMF member countries record the SDR as an asset, so it becomes part of the foreign exchange reserves of the central banks.However, the SDR is neither an asset nor a liability of the IMF. The IMF simply performs management functions.If a member country needs to use such foreign exchange reserves at a certain point in time to meet the demand for hard currency in the market, it can sell its SDRs to other member countries in exchange for hard currency.Similarly, if a member state has difficulty in repayment—the debt is denominated in SDR, it can also sell the SDR it holds to other member states and convert it into hard currency for debt repayment.The key to understanding the SDR, as the IMF puts it, is that it is "the underlying right of IMF members to freely acquire usable currencies."That's all.
The G20 London Summit announced that it will issue an additional US$250 billion in SDRs for IMF member countries.The specific approach is to create "new" SDRs and distribute them to the balance sheets of the central banks of the member countries in the IMF.Since the SDR is not a liability, the move is different from central banks printing money.In other words, additional issuance cannot be equated with quantitative easing in the traditional sense (that is, printing and issuing currency).The new SDRs will be allocated according to the existing fund shares, that is, the United States will get 16.8% of the total new SDRs, and the EU countries will get about 30%.It can be seen that most of them are allocated to developed countries, which theoretically have the lowest demand for SDR.
However, for developing countries that need SDR most, this move will also bring two obvious benefits.First, it increases the scale of nominal foreign exchange reserves held by developing countries.This is positive in an environment where the market pays close attention to the external debt of each economy and is keen to compare the size of foreign exchange reserves and the external debt ratio of various countries.Second, economies in financial difficulties can exchange the newly added SDR for hard currency from other member states.
The latter case can be taken in two ways.First, SDRs can change hands voluntarily within member states.Secondly, in theory, the IMF can designate economies with stable external balances (trade surplus and large foreign exchange reserves) to buy SDRs from members with weak external balances (trade deficits and small foreign exchange reserves).Economies in balance-of-payments crisis can thus exchange dollars from the US (or China) in this way.
In this way, new dollars (or renminbi) will be created.Therefore, rather than saying that expanding the size of the SDR increases global liquidity, it is better to see it as a new global liquidity tool.During its use, new currencies are created.In the current environment, this approach does not pose a serious inflation threat.Some people may ask, if all member states refuse to buy SDR in the hands of economies that need hard currency, won’t the measures to increase the total size of SDR become invalid?We feel that the circulation of SDR within member states should not face too many problems.
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that the allocation of new SDRs will not affect the voting rights of member countries in the IMF, because the allocation of new SDRs is still carried out on the basis of the original allocation.We will also talk about the reform of the IMF below.
A third indirect result for China was the G20 leaders' agreement to provide $250 billion in trade finance.Specific financing actions will be carried out through the World Bank, international commercial banks, export credit banks and other financial institutions.The measure should help ease the fractured trade finance in the current tight liquidity landscape.The money was supposed to arrive within two years of March 2009, but more details were lacking weeks after the G20 summit closed.
All in all, these three measures will help the external demand for China's exports to stabilize rapidly, and will stimulate China's economic growth prospects in 2010 and beyond.Most such international summits fail to impress global financial markets with accomplishments, but this one did — at a time when what the world markets most needed was action to restore confidence.The summit also helped China.The specific stimulus effect will depend on the details and quality of these measures, but given that 30% of China's GDP growth in recent years has been driven by external demand, China will certainly benefit greatly from the global economic stimulus plan.The outcome of this summit proves that active participation in the global financial system is beneficial to China, but it also shows that China still needs to contribute its own strength.
While many details have yet to be released, the proposals at the G20 summit to reform the international financial system fit China's goals.Some of these are reforms that China desperately needs, and others are reform proposals that are important to other IMF members and that the Chinese government is happy to support.The summit decided to create a new Financial Committee to replace the existing "Financial Stability Forum" (FSF) and to work with the IMF to:
Establish an early warning system for global macroeconomics;
Establish regular regulatory regimes for hedge funds with systemic implications;
Conduct a regulatory review of credit rating agencies in late 2009;
Establish supervision on the remuneration of corporate executives and the performance of independent directors.
What is the Financial Stability Forum?The forum was originally a loosely organized group composed of G7 finance ministers and representatives of international financial institutions including the IMF. It reported to the G7 and was established in 1999. Its main task is to coordinate financial supervision among major economies.The summit agreed that the Financial Stability Forum should establish a global macroeconomic early warning system in 2008.We still need to wait for concrete plans from the Financial Stability Forum before we can assess this reform.Due to the recent overlap and competition between the FSF and the IMF, it is necessary to clearly delineate the responsibilities of the two.China and some other emerging market economies also appear to be involved in the FSF's plans.
But an important question is how much influence a regulator can have.If the Financial Stability Forum warns that Washington's policies are unsustainable, will Washington accept it?Would you accept it if it was changed to Beijing?Probably not.This is an unavoidable problem in international organizations.They can make recommendations, but they are rarely neutral and cannot enforce their recommendations.As a result, a number of complex and painstaking negotiations were required to create a new regulatory framework.For example, can we create a global framework for regulating hedge funds that satisfies America's preferences for free markets and the French and Chinese governments' need to curb speculation.If not, are all agreements beyond framework principles devoid of practical use?We'll just have to wait and see, but don't get your hopes up.Until the eve of the publication of this book in November 2009, this issue has not been further clarified.
Then, when it comes to global financial regulation, we have to mention an urgent problem: IMF reform.
After years of sitting on the sidelines during the boom, the global financial crisis thrust the IMF back into the spotlight. Before 2007, because no country borrowed money, the IMF had no interest income to maintain operating expenses, and even had to lay off staff. The IMF also needs to rethink its true role. Its role as an international "firefighter" seems to be weakening day by day, and it faces the danger of being marginalized in the embarrassing situation of "no fire to extinguish".Some critics even suggested firing the idle "fireman."This situation changed significantly in 2008.With the frequent crises and dangers around the world, the IMF has become busy.
Above, we have discussed the impact of the financial crisis on the IMF's funding situation. The IMF needs to get bigger.But at the same time, how the IMF should operate is also a hot topic.Countries such as China believe that they do not have enough voice in the IMF, so they expect change.This focuses on two areas: voting weight and top positions.But there are some more fundamental issues that need to be clarified.Next, we will analyze the reform of the IMF starting from the details.
IMF voting power is an extremely complex issue.Few people can figure out the details.Bismarck, Germany's "Iron Chancellor" once said, "There are two things in the world, lovers should not observe their production process. One is sausage and the other is law."This also applies to the issue of IMF voting rights.
Roughly speaking, voting rights are determined in this way.At the beginning of its establishment after World War II, the IMF allocated the voting rights of each member country according to each country's GDP, total trade volume and some other factors.Put these factors into the IMF voting power calculation formula to find the voting power share of each member country.But since then, the world pattern has clearly changed.European countries such as Ireland and Spain have grown in size relative to their neighbors such as France and Germany.Countries such as China, India and Brazil, whose economies are growing much faster than those of the United States and Europe, hope to gain more say.But at the same time, despite the dramatic changes in the world economic landscape, the United States is still the largest economy in the world, accounting for 30% of global GDP, but its voting share is only about 17%.The European Union as a whole controls 32% of voting power, by far the largest voting share of any economy, a share that is disproportionately large for its economy.But any country with a relatively small economy (such as Belgium, Luxembourg) is unwilling to give up its voting rights.And if some countries want to get more voting rights, other countries must reduce their own voting rights.Renegotiating voting shares will therefore be an extremely political process.
At the same time, in addition to the factor of economic scale, many countries are quite critical of the veto power enjoyed by the United States.The U.S. has 16.77% of the voting power - that sounds high, but when you consider that the U.S. economy accounts for 30% of the world's total output, the U.S. has less voting power than it should have.To compensate for the lower voting weight of the United States, the United States has veto power in the IMF.According to IMF rules, any major proposal or reform requires 85% of the voting power to pass.Therefore, the United States enjoys a "one-vote veto power" in the decision-making of major IMF issues.Getting the US to give up its veto power, as China and many other countries hope, would require assigning a larger and fairer share of the US voting power.And where do more voting rights come from?
After years of negotiations and consultations, in 2006 IMF member countries adopted a proposal to reform voting rights.This is the first reform of voting rights since the establishment of the IMF, but the impact has been minimal.Developed countries gave up only 2.6 percentage points of voting power, which is far from enough.China's voting power increased from 2.98% to 3.72%.Many countries complain that the EU is blocking progress on voting rights reform.Because this reform needs the approval of the US Congress, it has not yet been passed before the G20 summit in 2009.However, the Obama administration should remain committed to promoting this reform.
The reform of the IMF's voting share has not yet been put in place and needs to be reviewed again. In January 2010, the IMF will conduct another formal review of the allocation of voting rights.China and other developing countries hope to gain more voting rights through this review.But it will be a deeply complicated issue -- and those familiar with the previous rounds are reluctant to restart the dialogue because it will raise more difficult issues.Many small European countries will still cling to their own shares.The issue of the US veto will still cause many divisions.Although the U.S. economy is currently facing difficulties, it still dominates the world economy, so the U.S. Congress will not agree to waive the veto.
Another breakthrough at the G20 summit was the decision to change the selection mechanism for board members of the IMF and other international financial institutions.This is a groundbreaking achievement, breaking the practice that the IMF and the World Bank are only managed by European and American countries.In the future, the appointment of IMF board members will be based on individual ability and experience.This is a victory for China and other developing countries, and it is also a victory for the United States.Previously, the IMF was an institution dominated by the European Union, with a European serving as its executive chairman. Currently, 7-10 of the 24 executive directors on the executive board are from Europe.Therefore, this reform gives the United States the opportunity to increase its voice, and it is also a victory for China and other developing countries. Since then, they have the opportunity to appoint the executive director of the IMF and have greater influence on the appointment of other directors. force.
However, the most fundamental question is: what role should the IMF play?Of course, providing emergency aid funds to countries in financial crisis is an important task of the IMF, but at the same time, the IMF should also be committed to helping countries (and the world economy) prevent economic crises from happening.This means that the IMF and the reformed Financial Stability Forum need to monitor the economic policies of various countries, and issue strong warnings when problems are found, and even have a certain impact on the behavior and policies of various countries, but this is by no means an easy task.
For example, many Chinese are dissatisfied with the IMF's frequent pressure on the renminbi over the past few years. In 2007, the IMF introduced a new surveillance mechanism to monitor currency deviations and trade imbalances across countries.Given that China's external surplus (current account surplus) has reached a historical high of 10% of GDP, the move is directed at China.There is clearly an imbalance in China's trade with the rest of the world.Most serious economic studies point to the fact that the yuan has been undervalued since 2004.As we saw in Chapter 12, many believe that the yuan's exchange rate problem is a cause of global economic imbalances and America's over-indebtedness.But at the same time, it is generally believed in China that the United States uses the IMF to exert pressure on China's exchange rate policy in disguise, and regards it as interference in internal affairs.China regards the IMF as a tool of the United States (in fact, there is a misunderstanding here. The IMF has always been controlled by Europe, so the IMF has been reluctant to interfere in the RMB issue as the United States wishes).But China seems to have since lost trust in the IMF.On the other hand, the United States is also dissatisfied with the failure of the IMF to complete the task of preventing external economic imbalances or restraining member countries from adjusting exchange rates to support their own exports, so they have also lost trust in the IMF.
Of course, the IMF did not warn of serious internal imbalances in the US economy.While China is resisting the IMF's pressure on the yuan, the US is also resisting the IMF taking issue with America's savings deficit, housing bubble or the Bush administration's dangerous fiscal deficit.Former US Vice President Dick Cheney once said that the deficit is not a problem in order to safeguard the interests of the Bush administration.And the IMF thinks it has done its part - it has done nothing wrong.But it really cannot exert any influence on the policy of the US government.
So, what kind of IMF do we want to see?What kind of IMF can we have?理想状态下，我们希望IMF能直言不讳地向制造危险的内外部经济失衡的国家提出警告，能够向强权大国说实话，并监控世界各国的情况，预警可能发生的潜在危机。这将对世界各国有所帮助。但我们又该如何创造出这样一个机构？当前金融危机显露出对大国经济缺乏外部监管的危险性，但我们是否准备好了接受IMF的改变，接受一个有真枪实弹、直言不讳（既对美国也对中国）、更有力量影响单个经济体行为的IMF？我有点怀疑。我们至多希望IMF能够坦率地发表自己的意见，但就连这点都很难保证。对于中国或美国来说，如果某些有利于国内经济的政策对外部世界产生了负面影响，它们会接受IMF的警告么？我不抱什么希望。
众所周知，一段时间以来，包括中国在内的许多国家都在寻求外汇储备的多元化，而周小川行长于2008年3月发表的一篇文章（基于几个月前他在马来西亚所作的一次演讲）在这一问题上开创了新的里程碑。
英文参见：http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=178；
中文参见：http://www.pbc.gov.cn/detail.asp?col=4200&id=279。
这是世界主要经济大国的央行行长首次公开提出维持现有货币体系的成本超过其收益，并且成本还在不断上升。也许有人会质疑，有哪种货币能够替代美元的国际储备货币地位？周小川给出了回答，并重提最早由凯恩斯在20世纪40年代提出的建立国际储备货币的设想。但与创建新的国际储备货币单位的设想不同，周行长的建议集中于一个既有的选项：特别提款权（SDR）。还有一些国内民众希望有朝一日人民币能取得国际储备货币的地位，但这将是个漫长的过程。在这一部分，我们来看国际储备货币应具备哪些条件，如果放弃美元的国际储备货币地位还有哪些选择，以及人民币如何向国际储备货币的目标迈进。
美元是当前的国际储备货币——从贸易、投资到主要大宗商品价格都以美元计价，且全球外汇储备中三分之二为美元。简单地说，人们可以将美元藏在床底下储备起来。他们这样做是因为他们相信美元可以保持其购买力，这也是储备货币的特质：无论任何情况下，储备货币都可以保持其购买力。还有人储备欧元，欧元也是一种储备货币，不过没有美元那么普及。近几个月，还有一些人开始青睐黄金这一储备资产，并开始购入黄金。因此，虽然美元显然仍处于主导地位，但已开始出现其他选择。
显而易见，当前很多人开始担心美元的保值能力。究其原因，主要是由于在经历了借债消费的狂欢之后，美国目前将主要精力放在恢复国内经济增长方面。因此，美国政府开始动用量化宽松工具。从操作层面讲，这主要是指美联储从美国财政部和市场上购入债券。为此，美联储需要印发美元来支付购买债券所需资金。美联储希望通过增加货币流通量来刺激需求，因为人们最终会发现持有或储蓄美元的成本越来越高。换句话说，由于增发货币，货币购买力降低，所以用手中的钱去买房或投资生意或用于任何储蓄以外的用途都是更合理的选择。也就是说，美联储的量化宽松政策意在制造通胀。只有当人们相信通胀即将来临，他们才会消费，从而重新启动经济。
但不断印发美元将削弱美元作为储备货币的地位。如果要制造通胀，则美元将不得不贬值。若果真如此，人们将纷纷抛售美元，致使美元的名义价值下滑。在这样的情况下，将没有人愿意继续持有美元。这种美国的美元需求与世界的美元需求间的矛盾被称为“特里芬难题”。美国政府可能并不是故意的（并非像一些中国的阴谋论者认为的那样），但它的行为事实上造成了这样的结果。
为什么这对中国来说具有无比重要的意义？因为中国目前是美国最大的债权国。2009年，中国仍在借钱给美国。最重要的原因是中国的外汇储备在继续增长。尽管2009年贸易顺差降幅较大，外汇储备仍在刷新。我们测算，2009年前三个季度，共有约750亿美元的外汇流入不属于贸易顺差流入、外国直接投资或海外投资收益。很多人将其称为“热钱”，但我们往往怀疑这一说法。我更愿意称其为“不能解释原因的”流入，因为里面包含着很多不是热钱的流入，例如内地企业香港上市募集的资金回流、贸易融资、中国居民购换汇流入等。不管什么吧，2009年一到三季度，中国外汇储备增加了约2750亿美元。在很多人看来，这是好事，意味着中国抵御未来危机的能力有了更大的保障，但是，挑战也扑面而来——如何保护这些资产的价值呢？
关于这一点，也正是关于中国投资美国国债市场的争论的焦点所在。中国对美国政府债务的绝对融资规模仍在增加。2009年8月底，中国持有的美国债务约为1.5万亿美元，其中美国国库券9300亿美元。美国政府未偿还债务总额达到10.9万亿美元，其中6.6万亿美元由公众持有（其余为美国社会保险信托基金持有的联邦各州政府间债务）。公众持有的美国政府债务中约一半由外国投资者持有。根据渣打银行的估算，中国持有的美国政府债务规模占外国投资者持有总量的三分之一。规模十分可观。
因此，最近几个月人们看到中国明显停下了对美国证券的买入步伐时，自然会有挺大的反响。实际上，根据美国财政部国际资本流动（TICS）月度数据，2009年以来，中国各个月份对美国国债的买卖表现为净买入和净卖出交替。这种让人眼晕的交易模式似乎成为2009年4月以来中国的外汇储备管理的既定政策。2008年中国大量买入美国国债，但2009年以后，横轴下方的柱形表明中国在减持美国国债。以2009年8月为例，该月中国净卖出美国国债，因此在美国财政部发布的数据中，中国对美国国债的持有量在上月扩大到8005亿美元之后，降低到7971亿美元。鉴于美国令人担忧的财政状况以及美元暗淡的前景，这一做法是可以理解的（不过中国的卖出量比起其总持有量来说规模很小，因此估计中国会继续卖出）。但实际上是这么回事吗？
当然我们也不十分清楚。但我们猜测，中国和其他国家一样，还从伦敦市场买入美国国债。这一交易在美国财政部国际资本流动月度数据中体现为英国的买入量，而不是中国的。这一月度“误差”在该数据系统年度调查数据发布之后凸显，调查之后进行的数据修正将以前年度英国项下的大笔买入量重新归到中国项下。英国自2009年以来成为美国证券的较大买家，中国净卖出美国国债的月份，英国市场的买入量看起来比较大，表明中国似乎通过伦敦市场进行美国国债交易。
估计要就2009年中国通过伦敦等地的买入量，对美国财政部国际资本流动数据进行多大调整是比较困难的。2008年6月，中国持有的美国国债和票据规模的上修幅度仅为311.26亿美元，相当于英国持有量的下修幅度2234.4亿美元的14%（似乎还有其他国家的央行也通过伦敦市场购买美国证券）。但同时美国财政部国际资本流动系统年度调查将中国持有的美国机构债、公司债和有价证券的规模分别上修了800亿美元和200亿美元。
我们因此假定，2009年英国对美国国债的买入量中有25%事实上是中国所为。如果这一假定成立，那么截至2009年8月末，中国持有的美国国债总量应达到9300亿美元之多，高于美国财政部国际资本流动月度数据公布的8950亿美元。我们还假定同年中国通过伦敦市场买入的美国机构债规模不大。
因此我们认为，中国持有美国国债的绝对额仍在上升，占外资购买总额的比重也有所提高。
考虑到中国持有的美元债务规模，周小川等人对美元币值的特别关注就不足为奇了。正如周小川在文中表达的主张，选择一种超主权货币为国际储备货币不仅符合中国的利益；从另一个角度讲，放弃美元的国际储备货币地位甚至更符合美国的利益，因为国际储备货币地位的诱惑使发行国付出了巨大的代价。换而言之，如果美元不作为国际储备货币，美国就不能像近些年那样大规模借款，从而也不会引发房地产和金融市场的泡沫。如果美元不具有国际储备货币地位，就没有人愿意购买所有的美元债务，则美国人就很难超前消费。而从华盛顿的立场看，保持美元的国际储备货币地位显然是有好处的。一个明显的好处就是，美国可以通过发行货币向任何持有美元债务的国家征收“通胀税”。通常经济学家称之为“铸币税”，即当通胀侵蚀了货币的名义价值后，债权方名义值的损失。
一些阴谋论者认为“铸币税”给美国带来了很大收益，其实不然。许多研究表明，“铸币税”所得规模非常小。当然，对于美国政府及美国的企业和家庭来说还有其他好处。国际储备货币地位使美国货币当局的货币政策具有独立性。但其他国家也可享有铸币税。由于以美元计价，美国企业在交易中不用支付兑换费用也不用担心外汇风险，获得了很大便利。发行债券的美国企业亦是如此。但其他国家的企业借助外汇远期或期权工具也可以实现对外汇风险的规避。美国拥有的深层次的债券市场与美元主要储备货币的地位互为因果。一个深层次高流动性的债券市场可刺激市场参与者增持美元计价资产，以获取更多利息，而美元的储备货币地位反过来又加深了美元债券市场的深度和流动性，两者相互依存。并且，其他国家也可以发展有深度和流动性的资本市场，南非就是一个绝佳的例子。另外，国际储备货币地位还具有一定的象征意义。储备货币通常代表着国家的强权地位。在这里需注意不要混淆，美元作为国际储备货币不是美国政府自命的，而是其经济规模带来的自然结果。
而且，我们还要考虑问题的另一面。很多人以为拥有储备货币地位意味着只用享受好处，无须承担任何责任。But in fact, it's not.亚洲央行持有大量美元外汇储备的原因在于美国出口美元。美国通过运行巨额经常项目赤字实现美元的输出，美国的进口超过了出口，并以美元支付。这对其余经济体意义深远，意味着美国一直在买它们的东西。金融危机告诉世界，尤其是亚洲出口国，美国消费者是非常重要的。你可以埋怨美国凭什么独霸国际储备货币地位，但不应忽视这样一个事实：这种地位隐含着美国消费者对中国出口商所具有的举足轻重的影响力，因此也对中国上亿农民工和企业管理层具有重要意义。问题的两个方面深深地纠缠在一起。
尽管美元走势堪忧，但美元仍保持着主要储备货币的地位。
2009年下半年美元趋于疲软，但其在全球金融危机期间的逆市而上，显示出它仍然享有避风港的地位。各国央行并没有抛售手中持有的美元。What is the reason?这是由于美元仍保有作为储备货币的许多重要特征。在北京工作的一位美国经济学家葛艺豪（Arthur Kroeber）提出国际储备货币应具备的6个特征：
1.储备货币应具有流动性，在世界任何地方都能被接受。
2.储备货币由独立的中央银行发行，该央行能够在稳定币值和治理通胀方面为市场所信任。例如，在没有出现严重的金融危机（如当前金融危机）时，美联储不能像一些发展中国家的央行那样被迫购买政府债券以增加货币供给及平息通胀。
3.储备货币具有价值贮藏功能。黄金具有价值贮藏功能是因为没人能制造它，而美元的价值贮藏功能在于中央银行承诺货币不贬值。
4.储备货币有可能带来收益。这是黄金和美元的关键区别之一。你购买的黄金就是一块金子，你可以把它放在银行里，但它不会给你带来任何收益。相反，由于美元拥有大规模的具有流动性的债券市场，持有美元可以获得一定收益，这些美元可以投资于长期内能够创造投资回报的经济体。美国的经济发展证明它是一个有能力进行重构、创新和再投资的经济体，因此其生产力能够得到持续提升。而生产力提高是创造财富的关键，也是创造投资收益的关键。
5.储备货币需要有一个完备的法律体系作为保障。换句话说，如果你用美元购买了美国资产，法律会保护你的资产所有权。
6.储备货币的规模能够扩张。黄金的不可制造性既是一个优点又是一个缺点。随着世界经济规模不断扩大，各国对储备货币的需求增加，这就需要储备货币的规模能够随之扩张以满足这种需求。而美联储可以印制更多美元满足这一需求。
任何欲成为储备货币的其他货币都需要满足以上全部或至少大部分特征，而这并不容易。从1971年布雷顿森林体系瓦解至今的38年中，美元充分地满足了这些条件。金本位制只在1890年到第一次世界大战前维持了一段时间（此前许多地方采取金银复本位制）。一些国家（像我的祖国英国）在一战后希望重返金本位制，但这绝对是个错误。换句话说，金本位制只持续了24年。美元作为储备货币的时间更长，而且现在看起来仍然强劲。
强劲？ !为什么我会这么说？截至本章的写作时间2009年11月，世界外汇储备中约65%～70%为美元。而且正如我们在过去几个月看到的，当金融危机爆发时，全世界所有资金仍选择逃往唯一的一个避风港——美元。欧元也符合储备货币的所有特征（正如原来的德国马克一样），因此成为世界第二大储备货币。不过，欧元的前景受到欧洲经济增长放缓（这限制了投资回报率）、债券市场规模较小以及市场对欧元区稳定性的担心的制约。其中，最后一点很重要。加利福尼亚州正面临巨大的财政危机，但它不会脱离美国，或选择离开“美元区”。而同样出现财政问题的意大利或西欧的一些国家，则有可能在它们认为必要时退出欧元区。虽然这不太可能发生，但这种可能性仍影响着市场对欧元作为储备货币的看法。欧元会一直存在么？这是欧元作为储备货币面临的一个重要问题。
也有人辩称，由于中央银行经常滥用权力，法定货币将永远无法保值。这些人支持重返金本位制。他们认为，黄金无法生产且存量有限，因此可以保值。他们鼓励包括中国在内的各国央行将外汇储备更多投资于黄金。中国已将部分外汇储备转为黄金。其中一些人还主张各国货币重新与黄金挂钩。他们认为，只有这样货币才能保值。
对此观点，大多数经济学家难以认同。因为黄金在许多方面不具备作为储备资产的关键特征。它不能用来在世界各角落购买商品，也不能用于生产方面的投资，因此无法带来收益。它只是一块可以藏在床底下或放在银行保险箱里的金子。相比之下，如果你持有美元，可以通过购买美国国债把钱借给美国政府，相当于投资于美国经济，然后政府通过征税取得收入，再用它来向你支付利息。换句话说，黄金没有生产力，这点很重要。此外，黄金的存量不能随世界经济规模的扩张而增加。黄金在一定程度上扮演了价值贮藏手段的角色，但对黄金的需求随全球珠宝市场的走势而起伏。另外，各国央行频繁买卖实物黄金更增加了市场的波动性。
如果还想再进一步尝试用黄金作为货币锚，就需要将各国货币汇率与黄金挂钩，像最初的布雷顿森林体系那样。但如果这样做的话，又将带来另一个问题，这会限制各国在经济不景气时通过增发货币来刺激经济的能力。如果将黄金作为基础货币，则不能在需要时创造更多货币，从而也就无法刺激经济。同时，钉住汇率制非常难以操作。在什么价位钉住？鉴于经济有兴衰周期，多久调整一次为宜（如果一国经济走弱，较低的汇率水平将有利于提振出口，刺激经济复苏；但如果该国汇率固定，则出口会受到冲击）？调整幅度多大？没有了浮动汇率制下的自动调节机制，就可能给经济带来新的问题。一战后的英国就曾有过这种经历。当时英镑重新钉住黄金，而过高的汇价和缺乏灵活性的汇率调节机制使英国经济受到拖累。
周小川提出另一个选择，主张将SDR作为新的国际储备货币。理论上，这一提议有很多优势：
其一，它可以分散单一货币作为储备货币的风险。SDR的货币篮子包括美元、欧元、日元、英镑，未来可能还将纳入人民币等其他货币。显然，这些国家的中央银行都可以选择通过增发货币使本币贬值，但由此带来的风险比储备一种货币要分散许多。因此，尽管SDR仍是一种法定货币，但以SDR作为储备货币可降低中央银行滥用职权的风险，也就是说，中央银行可以分散美元风险。
其二，如果再将大宗商品和黄金纳入SDR的定值基础，将能进一步支撑SDR，避免各央行滥用权力使法定货币贬值。这将我们带回到凯恩斯在二战后提出的一个设想。凯恩斯也针对这一问题提出一种名为“班克”（Bancor）的国际货币单位，采用包括黄金在内的30种商品作为定值基础。不过最后，凯恩斯的方案由于太过复杂而流产。美国对美元与黄金挂钩、重新取得主导地位十分满意。
但是，周行长提出的方案若要真正实施也面临一些困难。
如上文所述，SDR并不是一种货币，而只是法定通货的集合，一个并不独立存在的货币篮子。上文曾提到从单一美元向多元化转变可能提高储备货币的稳定性。但同时，在经济危机爆发时（像现在）许多国家的中央银行（包括欧盟和英国央行）均采取量化宽松政策，因此有可能使所有主要货币的购买力降低。
另外，用包括黄金在内的一篮子商品作为SDR的定值基础将带来上文提到的金本位制的问题。正如我们在上文看到的，作为储备货币，需要有相应的资产（如债券）供中央银行和其他投资者购买，而目前还不存在SDR资产。因此，有人建议IMF发行债券，但很难想象IMF的债券发行规模能足够大。IMF（或其他发行这些债券的机构）如何运用筹得资金也是一个问题。为支付债券利息，需要把债券发行筹得资金用于投资以赚取收益，而美国仍是世界上最具生产力的投资首选。
当前，贸易或对外投资的计价货币均不是SDR，这很难改变。投资者和贸易公司一般都愿意使用本国货币结算。
IMF的性质不同于中央银行，因此无法决定将SDR定为一种储备货币。
IMF投票权系统的改革是一个非常复杂又高度政治化的过程。SDR货币篮的重构也牵扯到诸多政治因素，可能会事与愿违增加更多不稳定因素。
目前，设立超级储备货币仍存在明显的障碍。同时，还不清楚央行持有SDR究竟能带来什么益处。这与持有SDR的组成货币（按同比例持有美元、欧元、日元和英镑）有何不同？如果一国决定将持有的外汇储备多元化并买入更多欧元，实际上可达到与SDR货币篮相同的比例，这是完全可以做到的，也是可能发生的，除非它们认为有一天美元会独揽大局，在各方面都优于欧元或其他货币。
在G20峰会上，俄罗斯向IMF和G20峰会工作组提出审议设立“全球储备货币”的提议。预计中国将会对此表示支持。但我们应该认识到，创建一种新的全球储备货币是一件极具挑战性的事。终结美元的国际储备货币地位并不容易，而将SDR改造成满足所有条件的国际储备货币也将是一个漫长的过程和巨大的挑战。
当然，还有一些人认为人民币也是国际储备货币的一个有实力的候选者。毕竟，中国的经济增速非常快，且人民币在国际贸易中广泛使用。因此在本章的最后一部分，我们来探讨人民币迈向亚洲区主要贸易货币的第一步。
2009年4月，国务院常务会议决定，在上海市和广东省内4个城市开展跨境贸易人民币结算试点。这意味着企业的产品和服务将以人民币定价，并用人民币进行进出口贸易结算。下面，我们来探讨开展跨境贸易人民币结算的可能操作方式，以及随着试点逐步展开，银行和企业将会遇到的一些问题。
从离岸市场看，该项试点的首要目标似乎是鼓励香港境内的贸易公司加大与内地企业的经贸往来。凭借粗具雏形的人民币市场，香港自然而然地成为人民币跨境结算试点的首选地。目前香港的部分企业和个人在当地拥有人民币账户，此次试点之前，香港在2008年建起了一套基本的人民币结算系统，允许部分银行进行人民币清算。目前，香港银行间清算系统可处理人民币个人支票清算及多余人民币存款，但不允许办理人民币的国际支付。（实际上，目前的做法就是所有香港银行将不愿持有的“多余的”人民币以中国银行设定的比价出售给中银香港，中银香港再将这些人民币转移至北京。也就是说，香港并没有一个真正的人民币市场，只由中银香港控制人民币在香港内外的流通。新试点允许在内地通过两家内地银行开展这类交易，也向在内地开展贸易的企业提供人民币融资。香港的外贸企业需要获得更多的人民币流动性，包括获得人民币贷款。许多企业借入资金用于进口支付，然后再用销售收入偿还贷款。）
另外，企业还需要能够将其多余的人民币收入兑换为港元及其他货币。两地支付互通安排（以及其他地区的银行支付结算系统）需要开放此类交易。目前，一些香港企业已在当地开立人民币账户（特别是那些从本地零售业务中收取人民币的企业），但这类账户目前仅限于特定类型的企业和交易。此外，虽然人民币可一次性兑换为港元，但反向兑换仍受到限制。在零售交易中，可将港元兑换为人民币，但有每日兑换额限制。如果企业更青睐人民币作为交易货币，则需要放松以上限制。如果兑换操作过于麻烦，企业会敬而远之。
香港银行业也需要获得更多人民币流动性。它们需要从内地或其他地区获得人民币，成为香港市场上人民币流动性的主要提供者。在初步阶段，可由两家结算银行提供人民币流动性，就长远来看，则需要在香港建立一个人民币市场来发展人民币在香港的交易。如果可以在香港建立一个真正的人民币市场，将大大推动人民币的区域化进程。
在香港，人民币市场已粗具雏形；而在其他市场，需要通过其他方式创造人民币流动性。