Chapter 20 Chapter 18 Lifting the Veil of "Optionalization of Power"

Because there is no "immediate benefit" of corruption, compared with traditional corruption methods, the hidden coefficient of "power option" of leading cadres is higher. "During the 'Eleventh Five-Year Plan' period, my country's anti-corruption achievements have been remarkable, which has effectively provided a guarantee for the overall development of the country's economy and society." Professor Qiu Peien of the Political Science Department of the National School of Administration said in an interview with reporters, "During the 'Twelfth Five-Year Plan' period, this kind of The high-pressure anti-corruption situation will continue."

At present, among all kinds of corruption in our country, there is a phenomenon of "optimization of power" among leading cadres that is increasingly emerging. Some people gradually seek rent and expand power to time, and trade power with future interests, which heralds a certain trend in the development of corruption. new trends and trends. In the opinion of many interviewed experts, this form of corruption, because there is no "immediate benefit" of corruption, has a higher "safety" factor than traditional corruption methods, so it is more difficult to fight corruption.Preventing and suppressing the "optimization of power" of leading cadres has become a thorny new topic.

On July 3 and 16, 2010, Zijin Mining Group’s Zijinshan Copper Mine Wet Process Plant located in Shanghang County, Fujian Province had two major water pollution accidents caused by copper-containing acidic solution leaking, causing direct economic losses as high as 3187.71 ten thousand yuan. This accident has attracted great attention from the society, and some details disclosed by the media are quite intriguing: many retired leading cadres in the political circles of Shanghang County, after being put on idle jobs by the Zijin Mining Committee, their annual salaries range from more than 100,000 yuan to hundreds of thousands of yuan.For example, Lin Shuiqing, chairman of the board of supervisors of Zijin Mining, was previously a member of the Standing Committee of the Shanghang County Party Committee and head of the United Front Work Department; supervisor Lin Xinxi was the deputy secretary and member of the Standing Committee of the Shanghang County Commission for Discipline Inspection.

Of course, there are also former senior officials from Beijing and the province.For example, Chen Yuchuan, the former chief engineer of the Ministry of Geology and Mining and the president of the Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences, who served as the independent director of the company; …In addition, some leading cadres also own shares of Zijin Mining through various channels. The Zijin Mining incident is not an isolated case.According to reports, Shen Kezhang, the former mayor of Jingkou District, Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province, founded a company after he was released from prison for bribery and embezzlement of public funds.When the house was built, it exceeded the planned fixed point, and the main body of the reservoir dam was shoveled down by about 1.5 meters.Public opinion generally believes that Shen Kezhang has been operating in the officialdom for many years. Even if he is not in office, his power influence is still there, and he can build illegal villas on the reservoir embankment through legal means. The option effect of power cannot be underestimated.

From Zijin Mining to the "Villa on the Bashang", there are various indications that the "optionization of power" of leading cadres has become a big black hole of corruption, which indicates a new trend and trend in the development of corruption. The so-called "optionization of power" by leading cadres means that when they are in office, they use the influence of power to seek illegal benefits for certain enterprises and individual bosses. Waiting to seek greater benefits as a foreshadowing. "In the process of approval and decision-making power for the use of various projects and engineering funds, some leading cadres use their power to 'grow big fish' and make long-term power investments." Qiu Peien pointed out that some leading cadres are keen on helping gangs Factions, these are option classics that infiltrate the feudal legacy.As for the "optionization of power" through engineering projects, promotion and promotion, it is even more of a hot option option.

Judging from the reporter's investigation, there are currently three main types of "optimization of power" among leading cadres: the first is the "confession of wives and sons".Seeking profits for the company and others while in office, and asking the company and others to donate benefits to their wives and children after resignation;Seeking profit for the company while in office, resigning or retiring to the company to "work with a high salary"; the third is the "personal attachment" type.Cultivate and place cronies in key departments before resignation or retirement, so that after withdrawing from the power center, you can still enjoy the various conveniences and benefits brought by power.

"In recent years, some leading cadres have engaged in less 'spot' transactions and more 'futures' transactions during corruption activities. They no longer make immediate profits, but wait for many years to include the principal and interest together." Beijing A prosecutor of the Municipal Procuratorate who did not want to be named told reporters this way. Many interviewed experts believe that the biggest feature of the "optionization of power" of leading cadres is that it does not directly involve money. "Leading cadres' optionization of power" is highly concealed and difficult to be discovered." Professor Ren Jianming, director of the Research Center for Integrity and Governance, School of Public Administration, Tsinghua University, who has been concerned about the phenomenon of "optionization of power" believes that in practice, he wants to investigate and crack down on difficult.Because of the "optionization of power" corruption, because the time span is relatively large, although it can be proved that leading cadres benefited the other party, it is difficult to prove that they took the other party's benefits, so the crime of bribery is difficult to establish.

"The implementation process of leading cadres' 'power option' corruption is very secretive, and the two parties basically formed a high degree of tacit understanding, and it is easy to reach an 'offensive and defensive alliance'." Dr. Ma Guoan, deputy director of the Legal Research Center of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, analyzed, " In the process of power option transactions of leading cadres, it is generally open to 'follow the rules', not naked cash transactions. These option transactions were put on the table at the time, and there was no reason for it."

In reality, leading cadres generally use the pretext of "supporting enterprises and promoting development" in the operation of "optimization of power". Even if national interests are damaged, it is easy to cover up with "mistakes in decision-making", which is quite concealed and deceptive. , so that the chances of power rent-seeking being hit are greatly reduced. In addition, this kind of "optionization of power" has a large "time and space span", so it is difficult to implement and obtain evidence, which virtually increases the "safety" factor of corrupt elements. "Some leading cadres' optionization of power" spans several years, or even more than ten years." Professor Lu Zhaowang of the School of Politics and Public Administration, China University of Political Science and Law, said in an interview with reporters that the "optionization of power" of leading cadres is corrupt. The time is quite flexible, which provides the greatest possibility for the successful realization of "power resources".

"As far as corruption itself is concerned, some transactions are carried out in different places, hometowns or countries." Lu Zhaowang gave an example. They buy houses and shop for them, and some create conditions for the children of leading cadres to study abroad, go through procedures and pay fees, provide guarantees, living expenses, etc. In fact, the current anti-corruption methods in our country are still limited to the "three old things" such as "reporting, auditing, and double regulation", which are relatively simple.Due to the lack of tangible evidence for leading cadres' "optionization of power" and the long time span, it is often difficult to prove it.

Relevant legal experts also believe that the loopholes in the law also open the door for leading cadres to "optimize power". Although the "Civil Servant Law" has relevant provisions, it is difficult to grasp whether the retirees who have no positions can be identified as "duty crimes" and whether the work they have engaged in after retirement can be identified as "optionization" of power. The Punishment Regulations have no relevant explanatory operational provisions. What needs to be pointed out is that the provisions in this aspect of my country's criminal law are also extremely vague.For example, in the criminal law of our country, the criterion for judging the crime of accepting bribes requires that the perpetrator not only has the intention to illegally accept other people's property, but also has the intention to seek benefits for others as a condition for illegally accepting property in exchange. "It is very difficult to legally prove the two intentions of option corruption at the same time." Chen Jie, a lawyer from Beijing Zhongguang Law Firm, analyzed in an interview with reporters, "This kind of system and legal existence is not easy to operate. It has also exacerbated the occurrence of 'power option' corruption." The interviewed experts believe that as a kind of corruption that uses power as capital to participate in the redistribution of social material benefits, the "optionization of power" by leading cadres seriously undermines the principles of justice and fairness, resulting in unfair social distribution.And its "advantage" that it is not easy to be sanctioned by the law makes it easier to induce leading cadres to abuse their power and breed corruption. According to the analysis of previous cases, there are many reasons for the "power option" of leading cadres, but the gray area in the power supervision system is the main reason. "The current supervision mechanism tends to be a mere formality. Subordinates lack power support for superior supervision, peer supervision lacks guarantees, superiors lack understanding of subordinate supervision, and public supervision and public opinion supervision lag behind." Beijing Normal University Politics and International Shen Youjun, an associate professor at the School of Relations, told reporters, “The current regulations on supervision are mainly aimed at leading cadres in office. As for leading cadres who are corrupt while in office, and then “cash out” the proceeds of corruption after retiring or going overseas, it is a blind spot of supervision. .” Many interviewed experts also pointed out that although my country has officially implemented the "Government Information Disclosure Regulations" in May 2008, the current level of government information disclosure at all levels is not enough, more information is controlled internally by departments and a few people, and the public's right to know And the power of supervision has not been fully respected, which also provides an opportunity for some corrupt leading cadres to use their power for personal gain. Therefore, to curb the "optionization of power", we must first strictly supervise the exercise of power by in-service cadres. Shen Youjun pointed out: "To prevent 'optimization of power', it is necessary to enhance the transparency of power operation from the system, give full play to the role of the news media, establish a three-dimensional monitoring network in the whole society, and ensure the standardization and integrity of the process of exercising power by leading cadres. Procedure and transparency." In view of the current reality that leading cadres are frequently rotated, in order to prevent the phenomenon of sudden promotion before resignation or retirement, many interviewed experts suggested strengthening the accountability of personnel negligence, and implementing relevant "strict prohibitions" and "prohibitions". Minimize the discretionary space of "top leaders" and prevent leading cadres from "surprise" wholesale official hats to implement "power options" in order to consolidate and continue their own power networks and corruption chains. Secondly, the interviewed experts pointed out that in addition to strengthening the supervision of the power of leading cadres in office, it is also necessary to regulate the behavior of leading cadres who leave their jobs. "It is necessary to strengthen the enforcement of relevant laws and regulations, especially the "Civil Servant Law" and the documents of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection." Lu Zhaowang said, "The "Civil Servant Law" strictly stipulates the restrictions on the resignation of civil servants: Civil servants who are leading members shall not be employed in enterprises or other profit-making organizations directly related to their original work within three years of resignation, and other civil servants shall not engage in profit-making activities directly related to their original work within two years of resignation. It is understood that in order to standardize the employment behavior of leading cadres after resignation and retirement (retirement), the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has issued a "three-year two prohibition" integrity self-discipline regulation: "Leading cadres at the county (division) level and above resign and Within three years after retiring, it is not allowed to accept the employment of private enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises and intermediary agencies within the jurisdiction and business scope of the original post, and it is not allowed to personally engage in or act as an agent for private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises to engage in business related to the jurisdiction of the original post. business and corporate activities.” However, in many parts of our country, the "Civil Servant Law" and the documents of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection have not been enforced, and there is still a serious phenomenon of "a piece of paper".For this reason, the interviewed experts called for more punishment for violating the ban on resignation and strengthening the accountability system; let corrupt leading cadres understand that "optionization" is not a "safe harbor" and no matter how long they leave their jobs, they cannot escape law justicfication. Many interviewed experts also suggested that in order to curb the "optionization of power" of leading cadres, it is even more necessary to improve the follow-up and control system of "continuation of power", including strict auditing of the retirement of leading cadres, the implementation of property declarations for civil servants and close relatives, and the implementation of property declaration for divorced officials. Retired leading cadres conduct long-term follow-up inspections, etc.