Chapter 21 17. Solve the problem of "one China"

U.S. China policy is based on the ostensible agreement between Washington, Beijing and Taipei that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of it.Any teenager could see that this was an unrealistic statement because it was a diplomatic concept.A little thought shows that since both Beijing and Taipei claim to be the only China, it represents two opposing concepts.Washington is in a dilemma, in a dilemma.The first step in freeing ourselves from these highly unequal competitors, the Chinese parties, is to see how we got into this predicament. The United States has played a role in China's political life for more than 100 years. In 1844, our first treaty upheld the full privileges of the British Empire acquired during the Opium Wars of 1840-1842.Over the next century, American businessmen and missionaries became agents of change in China, helping to facilitate the great modern Chinese Revolution. In 1943, when the privileges granted by the unequal treaty were formally abolished, we were already deeply involved in China's internal affairs as an ally that declared war on Japan.Since 1954, the security treaty with the Taiwan authorities has placed us in the position of supporting one side in the unfinished Chinese civil war.Like it or not, the American people were, and still are, more involved in the lives of the Chinese people than we generally realize.

The Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough of 1972, Washington's closer relationship with Beijing, came too late.Clearly, after the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, only the leadership of the Republican right could end the disaster caused by the isolation of the United States from the Chinese revolution.The main motivation for this move was the hope that the United States would maintain a balance in the triangular relationship with China and the Soviet Union, so that the Soviet Union could not act as an intermediary between Beijing and Washington. In February 1972, Nixon and Zhou Enlai signed the "Shanghai Communique". Its extraordinary achievement lies in revealing the differences and similarities between the two sides.But the exact duration of the normalization it envisions has yet to be determined.

In general, the modern Chinese revolution encompassed two main areas, which may be called mainland China and maritime China.Today's mainland China is a country of peasants swarming on arable land, following the great Chinese tradition of running the government from a bureaucratic bureaucracy in the capital.It was a bureaucratic empire of peasants busy modernizing themselves. Maritime China is relatively young, but its history can be traced back to the beginning of AD.Chinese merchants and sailboats have traveled to and from the coast of East Asia for nearly 2,000 years.During the last 1,000 years, they left a considerable record of trade and contacts with Southeast Asia.These small, coffered, seaworthy boats (the Chinese, as in many other fields, were pioneers of seafaring technology) sailed the waterways of Macau, Canton to the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean long before European ships arrived up. The first Portuguese to enter China in 1514 entered China through the trade routes of these Chinese sailing ships.The Spaniards, Dutch, British, and French, who frequented Southeast Asia and eventually established colonies in succession, found Chinese chambers of commerce in major ports.

Maritime China existed before the arrival of European colonial powers, and this maritime tradition, originating in southern China, is of course very different from that of mainland China.In foreign trade, private enterprises are the basic ingredients, risky investment is necessary, and commercial accounting must dominate. In short, the development of maritime China is a microcosm of European expansion in East Asia, which has continued to spread around the world since the time of Columbus, and still dominates Western perceptions of modern history.The Chinese are so capable of navigation and maritime trade that at the beginning of the 14th century, when the Ming Dynasty sent seven large expedition ships to India and across the Indian Ocean to Arabia and Africa, it was the first time that the European sailing era was created by successfully rounding the Cape of Good Hope. A group of Europeans was almost a century earlier.If China wanted to, it could have colonized all of Southeast Asia long before the Europeans.China has not done so because overseas colonies are not attractive to the bureaucrats who rule mainland China.The governments of northern China were not interested in maritime trade and were preoccupied with dealing with the Mongol threat from central Asia.

European colonialists got their first taste of the commercial and even pirate greed of competing rulers.This extreme greed shocked the Chinese court, which has long believed in the Confucian view that trade should be in the hands of government officials.The rulers of the Ming and Qing dynasties both banned foreign trade in vain and closed the coast to prevent coastal piracy and the invasion of foreign political systems.In the 17th century, for example, Taiwan became the stronghold of the sphere of influence of the Chinese explorer Zheng Chenggong. In the 18th century, Guangzhou became the only treaty port for trade with Europe. After 1842, the British guns forced the opening of the treaty ports, and there was more room for the development of maritime China.Compradors who mastered foreign trade in domestic and foreign trade soon became Chinese businessmen within their purview, and a modern commercial and financial class emerged.Although this development was weakened by the privileges of foreign exchanges and treaty ports, it was indeed part of China's modern economic development.

The Cantonese became the great middlemen between East and West.The Chinese who migrated to California under the guidance of the famous "Six Companies" mainly came from this area.Sun Yat-sen, China's first professional revolutionist, was a Cantonese, and the American and British missionaries initially achieved success here. Yung Wing, who graduated from Yale University in 1854, was also Cantonese. In the 1870s, he successfully brought the Chinese educational delegation, which played a pioneering role in the bilateral culture, to Hartford, Connecticut. Most of the young people are Cantonese.

Today, Guangdong once again dominates China's foreign trade.Maritime China has matured and now includes the British colonies of Hong Kong, the Republic of Singapore, Taiwan, and tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Bangkok, Manila, Colombo, and elsewhere who have pledged their allegiance to the newly independent nation.In all these places, the path of economic development of Chinese businessmen and entrepreneurs is similar to that of Japan, South Korea, and those East Asian countries with a Confucian ethical background. As far as its results are concerned, this is an economic revolution more convincing than any economic activity in mainland China.On the basis of the family or cooperative enterprise familiar to the United States and Western Europe, it heralded the joining together of the coastal regions into the international trading community.The population of Maritime China may be only 25 million or 30 million, and its activity in international trade was once more than that of the People's Republic of China with a population of more than 1 billion.

Taiwan's paradox is that its economy is part of "Maritime China," but its ideology remains that of "Mainland China."I am in favor of the one China concept, which has been the main idea of ​​all mainland power contenders for 2,000 years.For at least one-third of the 2,000 years, China actually had more than one regime or organized city-state.However, the idea of ​​unity—unification of all descendants of Yan and Huang under a single court headed by the Son of Heaven—has always been held up as the ultimate political goal.In the remaining 2/3 of the time, this idea is realized, which further strengthens the persuasiveness of the above idea.

As in previous years, China's desire for reunification manifested itself in the way it avoided civil war and warlord plunder in the 20th century. In 1912, China avoided the Japanese invasion, so that the unity was temporarily maintained. In 1928, China achieved national reunification with great pride and joy.Chiang Kai-shek devoted his whole life to the cause of national unification.Although the unification of China under the Nanjing government in the 1930s was incomplete, it was Chiang Kai-shek's lifelong belief to unify China and make it strong enough to resist imperialist encroachment.Therefore, his Taiwan regime has always regarded the idea of ​​unification as its political belief for 30 years, reaffirming its determination to recover the mainland.

The Taiwan regime under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of the supreme commander, has a moral responsibility to follow the established policies out of loyalty and filial piety in the relationship between father and son.Taiwan has shared the miracle of East Asian economic take-off, but it has not yet broken away from the tradition of Chinese political thought on the mainland.This is a curious example of old ideas coexisting with modern practices. More importantly, Taiwan's one-China philosophy puts it in a position of civil war with the People's Republic.The ineradicable religious prejudices of the Chinese allies stand in the way of the Americans who want to get rid of the Chinese civil war.

If Chiang Kai-shek's arrogance and devotion to ideals allowed it, in the early 1950s the Nationalist regime could legally join the United Nations as a member as long as it renounced its claim to the mainland.This approach is based on national consciousness and is free from interference from Western ideas.However, the facts of life in the past 30 years show that the political thinking of the Chinese people does not agree with this approach at all.Our friends in Taiwan still ask us to support them as an incompatible friend with the People's Republic.Even today, "two Chinas" is an evocative term for both Beijing and Taiwan. Beijing has not made it easy for us on this issue. They have repeatedly emphasized in their daily slogans that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the motherland and they are determined to regain Taiwan.This is something we can understand and must treat with caution.Beijing's rulers have gone to great lengths to weed out power contenders.Emperor Yongle of the Ming Dynasty even sent expeditions to sea to search for those refugees who applied to stay overseas.Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty wiped out the survivors of the Ming Dynasty in a major civil war, and regained Taiwan 40 years after Taiwan's independence.Rooting out power grabbers has always been a legal imperative for Beijing. We have been involved in China's civil wars for more than 30 years, since Patrick Hurley and George Marshall brokered in Chongqing and Yan'an.Obviously, since 1972, we have only a formal position, and the problems between the parties vying for power in the Chinese civil war should be resolved by themselves, and we have nothing to do.Yet history dragged us in, and our bilateral security treaty with Taiwan in 1954 demonstrated and inspired the American interest in trade and engagement that we had when we intervened in Chinese life in the 19th century.The maritime trading world at that time belonged to Western and Japanese imperialism, while today's maritime trading world belongs to multinational corporations and neo-imperialism.Communists continue to deplore them, while sometimes competing with them.In fact, the truth of Marxism is giving way to new facts. So how should we deal with these two opposite contradictions?Thinking about it, Baozhi, the "one China" principle is just one of the ancient Chinese strategies used to skillfully manipulate those simple barbarians.Our relationship is like a love triangle in a novel: each lady says "I only love one" and asks us to leave the other.Based on this, for a quarter of a century, we denied the existence of the People's Republic and had tense relations with Vietnam.After that, Beijing wants us to do the exact opposite, denying the existence of our longtime allies and protectees.But the American world is multiple and cannot satisfy every Chinese party. For 50 years from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan was a Japanese colony, and it was only under the control of the KMT when the Chinese Communist Party took over the mainland. Pointing this out is not a big deal for the "one China" myth Glorious.Although the Japanese colonialists did not develop Taiwan's cultural life, they did develop its economy, and the subsequent assistance from the United States also supported Taiwan's economic development.In short, the enterprises run by people from mainland China and Taiwan have created the current high standard of living and production capacity in international trade.As part of Maritime China, Taiwan, with its highly capitalized and export-oriented industries, had become less easily assimilated, indeed indigestible, by the new mainland society. As for Taiwan's independence, apart from underground Taiwan independence activists who have never presented themselves as actual replacements for the KMT government, no Chinese would support the idea.Chinese patriots don't want to split China's land at all.Taiwan's independence would not only worsen the Beijing-Washington rapprochement, but it would also be a flagrant provocation to Beijing, which Beijing will not take indifferently.In short, Americans from the other side of the Pacific Ocean, who have completely different political ideas from China, have to accept traditional Chinese ideas about China's unification even when they help create a situation that is not unified. This forces us to resort to a formulation.We are powerless to return Taiwan to the control of the mainland because Taiwan is a viable polity that is well equipped, economically developed, and actively and steadfastly resisting conquest by the government of Beijing.It would be futile to try to kill such a regime.Since we don't need to regard "one China" as a basic clause of our political beliefs, we have no obligation to break the separation between Taiwan and the mainland, but on the other hand, because of our long-term cooperation with Taiwan, we have a moral responsibility to It lasted: recognition of the Nationalist government for about half a century (since 1928) and support for the island kingdom for a quarter of a century (since 1950) produced a continuity of thought and a friendship that could not be shaken off or easily discarded the bond.After all, Taiwanese society is part of our world, and it is becoming more and more closely connected with us through trade, culture, education and other means.We share many of the same ideals and constitutional institutions, and it is neither feasible nor humane to disrupt that relationship.However, our relationship with the vast People's Republic has grown steadily in terms of diplomacy, trade, tourism, and exchange of scientific and technological missions.Beijing is hosting a growing number of American citizens (two-thirds of whom are of Chinese descent), arranging them for weeks-long tours.It would be irresponsible, even immoral, to give up dealing with a people who make up about a quarter of the world's population, and this government has a nuclear deterrent.Without the cooperation of Beijing and Washington, the future peace of mankind will be difficult to guarantee.Of course we also expressed concern about the Soviet Union.At least we want to equalize our engagement with China with the Soviet Union. Fortunately, Beijing and Taipei have different interests in Taiwan.When Sino-Soviet relations became the primary contradiction in Chinese foreign policy, differences with the United States became secondary—including American involvement in Taiwan (“occupation”).In fact, in terms of practical policy, the continued presence of the United States in the Western Pacific is acceptable and even desirable for the Sino-US reconciliation situation, as long as it maintains stability (that is, resists the expansion of the Soviet Union) and does not violate China's long-term interests (such as sovereignty over Taiwan).In this way, Beijing's theoretical long-term interests of benevolence are different from Taipei's actual short-term interests.We can also slip through the cracks. The above considerations lead us to the ins and outs of "normalization".Let us make a distinction between our policy in theory and in practice.Now that we accept the "one China" theory, we have no choice but to recognize Beijing's sovereignty over Taipei in the form of an agreement.If we are a realist like the Chinese, we can justifiably accept the past 80 years as a fait accompli that Taiwan has a separate government from the mainland, let's call it autonomy, and it looks like no matter what we do, it will remain this way for a long time.Based on this, we can conclude that Beijing's sovereignty over Taiwan is a deferred sovereignty.In principle, we recognize this sovereignty at all times, but in practice it is in name only.As for our economic relationship, if our recognition of Beijing gives it MFN status in trade with the United States, then under the One China creed we can infer that MFN status also applies to Taiwan.In this way, when we deal with other aspects of our relations with Beijing, as long as it is under the name of "one China", we can naturally advocate equal treatment for Taiwan.Of course, there are many legal procedures that need to be resolved in order for Taiwan's trade and engagement to continue in its original form.However, this is an American business and it concerns the rules and regulations we create, but legal slickness can get us what we need (the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the U.S. Congress in early 1980 was the desired outcome ). The Japanese model of turning a trade mission in Beijing into an embassy and an embassy in Taiwan into a trade mission paved the way for us.The Japanese experience provides us with an example of legal-economic adjustments, a solution that was found in 1972 through difficult negotiations among the concerned tripartites.The law is conceived to enable the continuation of Japan's necessary consular functions in Taiwan and to enable its trade, tourism and continued investment in Taiwan. Of course, what is lacking in the Japanese model is mainly a security treaty, and our military deployment against Taiwan is the key to the problem.Taiwan's security, and the reliability of our security guarantees for Taiwan, has an immediate appeal to Japan -- and it is our defense commitment that underpins Japan's development. According to the 1972 Nixon Enlai statement and subsequent promises, the United States promised to reduce and withdraw US troops from Taiwan, but did not mention the US military bases in the Philippines and Okinawa.It is not very far from Subic Bay to Taiwan, and the unilateral US statement that it will protect the island from attack has permanent credibility.The obligation of the United States is no longer to protect a government that it no longer recognizes, but to protect a region, and at the same time avoid violating Beijing's idea of ​​sovereignty. What we unilaterally promised is only to "maintain the stability of the Western Pacific."The true meaning of this statement should be understood with as little official awareness as possible, and we believe that the Seventh Fleet will still patrol the Taiwan Strait if necessary. Difficult, if informal, discussions with Beijing may resolve the issue of providing military aid to Taiwan's military.However, as a country that provides arms to half the world, it is not impossible to provide some form of assistance to Taiwan through a third party or other channels. To solve this problem, the legal conception must be quite mature.We can demand that, under the condition of recognizing "one China", we have the right to send consulates to places beyond the reach of our embassy in Beijing.Alternatively, we give the Consulate General in Hong Kong jurisdiction over the nearby islands.Our early merchants who did business with China acted as consuls paid by commercial profits.There are many special solutions in international law that arise in special circumstances. This normalizing design frees us from alienating one side in an unfinished civil war.It will not resolve the military confrontation between Beijing and Taipei, and our disguised commitment to protect Taiwan will still involve us in Chinese politics.But a more explicit acknowledgment of the existence of a "Mainland China," no longer a slave to the ancient "one China" myth of imperial China, would be a step toward realism.It allows us to freely negotiate with the People's Republic of China on an agenda of mutual concern for global survival in relation to each other.Taiwan's stability is only the beginning of a larger goal. All necessary creative arrangements for our continued relations with "Mainland China" and "Sea China" in the Western Pacific should be approached in a pragmatic and non-embarrassing manner.These necessary legal concepts are low-level and secondary compared with Chonggao's policies and principles, and they only bring some convenience to bilateral relations.Our future relationship with Beijing should be justified by the concrete benefits Beijing receives.U.S. relations with China will prove worthwhile forgoing any possible relationship with Taiwan altogether.No matter whether the legal concept is feasible or not, no one can threaten the long-term interests of today's People's Republic or the Chinese people.We always interpret their existence as a necessary response to the great ideal of "one China", which is not an operational fact. One thing is fundamental: a retreat from normalization would be a throwback to the imperialism of the last century, which lurks the dire crisis of war.To put it more practically, although we recognize the idea of ​​"one China", we cannot accept the demand for "one China" put forward by any party, that is, the Chinese friends in Beijing and Taipei.If we can never reap the benefits of a civil war in China, we will have to choose between the autonomy (delayed) Beijing has placed for Taiwan and the autonomy (limited) of Taipei.Only in this way can the stability of the Western Pacific be maintained.