Chapter 9 Chapter 8 Xiangjiang River, Xiangjiang River

Bai Chongxi, who believed that "there are bandits and me, and there are no bandits and no me", suddenly opened up the Iron Triangle of Quan, Guan, and Xing, but the Red Second Division lost precious opportunities.The Red First Army, which has always been strong and persistent, is shaken about how long its fighting ability can last.Li Jue, a titan of the Hunan Army, refused to admit that he copied Lin Biao's army headquarters until his death. There is a popular saying in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan: China has three and a half military strategists, two and a half are in the mainland, and one is in Taiwan.

The one in Taiwan refers to Bai Chongxi. In 1928, Tan Yankai, the chief executive of the Kuomintang, wrote a couplet as a gift to Bai: "Commanding can return to the world, and children who learn language can know their names." From his calculation of the time and direction of the Red Army's breakout in front of Chen Jitang, people can know that not only the outstanding military strategists of the Communist Party can be called soldiers like gods. He Jian was born in the same year as Chiang Kai-shek, and Bai Chongxi was born in the same year as Mao Zedong.At the age of 14, he applied for the Guangxi Army Primary School. There were more than a thousand applicants in the province, and only 120 were selected, and Bai was admitted as the sixth. At the age of 16, he applied for the Guangxi Provincial Junior Normal School and ranked second.After entering the school, he ranked first in the examination many times and was selected as the foreman.

This person from Shanwei Village, Nanxiang Township, Guilin County, whose family is not well-off, did not have smooth sailing just because of his excellent studies. There was a classmate named He Shuxin in the class who was from Guilin city. He was jealous of Bai's academic performance and would often make fun of Bai Chongxi and his younger brother as "country people".One day when Cheng Bai was away, He was swearing and swearing in the room again. Bai came back suddenly and asked him what happened?He couldn't keep his mouth shut at the gate, so he braced himself and pushed down, and said in a dialogue: "Bah! Country man!" When Bai Chongxi recalled this scene in Taiwan in his later years, he said: "I couldn't help being furious, thinking that a man can't be humiliated, so I beat He Knock him down and kick him twice as punishment. This is my first fight since I was a student."

First of all, he beat people with his hands, and when things got serious, the defendant went to the principal.Many classmates advised him not to admit to the principal that he had beaten He, at least not to admit that he had done it first.Bai insisted on going his own way and refused to listen to dissuasion.Instead of explaining to the school and begging for mercy, he packed up his luggage and prepared to go home, and told his younger brother to stay and study hard and not to worry about it.Later, the students recommended a representative to present their situation to the principal, and the school also found out the cause of the incident, and did not expel Bai Chongxi from his student status, and gave a major demerit punishment to settle the matter.

This disposition of Bai Chongxi was often shown in the future. In 1919, Bai Chongxi served as the company commander of the model battalion of the Gui Army, and went to the Zuojiang River Basin to suppress bandits.Because Guangxi has continued to adopt the policy of recruiting security for years, bandits have become more and more powerful, forming a situation of "selling cattle to buy guns", "nowhere, no mountains, no mountains, no caves, no caves, no bandits".The model camp recruited 200 bandits, and Bai Chongxi strongly advocated shooting 80 of them habitual bandits on the spot to prevent future troubles.At that time, Guangxi warlord Lu Rongting himself was a bandit who was recruited. He was furious when he heard the news and firmly refused.Bai has made up his mind and acted arbitrarily.He let the 80 bandit leaders go home for the holiday for 3 days, and strictly ordered them to return to camp on time.When they came back, they said that they had behaved illegally outside and had failed their preferential treatment. They used ambushes to arrest 80 people one by one and executed them immediately.At the same time, it was quickly reported to the top that the bandits had snatched guns at night and conspired to rebel.Faced with the fait accompli, Lu Rongting was helpless.

Since then, Guangxi's policy of recruiting bandits has been changed to a policy of advancing and suppressing. Bai Chongxi's temperament was revealed many times in his later relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. There was a good cooperation between him and Jiang.Because of Bai Chongxi's military talent in unifying Guangxi, at the beginning of the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek asked him to be the chief of staff of the general headquarters.Bai Yi did not dare to accept the responsibility, and Li Zongren also believed that the commanding officer of the Guangxi army would not let him go;

After the capture of Wuhan, the first division of the first army of Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Boling, and the second division Liu Zhi failed in Zhejiang, and He Yingqin was trapped in the battle in Fujian. , overcome Hangzhou, force Shanghai, Lian Zhan Lian Jie. The "April 12" counter-revolutionary incident in 1927 was the peak of Jiang and Bai's cooperation.Jiang made up his mind to "purge the party" in Shanghai, and Bai served as the commander of martial law in Shanghai; Jiang issued the "Proclamation on Purging the Party" and "Purge the Party", while Bai used machine guns to shoot at the workers' ranks in Shanghai; White horror, under the word "white", it is specifically marked as Bai Chongxi.

After the peak, it's downhill.And because the peak is too steep, the downhill is also steep. Only 4 months after the "April 12" Incident, Bai Chongxi joined forces with He Yingqin and Li Zongren to force Chiang to step down for the first time.Later, in the Jianggui War, Jiang Feng War, Jiang Fengyan War, and the Ningyue War, as long as it was against Chiang, Bai Chongxi was indispensable. White against Chiang.Jiang also protested. Tang Shengzhi made a comeback in March 1929, but Bai Chongxi was unable to gain a foothold in the north, and fled south in disguise from Tanggu on a Japanese ship amidst the sound of defeat.Chiang Kai-shek learned that Xiong Shihui, commander of the Shanghai garrison, sent an urgent telegram to "send a quick turn to stop outside Wusongkou, and make sure to search for the rebel and investigate in Beijing."

Chiang Kai-shek's desire to get rid of it and then be quick is beyond words. Later, thanks to Xiong Shihui's secretary's tip-off, Bai Chongxi escaped with his life. The relationship between Bai and Jiang is a kaleidoscope in the history of the Republic of China.The relationship of life and death on the battlefield turns into a relationship of fighting against each other in an instant; the relationship of relying on each other in the political arena turns into a relationship of life and death in the blink of an eye. But Chiang Kai-shek's huge plan to pursue and block the Xiangjiang River must still be used in vain.The Gui army is extremely powerful and has Bai Chongxi's brains, so it is likely to play the leading role.

It is Jiang's practice to give money first to the employer.Immediately, a plane rushed to Bai Chongxi to send two armies, three months' funds, a battle plan, a secret telegram, etc., and a telegram was attached: "If your department can do its best to intercept the Hunan-Guangxi border, cooperate with the central army to wipe out the Between Guanyang and the whole county, the party and the state are responsible. Zhongzheng dare not be stingy with the required salary." Bai Chongxi also replied: "Follow orders." Both sides were nice and courteous. Bai Chongxi put all two armies of the Guangxi Army on the border of northern Guangxi, controlled Guanyang and the whole county with the 15th Army, and controlled Xing'an and Gongcheng with the Seventh Army; he also led the advance command post to Guilin; A large net spread around the Xiangjiang River was formed.The Guangxi army is in a decisive battle with the Red Army between Quan, Guan and Xing.

But Bai Chongxi had an extra heart.While mobilizing the army, he dispatched the air force, in the name of scouting the whereabouts of the Red Army, but in fact scouting the actions of Jiang Jun.Having dealt with Jiang for many years, he knew him too well, so he always suspected that the Central Army wanted to use the opportunity of tracking the Red Army to go south and penetrate into Guangxi. The main principle of the Guangxi Clan is still to prevent Chiang Kai-shek more than prevent the Communist Party. Sure enough, the air reconnaissance report: Jiang's army maintained a two-day schedule with the Red Army in a large encirclement situation, and its main force stopped between Xinning and Dong'an for more than 7 days. Since it is said to be a great opportunity to eliminate the Red Army, why didn't the Central Army Xue Yue and Zhou Hunyuan actively pursue and suppress it? Gui Jun's plane flew back, drawing a big question mark in Bai Chongxi's mind from the air. Bai Chongxi and Xue Yue are old acquaintances and enemies. Before the "April 12" Incident was launched in 1927, it was Bai Chongxi who proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that Xue Yue, who was left-leaning in thinking, should be dismissed from his position as the commander of the First Division.At that time, Bai Chongxi, as the former commander-in-chief of the Eastern Route Army, thought he knew what kind of medicine was sold in Xue Yue's gourd. Now that Xue Yue is the commander-in-chief of the former enemy of the pursuit and suppression army, and the nine divisions of the Central Army under his command are walking around, what kind of medicine is selling in the gourd? In the midst of anxiety, the secret radio station of the Guangxi clique in Shanghai sent another telegram saying: Chiang Kai-shek decided to use Yang Yongtai's plan to eliminate the three evils in one fell swoop, and forced the Red Army to enter Pingle, Zhaoping, and Cangwu in Guangxi from both sides of Longhu Pass. All the way to oppress the Red Army to enter Xinhui and Yangchun, Guangdong; it is estimated that the troops in Guangdong and Guangxi will not be enough to deal with it, and they cannot resist the massive entry of Jiang's army.In this way, all three evils will be eliminated in one fell swoop, and Jiang's confidant's serious troubles will be eliminated. The power generator is Wang Jianping, a native of Pingle, Guangxi, a classmate of Bai Chongxi's Baoding Military Academy, and has a very close personal relationship with Bai.He has been infiltrated into the Central Committee of Jiang Jun to participate in secrets, constantly collecting information for Bai, and often lives in Shanghai. Bai Chongxi read Wang Jianping's telegram, and repeatedly said: "What a vicious plan, we are almost fooled!" Contact Xue Yue to place the main force in Xinning and Dong'an, and only maintain contact with the rear of the Red Army, with the intention of driving them away and not in a decisive battle. , the trend coincided with Wang Jianping's telegram, so he decided to immediately change the deployment, determined to adopt the advice of his staff Liu Fei: "Do not stop the Red Army, do not cut the waist, only hit the tail"; get out of the front, occupy the flanks, and urge them to leave as soon as possible Guijing. Taiwan's "Historical Journal of the Republic of China" records that on November 17, 1934, "Bai Chongxi went to Hunan and Guangxi to deploy defense." He was not there to arrange battles, but to arrange retreats. At that time, in the area of ​​Longhuguan in northern Guangxi, the Guangxi army mobilized countless peasants to rush to repair roads and bridges. They did not stop all night, and women and children also joined.Bai Chongxi issued an order to transfer the army to Longhuguan on the night when he held a meeting in Pingle to arrange fortified walls and clear fields to defend both the Red Army and the Jiang army. First of all, in addition to sticking to the position of Longhu Pass, the security forces at Yong'an Pass, Qingshui Pass, and Leikou Pass were ordered to retreat, and the fortifications Xingye were dug up to allow the Red Army to pass through northern Guangxi from the passes north of Longhu Pass. The second is to order the forty-fourth division and the forty-two division deployed around Shitangwei, the core position of the Quanguan Xing Iron Triangle, to block the backbone of the Red Army, withdraw to the front line of Guanyang and Xing'an, change the frontal position to the side position, and change the interception for flanking. The Seventh Army assembled in Gongcheng.From Guanyang to Yong'an Pass, only a small number of troops remained.The whole county is completely open, and only the militia is stationed. After this series of actions, a key change occurred in the Gui army's formation. Quanzhou is an important town in northern Guangxi, the throat of the Central Plains into the south of the Five Ridges, and military strategists have always fought for it. Bai Chongxi is very familiar with this place.At the age of 18 during the Revolution of 1911, he signed up to join the Guangxi Northern Expedition Student Death Squad.After the family found out, they went to guard the gate of Guilin City and wanted to take him home.He changed into plain clothes and slipped out of the west gate and walked around two mountains before catching up with the team.When the Death Squad marched to Jeonju, the feet of Bai Chongxi and most of his classmates were worn down by straw sandals, and the soles of their feet were also injured by road stones.But this group of young people gritted their teeth and walked all the way to Hanyang to join the Southern Army camp. This time, Bai Chongxi came to Quanzhou again, and he didn't look like he went to the Death Squad and worn out his feet, this time he came to oil the soles of his feet - he wanted to slip. Bai Chongxi's original north-south formation along the Xiangjiang River was like a gate closed in front of the Red Army.Now it is suddenly changed to an east-west formation with the Xiangjiang River as the vertical axis, as if the gate suddenly opened.In particular, the abandonment of Shitang, the core of the triangle area of ​​Quan, Guan and Xing, created a wide and deep crack in the thousands of mountains and ravines. According to the records of the Hunan Army, the day when the Guangxi Army abandoned the core positions of Quan, Guan, and Xing was November 22, 1934. At this time, the forward of the Red Army was very close to northern Guangxi. Someone in the Guangxi army suggested that with such a deployment, once the main force of the Red Army breaks in from Guanyang and Quanxian County, Xia Wei's 15th Army will not be able to support it, and the Xiangjiang defense line will inevitably be lost.Bai replied angrily: "Lao Jiang hates us more than Zhu Mao. This plan is his most ideal plan. Who cares, there are bandits and I, and there is no bandit without me. Why should I create opportunities for him with a wet pot cover? ?It’s better to keep Zhu Mao, we still have a chance to develop. If Xia Xucang (Xia Wei’s alias) can’t stop it, we will open Xing’an, Guanyang, and the whole county to let them pass. Anyway, I can’t let anyone enter Pingle, Wuzhou, sacrifice the essence of our province." This is Bai Chongxi's basic point of view.The opening and closing of the gate does not matter to him.With a total of 18 regiments, he can only nail a door panel whether facing the Red Army of 5 legions or the Central Army of 9 divisions.Closing the gate of Xiangjiang River to the Red Army opened the gate of Guangxi to Jiang Jun.Closing the gate of Guangxi to Jiang Jun opened the gate of Xiangjiang River to the Red Army. This is a dilemma.But Wang Jianping's telegram from Shanghai made Bai Chongxi understand a dialectic in an instant: to close is to open, and to be open is to close. So he did not hesitate to pull the door that closed the Xiangjiang River to protect Gongcheng and Guilin. After completing these arrangements, Bai Chongxi took Liu Fei to Quanzhou to meet Liu Jianxu. When Liu Jianxu shook hands with Bai Chongxi, he thought that the Xiangjiang River defense line had been closed by the Hunan and Guangxi armies.Unexpectedly, at this time, the door of Gui Jun quietly opened. Chen Jitang's giving way, and Bai Chongxi's giving way, have been in the fog of history for a long time. The secret understanding between Chen Jitang and the Red Army is known to senior leaders of both sides.There have been negotiations.There was an agreement written down in a notebook.There was a tacit understanding between the two parties that was more important than the agreement. Bai Chongxi's move to give way is a real mystery.Until He Changgong's memoirs were published and Chen Jitang gave way to the world, people who studied the history of the CCP were still guessing and judging Bai Chongxi's motives back then, and even suspected that he had a secret understanding with the Red Army. The American Salisbury wrote a book "The Long March--The Unheard Story".He said "there is evidence that there is an understanding with the Guangxi warlords Bai Chongxi and Li Zongren", citing two people as evidence.One was Xu Mengqiu, the first historian of the Red Army, who said in 1936 that the leader of Guangxi "promised to open an area", that is, a corridor tens of miles wide between the Jieshou of the Xiangjiang River and Quanzhou; History expert Hu Hua.Hu Hua told Salisbury in 1984, "The statement about the corridor is well-founded," otherwise the Red Army would not have been able to persist on the Xiangjiang River for a week. Is there any "secret arrangement" that allowed the Red Army to cross the Xiangjiang River smoothly? Salisbury said: "I have been exploring this issue", but I have never explored why.Xu Mengqiu, Hu Hua, and Salisbury passed away one after another. Bai Chongxi's series of unusual and sudden transfers left a gap in defense in the Iron Triangle of Quan, Guan, and Xing, which has always been a gap in the history of Chinese revolution. A history without mysteries is a dull history. The process of solving historical puzzles is often a process of complicating the answers. When arranging the defense of the Xiangjiang River, Bai Chongxi and Liu Fei once went to Xing'an and said half-jokingly and half-seriously to Xia Wei, commander of the 15th Army, and Lan Xiangshan, chief of staff: "Who sent a letter to the Red Army saying that we will make a way for them to pass. "The heartfelt words are hidden in the jokes. No one sent such a letter.There is no agreement or tacit understanding between Bai Chongxi and the Red Army, but only careful arrangements and arrangements for their own interests.The rest depends on each other's tacit understanding. Bai Chongxi intends to shrink, but Liu Jianxu is unable to make up for it. For the well-planned decisive battle of the Huangsha River, He Jian even made preparations for the rear hospital.In addition to the original health institutions of each combat unit, he specially added a military depot hospital in Lingling behind the Huangsha River, and another hospital in Chenzhou was "scheduled to be transferred to Lingling during the decisive battle of the Huangsha River." The location of the battle was not in the Huangsha River. On November 22, He Jian received the key telegram from Bai Chongxi: Because the Red Army attacked He County and Fuchuan, the main force between Quanzhou and Xing'an moved south to Gongcheng.Please fill in the defense left by the Hunan Army. He Jian complained endlessly.On the 21st, Liu Jianxu's department had just assembled and deployed on the front line of the Huangsha River. Bai Chongxi slapped his ass and flashed nearly 200 miles of Xiangjiang defense line. How to fill it?The Guangxi army shrunk to the hinterland, and the Hunan army was required to go deep into the Gui territory to help defend, and a loophole appeared in the Hunan territory.Who will fill in? The retreat of the Guangxi army at Yong'an Pass, Qingshui Pass, and Leikou Pass in northern Guangxi enabled the vanguard of the Red Army to quickly pass through the passes north of Guanyang and advance towards the empty Shitangwei area. He Jian's thoughtful plan for a decisive battle on the Huangsha River fell through in an instant. At this time, the Hunan Army was on the front line of the Huangsha River closest to Quanzhou, with Zhang Liangji's 16th Division and 4 supplementary regiments led by Li Jue; Chen Guangzhong's 63rd Division had just arrived in Dong'an; Tao Guang's 62nd Division on the 25th Only then can they reach the Huangsha River; Xue Yue's troops were concentrated in Lingling on the 24th, and they were extremely exhausted. On November 23, He Jian sent a telegram to Liu Jianxu: "Let the first road extend along the upper reaches of the Xiangshui River to Quanzhou to make contact with the Guangxi army and stop the bandits from fleeing westward." On November 25th, Liu Jianxu and Xue Yue were called again: "The first route to pursue and suppress commander Liu Jianxu's command post, as the line from Huangsha River (not included) to Quanzhou, focusing on the northeast of Quanzhou"; "The second The command post of Xue Yue, the commander of road pursuit and suppression, is in charge of the line from Lingling to Huangsha River (inclusive), gathers the main force near Dong'an, and coordinates with the first route"; "The first and second routes are both limited to start operations tomorrow morning." A new telegraphic language has come to the fore since the airwaves were used as a means of communication for humans.When the most complex feelings must be expressed in the most refined language, the nuances of a few words contain the meaning that only the person involved can understand that they may hug or draw a gun. He Jian's method of allowing Liu Jianxu and Xue Yue to connect step by step and advance step by step has an obvious meaning: the Hunan Army can enter the territory of Guangxi to take defense.But the location of the defense is Quanzhou, not Xing'an.The Hunan army's river defense can extend 70 miles from the Huangsha River to the whole prefecture, but it will never advance towards Xing'an to "fill up" the gap of more than 100 miles left by the Gui army.The anti-blocking plan for the Xiangjiang River in Nanchang has long been arranged, and if there is a leakage, it is not his responsibility. Bai Chongxi played tricks, and the Red Army did not "attack He Fu" at all.Lin Biao's 1st Army Corps only pretended to move towards Longhuguan, and assumed the posture of attacking Gongcheng and Pingle. Bai Chongxi immediately took it as a reason to retreat. He Jian also played a trick here.On November 22, he received a telegram from Bai Chongxi to withdraw his defense. On the 23rd, he sent a telegram to Liu Jianxu to prepare to move south to take over the defense, but let the troops start to move south on the 26th, and repeatedly told Liu Jianxu not to extend across the state.Afterwards, he told Chiang Kai-shek that the Red Army was "attacking the front line of the Huangsha River" and that Liu Jianxu's troops were too tight to assemble. Bai Chongxi was definitely not the only one who deceived Chiang. Bai Chongxi withdrew his defense, but He Jian didn't make up for it, so he kept Chiang Kai-shek in the dark. A huge loophole suddenly appeared on the Xiangjiang line carefully constructed by Chiang Kai-shek. The gate of the Xiangjiang River Ferry is opened. The plainclothes reconnaissance team of the First Red Army, which was at the forefront of the Central Red Army, continuously sent back reports that there was no enemy ahead.Lin Biao of the First Red Army immediately decided to adopt the posture of "dividing the two wings and breaking through the middle" to advance towards the Xiangjiang River, striding across Bai Chongxi's "Quan, Guan, and Xing Iron Triangle" without hindrance, breaking through the blockade. At this time also presented an excellent opportunity. Liu Zhong, chief of the reconnaissance section of the Red First Army, led the plainclothes reconnaissance team of the regiment to cross the Xiangjiang River quietly from Jieshou. When they arrived near Quanzhou City for reconnaissance, they found that Quanzhou was still an empty city.There is only one militia group of the Gui Army in the city, panicked and weak in combat effectiveness.The Hunan Army's receiving troops have not yet arrived. Whoever occupies the whole state will occupy a favorable position in the Xiangjiang battle.Liu Zhong immediately suggested that the First Army, Second Division and Fifth Regiment near the opposite bank should cross the river quickly and occupy Quanzhou. Liu Zhong once served as a political commissar in the Fifth Regiment.This is a unit that can fight, and was awarded the title of "Model Red Five Regiment" by the Central Revolutionary Military Commission in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. But the current head of the group, Chen Zhengxiang, can't make the decision.Leading the Fifth Regiment was Li Tange, Chief of Staff of the Second Division.Li Tange felt that he should obey the orders of the army headquarters.Report to the Legion Command first, and then act after the order. There is a saying that soldiers are expensive and fast, and there are also three major disciplines and eight points of attention. The first "all actions follow orders".How to master it all depends on the commander himself.Besides, which commander doesn't want to grasp the military aircraft? But the military plane is fleeting. When the command of the Legion Command to "cross the Xiangjiang River and occupy Quanzhou" was issued, Quanzhou had been occupied by the Hunan enemy who had just caught up.At 5:00 pm on the 27th, Liu Jianxu, the commander of the first column of the Pursuing and Suppressing Army, sent a report to his subordinates saying "I am in the whole county" and issued a series of combat orders. Li Tange had no choice but to command the fifth regiment to seize Jueshanpu and urgently build a defensive position facing the whole state. The contradictions and mistakes of the enemy have brought us extremely favorable opportunities.Mistakes on our side have caused some excellent opportunities to be lost again.The reason why the Red Army suffered huge losses in the Battle of the Xiangjiang River was that the central column was too cumbersome and slow, and failed to effectively use the gap in the Xiangjiang River. Later, Liu Jianxu launched violent attacks on the positions of the Red First Army again and again, using the advance base of Quanzhou.If the Second Division and the Fifth Regiment of the Red First Army had decisively occupied Quanzhou, the defensive posture of the First Army against the Hunan Army would undoubtedly have been greatly improved.Did Lin Biao still send the telegram to the Central Committee on the evening of November 30 that "the line of defense is shaken and it is extremely critical"? After Liu Zhong retired in his later years, he wrote a memoir "From West Fujian to West Beijing".Mentioning that 50 years ago, the chief of staff of the Second Red Division, Li Tange, missed the opportunity to control the whole state, and still sighed.What moved him was not only his personal mistake, but also the price of blood and lives of his comrades in arms behind this mistake. The thin memoir is poorly printed, with many typos.The Lieutenant General, who was awarded the title in 1955, revised it word by word, book by book.After correcting, I wrapped the book in paper and sent it to the library of National Defense University. My hands covered with age spots stroked the cover over and over again, and repeatedly told me to store it carefully in an incomprehensible Fujian accent. The library staff were polite and polite, and they were also curious that this old man in dark blue casual clothes was so persistent and serious about a small booklet. After the "September 13th" incident, Liu Zhong was implicated in the Lin Biao issue. Back then Lin Biao's First Red Army was the pioneer of the Long March.Liu Zhong's plainclothes reconnaissance team is the vanguard of the vanguard. Looking at the back of this weak and staggering old man, can you imagine that he was the one who walked in the front of the Red Cyclonus? While the Hunan Army, the Guangxi Army, and the Central Army were pushing the most serious combat tasks back and forth, the Central Red Army showed a tenacious unity in its rapid advance. After the first regiment and one division covered the central column across the Xiaoshui River, they should quickly advance to the Xiangjiang River according to Lin Biao's order and join the regiment headquarters.But the Defender Five Army Corps hadn't caught up yet, and a gap was formed on the front line of Xiaoshui.Peng Dehuai immediately ordered the first division to stop advancing.He told Li Jukui, the commander of the First Division, that we should not leave any gaps for the enemy. Not only can the First Division not leave now, but the Sixth Division of the Third Army Regiment should be under the command of your First Division temporarily. I will contact your army headquarters to explain other issues. According to Peng Dehuai's order, the first division continued to defend the west bank of Xiaoshui for two days, sank batches of ferries chasing the enemy, effectively blocking the enemy's advance and protecting the rear of the Red Army. On the night of November 27, the Second Division of the First Army Corps crossed the Xiangjiang River and occupied Jieshou, and the Fourth Division of the Third Army Corps also arrived immediately.The second division developed in depth, and the fourth division was ordered to take over the defense.Originally wanted to deploy defenses on the north bank of the Xiangjiang River according to the original formation of the First Army Corps, but Lin Biao said no. The Fourth Division should not be placed on the original position of the Second Division. Zhang Zongxun, the commander of the Fourth Division, and Huang Kecheng, the political commissar, deployed defenses on the south bank according to Lin Biao's opinion, and soon caught fire with the Gui enemies who were catching up. Peng Dehuai commanded the troops of the First Army Corps, and Lin Biao commanded the troops of the Third Army Corps, both of which were crucial. If the first regiment and one division did not stick to Xiaoshui according to Peng Dehuai's order, the central column would be chased by the enemy for nearly two days in the Xiangjiang area, and the Red Army's losses in the Xiangjiang battle would increase even more. If the Fourth Division of the Third Army Corps did not follow Lin Biao's order to deploy defenses against the water on the south bank, the Jieshou Ferry would be lost under the surprise attack of the Guangxi Army, and the Red Army Brigade would be cut off by the chasing enemy on the Xiangjiang River. Although they were not facing their own troops, their orders were made without thinking. Without thinking, it is without thinking about the relationship between command and personnel. It comes from more accurate and deeper thinking about the enemy's situation and situation. From Jieshou to Pingshandu, Chiang Kai-shek's carefully constructed Xiangjiang defense line was torn open a 60-mile wide gap. On November 27, on the same day that Lin Biao occupied Jieshou, Liu Jianxu occupied Quanzhou. The Red Army's assault vanguard and the Hunan Army intercepted the general, and each made their own military machines run at high speed. The River Crossing Troops of the First Army Corps marched in depth overnight, and together with the Troops of the Third Army Corps, quickly controlled the 30-kilometer crossing point on the line from Jieshou to Jueshanpu.Lin Biao climbed up the hill to look at the terrain, and decided to use the 4-kilometer-long hill line around Jueshanpu as the main blocking position, and immediately deployed the Second Division troops to enter the position to build fortifications. Liu Jianxu issued a series of orders in the whole prefecture at 5:00 p.m.: Zhang Liangji's division went out of the county to occupy positions along the line of Feiluan Bridge and Qiaotou, and waited for an attack; Immediately assembled at the northwest end of the city to stand by; the artillery battalion was under the command of Zhang Liangji, and immediately selected a position near Dashitang to measure the shooting distance. The follow-up Hunan army came one after another. A fierce battle is imminent. The first to attack was not Liu Jianxu, who was rushing forward, but Bai Chongxi, the Guijun who fled out of the passage. On November 28, Chiang Kai-shek angrily sent a telegram to Bai Chongxi: "The Communist bandits are exhausted and are about to be wiped out. Success is on the verge of failure. Suppose it turns out to be a resurgence because of this, and it will always be a scourge for the party and the country, and even pass on to the descendants of the poison, forever, what is the public opinion? Other than Zhongzheng, who else believes in brothers and has selfless friendship with bandits?" The words have reached such a serious point: "Who will believe in brotherhood and selfless friendship with bandits?" Bai Chongxi, who was reading the telegram, was sweating hot and then cold. In 1927, Bai Chongxi was ordered by Jiang to serve as the former commander-in-chief of the East Route Army, just as his wife Ma Peizhang came as agreed.Before the wife arrives, Bai has already set off.Jiang immediately called Yun: The day after my brother left, my sister-in-law came.The fact that couples can't meet each other is a fault. Once upon a time, brothers and sisters who were in trouble, are now cut into pieces. On the same day as Jiang received the telegram, the Guangxi army launched an attack on the Red Army. So people believed that this telegram was the reason why Bai Chongxi attacked the Red Army. In fact, with or without this telegram, the Gui army's attack date had already been set. One Bai Chongxi brings out a small batch of Bai Chongxi.At the beginning of the release of the "Iron Triangle", the 15th Army of the Guangxi Army in Guanyang calculated based on the observation and calculation of the marching speed of the Red Army in front of them. It was counted from the time when the Red Army entered Qingshui Pass on the night of November 23, including the Red Army's day and night marches to avoid aerial reconnaissance. It is estimated that it will take 5 nights to pass the habit. The strategy of "don't stop the head, don't cut the waist, only hit the tail" has been decided, but there is still the question of whether to hit the big tail or the small tail. Gui Jun formulated two plans at the same time. Case 1: When the Red Army attacked on the fourth day and night, all three divisions of the 15th Army deployed to intercept the rear of the Red Army; Case 2: On the fifth day and night, only one division was deployed in Xinxu to intercept the last small part of the Red Army . Xia Wei, the commander of the 15th Army, advocated hitting the big tail and adopted the first case; Liao Lei, the commander of the Seventh Army, advocated hitting the small tail and adopted the second case. The two argued on the phone. Bai Chongxi made a decision.He said "just use one division in Xinxu", and decided on the second case. On the 28th, the fifth day of the Red Army's passage on the Guangxi Army's calendar, Wang Zanbin's division of the 15th Army went into battle in Xinxu. Bai Chongxi's opponent is Peng Dehuai of the Red Army. On November 28, Wang Zanbin's Division of the 15th Army of the Guangxi Army launched an attack on the 5th Division of the Third Army Corps in Xinxu, fighting fiercely for two days and nights.The fifth division suffered heavy losses. Hu Jun, chief of staff of the division, and Huang Mianchang, head of the fourteenth regiment, died successively. On the 29th, the Gui Army resumed a fierce battle with the Fourth Division of the Third Army Corps in Jieshou Nanguanghuapu. On the 30th, Shen Shuqing, the head of the Tenth Regiment, was killed in action.Peng Dehuai ordered Du Zhongmei to take over as head of the delegation.Du Zhongmei sacrificed again that day.One regiment sacrificed two regiment leaders in one day, which has never been experienced by the three army regiments before, and the intensity of the battle can be imagined. The Eighteenth Regiment of the Sixth Division of the Third Army Regiment was surrounded by the Gui Army on the east bank of the Xiangjiang River, and the whole regiment was wiped out. Huang Kecheng, political commissar of the Fourth Division of the Third Army Regiment, later recalled: "Since the beginning of the Long March, the Central Red Army has been chased and intercepted by the enemy along the way, and has suffered repeated losses. Among them, the losses when passing through the territory of Guangxi were the largest, with no less than 20,000 casualties. , it was the most serious loss in the battle in Guangxi." Although the "hitting the small tail" was adopted, the Guangxi army also caused a lot of damage to the Red Army. Reviewing this battle, if Liu Jianxu's troops can work hard to cooperate, the results will be even greater.When Liu Bufu entered Quanzhou, we prepared special wine and meat for hospitality as a landlord, and hoped that after he was full, we would assist in fighting together.We sent a plane to check whether Bu Liu was doing anything, and the pilot came back and said angrily, "They are not suppressing the Communist Party, but 'resisting Japan'." It turned out that Bu Liu was sleeping with a gun on his back. means the sun. Saying that Liu Jianxu was asleep without completing the defense defense, there is no evidence to prove it in Taiwan.But in the mainland there is still Liu Fei, a high-ranking member of Bai Chongxi.Liu Fei's recollection proves that Bai Chongxi intentionally misrepresented the meeting with Liu Jianxu in Quanzhou.At that time, he repeatedly told Liu Fei: "When you see Liu Huixian (Jianxu), you must not tell him all about us"; Will inform Jiang to curry favor.After the meeting, Bai Chongxi told Liu Jianxu in person that Guangxi, in accordance with the central government's will, was preparing to cooperate with the Central Army to wipe out the Red Army from south to north in the Quan, Guan, and Xing areas, and hoped that Hunan would be encircled from the front. Regarding these, Bai Chongxi kept silent in Taiwan. It is conceivable that Bai Chongxi in Taiwan can only write like this. "Your Ministry violated the order and opened the main roads leading to Qianchuan, which is tantamount to returning the tiger to the mountain." Bai Chongxi will never forget Lao Jiang's stern telegram of accusation.He must do everything possible to cleanse and free himself, to prove that he has never been like this. Of course, if I lived in mainland China in my later years, memoirs would definitely be written in another way. Bai Chongxi's memoirs are not without truth.For example, the statement that "the Communist Army passed through about 60 kilometers from the front and could not find any grains of grain" is true. But Bai Chongxi didn't tell anyone why he couldn't find the "Quan, Guan, Xing Iron Triangle" 60 kilometers away and couldn't find the soldiers of the Gui Army. Until death. To be fair, Liu Jianxu, who was accused by Bai Chongxi of being weak in combat, was extremely brave in the Battle of Xiangjiang. His opponent was Lin Biao, head of the First Red Army. On November 29th, Liu Jianxu connected two telegrams with He Jian: Telegram of Yanyan in November: Commander-in-Chief Liu Jianxu: Entrusted to take a seat on the Haihai Telegram: Ordered to serve in the area between the east of Xiangli and the west of Siguan, and the bandits Army annihilated.Our army was ordered to pursue and suppress them, and it was our duty to do so.In any case, the main force of the bandit army should be prevented from fleeing from Quan and Xing.I really hope to motivate the soldiers to work hard to sweep the right wing of the bandits from the salt water, oppress the area south of the Xiang River, and gather and wipe them out.Ho key.Yan Shu general staff machine. In November, the garrison order: Commander-in-Chief Liu Jianxu: According to the report of the Air Force today: in the villages of Lianhuatang, Dafuqiao, Shitangwei, Tietoutou, and Dalingbei, a large number of bandits were found. ... It is very obvious to judge that the bandits have followed the old path of Xiao bandits and fled westward.The Fifth and Fifth Brigade of Yangzhou firmly guarded the mouth of Meixi, stopped the bandits from fleeing north, intercepted the bandits fleeing west, and supervised and led the main force to destroy the bandits halfway along the river in the whole prefecture and salt water. Liu Jianxu started suddenly like a fully powered chariot. Liu Jianxu is a famous hero of the Hunan Army.As soon as he entered Quanzhou, he categorically informed the commanders of the troops under his command: "I am in the whole county", with a posture of "I will be responsible for everything". He has a lot of experience in the military.Chen Cheng was a student of the eighth period of Baoding Military Academy, Ye Ting was a student of the sixth period, and Liu Jianxu was a student of the third period. He entered Baoding Military Academy in 1914.Artillery was fierce in modern wars, and China has always suffered from the strong ships and powerful guns of the great powers. Chiang Kai-shek enrolled in the military academy to study artillery, Chen Cheng also studied artillery, and Liu Jianxu also studied artillery.He has a deep relationship with He Jian.The two are both fellows from Liling and classmates in the third period of Baoding. When they returned to their hometown, they started a guerrilla team together.He Ren was the leader of the guerrilla detachment, and Liu was the battalion commander; He Wei was the brigade commander, and Liu was the commander of the regiment;When the Northern Expedition Army conquered Wuchang, when the He Jian Division took the lead in opening the west gate of Wuchang, the first unit to rush into the city was Liu Jianxu's brigade.The relationship between He and Liu is clear at a glance. After receiving two telegrams from He Jian, Liu Jianxu ordered Li Jue, Acting Security Commander of Hunan Province, to command the entire 16th Division, supplement 4 regiments of the corps, Chen Zixian's brigade (less than one regiment), one mountain artillery, two infantry artillery, and divide by one regiment Stick to the outside of the Zhaixu, and the rest will attack along the Quanxing Highway.The first part of the 63rd Division will replace the position of the 16th Division, and the 62nd Division will be the reserve team, located in the northwest of the county. The Red First Army is under tremendous pressure.At noon, the Hunan enemy attacked near Daizipu.The forward positions of the Red Army in Lubanqiao, Hoetian, Daizipu, Goupai Mountain and Ma'anshan were captured one after another.Under the enemy's superior artillery fire, the forward troops of the Second Red Division retreated step by step to the core position of Jueshanpu. Only the lines of Shazibao and Tianxinpu are still in our hands, and we are at a stalemate with the enemy. On the 30th, the Red First Division arrived after completing the task of blocking Xiaoshui.Lin Biao ordered him to immediately enter the Jueshanpu position regardless of fatigue, and set up defenses on Mihua Mountain and Baoziling in Huaizhong. Jueshanpu is a small village with about twenty fireworks households.The Guihuang Highway runs parallel to the north and south of the Xiangjiang River, with many small mountains sandwiched on both sides. Jueshanpu is located at the intersection of the mountains and the road.Only by controlling it can we ensure that Jieshou Ferry is in my hands. The battle started that day across the board. Later, many articles describing the battle said that the enemies of the whole state were mobilized.The Red Army used 5 regiments to deal with the pounce of 16 regiments from 4 divisions of Liu Jianxu and Xue Yue. In fact, Xue Yue's department did not come up, and Liu Jianxu did not mobilize. On the 30th, the Hunan Army troops on the 29th were responsible for the attack: the 16th Division of the Hunan Army, and the 4 supplementary regiments led by Li Jue. According to the detailed battle report of the Hunan Army, at dawn on November 30, the 16th Division, with 4 regiments including the 48th Brigade and the 93rd Regiment, attacked Dengjiaqiao and Tianxinpu.Division commander Zhang Liangji commanded one of the three regiments of the 46th Brigade to attack the area of ​​Shazibao and Jueshanpu along the Quanxing Highway.李觉率4个补充团沿公路跟进策应。 共11个团兵力，就攻防来说，其优势并不是很大。这里需要特别提一下湘军前线总指挥、湖南代保安司令兼十九师师长李觉。 李觉比林彪大7岁，湖南长沙人。军校毕业后投入湘军第一师任排长。他所在的部队是土匪收编过来的部队，生活作风非常腐败，士兵毫无纪律可言，根本不把李觉这个嘴上没毛的学生官放在眼里。团长唐生智便给李觉出主意说，把老姜烧热了烫嘴唇，便可以烫出胡子来。李觉信以为真，如法炮制，非但没有烫出胡子，反而在部队中闹出了笑话，却又因此被周围人认为老实憨厚，赢得了士兵们的好感。 从此李觉以唐生智为榜样，不摆架子，不怕吃苦，和士兵们一同作劳役，一同玩游戏，建立起良好的感情。 这就是唐生智湘军战斗力的基础。 1921年夏，吴佩孚由水路进袭岳州，唐生智的第二旅被四面包围。李觉生平第一次历经这样艰险而激烈的战斗，未免有些惊慌失措。他看到唐生智总是进攻在前，退却在后，始终不离开战斗前沿，不禁深受感动，于是自动请求和唐旅长一同断后。唐生智问他：“你不怕了？”李觉答：“旅长不怕，我怕什么？” 自此，唐生智对李觉十分器重，亲自选派他赴保定军官学校深造。毕业后又由唐本人亲自撮合，与唐部骑兵团团长何键的大女儿何玫在长沙结婚。从此李觉作为何键长门女婿，唐生智亲手带出来的军官，在湘军中具有了双料优势。蒋介石搞全国军队整编，湘军军改师，师改旅，所有军官皆降一级使用，偏偏李觉却由团长晋升为旅长。1930年冬，出任十九师师长，是湘军中最受何键信任的人物。 向全州方向派去了左膀右臂刘建绪，又以长门女婿李觉做攻击先锋，可见何键对湘江之战下注之重。 李觉跟唐生智学到的一套带兵办法，较得士兵信任；且又有何键女婿的身份，使同是师长的章亮基也不得不唯命是听。加上李觉本人头脑机敏，作战顽强，这一切立刻在红一军团防守的阵地当面表现了出来。 30日刚刚上来参加防守的红一军团一师米花山阵地，当天就被突破。紧接着二师的美女梳头岭也失守。一师向西南方向后退。李觉指挥湘军三面夹击二师五团防守的尖峰岭。轮番冲锋，倒下一批，又冲上来一批，人夜攻势仍然不停。五团政委易荡平身负重伤，为不当俘虏，用警卫员的枪对着自己头颅扣动了扳机。五团尖峰岭阵地失守。二师主力只得退守黄帝岭，与强攻不舍的湘军拼杀得惊天动地，阵地前后，到处是红军指战员的遗体。四团政委杨成武也身负重伤。湘军采取迂回战术，派部队向二师侧后运动，二师只得后撤。 这是红一军团从未经历过的最残酷战斗。 林彪也为眼前的战局深感震惊。 一军团过去应付过无数困难的局面和包围，但总能先敌自主决定自己的意志，取得支配战局的主动地位。现在眼见军团部队处于敌人迂回包抄之中，还需要像钉子一样坚守阵地，自己的野战机动性全部失去。如此窘境，林彪头一次遇到。 长征路上林彪有两次最为紧张。第一次就是掩护中央纵队强渡湘江。 几天来，前后方的来往电报都标明“火急”、“十万火急”；但后方对催促前进的回答却总是“中央纵队向湘江前进”、“中央纵队接近湘江”，仍然携带着几十个人才抬得动的山炮、制造枪弹的机床、出版刊物的印刷机、成包成捆的图书文件、整挑整挑的苏区钞票……还在以每天20公里的速度前进。 11月30日深夜，在觉山铺的军团长林彪、军团政委聂荣臻、军团参谋长左权彻夜未眠，对着摇曳的马灯反复思虑了几个小时，给中革军委拍发了一封火急电报：朱主席：我军如向城步前进，则必须经大埠头，此去大埠头，须经白沙铺或经咸水圩。由觉山铺到白沙铺只二十里，沿途为宽广起伏之树林，敌能展开大的兵力，颇易接近我们，我火力难发扬，正面又太宽。如敌人明日以优势猛进，我军在目前训练装备状况下，难有占领固守的绝对把握。军委须将湘水以东各军，星夜兼程过河。一、二师明天继续抗敌。 这就是那封著名的“星夜兼程过河”电报。之所以著名，因为局面已到千钧一发之际。向来披坚执锐的红一军团，对自己的战斗能力还能支撑多久已经发生动摇。 这封电报给中革军委带来极大震惊。行军过程中前后左右不问断的枪炮声，使中央纵队和军委纵队的人们已经明白局面的险恶。但未料想险恶到如此程度。 接到一军团火急电报，12月1日凌晨一时半，朱德给全方面军下达紧急作战令，其中命令“一军团全部在原地域有消灭全州之敌由朱塘铺沿公路向西南前进部队的任务。无论如何，要将汽车路以西之前进诸道路，保持在我们手中”。 两小时后3时30分，为保证中革军委主席朱德的命令不折不扣地执行，中革军委副主席、三人团中的组织者周恩来以中央局、中革军委、总政治部名义起草电报：一日战斗，关系我野战军全部。西进胜利，可开辟今后的发展前途，迟则我野战军将被层层切断。我一、三军团首长及其政治部，应连夜派遣政工人员，分入到各连队去进行战斗鼓动。要动员全体指战员认识今日作战的意义。我们不为胜利者，即为战败者。胜负关全局，人人要奋起作战的最高勇气，不顾一切牺牲，克服疲惫现象，以坚决的突击，执行进攻与消灭敌人的任务，保证军委一号一时半作战命令全部实现，打退敌人占领的地方，消灭敌人进攻部队，开辟西进的道路，保证我野战军全部突过封锁线应是今日作战的基本口号。望高举着胜利的旗帜，向着火线上去。 Central Army Military Commission 总征 局面极其严峻。以最高权力机关联合名义发报，且电报语气之沉重，措辞之严厉，为历来所罕见。 不能仅仅是宣告胜利的电报可以载入史册。林彪“星夜兼程过河”电报和周恩来“向着火线上去”电报，更叠现出我军那部既光辉灿烂又千曲百折的战史。 艰难奋战不再是一个抽象概念，在这里，它融化在了字里行间。 面对红一军团历史上空前的严峻情况，林彪在天亮之前给各部队下达命令，按照军委要求，12时前决不准敌人突过白沙铺！聂荣臻组织政工人员全部到连队，提出战斗口号：生死存亡在此一战！ 林、聂光想着白沙铺了，未想到差点儿让李觉麾下的湘军端了一军团的军团部。 12月1日凌晨，敌军再次对觉山铺一线发起猛烈进攻。国民党《陆军第十六师于全县觉山沙子包一带剿匪各役战斗详报》记载：本日拂晓，我李代司令率补充各团附炮兵，沿公路向朱兰铺、白沙铺攻剿。本师（十六师）第四十八旅附第九十三团，向刘家、严家之匪攻剿。师长率第四十六旅沿公路跟进策应。自晨至午，战斗极烈。我军在飞机炮火掩护之下，勇猛冲击，前仆后继…… 不仅林彪会打穿插迂回，李觉的穿插迂回更加凶猛。湘军一部从一军团一师与二师的接合部切入，以浓密的树林作掩护，向右翼迂回到一师三团背后，包围该团两个营。左翼敌人也向红军侧后迂回。一、二团被分割截击，情势危急。 战至中午，敌人竟然迂回到了觉山铺南面隐蔽山坡上的军团指挥所。参谋长左权正在吃饭，警卫员邱文熙突然报告：“敌人爬上来了！”聂荣臻不信，以为是自己部队在调动，到前面一看，黑压压一片敌人端着刺刀，已经快到跟前了。 林彪拔出手枪。聂荣臻拔出手枪。左权丢下饭碗操起枪去指挥警卫部队。军团指挥所瞬间成了战斗最前沿。军团指挥员眨眼变成了普通战斗员。 红一军团部曾几次遇险。 第四次反“围剿”在草台岗围歼陈诚的十一师，一颗炸弹落到指挥位置，强大的气浪把正在写作战命令的林彪一下子抛到山坡下。林彪爬起来一看没有受伤，拍掉身上的土，继续书写战斗命令。 第五次反“围剿”一军团从大雄关向西南转移，在军峰山堡垒地带遭毛炳文第八师袭击，敌人冲到军团部前。林、聂带领身边的警卫员、炊事员和机关直属队人员投入战斗，一直顶到增援部队上来。 但最险的还是湘江这一次。 1942年5月，左权牺牲在抗日前线。林彪写了一篇声情并茂的《悼左权同志》：多少次险恶的战斗，只差一点我们就要同归于尽。好多次我们的司令部投入了混战的旋涡，不但在我们的前方是敌人，在我们的左右后方也发现了敌人，我们曾各亲自拔出手枪向敌人连放，拦阻溃乱的队伍向敌人反扑。子弹、炮弹、炸弹，在我们前后左右纵横乱落，杀声震彻着山谷和原野，炮弹、炸弹的尘土时常在你我的身上，我们屡次从尘土中浓烟里滚了出来。 文章落笔时，他眼前一定出现了湘江畔那场血战。 活生生的、摒弃一切夸张、形容、粉饰的战争。 林彪一生没有留下什么像样的军事专著。他更不会似哈姆雷特那般在空寂幽暗的舞台上就自己的经历感受大段独白。从始至终他沉默寡言。在家乡林家大湾上学时，他曾给小学女同学林春芳写过一副对联：读书处处有个我在，行事桩桩少对人言。这两句话成为贯穿他一生的格言。只有在很少的场合、很少的文字之中，他才略微表露出自己的真情与心迹，《悼左权同志》是其中之一。 中央纵队在12月1日中午以前渡过湘江并越过桂黄公路。 一、三军团在两侧硬顶，五军团在后卫硬堵，红军主力部队硬是用热血浇出一条愈见狭窄的通道。湘江江面，殷红的鲜血伴随着撕碎的文件、丢弃的书籍、散落的钞票，汩汩流淌。 彭德怀晚年回忆这一段时说：“一、三军团像两个轿夫，抬起中央纵队这顶轿子，总算是在12月抬到了贵州之遵义城。” 当时彭德怀已在“文化大革命”中身陷囹圄，回顾这一幕，仍如释重负。 湘军刘建绪给红一军团予拦截；桂军白崇禧给红三军团、红八军团、红九军团予侧击；中央军周浑元予红五军团以尾击，造成红军的重大伤亡。 五军团三十四师、三军团六师十八团被隔断在河东。 八军团二十一师完全垮掉。二十三师严重减员。军团政治部主任罗荣桓冒着弹雨蹚过湘江时，身边只剩一个扛油印机的油印员。整个军团损失三分之二，剩下不到2000人。十几天后，八军团建制撤销。 江西苏区著名的少共国际师也基本失去了战斗力。 中央红军从江西出发时86000余人，至此损失过半。 在通过湘南郴州、宜章间第三道封锁线时，彭德怀曾建议三军团迅速北上，向湘潭、宁乡、益阳挺进，威胁长沙，迫敌改变部署；同时中央红军其他部队进占湘西，在溆浦、辰溪、沅陵一带建立根据地，创造新战场，“否则，将被迫经过湘桂边之西延山脉，同桂军作战，其后果是不利的。” 红军到底还是进入了西延山脉。三十多年后，彭德怀还在感叹未采纳他的方案。 并非所有失误都可归入左倾机会主义路线。薛岳率领的中央军九个师就在北面并行追击；曾经失守长沙的何键更是将主力云集衡阳，严防红军北上进入湖南腹地。历史如果能够再走一遍，那么从湘南北上，前途只会更加凶险。 黄克诚回忆说：“桂系军队不仅战斗力强，而且战术灵活。他们不是从正面，也不是从背后攻击我军，而是从侧面拦腰打。广西道路狭窄，山高沟深林密，桂军利用其熟悉地形的优越条件，隐蔽地进入红军侧翼以后，突然发起攻击，往往很容易得手。而我军既不熟悉地形，又缺乏群众基础，所以吃了大亏。” 本来还要吃更大的亏。 中央红军冲过湘江后，进入西延山脉。桂军依仗道路熟悉，当红军还在龙胜以东时，桂军第七军二十四师已抄到前头，先期赶到龙胜。该师参谋覃琦建议：迅速攻占入黔通道马堤北坳，截断红军去路，将其包围于马堤凹地歼灭之。 马堤地区是由南向北的狭长隘路，东西两侧重山叠嶂，无路可攀。北路若被先期赶到的第七军二十四师截断，南路又有夏威十五军部队追击，红军既无攻坚兵器，又难寻到粮食，困于狭长谷地，局面可想而知。 但二十四师师长覃联芳不用此案。他说：“总部（白崇禧）的作战计划是放开入黔去路，使红军迅速离开桂境，堵塞中央军入桂剿共借口。本军进出义宁、龙胜，主要任务是防止红军向三江方面侵入。依你的意见，纵能将红军围困于一时，他这样大的兵力，岂能立即歼灭？倘逼考虑跳墙回头同我硬碰，造成鹬蚌相持，给中央军入桂之机，获渔人之利，这与总部的作战计划相违背，断不能行。” 覃联芳师没有采取积极行动。其以防守态势监视红军大队通过后，才攻占马堤北坳，截击红军后尾四百余人。 桂军确实给红军造成很大的损害。但从实质上看，中央红军通过桂境时，桂军的攻击仅属于尾击和侧击。少部分想推动红军早日离境，多部分则是为了应付蒋介石。其让开防堵正面，放开红军西进通道才是关键和实质。 作为对11月28日蒋介石指责桂军让路电报的回答，白崇禧12月1日给蒋介石拍发了一封颇不客气的电报：“钧座手握百万之众，保持重点于新宁、东安，不趁其疲敝未及喘息之际，一举而围歼于宁远、道县之间，反迟迟不前，抑又何意？得毋以桂为壑耶？” 同一天，桂军第七军覃联芳师与从清水关进入广西的中央军周浑元部万耀煌师发生冲突。这次覃联芳的攻击精神极强。部下通过衣服颜色已经辨明是中央军，覃联芳仍说：“即使是中央军，也不能放过”，派出一营兵力攻击前进。万耀煌师不意之间遭覃师两面突袭，急向关外撤退，但先头部队一个连还是被桂军包围，就地缴械。 虽然最后双方皆以误会互相致歉，