Chapter 28 Chapter V Incentives
In the UK, export incentives are often applied for for certain goods, and the government sometimes agrees to pay them.Because in foreign markets, we cannot completely monopolize the labor of workers like we do at home; we cannot treat foreigners like we do to our own people and force them to buy domestically produced goods, so someone came up with a way, that is, we To pay for the consumption of foreigners (that is, to issue incentives for these commodities).It has been supposed that such bounties, for the merchants and manufacturers of the country, enable them to sell their goods cheaply in foreign markets against their competitors; The difference is more in favor of the country.This method of strengthening the country and enriching the people with the balance of trade advocated by mercantilism is considered the best method.
There is a theory that incentives should only be awarded to those sectors of business that depend on incentives to stay afloat.However, we all know that if any commercial department sells goods, if the profits it gets can compensate for the cost of production and sales of goods and make profits, then these commercial departments will be able to operate normally even without incentives, just like other departments without incentives. .If the benefits obtained from the sale of goods by certain commercial departments cannot compensate for costs or increase profits, then issuing incentives to support the continued operation of these commercial departments is actually encouraging a business model in which the income is less than the cost, that is, every operation is profitable. You will only lose money and not make a profit.Just think, if all business branches were like this, the capital of the country would be exhausted very quickly.
We should be clear that the business sectors that can issue incentives should be those that have long been engaged in trade between the two countries and often lose money.But in fact, even if there is no incentive money to compensate for the loss, these departments will change their capital use and transfer to other profitable industries out of self-interest.It can be seen, therefore, that the bounty system, like other measures proposed by mercantilism, only makes the development of the national industry contrary to the normal laws, and makes it more unfavorable.
A learned author wrote in his treatise on corn trade: "Since the establishment of the grain export incentive system, the export price of grain has been higher than the import price when considered from the general price of grain; This difference would greatly exceed the sum of the bounties for the period. The mercantilists would say that the excess of exports over imports not only covered the expenditure of state bounties, but left a large surplus, such that the corn trade Wouldn't it be good for the country? But in fact, the payment of the bounty is only a small part of what the society pays for the grain export trade. They don't take into account the cost that the farmer pays to grow the grain. Therefore, if the grain in the foreign market Income, which cannot recover the expenditure of the bounty and the cost of the farmer and make a profit—this is the reason why the bounty system was established, and the loss in the middle is the loss of the entire society or national assets.”
It has been said that the marked fall in the average price of corn was the result of the bounty system.I have said that between the end of the last century and the first sixty-four years of this century the average price of corn continued to fall.If what I say is true, this would have happened without the bounty system.France, for example, had no bounty system, and the export of grain was prohibited in France until 1764, but the average price of grain in France fell as in England.In the final analysis, the fall in the average price of corn was caused by the gradual rise in the real value of silver, and not by any system.I have shown in the first part of this book that the real value of silver in the European market has gradually increased during this century.It follows that the fall in the price of corn is not caused by the bounty.
It has already been said that in years of good harvests the bounty would prompt so much exportation of grain that the price in the home market would be higher than it would have been in the normal state (without the bounty system)—of course this is what the proponents of the bounty system argue. But in years of bad harvest, though the system of bounties ceases, the price of corn rises above the normal price, as there is not much surplus to make up for the shortfall in the good year, owing to the great export.Thus, the system of bounties raises the price of corn in the home market above its normal state, whether the harvest is good or not.I believe that people with a little rationality will agree with my above point of view.
But two reasons have been given to support their view that the bounty system helps to encourage cultivation: First, the bounty provides the farmer with a large foreign market, increases the demand for corn, and helps to promote the production of corn. ; Second, farmers under the bounty system sell at a higher price than they would under normal farming conditions (no bounty system), thus encouraging farming.And, in the long run, this double effect will greatly promote the production of corn; and at the end of the period the bounty system will raise the price of corn far less than it would fall under normal cultivation.
My response to the first point above is as follows: the rewards open up foreign markets and inevitably lose the domestic market.Corn, which was exported upon bounty, remained in the home market when it could not, and, though it increased consumption, lowered its price.Like other export bounties, the corn bounty imposed two different taxes on the common people: a tax on the people for the burden of the bounty; It is what people pay invisibly when they buy grain.As far as corn is concerned, the second tax is much more onerous than the first.Let us assume, at the average annual price, that a five shilling bounty is paid for a quart of wheat exported, and that the price of corn in the home market is sixpence a bushel higher (four shillings a quart higher) than it would be if there were no bounty. make).People, then, not only pay five shillings a quarter of the export bounty, but pay four shillings more for each quart of wheat consumed.According to the theory of the aforementioned author--that the proportion of the export of corn to the domestic consumption is one to thirty-one, then, when the tax on the first is five shillings, the tax on the second That's six pounds four shillings.The imposition of such heavy taxes upon the necessaries of life has the effect not only of reducing the necessaries of the poor, but of raising wages in proportion to the price of the necessaries of life.In the first case, the ever-diminishing necessities of life of the people, their ability to raise children must be reduced, and thus retard the growth of the domestic population; affect the development of domestic industries.Thus the bounty system, on the one hand, increases the proportion of the foreign market to the domestic market; The expansion of the grain market.From this point of view, in essence, the bounty system did not expand the market and consumption of grain, but reduced the market and consumption of grain.
The second point of view above is that an increase in the price of grain is beneficial to the farmers and thus will increase the production of grain.
My response to this view is as follows: If the bounty results in an increase in the real value of corn, the farmer can support more people with the same amount of corn in accordance with the way of life at the time—whether wealthy, moderate is still frugal, then the result may be as described in the above point of view.But in fact, any artificial system, including the bonus system, will not have such a result.The effect of the bounty on the price of corn was only nominal; it had no real influence on the real value of corn, but only lowered the real value of silver.
As the money-price of corn determines the price of other produce, it may be said that an equal quantity of silver would exchange as much corn as other produce.The bounty system imposes a heavy tax on the people, a great burden to the taxpayer, and little benefit to the beneficiary.
The money price of corn also determines the price of labour.The progress, regression, or stagnation of society will lead the employers of the laborers to live in prosperity, moderation, or thrift.The price of labor refers to the purchasing power of a laborer to purchase a certain amount of grain according to a rich, moderate or frugal life.
The money price of corn determines the price of all other produce of the land.In the process of improvement, the price of all the produce of the land will remain in a certain proportion to the price of corn.Of course, this ratio will vary from period to period.Take, for example, pasture, hay, livestock meat, and horses and horse grain, whose prices vary with inland transportation and the effect of domestic trade on the price of grain.
As the money-price of corn determines the price of all other produce of the land, it determines the price of all the raw materials of manufactures; and as the money-price of corn determines the price of labour, it determines the price of the skill of the manufacturer.The above two combined, it follows that the money-price of corn determines the price of manufactures.In short, the price of labour, and of all the produce and manufactures of land, varies with the price of corn.
As a result of the bounty, the price of corn was raised from three shillings and sixpence to four shillings, and the peasants were obliged to pay to the landlord a money rent corresponding to the increase in the price of corn.But the rise in the price of corn has not increased the purchasing power of four shillings over three and sixpence;It is true that the people benefit somewhat from the increase in the price of corn when they buy foreign goods; but they gain nothing at all when they buy their own produce.Moreover, the important point is that the capital of farmers and landlords is basically used to buy domestic products.
The fall of the price of silver by the richness of the mines affects most branches of commerce in essentially the same way.Therefore, a fall in the price of silver leads to a rise in the price of commodities, and does not make the owners of the commodities richer or poorer.Though gold and silver are actually cheaper than they were before, the real price of every other article is unchanged.However, if the decline in silver prices is the result of individual countries or political factors, then this is an extremely important thing.It doesn't make people richer, it makes people poorer.The reason is, that the rise of the price of all commodities, which would depress the domestic industry, would require less silver than the domestic produce to sell in foreign countries, so that the foreign price would be lower than the domestic price, both in the international market and in the domestic market. .
For example, Spain and Portugal were rich in gold and silver mines, which allowed them to sell gold and silver to other countries in Europe.The price of gold and silver, somewhat cheap in Spain and Portugal, is dearer in the rest of Europe.From the above, it can be seen that Spain and Portugal will suffer from an inherent disadvantage in trade.However, the difference between its gold and silver prices and other European countries cannot be greater than the cost of transporting gold and silver and its insurance premiums.Due to the small size and high value of gold and silver, the cost of transportation is not a big problem; and the insurance cost is the same as that of other goods of equivalent value.If Spain and Portugal had not exacerbated their own disadvantage by their political institutions, they would actually suffer very little from this particular situation.
However, the policy adopted by Spain on the export of gold and silver is to levy taxes, while Portugal prohibits the export of gold and silver. As a result, gold and silver smuggling continues, because the value of gold and silver in other countries is higher than that of Spain and Portugal, and it can be compared with smuggling. costs are offset.Let's illustrate this with the example of a river with a dam. If the dam is full, the water will overflow as if there were no dam.For the same reason, the prohibition of the export of gold and silver will lead to this result.A nation cannot keep a surplus of gold and silver beyond its use.For the amount of gold and silver used in coinage, gold and silver utensils, gilding, and gold and silver ornaments in a country is determined by the annual output of the country's land and labor.If it is more than the amount used, the excess will overflow like the water in the dam.Spain and Portugal restricted the export of gold and silver, so that the annual export volume of gold and silver was almost the same as the import volume.Thus, compared with the annual production of their land and labor, the quantity of gold and silver in Spain and Portugal is greater than in other countries.Therefore, the greater the restriction—the heavier the taxation, the heavier the punishment imposed by the prohibition, the stricter the enforcement of the law, the greater the difference, just as the higher the dam, the greater the difference in water level between the inside and the outside of the dam.People can often see many gold and silver utensils in the national homes of Spain and Portugal, but they can't see other things that are suitable for this symbol of wealth.A great surplus of gold and silver, however, must necessarily reduce the value of gold and silver, and thereby raise the price of all commodities, and at last restrain the development of agriculture and manufactures in both countries.The foreign countries could thus furnish to the West and Portugal almost all the manufactures, and a great part of the produce of the land, with a smaller quantity of gold and silver than they expended at home.
Taxation and prohibition play a role in two distinct ways.On the one hand, the taxation lowered the value of gold and silver in Spain and Portugal; on the other hand, the value of foreign gold and silver rose slightly due to the surplus of domestic gold and silver.If foreign countries trade with Spain and Portugal, both sides can actually enjoy benefits.We know that if the sluice is opened, the water in the dam will flow out of the dam, and soon the water levels inside and outside the dam will be equal.If, therefore, this tax or prohibition were abolished, the quantity of gold and silver in Spain and Portugal would decrease, that in foreign countries would increase, and soon be equal or nearly equal in all countries.On the surface, although the prices of Spanish and Portuguese commodities, land and annual products of labor will fall, and the export of gold and silver will bring losses, in fact, the real value of commodities and annual products will remain the same as before. The quantity of labor commanded and employed is the same as before, only it is now represented by a smaller quantity of gold and silver than before.The rise in the value of gold and silver has the same effect on the present circulation of commerce with smaller quantities of gold and silver than with former large quantities.And the gold and silver flowing into foreign countries is not simply flowing in, but is exchanged for equivalent goods.These goods are not all consumed by the idle rich; and the real wealth and consumption of those rich are not increased by the export of gold and silver.Of the goods exchanged, the greater part are materials, implements, and food, with which the working people produce all the value they consume, and at a profit, which in turn enable the employment and maintenance of still more working people.In this way, the former dead capital of society becomes living capital, and promotes the development of industry; the annual output of land and labor will gradually increase; finally, the disadvantages to which industry is currently suffering will be completely changed.
The system of bounties for the export of corn produced the same results as the unreasonable policies adopted by Spain and Portugal towards the export of gold and silver.Regardless of the present state of cultivation, a bounty on the export of corn tends to make corn more expensive in the home market than it would be without the bounty, and lower in the foreign market than it would be without the bounty.The average money-price of corn, as has been said, affects in some measure the average money-price of all other commodities, so that bounties tend to lower the price of silver at home, and raise it abroad.The foreigners, and especially the Dutch, thus obtained English corn at a cheaper price--a price lower not only without the bounty, but also under the bounty.The eminent writer Matt Dekker once said: "The bounty system, which did not enable the English worker to produce goods for as little silver as it would have done without the bounty, enabled the Dutch to produce Commodities." The consequence of this is that, everywhere, English manufactures are more expensive than they would be without bounties, and Dutch manufactures are cheaper than they would be without bounties.Finally, Dutch industry enjoys a double benefit (low costs and high profits).This is because it is only superficial that the bounty raises the domestic price of corn in England, and its real price does not rise; it is also superficial that the bounty raises the quantity of labor employed and maintained by a certain corn, but in essence it increases the quantity represented by a certain corn. The amount of silver has risen.This result adversely affected British manufactures, farmers, and squires.Although the income of the peasants and gentry increased, the quantity of labor, food, and other commodities they could buy decreased, so that their benefits were only superficial.
In the whole country, I see, there is only one class of persons who can really benefit from the bounty system, and that is the corn merchants (exporters or importers).In good years the bounty causes the export of more corn than it would have had without the bounty; in the bad year the bounty causes the import of more corn than it would have had without the bounty.Thus, grain merchants benefited from good or bad harvests, especially in poor harvest years, when the grain they imported could be sold at a higher price, thereby earning greater profits.The corn merchants, therefore, were the most in favor of the bounty system.
As for the country gentry, following the example of the manufacturers, they thought that the importation of foreign corn should be heavily taxed (prohibited in good years), and the exportation of their own should be rewarded.They believe that this can not only obtain a monopoly position in the domestic market, but also not cause a surplus in the domestic market.This approach is the same as that of manufacturers.There is, however, a fundamental difference between corn and manufactures.By monopolizing the domestic market, or by encouraging exports, woolen goods may be sold at a higher price than they would otherwise be, because by these measures, they increase not only their apparent price, but also their real value.The manufacturers thus increased not only their apparent wealth, but their real wealth, and they were able to live better, employ more labor--hire more, and consume more Taste.The application of the bounty system to corn, however, does not raise its real value, but only its apparent price.Such a result, therefore, does not increase the real wealth of the farmer or squire, nor sustain and employ more labourers, nor, of course, promote the cultivation of corn.
We know that everything has its essence, and the real value condensed by grain cannot change with the fluctuation of currency price.Neither the system of export bounties, nor the possession of a monopoly in the home market, can raise the real value of corn; nor can the freest competition lower it.The real value of corn, all over the world, is determined by the quantity of labor it can sustain; , that is, the amount of labor that a rich, moderate, or frugal life can sustain.We know that woolen and linen are not the dominant articles of life, and they do not measure or determine the real value of all other commodities.Grains are not.The ratio of the average money price of corn to the average money price of other commodities measures and determines their real value.Although the average money price of corn varies from century to century, its real value does not change at will, but only the real value of silver.
In fact, any system of export incentives for commodities is bound to be opposed by the people.The reasons are as follows: first, all the policies of mercantilism violate the normal laws, causing some domestic industries to transfer to less profitable industries, so they are generally opposed; second, the export incentive system not only Turning some industries into less profitable industries, or even turning these industries into unprofitable industries, is particularly opposed.The corn bounty system was objected to on other grounds: First, it did not at all promote the production of the commodity which it was intended to promote.The gentry demanded this bounty on the basis of the imitation of the manufacturer, but the gentry were not so fully aware of their interests as the manufacturer.They not only expended the great revenues of the state, but imposed heavy taxes upon the masses of the people, without thereby appreciably increasing the real value of their commodities.Moreover, by thus diminishing the real value of silver, the bounty system has restrained the general industry of the country.As the development of the general industry of the country determines the degree of improvement of the land, the bounties they demand, instead of promoting the improvement of the land, hinder it to a certain extent.
There is an opinion that the production incentive system is more effective than the export incentive system in promoting the production of goods.At this time, the people only have to pay one kind of tax to pay the bounty.The bounty of production lowers the price of goods in the home market, so that people do not have to pay the second tax mentioned above (caused by the increase in the price of goods), and, to a certain extent, the first tax people pay seems to be Part of the compensation was also received.The mercantilist prejudice holds that national wealth derives more from exports than from production; and that exports are more favored than production in terms of earning money.As a result, production bounties are not given out very often.Another view is that production incentives are more likely to generate fraud than export incentives.I don't know if that's true, but it's well known that export incentives actually lead to a lot of fraud.However, both merchants and manufacturers favored the policy of export bounties because their goods would not have a large surplus in the home market—a production bounty would sometimes cause a surplus, while an export bounty caused the surplus to be shipped abroad, As a result, domestic surplus goods can be sold at high prices.Therefore, among the various policies of mercantilism, the export bonus system is their favorite one.Operators in certain industries are even willing to spend their own money to reward the export of some goods.This policy has been implemented smoothly, mainly in the following two aspects: one is to increase the quantity of domestically produced goods; the other is to keep the high price of its own goods in the domestic market more than doubled.If, however, corn bounties had really lowered the money price of corn, the result would have been very different.
Certain bounties, similar to production bounties, were also given out on specific occasions.It is of this nature, for example, that the bounties in the whitefish and whale fisheries are calculated according to the tonnage of the fishing vessels.This bounty is said to make the commodity cheaper in the home market than it would be without the bounty.But from other perspectives, we must admit that the result is the same as export incentives.This bounty costs part of the domestic capital in bringing the goods to market, but its price does not cover the cost and provide a profit.Although this kind of bonus is not conducive to the growth of national wealth, it can increase the number of ships and sailors, which is conducive to national defense construction.It may be said that the expense of maintaining a large standing navy with such bounties is much less than that of a standing army.
Notwithstanding the merits of the above incentives, I still believe that Parliament was deceived in approving them for the following reasons:
First, the amount of bounty fishery incentives appears to be too large.From the beginning of the winter fishing season in 1771 to the end of the winter fishing season in 1781, the tonnage rewards for the white fishing boats were 30 shillings per ton.The whitefish that is marinated immediately after being caught at sea is called Haitiao; the one that is packaged with salt and shipped to the market for sale is called commercial whitefish. Generally, three barrels of seatiao can be converted into two barrels of commercial whitefish. fish.During these eleven years, the Scottish whitefish fishing boats caught a total of 378,347 barrels of whitefish; commercial whitefish totaled 252,231 barrels. One-third of a barrel; the tonnage bonuses paid by the government amount to one hundred and fifty-five thousand four hundred and sixty-three pounds and eleven shillings, that is, eight shillings and one-quarter pence per barrel of sea bills. Twelve shillings two and a quarterpence for a barrel of whitefish.
Salt for curing whitefish, whether of Scottish or foreign origin, is delivered to the salting industry free of all excise duties.Excise duty is at present one shilling and sixpence a bushel of Scotch salt, and ten shillings a bushel of foreign salt.It is said that a barrel of whitefish requires about five-quarters of a bushel of foreign salt; and Scotch salt, two bushels on the average.If the whitefish is for export, it is exempt from all salt duties; if it is for domestic consumption, it pays one shilling for the barrel, whether foreign or Scottish salt tax on salt).We know that, in Scotland, foreign salts are generally used only for curing whitefish.Even at the most conservative estimate, it takes a bushel of salt to cure a barrel of whitefish.From April 5, 1771, to April 5, 1782, the importation of foreign salt amounted to 936,974 bushels (eighty-four pounds per bushel); Scotch salt is but one hundred and sixty-eight thousand two hundred and twenty-six bushels, and only fifty-six pounds a bushel.It can be seen from these data that foreign salt is mainly used in fishery salt.
In addition, if the whitefish is exported, there is a bounty of two shillings and eightpence per barrel.More than two-thirds of the whitefish caught by fishing boats are exported.When, therefore, it is summed up, it will be seen that, during these eleven years, the barrel of whitefish caught by the fishing boats, if cured in Scotch salt, cost the Government a total of seventeen shillings and eleven shillings a barrel for export. Three-quarters pence; for domestic consumption, the barrel cost the Government a total of fourteen shillings three and three-quarters pence.If cured in foreign salt, it costs the Government a total of £1.7s.5 and 3/4pence a barrel when exported; Another three quarters.The price of a barrel of good commercial whitefish ranges from seventeen or eighteen shillings, to twenty-four or twenty-five shillings, and averages about a guinea.
Secondly, the rewards of the whitefish industry are not distributed according to the amount of fishing, but according to the tonnage of fishing boats.Therefore, I worry that many fishing boats go out to sea for rewards, not for fishing. In 1759 the bounty in the stinger fishery was fifty shillings a ton, yet in Scotland all the ships caught a total of four barrels of kelp.However, the government spends 113 pounds 15 shillings for each barrel of sea sticks this year. For each barrel of commercial whitefish, the government needs to spend 100 shillings. Fifty-nine pounds seven shillings and sixpence.
Thirdly, the boats often used in the Baibai fishing industry are generally large fishing boats or deck boats with a load of 20 to 80 tons.This approach may have been learned from the Dutch, but in fact it is not suitable for the Scottish situation.In the Netherlands, the waters where whitefish live in large quantities are far from the land, so fishing requires deep sea voyages, and only deck boats that can carry sufficient food can be used.In Scotland, however, the main areas of the whitefish fishery are very close to land (the Hebridiz Islands, the Western Isles, the Shetland Islands, and the north and north-west coasts are full of bays where the whitefish congregate in the bays known as the Lochs of the Sea); also, the migration period of the whitefish is not stable, so for Scotland, the small boat fishery is actually the most suitable, and the fish can be salted or eaten immediately after the fisherman catches .However, in Scotland, there is no bounty for small boat fishing, but thirty shillings per ton for big boat fishing.In the same situation, it is difficult to obtain a market for pickled fish from small boats compared to larger boat fisheries.Consequently, the small-boat fisheries, which were once relatively prosperous (with many sailors, I am told), are now all in decline.Neither the customs collector nor the salt tax official kept records of the small boat fishery, since there were few incentives.So I'm not sure at this point what the size of the small boat fishery used to be.
Finally, in Scotland, the common people in many parts have whitefish as their staple food during certain seasons.If the bounty would bring down the price of whitefish in the home market, it would also be a relief to the greater part of the people of England who were not well off.However, the large-vessel fishery incentives for whitefish did not produce such good results. Instead, they produced just the opposite results, such as: (1) undermining the development of small-vessel fisheries suitable for the domestic market; An additional export bounty of eightpence enabled the export of two-thirds of the whitefish caught by the great fishing vessels to foreign countries.Thirty or forty years ago, before the bounty for big boats was instituted, the common price of whitefish was sixteen shillings a barrel; The common price of a barrel of whitefish is seventeen shillings to twenty shillings; and during the last five years the average price of a barrel of whitefish has been twenty-five shillings.This high price is due, on the one hand, to the shortage of whitefish along the Scottish coast; on the other hand, the price of the barrels of whitefish (in which the price of the barrel is included in the price of the fish) has nearly doubled since the beginning of the American War. , from about three shillings to nearly six shillings.However, the records I have of past prices are not entirely consistent.An old man with rich experience once told me that more than fifty years ago, the price of a barrel of good commercial whitefish was generally one guinea.I think it can still be regarded as the average price at that time.But all these records show that the large fishing boat reward did not reduce the price of whitefish in the domestic market.
Some may feel that if the fishers, supported by bounties, sell their wares at the usual price, or a little higher, they should make a great profit.However, I think that may be the case for only a small number of people, but it is not the case for the majority.The meaning of this kind of bonus is actually just to reward entrepreneurs who take risks to engage in industries they don’t understand, and these huge bonuses cannot compensate for their losses caused by ignorance. In 1750, according to Act No. 24 of the 23rd year of George II, for the first time, it was stipulated that a ton of whitefish would be rewarded with 30 shillings, and it was agreed to establish a joint-stock company (the company manager and directors all lived in London), The capital is £500,000.For every £100 invested by the investor within fourteen years, the investor will receive £3 a year back, half of which will be paid semi-annually by the customs collector Export incentives, salt tax, etc. are all exempt).Later, the government announced in various domestic seaports that it is legal to set up a fishing company with a total capital of more than 10,000 pounds.The operators of these small fishing companies are responsible for their own profits and losses, but they can also receive annuities and various incentives.Before long the capital of the great companies was full, and several fishing companies were established in the various sea-ports of the country.But even with these incentives, these companies, large and small, lost all or most of their capital and eventually disappeared.Today the whitefish fishery is almost entirely run by private capitalists.
Of course, if any manufacture is really necessary to the defense of the country, it would be very folly to depend upon other countries for the supply of that manufacture; It is also reasonable to maintain its development.It was on this principle that England gave export bounties to the manufacture of canvas and gunpowder.However, if taxes are imposed upon the mass of the people only to maintain the development of individual manufactures, this is generally not justified.In times of economic prosperity, when people have a lot of income and don't even know how to use it, it may not matter to the people to issue such incentives to individual manufacturing industries.However, it would be very wrong to continue to waste like this in times of general economic difficulty.
We should pay attention to the essence of things, and don't care about the specific names of things.For example, incentive payments are sometimes called subsidy payments and tax rebates are sometimes called incentive payments.As a reward for tax rebates, it cannot be generalized with real rewards.The export bonus for refined sugar is actually a tax rebate for the export of brown sugar and brown sugar; the export bonus for fine silk products can also be said to be a refund of import taxes; Refund of Import Duty.根据关税术语，那些出口时形态和进口时一样的货物所得的补贴，被称作退税。如果进口以后，货物形态被某制造业加以改变，名称也随之改变，并且归入了新的项目之中，则其所得的补贴叫做奖励金。
社会对有专业技能的技术人员和制造业者所发放的奖金，也不能被称为奖励金。因为这种奖金的性质与上述所讲的奖励金完全不一样：一、它不会使一国资本违反正常规律，大量地流入某一个特定行业，它只是奖励了人们的技能，从而增进了各行业工人的上进心；二、这种奖金不会破坏各行业的平衡，它反而完善了各行业的发展。此外，奖励金的花费比奖金的花费要大得多。以谷物奖励金为例，社会每年的花费有时达三十万镑以上。
下面，我来谈一谈谷物贸易和谷物条例。人们对谷物出口奖励金制度的法律和相关规则，一般都予以普遍称赞。我将用奖励金这一章的论述来指出这种称赞和表扬是不当的。对于谷物贸易的性质及英国与谷物贸易有关的主要法律的专门研究，可以充分证明我的观点的正确性。
谷物贸易，包括四个不同的部门。这四个部门，有时虽然由一个人经营，但按其性质的不同，可以分为四种独立的贸易：一是内地商人的贸易；二是国内消费品进口商的贸易；三是供国外消费的国内生产物出口商的贸易；四是运输商的贸易，即进口谷物再出口的贸易。
第一，内地商人的贸易。实际上，尤其在大荒年，内地商人的利益是和人们的利益一致的，虽然其表面上看起来似乎和人们的利益相反。对内地商人来说，他通过谷物实际歉收的情况而提高谷物价格来获利，当然，如果该价格提高的程度超过了一定的限度的话，那么他也将遭受不利。因为谷物价格的提高必然影响谷物的消费量。在这种情况下，所有人（尤其是底层人民）都不得不依靠节省粮食来生活。当谷物价格提得太高时，谷物的消费将会受到很大程度上的阻碍，最终使得市场上的供给超过消费。直到下次谷物上市，内地商人将会遭受两种损失：一是因为收成不好的自然原因而遭受很大的损失；二是上一次的剩余量只能以比之前更低的价格出售，从而遭受一定的损失。与此相反，当谷物的价格提得不够高时，谷物的消费虽然不会因此受到阻碍，市场上的谷物供给量很有可能小于消费量；但是，内地商人却会因此而损失一部分的利润，而且还将使人民在这一季节结束前面临饥饿的威胁。内地商人无论是出于对人民利益的考虑，还是出于其自身利益的考虑，都必须保证每一季节的谷物供给都与人们每天、每星期、每月的消费保持相应的比例。而内地商人又是非常了解谷物的收获情况以及谷物每日、每星期和每月的销售情况的。他凭借这些知识，基本上能够正确判断人们的实际需求量。因此，他一定会尽自己最大的判断能力，按上述比例向人民提供谷物，使他的谷物能够达到最好的价格，从而获得最大的利润。就算他忽视民众的利益，只为自己打算，但是在谷物歉收的年份，他也应当按照谨慎船长对待船员的态度来对待人民大众——他在预见到粮食缺乏时，就应当叫他们节省粮食。不可否认，有的船长可能考虑的太多，在没有必要的时候也叫船员们节省粮食，从而使他们感到困难。然而，上述这点困难和船长冒失的行为使大家遭受灾难相比，可以说是微不足道的。与此相同，贪婪的内地谷物商人也许会把谷物价格提高到超过歉收年应有的程度，那时，人们虽然可以避免季节末的饥荒，但还是会感到困难。然而，与商人在季节初廉价出售谷物而造成人们季节末的饥荒相比，这种困难也是微不足道的。并且，谷物商人自己也会因这种贪婪而受到损害：人们都会憎恨他。另外，在季节末，他手上仍有一定的谷物剩余量，如果下一季节是丰收的，那么他就只能以比之前低得多的价格出售这些剩余量了。
假若一大群商人占据着一个国家的所有收获物，他们出于自身利益的考虑，也许会像荷兰人处置马鲁古群岛的香料那样，为了提高一部分存货的价格，把大部分的存货毁坏或抛弃。然而，就谷物来说，就算有法律的强制力，要对谷物进行大范围的垄断也是非常困难的。在法律允许自由贸易的地方，谷物可以算是最不容易被少数大资本家所垄断的商品了。这是因为，一个国家收获的全部谷物是巨大的，少数私人的资本是不可能全部购买的；即使他们能够全部购买，谷物的生产方法也会阻碍他们达到购买目的。对于任何国家来说，谷物都是年消费量最大的商品。因此，相对于生产其他物品，一国的劳动每年用在生产谷物的部分必然要大得多。自从谷物第一次从土地上收获，它便开始在众多人之间进行分配。这些所有者散居在国内各处，并不像许多的独立制造者一样聚居在一个地方。对于最初的所有者来说，他要么是直接将谷物出售给邻近的消费者，要么是通过出售给其他内地商人而间接出售给消费者。相对于经营其他商品的商人，内地谷物商人的人数也更多，他们散居在各地，从而不可能组成什么团体。在歉收年份，当某一个商人发现他的谷物不能按现价在季节末售完时，为了不使他的竞争者得利而自己受损，他就会立即降低谷物价格，在下一个季节的新收获物到来之前将谷物出售。影响这个商人行为的因素，也将影响其他的商人，于是他们都会根据自己的判断，按照季节的丰歉以最合适的价格出售谷物。
如果认真研究本世纪及上两个世纪欧洲各地粮食不足和饥荒的情况（有些记录是很可靠的），我们就可以发现一个事实，即当时的粮食不足，并不是由内地谷物商人的联合垄断所引起的，而是因为真正的不足。特殊情况下，粮食不足可能是因为战争，而大多数情况下，是因为收成不好。并且，政府解决粮食不足的不适当手段也带来了一些困难。
然而，在通商和交通完全自由的广大产麦国，最不好的收成年也不会出现由大量的粮食不足所引起的饥荒。即使在最歉收的年份，如果能稍微节省使用，也能养活一样多的人数。干旱和暴雨最能影响粮食的收成。而我们都知道，麦子既可以生长在高地，也可以生长在低地；既可以生长在潮湿的土地里，也可以生长在干燥的土地中。因此，当遇到暴雨季节时，高地收成好，低地不好；当遇到干旱季节时，湿地收成好，干地收成不好。于是，无论是暴雨还是干旱，麦子在一个地方的损失可以在另一地方得到弥补，虽然总的收成比气候好的季节要少一些。对于产米国，干旱的影响要严重得多。因为作物不仅需要润湿的土壤，而且在其生长期的一段时间内，它还必须浸泡在水中。但是，在这样的国家里，并不是经常发生干旱，从而也不至于引起饥荒。其实只要政府允许自由贸易，就可以避免发生饥荒。例如，数年前，孟加拉的干旱，本来只会引起大量的粮食不足，然而，后来可能是因为东印度公司人员对大米贸易进行了不适当的限制，以致这次粮食不足演变成了饥荒。
为解决粮食不足所造成的问题，政府下令所有的商人以他们认为合理的价格出售谷物。但造成的结果却只有两种：一是商人并不提供谷物，导致人们在季节初期就要遭受饥荒；二是商人们提供谷物，并鼓励人们快速地消费，结果人们在季节末仍然面临着饥荒。我们知道，真正的粮食不足问题，是不能避免而只能减轻的。而完全自由的谷物贸易，既是防止饥荒的唯一有效办法，也是减轻粮食不足问题的最好办法。因此，谷物贸易比任何一种贸易更值得受到法律的充分保护，也更需要这种保护。正因为这样，谷物贸易比任何一种贸易更容易遭到人们的不满。
在歉收的年月里，底层人民会憎恨谷物商人，因为他们常常会认为是谷物商人的贪婪造成了他们的贫苦。这时候大家也许会认为，谷物商人不但赚不到钱，还会有破产的危险，因为人们可能会用暴力掠夺他的仓库。但实际上，谷物价格昂贵的歉收年，却正是谷物商人获得大利益的时候。一般来说，他会和一些农民订立合同，要求他们在一定期间按照一定的价格提供一定的谷物。这里的合同价格一般是根据适中合理的价格如平均价格来制定的。例如，上次歉收年份以前，每夸脱小麦的平均价格是二十八先令；其他各种谷物的合同价格也以这个为准。因此，在歉收年份里，谷物商人以平均价格购进谷物，再以高得多的价格售出大部分的谷物。从中，谷物商人就获得了一种超额利润。然而，由于商品的易腐性和价格的随意变动，这种超额利润只是补偿了他在其他方面遭受的损失而已，从而使他的行业与其他行业处在平等的地位。这一点，从人们由谷物贸易转向那些其他发财机会多的贸易这一事实，就可以看得出来。由于谷物商人在歉收年份里获取超额利润，因而更容易遭到人们的反感。因此，一般来说，有一点品格和财产的人，都不愿从事这一行业。由于只有一些下等商人经营这种行业，所以国内市场上生产者和消费者之间的中介，差不多只有磨坊主、面包房主、制粉商、面粉经销商，以及一些贫困的小贩。
虽然谷物贸易行业有利于整个社会，但欧洲以前的政策，并没有致力于消除人们对它的偏见，反而还刺激了人们的这种偏见。例如，爱德华六世五年及六年第十四号法令规定，所有那些购买谷物后想再拿出来出售的人，都被认为是违法垄断者。如果是第一次触犯规定，则判处两个月的监禁，并处相当于谷物价值的罚款；如果第二次触犯规定，则判处六个月的监禁，并处相当于谷物价值两倍的罚款；如果第三次触犯规定，则判处手指枷刑，由国王决定监禁期限的长短，并没收全部动产。那时，欧洲其他大部分地方的政策也几乎和英国是一样的。
也许我们的先辈认为，人们从谷物商人那里购买谷物肯定比从农民那里购买要贵；因为他们觉得，谷物商人除了要支付给农民谷物成本外，还会获得超额利润。因此，他们想要完全抑制这种行业的发展，甚至想要尽可能消除生产者与消费者之间的任何中介。于是，对谷物商或谷物运送者所经营的行业，他们总是多加限制。比如，那时的规定有：如果没有特许状证明某人诚实公正，那么他便不得经营这种行业。而根据爱德华六世的法令，只有经过三个治安推事的同意，才能取得这种特许状。后来，伊丽莎白的一个法令又加大了这种限制，该法令规定，这种特许状只能由一年开四次的法庭来颁发。
以前，欧洲企图靠上述政策来管理农业——农村中最大的行业。然而，农业的管理原则，与城市中最大的行业——制造业的管理原则是完全不同的。在以前的政策下，农民只能接触到消费者或谷物商人及谷物运送者，因而，他们不但要从事农民的工作，还要从事一些谷物批发商和零售商的工作。相反，在制造业方面，以前的欧洲在许多情况下都禁止制造者自己开店，不允许他们零售自己的商品。上述农业政策的目的，是为了使谷物价格低廉而促进国家的利益，但多数人都不了解这应当如何进行。商业政策的目的，是要促进特定人如店老板的利益。人们都知道，店老板会受制造业者的影响而以低价出卖自己的商品，因此，如果允许制造业者从事零售，那么就会损害这些店老板的利益。
在当时，虽然允许制造业者开店零售商品，但是他们的货物价格绝对不能比一般店铺便宜。其实，无论投入店铺里的资本是多少，它都是从制造业中分离出来的。而且，为了使制造业者与他人处在同等地位上经营业务，像店老板投入的资本赚取了制造业者的利润那样，制造业者投入的这部分资本，也必须能够赚取店老板的利润。在制造业者居住的城市里，假设制造业资本及店铺资本的普通利润都是百分之十，那么，在制造者自己开店零售的情况下，他每出售一件商品将获得百分之二十的利润；当他不是自己开店零售，而是将货物从工厂运到店铺时，他对货物的估价一般是零售店老板支付给他的批发价格。在第一种情况下，如果出售价格比其他店铺老板低，那么他店铺资本的利润便会减少一部分；在第二种情况下，如果他的估价低于批发价，那么他的制造业资本的利润也会减少一部分。表面上，对于同一件商品，他好像是获得了加倍的利润。但由于这种货物曾先后作为两种不同资本的一部分，因此，相对于他投入的资本，他获得的其实只是一种利润而已。如果他所得的利润比这一种利润还少，那么他就亏损了，也就是说，他所投入的全部资本，并没有像其他人那样获得相当的利润。
若是允许农民像谷物商人一样自己出售谷物，那么他的资本将分为农业资本和商业资本两种。其中，商业资本投入谷仓和干草场，以备市场不时之需，农业资本则投入土地的耕作。并且他投入后者所得的利润，不能少于农业资本的普通利润；他投入前者所得的利润，不能少于商业资本的普通利润。对于农民或谷物商人来说，实际上用来经营谷物生意的资本，都要有相同的利润来收回资本的投入，使他们能够和其他同行处于同等地位上。这样一来，被迫兼营谷物商业的农民，绝对不会使他的谷物价格低于自由竞争情况下其他任何谷物商人的谷物价格。
就如以全部劳动投入一项操作对劳动者有利一样，以全部资本投入在一个行业对商人是有利的。从一项反复操作中，劳动者可以学会一种技能，从而能用两只手完成比别人更多的任务；与之相同，商人也可以学会一种简单的货物贸易方法，从而能够以等量的资本经营比别人更多的业务。这么一来，劳动者可以以更低廉的价格提供他们的产品。与将资本和精力投在多种货物上的劳动者相比，商人也可以以更低廉的价格提供他们的商品。与那些精明活跃的小买卖商人不同，大部分制造业者的工作仅仅是整批地购进商品，然后再以低廉的价格零售商品；同样，与那些精明活跃的谷物商人不同，大部分农民的工作仅仅是整批地购进谷物贮存于谷仓内，再以低廉的价格零星地出售给邻近的都市居民。
我认为，为了社会利益所做的一类事情，既不应该受到强制，也不应当受到妨碍。例如，禁止制造者兼营店铺的政策，企图强行加速资本用途的划分；而强迫农民兼营谷物贸易的政策，直接阻碍了资本用途的划分。可以说，这两种政策都侵犯了自由，因此都是不正当的。有一句谚语说，兼营一切事业的人不富。以劳动或资本兼营没有必要经营的行业的人，不会因为他的商品比竞争者的售价低而使其竞争者受损，大部分情况下，他只会使自己受损。人们是自己行为的当事人，因而更了解自己的利益，因此，法律应该让人们按照各自的利益来做。
在上述两种不当政策中，强迫农民兼营谷物贸易的政策相对来说更加有害。因为这项政策不仅阻碍了对社会有利的资本用途的划分，而且不利于土地的改良与耕作。强迫农民兼营两业的政策，其实就是强迫他把资本分为两部分。实际上，当他将自己的所有资本都投入耕作时，他可以一收获农作物就立即卖给谷物商人，这样他的资本就可以立刻回到土地上。于是，他又可以购买更多的耕牛、雇用更多的劳动，从而更好地改良和耕作土地。如果强迫他兼营谷物零售业，那么他便不得不把一大部分资本保留在谷仓和干草场中。因此，这种政策不仅不能降低谷物价格，反而因减少了谷物生产而提高了谷物价格，最后必然不利于土地的改良。
除了农民之外，享有适当保护和奖励的谷物商人，是最有利于谷物种植事业发展的。谷物商人的业务对农民的业务的促进，就如批发商人促进制造业者的业务一样。这主要表现在两个方面：一是批发商人为制造业者提供了市场。当商品制造完成时，批发商人就立即将商品购买走了，甚至在商品未制成之前，他们就已预付了定金，这么一来，制造业者就可以将自己的所有资本，甚至更大的资本投入制造业中。与将货物直接卖给消费者和零售商人相比，将货物卖给批发商人对制造业者更有利。二是批发商人的资本能够补偿制造业者投入的资本。在大小资本所有者之间的交往中，大的资本所有者出于自身利益的考虑，总是愿意扶持小的资本所有者，甚至在他们有破产危险的情形下援助他们。
同上，如果农民和谷物商人之间的关系也能普遍地建立起来，那么其结果也是有利于农民的。农民可以将所有资本或者更多资本，不断地投到土地耕作上。虽然农业相对于其他行业，更容易遭受灾害，但是，当农民和谷物商人建立了这种来往后，无论发生哪种灾害，富裕的谷物商人都愿意帮助他们并且有能力帮助他们。于是，他们也就不用像现在这样寄希望于地主的大发慈悲了。如果这种来往被普遍地建立起来——虽然那几乎是不可能的事情；如果农民能够把所有农业资本从其他不适当的用途转移到土地耕作上来；如果在必要时有一个更大的资本来扶助农业资本，那么全国的土地将发生多么巨大、多么广泛的改良，都是我们难以想象的。
可以说，爱德华六世尽可能防止生产者和消费者之间存在中介的做法，实际上是在抵制一种对人们有益的贸易。事实上，如果这种贸易是自由进行的，那么它不仅可以最好地解决粮食不足问题，甚至还可以预防这种灾祸。因此，除了农民外，谷物商人的业务是最有利于谷物生产的了。不过，后来的几个法规对这方面的规定缓和了一些。例如，这些法规先后规定，当每夸脱小麦价格不超过二十先令、二十四先令、三十二先令或四十先令时，人们可以囤积谷物。最后，查理二世十五年第七号法令规定，在每夸脱小麦价格不超过四十八先令时，只要不是垄断者（购买谷物后在三个月内在同一市场售卖的人）囤积谷物或购买谷物以待出售，出售小麦都被认为是合法的。这项法令总算给予了内地谷物商人应有的贸易自由。乔治三世十二年的法令，将先前其他取缔囤积和垄断的法令都予以废止了，但并没有解除查理二世第十五年法令所设的限制。
在一定程度上，查理二世十五年的法令，实际上保留了两种非常不合理的偏见。
第一，该法令认为，当每夸脱小麦价格涨到四十八先令——其他各种谷物也相应涨价时，这时候囤积谷物很可能对人民不利。但是，根据以上明显的论述，内地谷物商人的囤积，实际上并不会影响谷物价格，所以也不会对人民有害。而且，四十八先令虽然说很高，但在歉收的年份里，却是谷物刚刚收获时常有的价格。那时候，新的收获物一点也没有卖出，所以任何人都不会认为，囤积新收获物会对人民不利。
第二，该法令认为，谷物最容易在某一价格时被人垄断（或囤积），之后又在同一市场内出售，这样将会对人民不利。但实际上，商人会根据自己的判断作出决定。比如，某个市场整个季节可能不会有充足的供给，不久谷物便会涨价，这时他就会决定在该市场大量收购谷物，以备将来出售。如果他的判断是错的，即谷物价格并没有上涨，那么他不仅会损失投入资本的所有利润，还会损失储藏谷物的费用，也即损失他投入的一部分资本。与个别人可能遭受的损失相比，他自己所遭受的损失要大得多。虽然说，在某一时期，个别人因为他的囤积可能购买不到谷物，但在此后的任何时期，他们都能以和以前同样低的价格购买到谷物。相反，如果他的判断是对的，则他的行为不但不会对人民大众有害，反而对他们有益的，即使他们早点儿知道粮食不足的问题，不至于后来强烈地感到粮食不足。如果他们忽视季节的实际不足情况，在目前价格低时大量消费，那么后来他们就一定会强烈地感受到粮食不足所带来的痛苦。此外，如果粮食不足是真正的不足，谷物商人出于对人们利益的考虑，也应当把这种痛苦尽可能平均分散到一年的每个月、每个星期或每一天中。从以上可以看出，和其他没有利害关系的人相比，谷物商人出于自己利益的考虑，需要研究并尽可能地作出准确的判断。因此，这一重要的商业活动，理所当然应当完全由他负责。也就是说，谷物贸易在国内市场的供给上，应当完全自由。
人们对囤积和垄断的畏惧，就如同他们对妖术的畏惧一样。一般来说，那些因妖术而被判罪的人是无辜的，同样地，因囤积垄断被判罪的人，也是无辜的。禁止告发妖术的法律，可以使人们不能出于自己的恶意，而控告他们的邻人犯有这种想象中的罪，这似乎可以有效地消除人们对妖术的畏惧。同样，恢复内地谷物贸易完全自由的法律，也许能有效地消除世人对囤积和垄断的畏惧。
虽然说查理二世十五年第七号法令有各种缺点，但是和其他法律相比，它在满足国内市场需求和促进耕作方面，作用很大。这项法令，也曾经使内地谷物贸易享受到了自由的保护。并且，内地贸易在满足国内市场需求和促进耕作两方面，比进出口贸易要有效得多。据上述那位学识渊博的作者的统计，英国每年平均进口和平均消费的各种谷物量之间的比例是一比五百七十。因此，在国内市场供给方面，内地贸易的重要性，是进口贸易的五百七十倍。同样，根据他的计算，英国每年平均出口的各种谷物量，只占年产量的一比三十。因此，在给本国产物提供市场以奖励耕作方面，内地贸易的重要性是出口贸易的三十倍。
我先要说明的是，我不太相信这种政治性的统计，因此不想证明上述两种计算是否正确。之所以在这里引述，只是为了说明，在一个理性并且有经验的人来看，谷物的国内贸易比国外贸易似乎要重要得多。奖励金制度设立前那几年谷价的极大下降，也许在一定程度上是查理二世那项法令造成的结果（大约在二十五年前，这项法令就已颁布，因此也有足够长的时间产生这样的结果）。
对于其他三种谷物贸易部门，我就简单地描述一下。
第二种贸易是进口外国谷物供国内消费的贸易。这种贸易明显有助于国内市场的直接供给，因此也是有利于人民大众的。虽然它会略微降低谷物的平均货币价格，但是不会降低谷物的真实价值，也就是说，不会减少谷物所能维持的劳动量。假若进口随时都是自由的，那么我国农民和乡绅每年出售谷物所得的货币，应该会比目前要少（目前大部分时间里是禁止进口的）。但他们所得的货币，比现在的等额货币有更高的价值，可以购买更多的其他物品，雇用更多的劳动。他们的真实财富虽表现为较少的银量，但价值却不会比现在少；他们所能耕种的谷物，也不会比现在少。因此，如果谷物的货币价格跌落、银的真实价值上升，其他商品价格略微降低，那么国内产业将在所有外国市场上获得一定的利益，从而促进国内产业的发展。但在国内谷物市场范围内，谷物的货币价格仍然会与种植谷物国的一般产业保持一定的比例，或是和与谷物交换的他物的价格或生产人数保持一定的比例。对所有国家来说，国内市场都是谷物最近、最方便、最大和最重要的市场。并且，这个市场会因为谷物货币价格下降导致银的真实价值上升而不断扩大，因此，与其说谷物货币价格下降会阻碍谷物生产，不如说它会促进谷物生产。
查理二世二十二年第十三号法令规定：“在国内市场上，当每夸脱小麦价格低于五十三先令四便士时，每夸脱进口小麦须纳税十六先令；当每夸脱小麦价格低于四镑时，每夸脱进口小麦须纳税八先令。”前一价格，上个世纪以前小麦非常不足的时候出现过；而后一价格，据我所知从没有出现过。其实，根据这个法令的规定，当小麦价格未涨到前一价格之前，缴纳的重税实际上就相当于禁止其进口；而在小麦价格未涨到后一价格之前，也要缴纳这么重的税。
其他各种限制谷物进口的税率和关税，差不多也是一样的繁重。并且，后来的法令还不断地加重了这种税。在歉收年份里，由于法律的严苛，人们遭受的痛苦可能是很大的。不过在歉收年份，这些法律被停止施行，实施的是一些暂时条例，一般都允许在一定时期内进口外国谷物。其实，这种暂行条例的实施，就已完全说明那些法律的不适当性了。
虽然限制进口的制度先于奖励金制度，但其精神和原则与后者几乎没有什么差别。只不过奖励金制度建立以后，无论这些限制进口的政策本身是否有害，这时实施这些政策都是必要的。例如，假设每夸脱小麦价格在四十八先令左右，若能够自由进口外国谷物，或进口只须缴纳小额的税，那么有人可能会为了获得奖励金而再把谷物出口，这样不仅会减少国家收入，也会完全偏离扩大本国产物的市场的目的，而是在扩大外国产物的市场了。
第三种贸易是出口谷物供外国消费的贸易。虽然它对满足国内市场需求没有直接作用，但是有间接作用。通常，当国内生产或进口的谷物，多于消费需要的谷物时，无论出口的谷物是来自本国生产还是从外国进口的，国内市场的需求仍然是可以得到满足的。在一般情况下，如果剩余量不能出口，那么生产者将会仅按国内市场消费需要而生产，而进口者也将只按国内市场消费需求进口。与此相同，提供商品的商人们每天都在担心货物不能全部卖完，导致的结果是市场总是出现存货不足的情况。禁止出口，就会抑制国内的土地改良与耕作，致使谷物的供给不超过本国国民的需要；而出口自由，不但可以促进国内耕作事业，而且可以向外国提供谷物。
于是，查理二世十二年第四号法令规定，在每夸脱小麦价格不超过四十先令，其他各种谷物的价格以此为标准时，不禁止谷物出口；查理二世十五年的法令，又将这种自由扩大，规定在每夸脱小麦价格不超过四十八先令时，允许自由出口；查理二世二十二年的法令规定，不论价格怎样，都允许谷物自由出口。当然，谷物在出口时必须要向国王纳税。不过，在关税表中，所有谷物的税额都很低。例如，每夸脱小麦仅须缴纳一先令；每夸脱燕麦仅须缴纳四便士；其他谷物仅须缴纳六便士。威廉和玛丽第一