Chapter 5 The Fourth Lecture on the Psychology of Negligence Continued

The significance of the negligence, which we have endeavored to establish, can serve as a basis for further research.But I will say it again: we do not claim—nor do we have to, for our purposes—that every fault has its own significance, although I believe it is possible.We need only prove that various faults have this meaning more generally.On this point, the various forms of negligence are also slightly different.Some slips of the tongue, slips of the pen, etc., are the result of purely physiological changes, though this is not the case for those based on forgetting, such as forgetting proper names or "determinations," and lost objects.Losing one's own belongings is also considered unintentional in some instances.In short, our theory can only be used to explain a part of the mistakes in daily life.You must also bear in mind this restriction when we proceed to assume that negligence is a psychic action resulting from the mutual check of two "intentions."

This is the first result of our psychoanalysis.Previous psychology did not know that there was such a situation of restraint, let alone that such restraint could produce these mistakes.We have greatly extended the range of psychic phenomena to include phenomena never recognized in psychology. Let's discuss first the statement that "negligence is the action of the mind." Does "negligence is a psychological act" have a richer meaning than "negligence is meaningful"?I don't think so.On the contrary, the former sentence is more vague than the latter sentence, and more likely to cause misunderstanding.Everything that can be observed in psychic life can be considered a psychic phenomenon.But it also depends on whether it is such a special psychological phenomenon that it directly originates from bodily organs or changes in matter, so it does not belong to the scope of psychological research; or it is another phenomenon that directly originates from other species. Mental processes, and behind these processes at a certain point a series of organic changes take place.What we call mental processes refers to the latter.So we might as well say: Negligence is meaningful, which is more convenient; the so-called meaning refers to importance, intention, tendency, and one of a series of psychological processes.

Although there is another group of phenomena that are closely related to negligence, they should not be called negligence.We may call these "accidental" and symptomatic movements.These actions seem to be unmotivated, meaningless, useless, and obviously superfluous.They differ, on the one hand, from transgressions, because there is no second intention to resist or divert, and, on the other hand, from gestures and movements which we take to express emotions.Among the accidental actions of this kind are apparently aimless actions, such as moving clothes or parts of the body, or other objects within reach.There are also actions that should be done but not done, as well as humming and chatting for self-entertainment.I say that these actions have meaning, can be interpreted in the same way as faults, can be regarded as real mental actions, and become the expression of other more important mental processes.I shall not, however, dwell on these phenomena in detail, and shall now return to faults; for a discussion of faults may shed light on many important problems in the study of psychoanalysis.

The most interesting and unanswered questions in the discussion of negligence are of course the following: We say that negligence is the result of two different dispositions being intertwined, one of which may be called the disinclination to be restrained and the other the disincentive which is restrained. intention.The distracted intentions cause no other problems, and as for the distracted intentions, we first need to know what are the intentions which rise to distract other intentions.Second, what is the relationship between the intention to pin and the intention to be pinned? We can again mistake the tongue for a representative of the same kind, answer the second question first, and then answer the first question.

The diverting tendency in tongue slips may be related in sense to the diverted intention, in which case the former intention is the opposite, correction, or complement of the latter.But in other, vaguer and more interesting cases, the tendency to pin down may have nothing to do with the intention to be pinned down. The first kind of relationship is not difficult to find evidence in the examples that have been studied.In any slip of the tongue which turns what was meant to be said in reverse, the intention which is restrained almost always has the opposite meaning to the intention which is restrained, so that the error is the result of the conflict of two opposite impulses.The meaning of the speaker's slip of the tongue was: "I call the meeting open, but would rather close it." A political newspaper was accused of being corrupt, and wrote an article in its defense, trying to close with the following sentence: "The reader should I know that this newspaper has always used the most unselfish disinterested attitude to seek happiness for the society.” However, the editor who was commissioned to make this defense accidentally wrote “the most unselfish attitude” as “the most selfish attitude” in the most interested manner.That is to say, he thought, "I have to write this article, but I know very well what is going on inside." And if a representative advocates that something should be brought directly to the emperor, but he is afraid of his own bravery, So because of a tongue mistake, the straight confession was mistaken for a polite confession.

The examples cited above that give people the impression of condensation and simplicity also have the meaning of correction, supplement or extension, among which the second tendency is closely connected with the first tendency.For example, "the incident was discovered, or it is better to say that they are dirty, so-the incident was refilled." ——It’s one of the few.” Another example is “My husband can eat and drink what he likes, but you know I don’t allow him to like this or that, so—he eats and drinks what I like Drinks and food." In these cases, the fault arises from or is directly related to the content of the distracted intention.

If there is no relationship between the tendency to check each other, it will be strange.If there is no relation between the restraining disposition and the content of the disposition being restrained, where does the restraining disposition arise from?Why did it show up exactly at that time?To answer this question, we have to start with observation, and from the result of observation, we can know that the restraining tendency originated from a train of thought that the person had not long ago, and then express it as the end of this train of thought.It is irrelevant whether this train of thought has been expressed in language or not.So this can also be regarded as a kind of "speech continuation", but not necessarily the "continuation" of speech.Here there is also an associative relationship between the tendency to be restrained and the tendency to be restrained, but this kind of relationship cannot be found in terms of content, and it can only be regarded as a forced relationship.

Here is a simple example, which I observed myself.I once met two Viennese women in the beautiful Dolomites.They set off for a walk, and I accompanied them for a part of the way, discussing the joys and fatigue of traveling life on the way.One woman admitted that this kind of life was uncomfortable. "It's a very unpleasant thing to walk all day in the sun until your coat .She continued: "However, if there is nachHose for a change..." Hose means pants: this lady wanted to say nachHause [meaning my home], we will not analyze this tongue mistake, I think you can easily understand of.The woman meant to list some clothes, such as "overcoat, shirt, underpants" and so on.The underpants are left unsaid because of etiquette; but in the second sentence the content of this sentence is entirely independent and the unspoken word becomes an approximation of Hause due to the similar sound.

We can now come to the long-delayed main question, namely, what are the dispositions which check other dispositions in this peculiar way?There are many kinds of them, but our purpose is to ask for their common ingredients.If we study many examples with this purpose, we shall know that they may be divided into three groups.In the first group the speaker is aware of his tendency to hold back and also feels it before making a mistake.For example, in the slip of the tongue "fa dirty", the speaker not only admits that the incident he criticizes is dirty, but also admits that he has the tendency to express this meaning, and only stops it later.In the second group, the speaker admits that he has the tendency to restrain, but does not know that this tendency has been considerably active before the erroneous speech.Therefore, although he accepted our explanation, he was a little surprised.Examples of this attitude are more readily found in other kinds of slips than in slips of the tongue.As far as the third group is concerned, the speaker refuted the explanation for the pinning tendency; not only did he argue that the tendency had not been active before he was wrong, but he also claimed that he knew nothing about it.For example, regarding the "hiccup" example, I mentioned his tendency to restrain, and the speaker vigorously refuted it.You know that my attitude towards these examples is also very different from yours.I do not believe the speaker's denials, and stick to my original interpretation, while you are deeply moved by his enthusiasm, and wonder whether I should abandon this interpretation, and adopt pre-analytic views, regarding these faults as It is a purely physical action.Why you have this insight, that's what I can guess.My explanation contains the assumption that an intention unknown to the speaker can be expressed through him, and I can infer its nature from various indications.This conclusion is so novel and so relevant that it inevitably makes you doubtful.I know this, and I admit that you are right.However, one thing must be clear: if you want to draw logical conclusions from this theory of fault, which has been confirmed by many examples, you must make bold assumptions; otherwise, the theory of fault that you have just begun to acquire will inevitably be abandoned again.

Let us now pause for a moment to consider the common elements of the three mechanisms of these three groups of slips.Fortunately, this common ingredient is easily visible.As far as the first two groups are concerned, the restraining tendency is acknowledged by the speaker; and in the first group, the speaker is aware of the action of that tendency just before the error is spoken.But no matter which group it is, its tendency to restrain is suppressed.The speaker is determined not to express the idea into language, and so he utters the wrong word; in other words, the inclination to forbid expression arises against the will of the speaker, or alters the expression of the intention he permits; or mixes with it. Get up, or replace it, and make yourself published.This is the mechanism of tongue slips.

It seems to me that the faults of the third group can also be fully coordinated with the mechanism described here.I have only to assume that the three groups differ in the degree to which they are effective in repressing an intention from each other.As far as the first group is concerned, the intention exists and has been felt before speaking; it is only rejected when speaking, and because of being rejected, it is compensated in the mistake.In the case of the second group, rejection occurred earlier.Before speaking, the intention has long since ceased to be felt, but is still clearly the cause of the slip of the tongue.But this simplifies the interpretation of the third group.Even if an intention is prevented from being expressed for a long, perhaps a long time, and the speaker denies it so much, I dare say that the intention is still felt.Leaving aside the questions of the third group, from the other two groups you must also draw the conclusion that the suppression of the original tendency to speak is an indispensable condition for slips of the tongue. We can now say that there has been progress in the explanation of negligence.We know not only that faults are meaningful and purposeful psychological phenomena, but also that they are the result of two different dispositions interfering with each other, and that any one of these dispositions, if it attempts to be published by disabling the other, cannot Its activities are prohibited without first being met with some resistance.Simply put, one tendency must be checked before other tendencies can be checked.This, of course, cannot give a complete explanation of the phenomenon of negligence.Immediately we can generate further problems; roughly speaking, the more we know, the more opportunities for new problems to arise.For example, we may have such a question: why can't things be done more simply?If there is an intention in the heart that wants to prevent another tendency from being realized, then the tendency will have no possibility of expression if the success is prevented; if the failure is prevented, the blocked tendency can be fully expressed.Mistakes, however, are a means of reconciliation; the two conflicting dispositions each partly succeed and partly fail in the mistake.The coerced dispositions are not all repressed, nor, with few exceptions, do they rush forward for their original purpose.According to our imagination, there must be various special conditions for the occurrence of such containment or mediation, but we have no way of guessing what these conditions are.Nor do I think that we can discover these unknown conditions by a deeper study of faults.It is only the analogies drawn from these investigations which must first be made of other vague realms of psychic life which dare us to make the necessary assumptions for further explanations of faults.But there is one more thing that needs your attention.It is not without danger to use small signs for the guidance of research, as we often do in this respect.There is a kind of mental disorder called combinatorial para-noia, which is to use this small sign to exceed all limits.I certainly do not claim that the conclusions drawn from this are infallible.We can avoid this danger only by widening the field of observation, by accumulating many similar impressions from various modes of mental life. For now, therefore, we leave the analysis of fault.But there is one more thing to your attention: the method by which we study faults must be kept in your mind as an example.You can see from these examples what the aim of our psychology is.Our purpose is not only to describe and classify psychological phenomena, but also to regard these phenomena as the result of mental struggle and balance, as the expression of intentions towards a certain goal, some of these intentions are combined with each other, and some are opposed to each other.We want to make a dynamic interpretation of the psychological phenomenon adynamic conception.According to this interpretation, phenomena that are merely inferred by us are more important than phenomena that we see. We shall, therefore, no longer study negligence; but we shall nonetheless take a bird's-eye view of the whole problem, in which we encounter facts some familiar and some unfamiliar.As for the classification, it is still based on the three types mentioned above: first, tongue mistakes, clerical mistakes, reading mistakes, hearing mistakes, etc.; Pick up and drop items, etc.In short, the errors we are studying are partly forgetting, partly errors of action. Tongue slips have been discussed at length, but now a little more material needs to be added.Some of the little emotional blunders related to tongue slips are also quite amusing.People are always unwilling to think that they have said the wrong thing, they often do not pay attention to what they say, and they never let go of what they hear.Tongue slips are contagious; it's easy to say the wrong thing yourself when it comes to tongue slips.It is not difficult for us to discover the motivation behind the most trivial mistakes, but we cannot see the nature of the hidden psychological process from this.For example, a person is disturbed on a certain word, so that he pronounces the long sound into a short sound, no matter what his motivation is, the result is that the short sound of the next word will be pronounced as a long sound, and a new mistake will be made to make up for his previous mistake. mistakes made.Another example is that when the diphthong eW or oy is mispronounced as i, the same result can be obtained; the later i sound must be changed to eW or oy to make compensation.There seems to be an intention behind this behavior: to prevent the listener from believing that it is the speaker's negligence of the native language habits.The second error of compensation is really to call the listener's attention to the first error, and to show that he already knows it.The most common, simplest, and least important form of tongue slip is condensing or prematurely pronouncing speech.For example, if you mispronounce a long sentence, it must be the result that the last word you want to say affects the pronunciation of the previous word.This shows that the speaker is impatient with the sentence and unwilling to say it.From here we come to the critical line, where there is no distinction between the fault theory of psychoanalysis and that of physiology in general.In these cases, as we suppose, the restraining tendency resists what it has to say; but we only know from this that the restraining tendency exists, not from what its purpose is.The disturbance it causes, either due to phonological influences or to associations, may be seen as the result of attention being drawn away from what was to be said.The point of this slip of the tongue, however, is not the distraction of attention, nor the tendency of the associations it arouses; it is the presence of other intentions which divert the original intention.As to its nature, this instance, unlike other more conspicuous slips of the tongue, cannot be inferred from its results. Now it's time to talk about clerical errors.The mechanism of clerical errors is the same as that of tongue errors, so we have nothing new about clerical errors, only a little increase in the knowledge of mistakes is enough.The most common minor mistakes, such as writing the next character ahead of time, especially the last character, show a dislike or impatience of the writer; while more pronounced clerical errors can show the nature and intention of restraint.Generally speaking, if we see a clerical error in a letter, we can know that the writer was not at peace at that time, but we don't necessarily know why.Clerical errors are the same as tongue errors, and they are not easy to detect.The following observation is striking, and some people often re-read it before sending it.Some people are not; and if such people re-read their letters once exceptionally, they will often see glaring clerical errors and correct them.How should this be explained?On the surface, it seems that they knew that they had made a typo in their letter.Can we be sure this is the case? There is also an interesting question about the practical significance of clerical errors.You may remember the murderer H.He pretends to be a bacteriologist and obtains dangerous germs from the scientific research institute to kill those related to him.He once complained to the staff of a certain academy that the cultures they sent were too ineffective, but he wrote the wrong words. Instead of saying, "In my experiments on mice and guinea pigs Mausen und Meer Schweinchen," he mistakenly said "In my experiments on rats and guinea pigs." Human Menschen".Although this clerical error had attracted the attention of the doctors in the hospital, they did not infer its consequences.What do you think?Wouldn't it be nice if the doctors decided that the clerical error was a confession and made a thorough investigation so that the murderer's attempt could be caught in time?In this instance, has not a serious consequence been produced by ignorance of our theory of negligence?I know that such a clerical error will greatly arouse my suspicions; but it is certainly wrong to use it as a confession.Because things are not that simple.A clerical error is certainly a sign, but a clerical error alone is not enough grounds for a reconnaissance.Judging from the clerical error, it can be known that this person has the intention of poisoning others; but it is not certain whether this is a definite plan to poison others, or just an unrealistic fantasy.People who have this clerical error may even use strong subjective reasons to deny the existence of this fantasy and refute the nonsense of this concept.It will be easier for you to understand these possibilities later when you discuss the distinction between mental and physical reality.But this example once again proves that negligence has an indisputable significance. The psychological situation of a misread is obviously different from that of a slip of the tongue and a slip of the pen.In misreading, one of the two conflicting tendencies is replaced by a sensory stimulus, so perhaps less persistent.The material a man reads is not a product of his mind and is different from what he writes.Therefore, as far as most of the examples are concerned, the misreading is that one character replaces another character; as for the relationship between this character and that character, there is no need to have any relationship, as long as the characters have the same shape.Lichtenberg's example of "Agamemnon" for "Angenommen" is a good example of a misreading.To discover its tendency to cause mistakes, you can completely abandon the full text, and use the following two questions as the starting point for analysis and research: a pair of wrong results, that is, when the replaced words are used for free association, what is the first result caused by it? What is this idea?2. Under what circumstances do misreadings occur?Sometimes, knowledge about the latter issue is enough to explain the misreading, for example, when a person is visiting a strange city and has a need to urinate, he sees a toilet with the words "Closethaus" on the second floor of a house. brand.He was wondering why the sign was so high when he realized that the word was "Corsethaus".In other cases, where the original text and errors are not related in content, a thorough analysis is necessary, but this requires training and faith in the technique of psychoanalysis to have any hope of success.The interpretation of misreadings is not so difficult, however.As far as Agamemnon is concerned, it is not difficult to infer from the words it substitutes the train of thought from which the disturbance arises.Another example is that during the Great War, we often heard the names of towns and generals, as well as military terms, so when we saw similar words, we often mispronounced them as the names of a certain city or general or military terms.What is on the mind takes the place of what has not yet taken interest.Thoughts shadow new perceptions. Sometimes the article itself will cause a tendency to disturb, and misreading will occur, and the original text will be changed to the opposite wording.If you ask someone to read a document that he does not like to read, an analytical study will show that every error in him is due to his distaste for reading. In terms of the more common misreadings mentioned above, the two elements that make up the mechanism of negligence seem less obvious.What are these two elements?That is: one is the conflict between tendencies and tendencies, and the other is that one tends to be expelled and make mistakes for compensation.Not all such inconsistencies developed into misreadings, but the entanglement of ideas associated with the errors was far more marked than the inhibitions he had suffered before.As for the various situations in which mistakes are caused by forgetting, these two elements are very easy to observe. The forgetting of "resolve" obviously has only one meaning; even its interpretation is generally accepted, as has already been said.The tendency to hold "resolve" in check is usually a rebellious tendency, an emotion of reluctance.There is no doubt about the existence of this rebellious tendency, so we need only inquire why it does not express itself in another, less subtle way.The motives why this inclination had to be kept secret can sometimes be conjectured; he knew that if he declared it he would be condemned, and that if he used it skilfully by means of negligence, he often achieved his purpose.If there is an important change in the psychological situation after the resolution and before the implementation, so that it is no longer necessary to implement the resolution, although the resolution is forgotten, it does not belong to the category of negligence.For since memory is of no use, forgetting is not surprising; it is written off, permanently or temporarily.Forgetting to carry out is a fault only if the resolution has not been so repelled. Examples of forgetting to fulfill resolutions are usually cookie-cutter, obvious, and not of research interest.But the study of this lapse also contributes to knowledge in two ways.We have said that the practice of forgetting the determination must first have a tendency to counter-resist.This is correct, but according to the results of our own research, there are two types of "opposite meaning" counter-will: direct and indirect.What is called indirect is best explained with one or two examples.For example, if the benefactor does not recommend the benefactor in front of a third party, it may be because he does not have a good impression of the benefactor, so he is unwilling to introduce him.This can of course be interpreted as the benefactor not wanting to promote the benefactor.Things could be more complicated, however.The benefactor's reluctance to introduce may have other secrets.This may have nothing to do with the benefactor, but that he doesn't like the third party he wants to entrust.From this, you can see that our interpretation cannot be used indiscriminately in practice.Although the benefactor has correctly explained the fault, he may still be paranoid and wrong the benefactor.Another example is that a person forgets a decision to make a date. The most common reason is, of course, that he does not want to meet the person concerned.However, according to the results of the analysis, the tendency to restrain may have nothing to do with this person but with the place of the date; he avoids this place because it reminds him of painful memories.Another example is forgetting to send a letter, the opposite tendency may have something to do with the content of the letter; but perhaps the letter itself is not harmful; it is put on hold only because it reminds me of another past letter, which directly aroused a feeling of disgust.We may therefore say that the previous hateful letter made the now harmless letter the object of abomination.Therefore, the application of well-founded explanations has to be carefully considered and guarded against. It is necessary to know that events that are psychologically equivalent can have many different meanings in practice. It may seem strange to you that this should be the case.You may think that the indirect "opposite meaning" can be used to prove that his behavior is pathological.But I can tell you that this kind of behavior can be encountered even within the range of health and normality.On the other hand, you must not mistake me for admitting here the unreliability of analytical interpretation.I said that I forgot that the realization of a plan can have many meanings, but this was in terms of examples which were explained without analysis, but only on the basis of general principles.If the person concerned is analysed, it can often be ascertained whether the aversion is immediate or otherwise. The following is the second point: if most of the examples have proved that the forgetting of "determination" must come from the restraint of "opposite intention", even if the analysand denies the existence of the "opposite intention" we have determined, we dare Stick to your explanation.Let us take the most common forgetting, such as forgetting to return a book, forgetting to pay a debt, etc., as an example.Whoever forgets to pay the book or the debt, I dare say, must have the intention of not paying the book or the debt.Although he denied this, he could not give another explanation for his behavior.We may, therefore, tell him of this intention, without feeling it; but it is enough to reveal himself by the effect of forgetting.At that time he may argue that he is merely forgetting.You know this situation is something we have encountered before.Our explanation of negligence has been borne out by many instances, and now, to be logically extended, we have to assume that men have tendencies of which they are unaware, capable of producing important results.But in this way, we cannot help but come into great conflict with ordinary psychology and the views of ordinary people. The forgetting of proper names, foreign names, foreign characters, etc., is also due to a tendency to be directly or indirectly incompatible with these nouns.I have given several examples of this immediate aversion.But indirect causes are so common here that their explanation requires careful analysis.During the Great War, for example, we had to give up many of our former amusements, and our memory for proper names was greatly hampered by irrelevance.I have not been able to recall the town of Bisenz lately; as a result of my analysis, I have no direct dislike for the town, simply because I have spent many pleasant days at the Palazzo Bisenzi in Orvieto, and Bisenz and Bisenzhi have similar pronunciations, so they have been forgotten together.In the motive of forgetting the name, we encounter for the first time a principle which later came to play an important role in the development of neurotic symptoms: simply, that the recollection of things which are associated with painful emotions causes pain, so that Memory is opposed to the recollection of such things.This tendency to avoid pain is in fact the ultimate purpose of forgetting nouns and many other slips, omissions and mistakes. The forgetting of nouns, however, seems to be particularly amenable to psychophysiological explanations, so that it sometimes occurs without a motive to avoid suffering.If a person has a tendency to forget nouns, analysis shows that he forgets not only because he dislikes these nouns, not only because these nouns can evoke some unpleasant memories, but also because this particular noun belongs to a particular noun. A more intimate series of associations.This noun is fixed here, and I don’t want to associate it with other things. Sometimes in order to remember certain nouns, I deliberately make them associate with them, but the association thus created promotes forgetting.You will be surprised at this if you remember the organization of the memory system.People's proper names serve as the most obvious example, since they have different values ​​for different people.For example, the name Theodore to some of you has no special meaning; to others it is the name of his father, brother, friend or himself.According to the analysis of experience, the former part of you will not forget the guests with this name; while the latter part seems to think that they should be reserved for their close relatives and friends, and they can't help but have some regrets about the guests with this name.Let us now assume that this repression caused by association is in accordance with the operation of the pain principle and the indirect mechanism; you will see that the cause of the temporary forgetting of nouns is also very complicated.But if we make a full analysis of the facts, these complicated reasons can also be fully revealed. A tendency to avoid unpleasantness is more evident in the forgetting of impressions and experiences than in the forgetting of nouns.Of course not all such forgettings fall under the category of negligence, but only those which, by the standards of ordinary experience, are considered extraordinary and unreasonable, such as forgetting recent or important impressions, or forgetting a well-remembered event. Only one of the paragraphs belongs to the category of negligence.Exactly how or why we have the capacity for forgetting in general, and especially for such deeply impressionable experiences as childhood events, is another question.As far as this forgetting is concerned, the avoidance of painful associations is also a factor, but it cannot explain everything.As to the ease with which unpleasant impressions are forgotten, that is beyond doubt.Many psychologists have noticed this; Darwin also knew this truth well, so he carefully recorded all the facts that conflicted with his theory, because he was afraid of forgetting these facts. Anyone who hears for the first time this principle of counteracting unpleasant memories by forgetting cannot help protesting that, from their own experience, it is precisely painful memories that are difficult to forget, because painful memories are often not subject to the will - such as sorrow and humiliation. memories.This fact is true, but there is little reason for this protest.Know that the mind is the arena of the dueling contest of opposing impulses, or, to use adynamic terms, organized by opposing tendencies.The presence of a particular tendency by no means excludes the existence of its opposite tendency; both can coexist.The important question is: How are these opposing tendencies related? After all, lost and misplaced objects can have many meanings and tendencies to be expressed by these faults, so it is of special interest to discuss them.What these examples have in common is the wish to lose something, but the difference is the reason and purpose of this wish.A person loses something, maybe because it is broken, maybe he wants to exchange it for a better one, maybe he doesn't like it very much; maybe he has a feeling of displeasure with the person who gave it to him; maybe It's because he doesn't want to recall the situation when he got it.Lost items, or damaged items, can be used to express the same intention.Legend has it that in social life, unwelcome illegitimate children are often far weaker than normal pregnant children.This does not mean that the kindergarten teachers used crude methods to cause this result. A certain degree of indifference in managing children is enough to explain it.The preservation or non-existence of items is exactly the same. Sometimes an object can be lost without losing its value, as if by an impulse to escape other, more dire losses by sacrificing it.According to the results of the analysis, this method of eliminating disasters is still very popular, so our losses are often voluntary sacrifices.Lost property can also be used to vent anger or self-punishment.In short, all the more distant motives behind the lost property are too numerous to enumerate. Like other faults, the mistaking of objects, or mistakes in actions, is frequently employed in the gratification of a forbidden wish; the intention is predicated on chance.For example, as a friend of mine once did, he was very reluctant to take the train to visit friends in the countryside, and when he changed trains at a certain station, he accidentally boarded the train back to the city.Another example is that someone wanted to take a break somewhere while traveling, but he couldn't do it because he already had an appointment with another place, so he made a mistake or delayed the time, so that he had to delay as he wished.Or like a patient I treated, I forbade him to talk to his wife on the phone.He wanted to call me, but gave the wrong number, so he called her again.The following is an engineer's self-report, which is enough to explain the meaning of damaged objects and wrong actions. “我曾在一个中学的实验室里和几个同事作关于弹力的实验；这是我们自告奋勇的工作，但是它所耗费的时间却超出了我们的预算。有一天，我和我的朋友F.同入实验室，他说自己家里很忙，不愿在此耽搁太久。我对此不禁表示同情，并半开玩笑地谈到一星期前的事件说：'我希望这个机器再坏一次，好使我们暂时停工，早点回家。'布置工作的时候，F.的职务是管理压力机的阀门；换句话说，他必须慎重地打开阀门，好使储藏器内的压力慢慢地进入水压机的气缸内。领导实验的人站在水压计旁边，到了压力适中的时候，大声喊道'停止！'F.听到这个命令，便将阀门用死力向左旋转。凡关阀门须向右转，这是没有例外的。于是储藏器内的全部压力立即侵入压力机内，致使连接管不胜负荷，有一个立即破裂——这是一个完全无害的事件，但却使我们不得不停工回家了。不久以后，当我们讨论这个事件时，友人F.已记不起我在先前所说的话，而我却记得毫厘不爽，这确实是很能说明问题的。” 记住这一点，你可能开始会怀疑仆人们失手损坏家内的器物是否完全出于偶然了。甚至一个人自己伤害了自己，或使自己陷于危险，究竟是否偶然，也都可发生疑问了——你们若有机会，这是可以用分析试验的。 关于过失，所能说的远不止于此；还有许多要研究和讨论的问题。但是假使你们听了我的演讲，已稍微改变了已往的信仰而预备接受这些新的见解，那也可以使我满足了。其他问题尚未解决就随它去吧。因为单靠过失的研究，决不能证明一切原则。为了我们的目的，过失之所以有价值，就在于它们是普通的现象，既为大家自身所易于观察，又和病态不发生关系。在结束之前，我想再指出一个未曾答复你们的问题：“假使由这许多例子看来，人们已对过失有所了解，而且他们的行动也似乎表示他们认识了过失的意义，那么他们究竟为什么还如此普遍地把过失看作是偶然的、无意义的现象，而如此强烈地反对精神分析的解释呢？” 对的，这个问题确有解释的必要。然而我并不立即给你们解释；我宁愿慢慢地使你们领会种种关系，然后不必借我的帮助，自然会得出这个解释。