Chapter 10 How important is the Chapter 8 system?

Economists are often plagued by the question: Why do some economies thrive while others stagnate?Some economists say that it is mainly caused by the weather - if the weather is hot and humid, it will inevitably be plagued by diseases; if it is hot and dry, dry and barren land will restrict economic development.Both types of weather have allowed Africa to catch up, so it is argued that Africa has little chance of developing its economy.But that doesn't explain why an economy like Botswana's is different -- it's doing really well there.And its neighbor, Zimbabwe, has been a disaster-ridden place, at least in recent years.There are also some economists who believe that to develop the economy, the first step is to reduce the size of the government, control government power, simplify the administrative approval procedures for business operations, lower tax rates, and allow private companies to continue operating to make money and create jobs.But of course we also understand that if these rules go too far, the country will be too poor to protect the vulnerable and prevent the infiltration of powerful corporate power.In this case, the economy will go in a bad direction.There are also many economists, including many Chinese scholars, who focus on "institutions" and the role of institutions on economic growth.

In this chapter, we specifically talk about the system—the rule of law, including various written systems and unwritten hidden rules.Institutions set the rules of the game for business.What exactly is the system?Are these systems good?What's the weakness?How much can China's institutional development change?The right institutions are critical to economic growth.They can support investment, innovation and consumption, and limit the abuse of power.Abuse of administrative power is one of the factors that undermine economic growth.As the Chinese Communist Party has learned from its 60 years in power, institutions can make a world of difference.The system knocked down the country in the first 30 years, and made the country in the second 30 years.

With the help of MIT professor Daron Acemoglu, we'll explore the role institutions play in shaping economic growth (and the challenges of bad institutions in doing business around the world), See if the lessons learned can be applied to China.Acemoglu found that the rule of law established hundreds of years ago made huge differences between countries.This means that the lives of Chinese people today may have left the imprint of the imperial system, and at the same time are affected by the system since the founding of New China in 1949 and the new system developed after the 1980s.The system of history can last forever, which is the information revealed by Acemoglu.Furthermore, his main point is that major changes in a system are difficult to achieve.I believe this is a very difficult challenge.

What's happening now?The path China has traveled in recent years shows that certain systems can be changed, but it also tells us that certain systems are difficult to change. "Crossing the river by feeling the stones" is a good strategy - as long as there are enough stones in the river, you are brave enough to keep jumping from one stone to the next.My feeling is that our current system reform is walking in the middle of the river, and we are not quite sure where the next stone will be.What I want to say in this chapter is that looking on the sidelines we have a system that does not seem to be perfect enough to support the next phase of economic growth.Facts have proved that China's system is effective in pooling resources and investing them in heavy industries.But the current system is not generally suitable for private enterprise, innovation and service industries, nor is it well suited for the protection of the natural environment.We might as well use the World Bank's global business environment survey rankings to compare the pros and cons of various economic systems.It can be seen that China's market economic system is only half built.The reform will continue to move forward, but the impetus does not seem to be very strong, and there is still a lot to do.

Economists agree on the importance of institutions.But what is an institution?The economics community is very divided on this issue, but at the end of the day, institutions are basically about the rule of law.The system includes the legislation passed by the Parliament, the National Congress, or the National People's Congress, the normative documents formulated by the government department, and all things that help the law to be implemented, such as public security, the litigation system, and also includes dispute mediation and arbitration between natural persons and enterprises all the rules.For example, internationally, an institution such as the WTO formulates and supervises a set of international trade rules and implementation, as well as a set of arbitration and coordination mechanisms for trade conflicts between countries.In daily life, you have a relationship with the system every day: the system determines how much you pay for electricity, if you get a ticket for speeding, it also determines why you can easily buy pirated CDs on the roadside.In short, the system is the rules of the game.And this game runs through your life, or at least most of your life, and it is related to your money, time, entertainment, etc., and occupies a large part of your life.In a country, as long as the rules exist, those who violate the rules of the game will pay the price, be subject to financial penalties or other penalties.Of course, at the global level, each country reserves the right to break the rules—but that means they face the potential danger of having to be out, with negative consequences.

A comprehensive set of institutions governed China's economic life.Some of these institutions are formal (laws and regulations stipulated in writing), but many are informal and unwritten (only taught by example rather than words).For foreigners (including those of us who study economics), one of the mysteries of China is that there is often a big gap between the formal rules and the laws that are actually followed.One day, I met the former deputy mayor of a port city in the north. He said with a smile, "If you don't become an official, you will never understand China", with a sense of accomplishment on his face.Now that he has long since resigned, he is helping to expand the mainland business with a high salary offered by a Hong Kong-funded real estate company. Obviously, he has done very successfully.He proudly boasted that through his connection, his company has acquired a lot of land in Shanghai at a cheap price.He knows the unspoken rules.

Economists are particularly interested in institutions that defend property rights, that is, laws that protect ordinary people's money, houses, land, and other property from being stolen and appropriated by those with wealth and power.Economists have discovered a general rule that where institutions are sound, the economy is more likely to prosper.The reason is not difficult to understand.If you are worried that the land and equipment purchased for the construction of the factory will be stolen or taken away one day when it will make money, how dare you buy it?The same goes for buying a house, if you think someone is going to use the legal system to take your house from you, then you will think twice when buying a house.Or if you are a farmer, if you are worried that one day your land will be taken away due to bribes from developers, will you still invest a lot in the land?Or, if you were a young promising engineer, would you spend years researching and developing if you could never own your invention and prevent others from copying it?Therefore, good institutions that can protect property rights are very important.Without a system that guarantees property rights, no one would dare to open factories or buy houses, farmers would not dare to invest in land, and engineers would not be able to work on new inventions for years.

But how is the system formed?What are the reasons for institutional strength or weakness?This question is very important.If we understand how to build strong institutions, we can go a long way toward helping poor countries achieve economic success.Some economists (including Danny Roderick, whom we covered in Chapter 3) argue that big political institutions matter.He believes that multi-party democracy is the political system most conducive to economic growth, because this political system usually means that there are less fluctuations in important policies, and economic crises are generally better managed, which means that growth brings The benefits can be shared by more people. "Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?", with Romain Wacziarg, December 2004, some people (including many foreigners doing business in China I know) have seen China's political party system with their own eyes, and believe that this system is more important in resource allocation, facilities Very effective in building, making long-term plans, and making decisions for the public good.They marveled at the government's ability to build roads and build buildings in such a short period of time, which was impossible under a system with detailed property rights protection.They praise China and make fun of India's chaotic democracy where even roads cannot be repaired and factories have to be moved from state to state until the unions in one state allow the business to operate.These friends in the business field had a good point.However, they were not evicted from the city, their houses were not forcibly demolished, and they themselves were not relocated 25 kilometers away from their workplaces.The champions of rapid urban renewal are often the ones who benefit from it, not the ones who sacrifice it.

Economists have given certain answers to what is the most important factor in forming a system.Acemoglu has made a lot of achievements in this field.The Turkish-born economist taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was the winner of the Clark Award in 2005, which is only awarded to the most outstanding economist under the age of 40.He is one of the brightest minds of our time and a rising star in economics. To get to the root of the problem, Acemoglu delved into history, researching early European settlers in Africa, Latin America and other "New Worlds." "Unbundling Institutions", with Simon Johnson, October 2004, this angle is indeed very clever.why?Because very few economists have tried it.Natural scientists do research through experiments in the laboratory. What is the raw material, how much is used, and the experimental conditions are all under control. They can repeat the experiment, change the dosage, change the experimental conditions, and record the results of each experiment.Through this behavior, humans acquire precise knowledge of the world.Economists, by contrast, study real life, and often messy real life.What’s more, we can’t use living people to do experiments repeatedly—people are in constant change, with thousands of faces, different endowments, and diverse and intricate viewpoints, experiences, and relationships.Therefore, it is difficult for economists to claim that X caused Y, because we have no way to conclude that factors M, I, and T did not play a role.Finding answers from history is a very clever way.In some respects, what happened in the past comes closest to the natural experiments that economists would like to see.Before modern society existed, most of the places where early European settlers arrived had no institutions.Watching these local institutions evolve is therefore like watching institutions grow in a petri dish.Acemoglu thinks we can figure out what forces drive institutions and what role those institutions play.One of Acemoglu's most surprising discoveries is that some of the things that happened in a place during the colonial period still affect it today.

He looks at what happened when early European settlers arrived in 71 places that later became independent countries.His first finding was that there was a strong relationship between the mortality rates of early settlers hundreds of years ago and today's "bad" institutions, where property rights are not effectively protected.Why is this?Acemoglu's explanation is interesting, and goes something like this: Hundreds of years ago, high death rates among early settlers led to fewer newcomers to that country.The few newcomers who remain in the country want to make sure they remain in charge and live better off than the natives, so they make sure the laws and courts remain in their hands.In other words, they want to ensure that society is run on a basis of laws controlled by people, rather than the rule of law.Therefore, real property rights are not properly protected.Acemoglu also found that the density of the local population at the time of arrival also matters.The larger and more concentrated the local population, the worse the system will be there.Again, this was due to the fact that the relatively small number of early European settlers wanted to be sure of keeping all their wealth in their own hands, and manipulating the law was the surest way to preserve your own wealth and steal it from others.

On the contrary, better institutions were established where the early settlers were in good health and large numbers of immigrants followed.A small and dispersed local population is more conducive to the establishment of better institutions, because the number of people who can be exploited is small.The United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia developed fairly good systems that continue to this day.We already know this.Surprisingly, Acemoglu's model also applies to Africa and Latin America.In Peru, early Spanish settlers depopulated by yellow fever met the wealthy, urbanizing Incas, on whom they began a continual plunder, meaning that good institutions were never established.Social unrest, income imbalances, low economic growth, these problems still exist today.Africa has much of the same story, with notable exceptions.For example, the situation in Botswana is far better than in many African countries.A large number of early immigrants who came to Botswana maintained their health and established institutions similar to those at home, and the country became rich.In fact, the economic development of this country in southern Africa has been good. It is one of the few countries in the world that can match China's economic growth rate in recent years.Another example is Congo, a country rich in natural resources, which was developed by a small number of Belgians and other European immigrants. It has never even been able to form a government, and it is still plagued by disasters. Interestingly, Acemoglu found no evidence that which country the immigrants came from is related to whether the system is good or bad (so the British have to set aside that the British are "good" colonists and the Belgians and Portuguese are "bad" colonists These concepts have grown up with almost every British person. Of course, due to the tragic historical facts such as the burning of the Old Summer Palace and the Opium War, I think it is difficult for most Chinese to agree with the British colonists.)Nor did he find that religion, geography, or natural resources played any role.That's all about institutions, and institutions a few hundred years ago seemed to be all about disease and population. This is not history that has passed by in vain. What happened at that time is related to today.Acemoglu found a significant correlation between GDP per capita today and the death rate and population density of newcomers in the 16th and 17th centuries.This implies that much of today's problems in the Third World can be "blamed" on colonial rule, but it is different from how we usually view the issue.That said, it wasn't colonial rule itself that caused today's problems (and many African leaders still think so), but what happened after the early settlers arrived. Acemoglu and his colleagues found, "Institutional Causes, Macro-economic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth", with Simon Johnson and James Robinson, July 2002, that countries with bad institutions are more likely to experience high inflation and overvalued exchange rates and long periods of slow growth.On these issues, today's economic policies (except for exchange rate policy) generally do little compared to the role of institutions.Strange as it may sound, the practical reason is that weak institutions mean that elite groups can and need to control resources, which is often one of the sources of economic crises.Often accompanied by a political crisis.Groups that do not own resources and are not protected by the rule of law sometimes rage.It's pessimistic to think that the economies that fail today are the result of terrible institutions.How much good can a new government, a new set of policies, or a lot of foreign aid do to an economically failing country if its colonial history has constrained its development everywhere? But does democracy necessarily work?Many people believe that as a country becomes richer, it will naturally transform into a democratic political system. The democracy mentioned here is a multi-party democratic election.This is the so-called "modernization theory" proposed by the famous American political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset in the 1960s. There is great disagreement about this theory.It has been found that once GDP per capita reaches a certain level ($5,000 is a common norm), societies transitioning to multiparty democracies are more likely to stay that way.Conversely, if a society falls below a certain level of economic development, it tends to slide into dictatorship, or be taken over by the military.In recent years, this theory has been given a new meaning. Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International and an influential Washington foreign policy critic, argues that trying to rein in a suboptimal economy and democratic institutions (freedom of press and opinion, freedom of association of citizens) etc.) countries that are not universal enough to create democracies tend to fail. The Future of Freedom, 2004 WW Norton and Company, 2003, Zakaria believes the outcome of an "illiberal" democracy: electoral systems, but iron-fisted rulers never seem to lose; media is censored; There are very few NGOs.Therefore, he suggested that the better time to promote democracy is to wait until the economy is mature and the society is prosperous.His book is a response to the Bush administration's attempt to promote liberal democracy in the Arab world.It is too early to tell whether Iraq's fragile democracy will survive -- and things are not looking good at first.But it's hard to say whether Zakaria's point is right, or whether the incompetence and corruption of the Bush administration means that something is only theoretically possible -- that overthrowing an authoritarian regime and establishing a democracy by force is theoretically possible, but concretely The special case of Iraq does not work. How does Acemoglu view this issue?In his opinion, generally speaking, the emergence of multi-party democratic politics is indeed accompanied by the rise of per capita GDP.But when he looked at the history of the colonial period, the correlation between the two disappeared. "Revaluating the Modernization Hypothesis", with Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared, August 2007. In other words, he believes that the history of this period is very convincing.In countries with poor institutions, elites can control the entire society, preventing any progress in the direction of society in the direction of democracy, and at the same time constraining economic growth.Bad institutions allow those in power to prevent the formation of good institutions.In contrast, societies where property rights are protected allow economies to develop and institutions better suited to foster democracy.Simply put, it is either a virtuous circle or a vicious circle, one of which must be present.This is a depressing diagnosis for many economies. As a result, some societies are more likely than others to evolve into democracies.Countries that are more likely to be democracies have the following characteristics: income inequality is low; property held by social elites is not easily dispossessed; and society as a whole is urbanized. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, with James Robinson, 2005, because: (1) the lower the income imbalance, the less wealth elites have to lose from wealth redistribution after shifting to democracy; (2) if elites can To protect their own wealth, they will be more willing to implement democratic politics; (3) If the people are concentrated in cities, it is easier to be organized.Take Saudi Arabia as an example. The distribution of wealth is uneven, the population is basically urbanized, and the wealth is oil. If several oil companies are nationalized, it is easy to control wealth.Hence, the wealthy elite are unlikely to relinquish power easily.These factors, combined with the threat of Islamic fundamentalism infiltrating the regime, reduce the likelihood of Saudi Arabia's transition to a multiparty democracy.In contrast, countries such as South Korea have transitioned over the past 20 years from a single-party or military-ruled state to a functioning democracy.In the 1980s, the income distribution of Korean society was quite balanced, and the society was relatively affluent. The wealth came from industry and commerce, so it was not easy to be deprived of it.This means that elites will not fight to the death against the forces of democracy, even though South Korea's urbanization was largely complete until the 1990s. Now let's go back to China to see how it fits with this grand historical theory?China has a colonial history, but it is different from ordinary colonies. In the 19th century, part of northern China was colonized by Japan, and the eastern coast was colonized by many Western countries with the help of so-called treaty ports.Of course, the country the colonists entered was not a country without any institutions like many countries they entered in Africa and Latin America.On the contrary, China already had a ruling class, a huge bureaucracy, a set of well-designed systems, and the rules for implementing these systems together constituted China's imperial autocratic system.This system has a history of thousands of years, far older and older than those colonial countries.Therefore, the colonists only exerted influence on the institutions in the regions they controlled, such as ports, or formulated some institutions, such as preferential tax systems and judicial systems in the regions they controlled (Hong Kong is the biggest example).But the scope is limited, and in these places, local institutions coexist with national institutions, including emperor-bureaucratic political systems, a set of land title contracts, national tax systems, and a highly developed legal system. With the decline of the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century, these local institutions were also weakened, but they still exerted a certain influence.Therefore, after the colonists came to China, they did not start with a blank slate, and their system never took root in China. At the beginning of the 20th century, China's imperial autocratic system fell to pieces. However, as the country was subsequently plunged into a civil war between two forces with conflicting ideologies and institutional solutions, China's 20th century can be seen as a long period of rebuilding the system. History of Struggles - Expulsion of Colonists, Replacement of Qing Dynasty's rigid rule.During this period, I experienced many setbacks and walked into dead ends many times. After the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, the Kuomintang led by Sun Yat-sen established the Republic of China, and then China experienced the Anti-Japanese War and later the war between the KMT and the Communist Party.During this period, the Kuomintang government failed to bring more peace to the country, corruption was rampant, and little achievement was made in system building. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party took power, the colonists were completely expelled, and a new group took control of the central government and set out to establish a new nationwide system.This is a fundamental shift from the past.In fact, a revolution may completely change a country's institutions. Of course, it is inappropriate to compare the nascent communist regime with the early European immigrants.But they do have one important similarity: the Communist Party leadership did bring about a whole new set of institutions.These new systems are based on ideology and are the product of the combination of European Marxism and Chinese characteristics. They are diametrically opposed to the previous imperial autocratic system and colonial system.What does the new system look like? Land, industry and commerce, and houses are nationalized, and the legal protection of private property rights is cancelled, and the state occupies and allocates resources.Thus, the only institutions that matter are those that determine price setting and resource allocation.Business contracts don't really matter anymore. A large and complex set of rules has been developed by the bureaucracy to govern all aspects of social life.To manage the country from the center of power requires a lot of regulatory costs.At the same time, a socialist bureaucracy also needs a very strong top leadership, who has the power to change the rules of the game at any time.In other words, the rule of law is subordinate to the party and its leaders, which means that sometimes the rules of the game have low stability, whether it is economic, political or social as a whole.This feature of Maoist China—governance without rules—was not conducive to economic growth or social well-being. Legislative and law enforcement agencies, including the National People's Congress and the courts, fell silent.The rules of the game change every year and every month. Economic growth under Mao came not from markets but from a planned economy, where planners set prices and allocated resources.This model has had some success, especially in the industrial sector, but at the same time, the absence of institutions - especially those that constrain power - has led to some bad policies, the consequences of which are borne by the people at large. bear. Part of the reforms led by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s involved rebuilding institutions, establishing a long-term system of state governance and gradually introducing property rights.Institutions grew and private property rights crept back. In the late 1970s, farmers gained partial rights to "their" land. In the 1980s, private entrepreneurs began to own the means of production, although legal support was still weak.Central leaders began to meet publicly with the best of private entrepreneurs, sending a clear signal that the private sector was once again politically acceptable.Urban residents began to rent housing from the state for a long time until the end of the 1990s. In 2003, farmers theoretically gained legal protection of land use rights.Legislation has been promulgated in various industries, including company law, securities law, commercial bank law, intellectual property protection law and so on.Private enterprises have gained more room for growth.Courts are again active in mediating disputes of all kinds.Compared with the 1960s and 1970s, everything seems like a dream. As we all know, since the 1970s, China's institutional construction has made great progress.But at the same time, people are also aware that there are still considerable gaps in the system, and some inappropriate systems still exist.In many places, farmers' rights to farmland are not formally protected by law.Game-changing news of officials taking bribes breaks every week.Law enforcement agencies such as courts sometimes succumb to a number of factors.People across the country often have different interpretations of the same laws and regulations.Seeing this, people will ask what is the system in China today? Of course, this is a difficult question to answer, and everyone has their own experience.Moreover, the system is very flexible. Whether the National People’s Congress should fulfill its supervisory duties on the passed laws, whether the courts can make decisions independently and impartially, and whether the supervision of government departments can be fair.If you are personally involved in a lawsuit, perhaps you will have a clearer understanding of the extent of the rule of law in China.Uneven might be an adjective. For those readers who have no litigation experience, there is also a reference indicator, that is, the World Bank's "Global Doing Business" ranking.This survey covers 181 countries (regions) around the world, including both developed economies and underdeveloped economies, asking questions around various aspects of business operations, and ranking the business environment of each country based on the scores of business people.The most recent survey was completed in 2007-2008. For details of the "Global Doing Business" report, please refer to http://www.doingbusiness.org/. The 2009 report covers the survey data of the global business environment from 2007 to 2008.The issues relate to property rights, but also to other institutional issues related to business and industry.The purpose of this survey is to get a feel for what is actually happening, not just what the formal rules are (this is important because institutions are our connection to what happens in reality, not abstract or unenforceable regulations ).One category asks how many steps it takes to build a warehouse; another category deals with how easy it is to get a bank loan.In some areas China scores above average.China ranks 18th in the world in terms of contract enforcement, and the procedures for property rights registration are also very easy.China has one of the most tedious procedures in the world when it comes to obtaining building permits.It is not easy to start a business, and the tax burden is relatively high (this research was conducted after the income tax of domestic and foreign-funded enterprises was unified). The overall ranking of China's business environment is 83rd, slightly higher than the average.Looking around, there are some unfamiliar neighbors.Kenya's overall business environment ranks ahead of China, as do Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Poland.Among Asian economies, mainland China is far behind by the high-quality business environment of Singapore and Hong Kong, China (both economies are in the top five), and South Korea ranks 25th.The ranking of these economies did not bring much surprise.However, there are also some Asian countries that rank ahead of China.The business environments of Thailand (13th) and Malaysia (20th) are relatively stable.Vietnam (94th) is behind China.Asia's other two giants, India (124th) and Indonesia (129th), lag behind China, which is some consolation. We can take a deeper look at the survey data of the World Bank.Simple and low-cost property registration procedures are one of the key elements of a good business environment. The reason is simple. Property registration protects the interests of the owner.In some African countries, the registration process for the transfer of property rights takes 90 days and requires a fee of about 10% of the value of the property rights. However, the registration of ownership is always confusing and does not protect the owner.In such an environment, the wealthy and politically connected can protect their property, but ordinary business owners and middle-income families cannot.How is China doing in this regard?Well done.It takes an average of 29 days to register the transfer of property rights at a cost of 3.2% of the value of the property rights.This gives China a ranking of 30th in the world for property rights registration. When investors put money into a business, their property rights need to be protected.How is China doing in this regard?Researchers from the World Bank research team tracked the procedures for investors of a company listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to apply for protection after being deceived by the controlling shareholder.The controlling shareholder sold the public company to another company he controlled for an extremely cheap price (in other words, he was stealing property).The findings were not encouraging.China's business system is very thoughtful in requiring the submission of complete documents required for transactions, but it does not do a good job of ensuring that such substantively questionable transactions are found to be invalid, nor does it ensure that the relevant persons in charge of the company are held accountable for the illegal transaction. responsibility.In this regard, China basically did not score.The World Bank researchers also looked at how easy it is to bring a civil suit against a guilty party to obtain compensation from other shareholders.But China has not done very well in this regard.In any case, from 2007 to 2008, China ranked 88th in the investor protection index ranking of 181 economies in the world, which is not ideal.A major reason to invest in Chinese stocks remains risky business operations.Clearly, this is an example of the distance between formal rules and the unwritten rules that are actually followed.Unfortunately, in the Chinese stock market, there is still a big gap between the two. Of course, no country is perfect - Enron's fraud in the United States, Parmalat's financial fraud in Italy, and the "irresponsible" acquisition of the Royal Bank of Scotland in the United Kingdom show that the US and European systems also have serious loopholes.In fact, the financial crisis has exposed serious flaws in the financial system itself, and significant institutional reforms will be required in the next few years.But the problems faced by the US and Europe are different from those faced by China.World Bank research suggests that the business environment in the US and Europe is, on average, better able to avoid and deal with common loophole deals. Therefore, we ask such a question, why can China's economy grow so fast under an average institutional environment?I think the answer lies in the fact that China's institutional construction has been significantly improved, especially in the protection of property rights.Over the past 30 years, ownership of factories, houses, and even land has become clearer and more secure, though far from perfect.China's large and hard-working labor force, its geographical proximity to China's Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Taiwan, and Japan (bringing technology and investment), coupled with the opening of the global economy, have all played a role in China's rapid economic development.Restructured institutional improvements have unleashed these fundamental drivers of economic growth. But the answer to this question also reveals a negative side.Institutional construction is still on the way, and the powerful growth momentum unleashed may outweigh all remaining institutional problems.But is there still enough momentum for growth now?If today's growth momentum is simply the result of initial reform steps, growth will inevitably slow down without further institutional reforms.Those who hold this view, including many of my Chinese friends, believe that corruption, abuse of power, and special interest groups mean that the Chinese economy needs more institutional reforms, or a serious crisis is inevitable, or (more likely ) Economic development is gradually aging and rigid.The issue became more urgent as China's economy slowed in late 2008.As if overnight, several roaring growth engines suddenly quieted down, and people began to question where the basis of China's long-term rapid economic growth lies. This leads us to the final question of this topic: How much room for change is there in the current Chinese system?This question is very important.In Acemoglu's view, the institutional environment basically does not change—institutions are created when societies are established.但我认为，有理由怀疑阿西莫格鲁的悲观是否适用于中国。 1949年新中国成立彻底打破了旧有的社会秩序，今天我们没有了皇室家族滥用权力的担忧，而且，70年代末的改革开放带来了沧桑巨变。尽管很显然我们生活在一个继承了很多历史遗产的环境里，但现在怎么样，制度在不断发生变化，还是陷在了哪一步？如果在哪儿被卡壳了，我们的问题就来了。 我们仍然借助世界银行的营商环境调查来找出一些蛛丝马迹。下面列出从2004～2008年间中国企业经营环境发生的一些变化。结果有喜有忧： 开办企业所需的日期从48天下降到40天，相关行政费用减少了一半，最低注册资本也明显降低。这是很大的进步。 申请建筑许可的成本有所降低，但审批仍需336天。时间仍然很长，但比俄罗斯快，那里需要704天。 2008年新《劳动合同法》实施以后，企业解除劳动合同的难度加大。劳动法律历来十分复杂。我们完全赞同有必要保护工人利益，但新《劳动合同法》的部分条款似乎走得有点远。 物权登记的成本也略有降低，从物权价值的3.6%降低到3.2%。便宜了当然更好。 银行潜在客户的信用信息更容易查找，理论上应该使得银行可以多向小企业放贷，但实际发生得并不多，银行仍然需要抵押，或者更愿意向大型国企放贷。 企业缴纳税款的种类和程序也有所简化。目前，大部分企业只需缴纳5种税，大大低于2004年该调查开始时的35种。计算应纳税额所需的时间也有所下降，但一年中有504个小时用于清算税款，仍然十分繁重。与2007年所需的972个小时相比进步不是很大。 货物进出口所需的行政费用略有提高，在港口发生的费用也有所上升。 企业破产时，股东本金回收率略有上升，从1美元本金收回32美分上升到35美分。但还是不够高，股东本金回收率最高的经济体在90美元以上。 世界银行未列出调查开展初期的整体排名，在有综合排名的最近两年中，中国的营商环境获得了改善，世界综合排名从第90位上升到第83位。不错但还不够理想，中国的整体营商环境仍然十分普通，这也预示着仍需很多努力。 那么需要做什么？理论上说，需要简化已有商业规则，增加规则的透明度，加强对既有规则的日常强制执行。说来容易，难在落实。 以下提出三点想法，希望对于改进中国营商环境具有操作性： 成立一个跨部门的“改善营商环境”委员会，并纳入部分成功的私营企业。委员会要有明确的任命以协调监管工商业的各个部门之间的行为，简化所有影响企业的规则。这实现起来难度很大，但是如果认真去做，将给商业和整体经济以巨大的供应面提振。降低营商成本意味着更多就业。这样一个委员会能够顺滑多头审批程序，简化与投资有关的复杂监管程序，简化资金出入境手续，顺畅管理工作。委员会的管理者和企业之间可以坦率地谈论遇到的问题。委员会的目标应该是减少或简化成千上万条法律法规。 在全国推广之前，对政府推出的所有重要的政策建议进行成本—效益分析。这意味着由某个独立的政府机构对所有需要使用公共资金的新政策作出评估，这一评估可在政策实施之前进行，或者在地方试点后进行。这一机构不同于国家审计署，它应该是独立的，它的任务是评估任何政府项目的资金价值。评估可以采用现代的成本—效益分析方法。这一方法可以评估对中小企业的扶持政策、对城镇消费者发放补贴、农村医疗保险以及新社保制度等。委员会的作用应该十分明确——像审计工作者一样，应该被赋予查弊纠错、制止浪费的权力。同样，重心在于确保，当政府进行市场干预时，产出要大于投入。这样的改革应能有助于降低无效甚至浪费的政府干预。 还有很多其他方面可以得到改进，包括司法仲裁程序制度的改进，以确保将地方对商业监管的影响力降到最低程度。可以开通全国性热线通报弊案的查处情况，扩大中央反腐部门的规模，明确其职责，等等。 如果用一句话来总结本章，那就是制度很难被改革，如果你不用上全部的气力，它们就不会被改变。