Chapter 5 Chapter 3 Why is China's economy growing so fast?

The system should be related to a long-term thing-making the rules of the game.On the contrary, policy can and should change frequently. Policy choices after 1978 have brought about profound changes in China—reduction of import tariffs, mobility of population, sale of state-owned houses, choice of “macro-control” to cool down an overheated economy, or large-scale fiscal stimulus to heat up a deserted economy .All of these can be referred to as "policies".So what language should be used to accurately describe the policies that have created wealth and greater personal liberty for us over the past 30 years?Some people believe that China is very original in terms of policy choices, so they agree to use the term "Beijing Consensus" to summarize China's policy choices.Another term corresponding to this, the "Washington Consensus", is a set of economic policies that have been widely questioned in recent years.

Since the advent of the "Beijing Consensus", people have often talked about it.Many hope that what Washington has, Beijing should have — and in fact do better.Especially at the moment, when the whole world is in shock from the failure of Western economic policies and financial regulation and its consequences, the "Beijing Consensus" exudes a unique charm.However, if we take a closer look, we will find that many of the effective economic policies that Beijing has chosen over the past few years are actually very orthodox.At the same time, there are some very unique practices, plus good luck.

Therefore, in this chapter, I will try to assess the economic policies adopted by China and carefully identify areas where China uses policies that do not belong to the category of orthodox economics.But I don't agree with the idea that the "Beijing Consensus" is all about good public relations and the economy is a mess.To really understand what's actually going on, we'll turn to the research of Harvard economist Danny Roderick.He formed a set of incisive and unique criticisms of the "Washington Consensus", supported policy intervention in the economy, and was also a strong advocate of the Asian economic growth model.For an introduction to Roderick's views in this regard, please refer to his book "Same Economics, Different Policy Prescriptions" published by CITIC Publishing House. ——Editor's Note In this model, the government actively participates in economic activities and protects the country's growing enterprises from foreign competition.He believes that China is also on the same path.I will point out some of the problems with Roderick's argument later on.

Many economists currently agree that there are only a few main policies to help poor countries develop, including governments running reasonable (ie small) fiscal deficits (or better yet, running surpluses), lowering barriers to imports, keeping inflation low, encouraging foreign investment, eliminating the “intervention” of administrative forces in the market, etc.These policies have been strongly recommended by the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) to developing countries for the past 30 years.The main reason these agencies do this is that it is the best policy in the eyes of economists.Of course, the reason is that open markets are good for American companies.In other words, it is also a policy that politicians in Washington are interested in supporting.But unlike some on the left, these ideas are not driven solely by commercial interests; at their core, they are also good economic policy.

The term "Washington Consensus" was first coined years ago by Washington-based economist John Williamson, and the concept is documented by the World Bank, the IMF, the U.S. Treasury, and many economists around the world. The collective wisdom of scientists is the widely accepted intellectual crystallization of the best economists.It is called a consensus because those that are still controversial are not included. The "Washington Consensus" includes ten aspects: see http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm? researchid=486. Strict fiscal discipline; the government should not run large fiscal deficits.

Increase public spending on education, basic healthcare and infrastructure. Carry out tax reform, broaden the tax base, and ensure moderate marginal tax rates. Allow the market to set the level of interest rates, and aim for (usually) positive real rates to encourage saving. Adopt a "competitive" exchange rate regime (meaning not overvalued so as to facilitate imports and offshore financing), but not a competitive exchange rate for large trade surpluses. Implement trade liberalization and remove quantitative restrictions on imports (elimination of licenses and quotas); low import tariffs are generally recommended, but Williamson believes that the level of import tariffs of 10% to 20% is appropriate because it can give domestic industry certain protection of.

Liberalization of foreign direct investment, but liberalization of foreign capital portfolios is not the first policy choice. Privatize state-owned enterprises, which can increase fiscal funds and allow more opportunities for expansion of the efficient private sector. Eliminate all restrictions that restrain new businesses from entering new markets or competing.Regulations related to national security, environmental protection and protection of consumer rights, as well as regulations on the supervision of financial institutions should be retained, but they should not be abused. Protect private property rights.

In the eyes of many economists, these elements still make perfect sense today.Don't you think so?It is not a radical program of free market economics.But the meaning of the "Washington Consensus" was quickly magnified, and it was regarded as the spokesperson of extreme free market ideas.In the eyes of conspiracy theorists, this word is very suspicious. It seems that Washington, who always wants to dominate the world, is lurking behind it. Conspiracy theorists are convinced of this.Critics use the term to refer to any policy they disapprove of, based on what happened to developing countries that received IMF bailouts in the 1980s and 1990s.In addition, the policy of liberalizing the capital account too quickly and allowing speculative funds to flow freely in and out of developing countries has also attracted widespread criticism.But, as you can see above, these policies were never part of the "Washington Consensus".The reason why some countries are forced to accept IMF bailouts is that their own macroeconomic management is in a mess, and government budgets have to be slashed, which means that public services have to be cut.Critics attribute such results to the policies of the "Washington Consensus", accusing them of neglecting the people.Rather, I feel that bureaucracy and government officials have dragged their country's economy into the abyss, ignoring the demands of the people.In many cases, the IMF has tried to cope with the distress left by bankrupt governments by cutting spending and so on. The IMF's approach in some countries has indeed gone too far, and it has also made mistakes.But I think a lot of the criticism against them is exaggerated, and anyway, the term "Washington Consensus" has turned into a poisonous apple.Left-wing critics in the capitalist world have turned to an "alternative" model.

Therefore, in recent years, the economy has grown rapidly without any crisis, and China, which does not rely on the IMF for a penny, seems to have been born out of nowhere.She "went her own way" and apparently distanced herself from the "toxic" advice of free-market economists.Therefore, international left-wing critics applaud China's development achievements, but they are not very clear about the policies adopted by the latter and where the driving force of China's economic growth lies.They simply assume that the Chinese model is a new one, and that there is clear evidence that there are still alternatives to the Washington model.

Of course, many Chinese are very proud of the country's extraordinary economic achievements since the 1980s.But many people know that these achievements come from the country's transition to the market, not away from it.From this we get to the core problem of using China's achievements to attack the "Washington Consensus" view.They forget that China has adopted, or shifted to implementing, a number of pragmatic, rational, and business-friendly policies even without IMF involvement.Of course, China has not implemented all such policies, but it has not.Let's itemize the footprints China has made over the years:

Strict fiscal discipline, run a moderate fiscal deficit, and control the scale of public expenditure. In the 1990s, expenditures on education and basic medical care were reduced to a very low level, but after 2000 they began to increase financial investment in these areas and reduce subsidies to state-owned enterprises. Since the tax reform in 1994, the tax base has been expanded, and the marginal tax rate is moderate. Lending rates are still set by the central bank, while giving commercial banks some flexibility.Savings are encouraged, even though real deposit rates are often negative. The mistake of overvaluing the currency is avoided.In fact, given the large trade surplus, RMB policy since 2004 could perhaps be called too “competitive” (periodically undervalued RMB exchange rate). China is open to trade.The relatively high import tariffs remained until the 1990s, were lowered under Zhu Rongji's tenure, and were lowered again after joining the WTO in 2001.The reduction in tariffs has had a positive effect on the Chinese economy, forcing domestic companies to compete with imports. Vigorously attract foreign investment in the manufacturing industry.Services and agriculture have more restrictions on foreign direct investment.Restricting portfolio inflows (meaning the kind of money that is not invested in physical assets or ownership and can therefore be withdrawn quickly) was never a policy included in the Washington Consensus. In the mid-1990s, small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises were privatized, closed down or restructured.This process is often accompanied by corrupt practices.But the state retained control over the large state-owned enterprises that have now become industry giants. Some business restrictions have been lifted, but market access in some industries remains strictly restricted. Some action has been taken to protect private property rights. In short, despite significant differences (such as privatization policies), China has adopted economic policies that are in many ways consistent with the "Washington Consensus".Of course, sometimes it is not consistent. For example, in the 1990s, China’s compression of public medical and education expenditures was obviously not a good policy.Also, the policy of making large state-owned enterprises bigger and stronger into industry giants, rather than privatizing them, has both advantages and disadvantages.In terms of exchange rate policy, the RMB exchange rate policy has been consistent with the "Washington Consensus" for most of the past 30 years, but there have been differences in recent years.Overall, government involvement in the economy may be more than most economists feel comfortable with, but when it comes to big policy, China isn't doing too badly.In many ways, China is even a model of sound economic policy. However, some people don't think so.In some people's eyes, China is different.Joshua Cooper Ramo is one of them.Raimer works for Kissinger Associates in Beijing. In 2003, he wrote a research report called "Beijing Consensus", arguing that China has achieved success in a new way.The report has been hotly debated since it came out. The term "Beijing Consensus" spread like wildfire.The three theorems behind this "consensus" centered on China's economic development are: China has shown a "commitment to innovation and continued experimentation".Raimer believed that the "Washington Consensus" was too blunt and that the only path to economic success was to experiment. GDP should not be the only indicator of economic development.Raymer believes that sustainability, wealth distribution and GDP together constitute an important indicator to measure the progress of economic development. autonomy theory.China sets its own economic policy without IMF intervention.It is important for developing countries to retain "financial sovereignty" so that they have the necessary freedom to experiment. In my opinion, every "theorem" has obvious problems, and it is not really a theorem at all.Starting from the first "experiment", we know that before the Chinese government introduces a major economic policy, it usually conducts a "pilot" on a smaller scale. The creation of special economic zones such as Shenzhen in the 1980s was perhaps the biggest experiment.Turn theoretical ideas into visible results in a small area, quickly find out the advantages and problems of the policy, and make improvements before deciding whether to promote it nationwide.However, the word "pilot" has an important meaning. It is not a real experiment in the concept of science, but the top decision-making level of the central government wants to introduce a certain policy, and then they use these well-designed "experiments" that have gained widespread support to resist the whole country. Problems or resistance that may be encountered in implementation within the scope. "Experimentation" triumphed over opponents, including critics within the party, and created groups interested in supporting and expanding the reform itself, such as the leadership of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone who suddenly saw a wonderful opportunity to get rich in their land at the beginning of the reform .Who can point out which policy "pilot" after the 1980s ended in failure and failed to spread across the country?I can't find it.This is not a real experiment, but high political art. The significance of the "Washington Consensus" is that it is a real experiment in many other countries, or the essence extracted from countless experiences.Economists can tell which policies are better than others by looking at the results of many policies implemented around the world.From actual experience and the study of experience, economists distill practices that can feed into policy and still stand the test of time.Keeping real interest rates low, imposing excessively high tariff barriers, and keeping foreign investment out usually leads to low economic growth.This is basic economic common sense, and we know it because of lessons learned from other countries.At present, the content we need to experiment is basically at the micro level in nature.Suppose you are the prime minister of your country and ask your senior adviser how to formulate trade policy, and he replies, "Prime Minister, I think we should try first." "Okay." You answer, "What should we try?" Your adviser has no There is more to say.Regrettably, the "Beijing Consensus" did not answer such an important question.Only "experimentation" itself is not a policy, but the absence of a policy.As a "theorem" it doesn't make sense. Let's talk about the second article about GDP.To anyone who has devoted themselves to studying how the Chinese economy and its political system work, it is obvious that local officials generally value GDP growth rates.Issues like environmental protection are things that most local officials have spent little time thinking about over the past 30 years.If you go around the countryside, you will soon discover the huge difference in China's urban and rural public service investment in the 1990s.Many people think that what we should care about is not only GDP, but the environment and development imbalance are also very important (I agree with this).But if you think China has struck the right balance over the past 30 years, you haven't spent enough time in China.Look at the second content of the "Washington Consensus", and you will find that it supports the expansion of education and basic health care spending.China is only now starting to do this, it didn't do it in the 1990s.Thus, the "Beijing Consensus" fails the most basic test: it does not accurately describe the facts. Third, can China's economic success be replicated? The unique significance behind the "Washington Consensus" is that it formulates a series of policy principles that any country can emulate.Many of these principles are well-tested. Can the "Beijing Consensus" do the same?Can it be emulated by other countries?If a country does not need IMF bailouts to stabilize its economy, it can decide its own policy choices.This is the first point. The "Beijing Consensus" says that after that the country should experiment and also focus on the environment.It seems like that's all there is to it. The "Beijing Consensus" did not mention substantive content, and talking about policies must have substance, otherwise it will only be empty words and public relations. Another question I have about the "Beijing Consensus" formulation is how replicable China's success is.In my opinion, the core of China's success is based on basically successful economic policies, and it is also based on other factors that other countries, even other Asian countries, do not have and cannot create.China has a huge labor force, which means it can be super competitive in export manufacturing.China can easily obtain investment, technology transfer, personnel training and trade from economies such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan and South Korea.A common language and culture connects many Asian investors, allowing China to easily tap into the production networks already formed in the region.China also benefits from a very open international trading system.At the same time, China's development has also benefited from a very strong government, guaranteed social stability and order, and especially benefited from the true reformist leader Deng Xiaoping.At the same time, China gained a foothold in the crisis-ridden late 1980s, partly because the entire power apparatus remained monolithic (this is one of the most striking differences between China and the Soviet Union, which lost control of the central government in the late 1980s). trust of the government, no longer carry out instructions from Moscow).Moreover, China has mechanisms to control at least some corrupt practices that countries in Africa or Latin America, or even some countries in less developed parts of Asia, will find it difficult to replicate.For this reason, I think it is prudent to mention that China provides a road map for the development of other countries. But this does not mean that China's practice is not worth studying, or cannot be replicated elsewhere.Here, our views on the "Beijing Consensus" come to an end for the time being.Below we will look at some serious claims, more worthy of rigorous discussion. Harvard University economics professor Danny Rodrik is the most vocal critic of the Washington Consensus.See Professor Rodrik's blog, http://rodrik.typepa.com/.At the same time, he is also a big fan of China.However, his criticism differs from that of the traditional left.He argues that the right institutions - ensuring that the rule of law is preserved - are a key element of economic growth. "Institutions Rule", with Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, October 2002, who also argues (unlike many on the left) that business and entrepreneurship are key to growing the economy.But he also believes that the government should intervene to help entrepreneurs thrive.This is where he differs from unorthodox economists.Roderick's ideas are worth studying, and he is one of the most respected heterodox economists.His research is of direct help in understanding the path China has traveled in recent years and what it means for the future. We begin our analysis with Roderick's views on economic growth and entrepreneurship.He argues that in developing countries, entrepreneurs are less likely to come up with entirely new inventions, including products and services, and they are more likely to copy successful examples of firms in developed countries.This isn't a bad thing, in fact it's usually a good thing.Think Baidu and Google, Sany and Caterpillar.But of course, not all products and services already available in advanced economies are suitable for new developing markets.Developing markets have different resources and specific problems that can limit the use of products and services already available in developed markets.Therefore, a significant trial-and-error process is required.In this process, entrepreneurs spend time, energy and money to identify.Once they find that a certain product works, a large group of entrepreneurs will jump in to form the production chain of each supporting link of this product, and capital will follow.In short, a new (or existing) industry was thus established in developing markets, such as cut flowers in Colombia, shipbuilding in South Korea, computer chips in Taiwan, and football manufacturing in Pakistan.In China, look at any successful industry around Wenzhou.No one accuses Wenzhou entrepreneurs of being unoriginal (although they have improved upon them), but they managed to experiment with different industries and, once they found something, put their fortunes and lives in it.Over the years, the success of many Wenzhou enterprises has become famous all over the world. To appreciate the original value of Roderick's argument, one needs to first understand how economists view development.Basically, they advise poor countries to "use their natural advantages as much as possible", that is, to focus on developing the wealth that nature bestows on them, such as fertile soil, huge labor force, and long coastline.Traditional economics holds that economic growth should come from exploiting as much of this natural endowment as possible.Traditional economists say that focusing on "comparative advantages" and then exporting products with comparative advantages is the most effective way of economic growth.And Roderick says that successful industrialization has little to do with this specialization and, on the contrary, a lot to do with its opposite—the diversification of manufacturing.He is an active advocate of the strategy of creating export-oriented manufacturing bases in Asia, that is, the practice of Japan in the 1950s, the practice of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s, and the practice of China in the 1980s.In Roderick's view, Asia's success is the result of a unique combination of government planning and market competition, an ideal model. Roderick takes exports very seriously.In one of his articles, he made the point that developing countries that export the same products as developed countries are more likely to achieve faster economic growth than other countries. "What You Exports Matters", October 2006, he concluded that "what you produce, this country will become".Why?The reason seems to be that exporting firms have to compete in international markets, which means they have to bring quality and technology to a level comparable to their rich-country competitors.When companies try to do this, there will be a lot of positive "spillover effects"-that is, advanced technology, operating skills, experience, etc. in the outside world will be created.And these businesses won't stand still, they'll be part of the larger economy.These experiences and technologies will be passed on to other nearby enterprises.Roderick argues that this has led to faster domestic economic growth in these economies than in economies that have not done so. In a 2006 paper, Roderick argued that China's economic development fits well with this theory.The scale of China's exports has been spectacular: the equivalent today of an economy with per capita GDP three times China's, in the early 1990s the equivalent of an economy with per capita GDP six times China's.This should have a huge positive effect on China's medium-term economic growth, because with the flow of corporate managers and R&D personnel between foreign-funded and Chinese-funded companies, knowledge, technology and management techniques will infiltrate Chinese companies.In the future, Chinese export companies still have room to improve their value chains. In 2003, compared with the unit value of the main electronics export products of China and the other two Asian countries, the value of Chinese products was generally lower, indicating that China exported low value-added products in these fields.In the next few years, there is still room for improvement in the value chain of Chinese export companies.Roderick believes the government can help speed up the process. Roderick is in favor of active industrial policy, or that he favors government policy measures to support specific industries.He's unique in what he likes and doesn't like, or at least he makes his likes and dislikes clear.He said he disliked the Latin American model of the 1960s and 1970s, when governments imposed excessively high barriers to imports to incentivize domestic production.Most economists think this policy is seriously wrong.Due to the lack of competition, the quality of products of Latin American companies is extremely low, and they cannot import important equipment such as mechanical equipment and even electronic computers. Domestic companies in Latin American countries have no way to improve their production. What Roderick greatly appreciates is the growth model of the four Asian tigers in the 1960s and 1980s.In Roderick's view, they succeeded in doing two things: the first thing is that import barriers are still set high, but companies are encouraged to export.This, on the one hand, protects domestic firms that are afraid of international competition, while ensuring the high efficiency of firms that have to compete in international markets.The second thing is that government officials in East Asia are "embedded" in the private sector, creating a very special relationship.In an ideal state of the relationship, government officials support rather than direct the private sector, and they solve problems rather than create obstacles for business.Why is this important?Roderick believes that "in an environment full of uncertainty and technological information spillovers, investment in non-traditional products is undersupplied".To put it another way, when the economy is not developed enough, it is not enough to have an "invisible hand".You need sharp minds, integrity and honesty, and even government officials composed of entrepreneurs to extend a helping hand to the business community, point out the maze for private companies, create the correct incentive mechanism, and encourage them to expand and grow.This is the way to be able to transcend your natural gifts. Roderick believes that China has followed a path similar to the four Asian tigers. Officials from all over the country are actively involved in supporting the development of local enterprises, building industrial parks, distributing subsidies to "good" enterprises, giving tax breaks, and doing everything possible to attract foreign investment. And so on, and so on.The way to achieve this is to link the achievements and careers of local officials with their performance in caring for local economic growth.The central government is equally eager to support certain industries, regularly formulating five-year development plans for the auto, steel, chemical and IT industries. "Without state support and government financing, companies like Lenovo would never have emerged," Roderick concluded.He also favors measures that would force foreign companies to set up joint ventures rather than sole proprietorships, because it means advanced technology is more likely to flow into the domestic market.For the same reason, he is also in favor of implementing a localization rate for spare parts.This policy requires that at least 50%, 70% or 90% of the spare parts used in a certain product manufacturing industry must be domestically produced, instead of all being imported.China has developed a large number of similar policies. In early 2009, I was in Beijing chatting with a senior executive of a foreign railway company. He admitted that a considerable amount of technology transfer was "the price that must be paid for doing business in China."The trick for his companies to maintain their competitiveness in China is to always be one step ahead of their "partners" in China.In fact, this type of technology transfer also includes the technology of foreign-funded companies that is often relabeled as indigenous Chinese technology, impressing everyone with the achievements of domestic companies in terms of technological innovation.Roderick believes that, generally speaking, even if some of these government interventions are in vain in the short term, they are still positive in the long run. We might as well go to the place to have a look, so as to understand more deeply how much effort the local government has made to support enterprises. In October 2007, I conducted a short-term research in Shenzhen and visited some corporate customers.People in the industry are undoubtedly well aware of the policies of local governments in supporting local enterprises, but in order to let more readers understand, I will describe what I have seen.In a word, enterprises in Shenzhen are happily in the arms of the local government. Before 2008, the income tax rate for Chinese-funded enterprises was 33%.But in many places, including the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, the actual tax rate is much lower than this. The income tax rate in Shenzhen is 15%.In addition, in order to support enterprises, the local taxation department has given many manufacturing enterprises the preferential treatment of "two exemptions and three half reductions", that is, they are exempted from paying corporate income tax in the first two years of a profitable year, and the tax is halved according to the local corporate income tax rate in the next three years. To Shenzhen is 7.5%.This is a great care, and it is a huge attraction for enterprises to settle here.Of course, Shenzhen is not alone. Local governments, especially those in the eastern coastal areas, have similar investment promotion policies.In fact, many companies turn into a new company every few years, so that they can enjoy the five-year tax break again.The local tax authorities are also not paying attention (or acquiescing). In 2007, the person in charge of a garment manufacturing company in Shanghai told me that they had registered five times. In recent years, the Chinese government has begun to try to eliminate these tax incentives and unify the tax rates for foreign and domestic enterprises, coastal and inland enterprises.The new "Enterprise Income Tax Law" came into effect at the beginning of 2008. The income tax rate of local enterprises was reduced to 25%. Measures such as "several exemptions and half reduction" were cancelled, and the tax incentives enjoyed by enterprises during the preferential period will naturally end ( In 2006, many companies set up new entities to extend the time of enjoying low tax incentives as long as possible).In general, the central government has shown a willingness to reduce the authority of local governments to determine tax rates on their own. Local governments have used their best wisdom to walk on the edge of the new tax law.A few months before the implementation of the new tax law, any "high-tech enterprise" certified by the Shenzhen Science and Technology and Information Bureau can enjoy the "two exemptions and three half reductions" again.Shenzhen also extended the period for some high-tech enterprises to enjoy tax incentives to "two exemptions and five half reductions".Any company that dreams of manufacturing high-tech products one day, or even uses other people's high-tech products, can apply for high-tech enterprise status.The State Administration of Taxation had to introduce multiple measures to plug the loopholes that local governments wanted to exploit. In the second half of 2008, the State Administration of Taxation issued a notice requiring that the qualification of high-tech enterprises can only be awarded to enterprises that truly own high-tech enterprises.It is unclear how well local governments are complying with this restriction, and it is estimated that many places will still do their best to protect local businesses. In addition, Shenzhen has also introduced some other subsidy measures.The main targets are high-tech companies, or companies that want to expand overseas markets.Here are some examples: The manager of a small sofa manufacturing company told me that there is a new policy, as long as the company proves that it pays the value-added tax on all purchased goods, and all products are exported to foreign trade, the city government can get an amount equal to 5% of its sales revenue. cash allowance.This is a countermeasure formulated by the local government to reduce the export tax rebate rate of low value-added products by the central government. A type of subsidy that we have heard many times is used to encourage companies to develop and sell overseas markets.It is said that any company is allowed to reimburse such expenses up to 20 times within a year, with a total reimbursement of up to 300,000 yuan. This initiative began in 2005. There is also a policy launched in 2006 to provide support for enterprises to apply for product license certificates. In addition, qualified enterprises also receive research and development subsidies worth 2 million yuan per year.According to the manager of a certain company: "You must establish an independent R&D office, provide proof that the R&D personnel have a college degree or above, and provide financial receipts for scientific research activities." High-tech enterprises can enjoy certain discounts when applying for bank loans, and the municipal finance will give certain loan interest discounts. Another subsidy was introduced by customers producing LEDs.If the value-added tax paid by an enterprise this year is 50% higher than that of the previous year, the enterprise can apply for a 50% value-added tax refund (I don’t know whether non-high-tech enterprises enjoy this kind of care, but there is a possibility). Presumably, there must be other tax incentives or subsidy policies besides what we have heard with our own ears.To sum up, Shenzhen has tried its best to do the following things: (1) support local industries; (2) support local high-tech enterprises; (3) support overseas expansion of enterprises and develop new products.Practices in other places also include providing low-cost or even free land for enterprises, taking care of water and electricity costs for new enterprises, or providing low-key cash subsidies as compensation because they cannot violate central regulations to give enterprises tax incentives.In short, China's industrial policy reforms over the years have fully tapped the advantages of labor-intensive manufacturing on the one hand, and at the same time, given a large amount of subsidies and support to capital.This is of course a very powerful combination, which makes up for many inherent institutional problems in the Chinese economy, which can increase risks and increase transaction costs. Many readers will feel that it is not uncommon for local governments to provide these subsidies.In fact, some scholars believe that this is also beneficial to China's economic growth.In a widely circulated article, Gerald Roland and Qian Yingyi (now at Tsinghua University) argue that China employs a "federalized" economic system that underpins economic growth. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint", Qian Yingyi, Gerald Roland, 1998, that is to say, local governments have great autonomy to formulate the rules of the game within their jurisdiction, similar to the states in the United States.These powers include giving tax breaks to companies, providing various subsidies, and interpreting orders from above in a way that is beneficial to local companies.Take Guangdong Province as an example. Local companies are notorious for not strictly adhering to employee social security contributions and not controlling overtime in private companies.Areas around Shanghai are more strictly enforced in this regard (at least that's what I heard).Local governments do this in order to compete for companies that can bring tax revenue, employment and investment to the local area.Local governments are doing it, and this competition means that taxes (and other administrative costs associated with running a business) should be dragged down as locals compete.In other words, Qian Yingyi believes that this kind of competition among Chinese localities is good for market development. In addition to industrial intervention policies, another way that the government may be able to help enterprises is the exchange rate policy.Roderick has studied exchange rates and found a strong correlation between undervalued real exchange rates and stronger economic growth in poor countries. “The Real Exchange Rateand Economic Growth：Theory and Evidence”，August 2007，汇率低估使得本国出口在全球市场上更有竞争力，进而激励外向型行业的投资，并给出口企业带来丰厚回报。你或许纳闷，为什么有人还叫嚣低估的汇率不会刺激经济增长呢。你或许认为，低汇率带动出口增长，进而加快整体经济发展，这不是十分明白的道理吗？然而，经济学家们在担心未能准确定价的汇率带来的看不见的成本，这些成本不明显，但十分紧要。例如，低估汇率意味着进口机械设备的成本增加。还可能带来非贸易领域的投资匮乏，比如国内服务业，因为人人都想把手中的资金投入出口行业。这反过来就会拖累经济增长和就业，并引发经济失衡。换而言之，经济学家通常认为，低估汇率造成的伤害会抵消给出口行业带来的优势。 不过，罗德里克认为，低估汇率对经济有促进作用还有另外一个原因，这也意味着总体说来，低估汇率对于一个国家的整体发展是有益的。他认为，由于低估汇率弥补了经济体中存在的其他严重问题，尤其是制度方面的不足，这一政策还是有用的。他举例说，发展中国家的法治水平一般较低，这给任何一个制造企业都带来了特定的问题。这类企业通常供应链很长，因此契约对它们而言非常重要。而且，当它们开展出口业务时，经常要面对海关等行政机构的官僚做派。罗德里克认为，在这种环境中，低估的汇率能够实际发挥补贴的作用。也就是，汇率能够带来一些额外的竞争力，来补偿低效率的制度（贿赂、行政审批时间等）带来的额外成本。这一发现的一个合乎逻辑的后果是，发展中国家的政府可能会尽量维持低估的汇率水平以提振经济增长。具体的方式可能通过进行外汇市场干预以防止本币名义汇率上升，即央行可以买入美元，以保持本币低汇率。 当然，对中国汇率政策也有很多讨论——在全球范围内也形成了很多研究。在这里，我将不再展开论述。但一个不容掩饰的事实是，最近几年的大多数时候，中国央行都会入市干预，买入美元和其他币种。央行持有的外汇储备不断飙升即为例证。市场干预达到这种规模，很难说（实际上是不可能）汇率是由市场决定的。围绕人民币是有管理的货币，还是被操纵的货币，打了很多口水仗（通常是意识形态的）。而且，得要承认，政府仍然控制人民币汇率的一个主要原因是出于对出口的担心，尤其是在2009年全球经济急剧收缩的环境下。当然，决策者必定不会认为，对汇率的“管理”是对制度缺陷的弥补，就像罗德里克所说的（事实上，要说中国经济中哪一领域的制度最有效率，恐怕当属出口行业。想想那些低税率，更有效率的行政机构，更高水平的物流，等等）。但是，这一策略是存在问题的。尽管人们担心出口行业失业，但没有对这一汇率政策使服务业需要背负的成本予以足够的重视。由于投资少，服务业创造的就业岗位少。就这一情形而言，2008年末外需大幅下滑对中国其实祸兮福倚，将会造成出口行业投资回落，激励中国企业家投资服务业——至少假如金融服务业、娱乐业、医疗、教育行业有足够的机会的话，他们会这么做。目前，这些领域大都将民间资本挡在门外。这是非常遗憾的，因为竞争被扼杀，创新受到抑制，无法创造就业，财富的创造受到破坏。换而言之，尽管大多数普通人认为控制汇率对中国是好事（罗德里克也同意），但大多数严肃的经济学家对由此带来的很大的、负面的而且通常是潜藏的影响担忧不已。 罗德里克的政策主张尽管很有吸引力，但对于实施这些政策的国家（比如中国）而言，也存在着两个大的问题。 第一个问题是，政府干预往往是一把双刃剑。政府干预具有隐蔽成本，而且你永远不知道一个十分强势的政府会如何改变游戏规则，也不知道它哪天想要改变规则，更无从知晓是否会不利于你的生意。某些时候，市长对于你的生意是有帮助的，但有时候，或许他打算扶持你的竞争对手，你的日子恐怕要开始不好过了；或者有时候他要为某一项目找钱，你被暗示或明示要意思意思。因此，成本和收益，得到与付出，不分你我，不可控制也无法预测。 一些中国具体产业政策的研究者最终惊异于研究所发现的情况。英国剑桥大学学者彼得·诺兰（Peter Nolan）最初愿意相信中国工业化政策的好处。他和他的学生们花了很长时间研究中国领先行业的多级大型国企，它们分布于钢铁、汽车、航空和银行业。他们的研究结果却表明，政府干预大多对企业是有损害的，即便是对国有企业。China and the Global Economy，2001，Palgrave，为了维持就业，企业被迫并购亏损的竞争对手。企业资产扩大，拓展新的行业，忽略了对核心竞争力的建设和效率的改进，结果造成企业发展定位模糊。这些企业缺乏真正的创新文化，往往由政府官员组成的班子领导。受重视行业的企业可以轻松获得银行贷款，因而在资金使用和企业扩张上往往奔腾豪放，无所谓效率。我们在深圳调研的几家私营企业高管公然地谈论他们每周都要做的上层工作——至少一个企业设有专职经理，其工作就是“经营”与当地政府的关系，主要内容是吃饭、喝酒、打高尔夫或其他活动。 在我看来，天真地信任政府总能给企业带来积极的推动，与自由市场狂热者深信政府干预往往是坏事一样有害。政府对企业不受限制的权力的成本与收益的微妙平衡，目前为止一直在中国起着作用，但并不确保它会永远起作用。在经济低迷的时候，资金减少，政府需要税收，地方政府能给予的支持力度减弱。在经济发展的初级阶段，行政部门可能知道怎样做，基本的工业布局比较简单。但随着经济发展趋于复杂，从工业转向服务业，从钢铁转向高科技、教育，有证据表明这种治理方式开始变得效率不足。更好的制度、明确稳定的规则的必要性变得尤为重要。需要政府下放权力以鼓励效率，需要绩效考核制，需要拼实力而不是拼关系的竞争。到了这样的时候，政府退出企业经营，专心投身于监管是关键。在中国，制度会有这样的飞跃吗？It remains to be seen. 关于政府应发挥的作用，还有一点需要提及。正如罗德里克所说，并不是一定需要政府来组织产业升级，从低附加值产业转向高附加值产业。如果条件成熟，这一过程能够自然地发生，因此也能够更为持久。 人们今天的挫折感是可以理解的。很多中资企业做袜子或其他低附加值产品，这让很多人感到气馁。他们认为，这样一来不公平，二来一个老是忙着做袜子、做塑料玩具的经济体是不健康的，而人家发达国家的企业尽生产电脑、激光一类的产品。持这种观点的人大谈产业升级的必要性。我不敢说他们的这番壮志不对，但我想可以从另外一个角度来说说我的看法。 第一，如果不做袜子，成千上万的人只好去做繁重而收益又无保障的农业劳动，做袜子也不是特别不好。这一行业仍在很多发展中国家占据重要地位。比如，印度的大多数人口仍然守着地里那点庄稼，基本靠天吃饭。我敢说，他们巴不得在工厂里做袜子，辛苦归辛苦，但能带来稳定的高一些的收入。 第二，任何事情的发生都有理可循——做袜子能够极大地创造就业。无论怎么说，这都是十分重要的。中国是劳动密集型经济，为数百万没有接受太多教育的人口创造就业，是很伟大、很伟大的事情。在很多发展中国家，包括亚洲新兴市场，人们百无聊赖地闲待着，没有机会工作，眼巴巴瞅着中国创造的工作岗位。因此，我们在随意批评中国创造数百万低端就业时要三思。 第三，我认为，只要构建正确的平台，产业升级能够自然而然地发生。这绝对不是低估中国企业的抱负。而且，鉴于近些年民营企业和出口的大量积累，似乎也并不缺资本。同样也不缺技术，技术会自然地从最早拥有的企业传播开来（往往是被偷去的）。因此，中国本土企业的科技水平远高于很多经济发展水平相当的国家。并且，今天外国企业越来越将真正核心的研发拿到中国来做，这只会加快技术的传播速度。 在我眼中，这一过程每天都在发生。我所在的渣打银行的中国员工学会了如何设计复杂的金融产品，学会了怎样在全球市场中经营客户关系及做交易，他们中的一部分人会转投中资银行，所有这些专业技术就会注入中资企业。再如，尽管几款中国制造汽车未能通过欧洲和俄罗斯的安全标准测试的消息吸引了很多眼球，但这种情况将会改变。一家美国汽车制造企业的中国区总裁曾经告诉我，他相信中国本土汽车的品质将在10～15年内赶上他们。最近我拜访的一家中资汽车企业计划2010年将汽车销往美国市场。这些车将走低端路线，以价格低廉取胜，但这仍然是一个非凡的成就。如今日本、韩国汽车在西方市场独步天下的事实，彰显了发展中国家的企业有着怎样的追赶潜力。 所以，我们有雄心，有资本，有促进产业升级的技术。我们卡在哪里呢？卡在制度障碍。第一，缺乏真正有效的保护并促进创新的一整套法律法规，而代之以政府官员设定部分行业、产品的专利申请目标。结果，近年来专利权申请数量膨胀，但大部分价值不高，甚至没有多大价值（从首次专利保护期限失效后，重新申请的比率很低可见一斑）。你的发明得不到法律保护，而你将被获准靠此发明赚钱，你自然不会培养出创新文化。当然，某些政府部门试图推动创新，但问题在于它们所运用的不是最好的机制。举个例子，对于出售盗版者，要依靠警方和相关刑事犯罪法规条例去制裁责任人，但是，除了逮售假包假表的小商贩外，警察还有更重要的事做。办案经费少，而犯罪取证所需的成本很高。更好的办法或许可以是允许认为自身专利权受到侵害的企业提起民事诉讼。目前，这种改变正在发生。存在的问题是组织难度仍然很大，而且裁决结果很难实际执行。但是，如果这一体系真正发挥作用，违反知识产权的行为将遭到重罚，效率就会提高很多。 其次，在于教育。这一领域范围广大，政策复杂，从小学到大学都存在很多问题需要解决。2008年所作的一项调研显示，中国农村地区100所小学的26%的学生患有贫血或肠道寄生虫病，这意味着他们的学习能力低、注意力弱。研究人员发现寄宿学校营养水平普遍较低，这也是影响学习能力的一个问题。提高小学生的伙食质量必须引起重视。目前只有30%的农村孩子初中毕业后升入高中，20%进入各类技术学校。原因在于，虽然九年制义务教育是免费的（这方面取得了进展），但中国高中阶段教育费用位于全世界之首。请看数字：每学年160美元，目前为止全世界最高。这一事实，对于一个数度将宇航员送入太空、举办了史上最为昂贵的奥运会的国家而言，不能不说令人感慨。相比之下，中国台湾地区处于同一发展水平时，高中入学率是100%。教育关乎未来劳动力群体的质量，因此教育薄弱将拖累中国长期的经济增长。的确有充分的理由将义务教育延长到高中阶段，但由于成本原因一直为财政部门所反对。 总之，我认为中资企业不会一直拘泥于当前的低科技环境。但能给予它们帮助的不是中小企业扶持资金，不是税收优惠，而是能够解决根本问题的制度性改变。 实行干预性产业政策、进行积极的汇率管理以及给予企业补贴带来的另一个较大问题是，容易招致贸易伙伴的不满。现在，或许你可以觉得“我不在乎——我们要想方设法帮助国内企业和经济发展”。这一反应是自然的，也是可以理解的。但是，在对本国企业和本国经济的关心呵护上，每个国家都有着同样的感受。为什么日本、韩国、马来西亚或者中国的其他贸易竞争对手不去管理本国汇率，不向与中国开展贸易的企业发放补贴？它们为什么不应该对别国的出口设置障碍？如果各国都开始“管理”本国的汇率，向它们想要扶持的企业发放补贴，贸易争端将不可避免地扩大蔓延。 出于这一原因，1995年，WTO诞生。第二次世界大战以后，全球就如何降低贸易关税，就哪些国家制定监管贸易和投资政策的共同规则等议题开始谈判磋商。贸易战的萌芽在20世纪30年代就已出现，当时由于各国立法保护本国企业，提高进口关税等原因，导致全球贸易体系崩溃。WTO的成员国同意开放贸易和投资，禁止补贴，限制其他类型的国家干预。这与罗德里克对发展中经济体的很多政策建议相左，也与中国政府实行的一些产业政策相左。尤其重要的一点是：中国扶持企业的一些措施与WTO框架存在着真正的紧张关系。作为一个发展中国家，中国的经济决策者通常认为自己有权利采用积极的产业政策、管理汇率等。在很多人眼中，包括罗德里克和很多读者在内，这是未尝不可的，但其中一些政策的确与WTO的精神和规则相背离。 这是美国（以及其他一些国家）将中国诉诸WTO的原因所在。我们需要谨慎地分析这些案例。有时候美国政客们对中国的攻击确实很蠢，完全没有理解实际发生了什么，也使得人们容易将其投诉视为美国针对中国的贸易保护。而且，美国国内的一些工业团体的确夸大了中国产业政策对他们造成的影响，并游说美国政府给予保护。但是，由于游戏就是这么玩的，我们也不能认为美国向WTO提交的所有申诉都是贸易保护或不公平竞争。国际贸易律师认同，其中的一些案例美国是占理的，中国没有履行先前的承诺。声称自己是发展中国家，抱怨贸易保护主义，是不够的。作为经济学家，我们需要从独立的立场走进很多案例的是与非。 例如2008年WTO的某一委员会认为，中国对进口汽车零配件征收过重关税，违反了WTO的相应规则。中国试图以此保护国内汽车配件产业，还能用别的办法提升自身竞争力吗？另一个案例是，美国向WTO申诉中国向出口企业提供多种出口补贴，给予中国企业不公平的优势，且补贴种类在不断增加。在以上两个案例中，中国的做法很可能偏离了WTO的框架和最初的承诺，美国只能借助这一机制激励中国履行入世承诺。尽管在思想上接受起来有难度，我们仍有必要意识到，如果这些规则得不到得当的实施，中国企业的利益也会受到损害。 这一点将我们带到罗德里克思想以及中国当前发展战略的矛盾之处。罗德里克希望中国等发展中国家有权利实施积极的产业政策，但他并没有特别认真地考虑这些政策给其他国家企业带来的成本。WTO的谈判微妙又复杂——富国开放市场，但前提是所有企业在同一个竞技场上竞争。现在，在很多情况下，中国劳动力的比较优势意味着中国企业能够在价格上打败美国对手。一般来说这是件好事，因为整体成本被拉低，整体劳动生产率得以提高。从第十一章的分析中我们可以知道，这应该也不会对美国工资造成多大影响。但是，一旦某一国政府为某一类企业降低税率，免费提供土地，对汇率进行管理以促进出口，就使得竞技场失去了平衡。受到影响的美国和欧洲企业向本国政府施加压力，要求后者向中国施压使之改变政策。某些情况下这听上去像西方的贸易保护主义——有时候确实是，但有时候是对中国的贸易保护主义的可以理解的反应。 为了平衡自己对发达国家“温和型保护主义”的支持，罗德里克也相信，发达国家应有更多政策腾挪空间。他希望美国等发达国家为因开放贸易导致的失业者提供较多社会保障和再培训。他还认为，如果发展中国家的企业使用童工或生产中不考虑环境成本，发达国家应该能够寻求对本国相关企业的保护。而且，他质问，发达国家的企业为什么不能将贸易伙伴采用低估汇率的行为诉诸WTO呢？ 换而言之，罗德里克认为，发展中国家和发达国家的企业都应该获得目前WTO所赋予以外的更多自由，而这是罗德里克政策建议的核心问题。如果按照罗德里克的逻辑走下去，我们或许应该解散WTO，回到没有贸易规则的世界。允许发展中国家补贴国内企业，允许发达国家给从不严格实行劳动保护和环保标准的国家进口的产品设置关税。很快这将导致一片混乱。20世纪最重要的制度发明之一——开放的全球贸易体系，将会崩塌。而且，正如我在本章开头所提，没有合理的制度作保障，经济增长对任何一个经济体而言都更加困难重重。2008年开始的全球经济衰退将使全球贸易框架面临生死考验。只有每个人都负起责任，我们才能安然通过考验。