Chapter 19 Chapter 3 The Road to Normalization
The main rationale for the U.S. policy of containment is Beijing's "expansionism."India claimed that China's surprise attack on Indian border guards in October 1962 was an unreasonable aggression.This undoubtedly deepened the US's impression that China is an "expansionist".Neville Maxwell, who has carefully studied the material on the Sino-Indian border conflict, dismisses the notion that China, the target of a policy of containment, is expanding.He pointed out that this is the delusion of the world, especially India, followed by the delusion of the Americans.He tells us about the Chinese approach to handling border disputes, if not diplomatic relations in general, and raises food for thought for the future of Sino-US relations, especially Taiwan.
Neville Maxwell, an Australian who was educated at McGill and Cambridge Universities, worked for three years in the Washington office of The London Times before moving to New Delhi in 1959 as The Times South Asia correspondent , in New Delhi, covering the Sino-Indian border dispute and the final years of the Nehru government.After traveling around India for eight years he returned to London, where he wrote a book at the School of Oriental and African Studies.As he puts it, among the recent international conflicts, there is no "more comprehensive record ... but so widely misunderstood" than the Sino-Indian conflict.Like Alastair Lamb (author of The Sino-Indian Frontier: The Origins of the Frontier Dispute and The McMahon Line: A Study of India, China, and Tibet Relations, 1904–1914) and other British studies scholars, their The rich and comprehensive historical materials come not only from personal experience, but also from India's confidential materials.
Even if Maxwell had no insider material on Beijing, it can be seen from the Indian record that China's behavior in this conflict appeared reasonable and rational from the beginning, while the Indian side increasingly Irrational and irrational.Nehru repeatedly stressed (1) that he was willing to hold talks with anyone, anywhere and at any time for the cause of peace, but (2) he would never hold talks on India's sacred borders.Nehru's distinction between "talks" and "negotiations" won him the sympathy of the world, and at the same time he avoided proposing substantive solutions to China's border issues.
The Sino-Indian border issue provides a good opportunity for politicians to display their talents. It is not as full of gunpowder as today's Taiwan issue. Two thousand years ago, the people of China and India created splendid civilizations on both sides of the Himalayas.However, after China and India established their respective republics and overthrew their imperialist rulers, they immediately made a claim on the borders set by the former imperialist rulers.
Therefore, in 1911, when the Republic of China ended the rule of the Qing Dynasty, it immediately declared the territory of the Qing Dynasty, including Outer Mongolia and Tibet.Chiang Kai-shek has always believed so, but China was unable to implement these statements at the time.Today, the Chinese are still frustrated that Outer Mongolia remained independent with the support of the Soviet Union.India never turned Tibet into a protectorate under British rule, making it a sovereign state recognized around the world, so there was nothing in international law to object to when the People's Republic of China started referring to it as the "Tibet region of China" reason.
The areas of dispute between China and India are the borders at the east and west ends.At the eastern end, what became known as the McMahon Line was really nothing more than a line drawn in 1914 by a British captain named Henry McMahon.China has never acknowledged this.This line runs east along the ridges of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, 140 miles north of the Assam Plain.Ten years before the British withdrew, India declared the line back in force and moved the border post to the disputed area south of the McMahon Line.They inherited the captured land.The western end of the Sino-Indian border is even less clear, neither delineating nor revoking the original demarcated border line.The British Governor in India had put forward three different plans, and these three plans evolved into 11 different plans. In 1954, according to Nehru's instructions, India adopted the most radical plan among the border plans proposed by the British Governor-General earlier, claiming that it had no control over the Karakoram Mountains until the Kunlun Mountains, including Aksai Chin (Aksai Chin or "White Rock Sands"). The area up to and including "Mo" is sovereign, although Indian patrols have never penetrated so far north.India discovered that China had built a 750-mile road from YarKand across Aksai Chin to Cartok in 1956-1957, linking Tibet and Xinjiang.Tibetan and Central Asian traders have been using this only road that can be used by cars.No Indians or representatives of the Indian government have ever been to the area, which India only made a formal claim to in 1958.
Although these issues remain unresolved, in the 1950s, Sino-Indian relations based on the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were "as close as brothers".Nehru was a prominent statesman in the Non-Aligned Movement; India competed with communist China to lead the development of Asia.The welfare and development of the two countries do not depend on the border between the two sides in the God-forsaken mountains of the Himalayas and Kunlun Mountains.It was of no further importance than being a focal point for Nehru's and all-India's display of patriotism.When this question was raised, its most fundamental strategic significance was that, due to the gentler northern slope, China was able to build roads to the declared border, while India was on the steep southern side of the Himalayas, and cars could not drive to the border.
Maxwell pointed out: "By 1958, the no man's land on both sides of the Sino-Indian border left by the imperial era was occupied, and both sides evacuated residents from this area for strategic and practical considerations." China believes that The two sides dispute the border issue, but it has not been clearly delineated, so it needs to be resolved through negotiations.China is willing to accept the unrecognized McMahon Line as a basic principle, because the Indians are already there, and India should accept Chinese sovereignty over Aksai Chin in the same spirit.This is a principle that China has always adhered to. It does not involve the issue of the sacred territory of the motherland, because no Chinese have ever lived in the Assam Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountains.The crux of the matter is that both sides must make concessions.
But in India, the problem is not so simple.China entered Tibet, suppressed Tibetan rioters, the Dalai Lama fled to India for political asylum in 1959, and then accused China of massacres in Tibet... This made the political atmosphere in New Delhi extremely hot.Regarding Zhou Enlai's negotiation proposal, Nehru refused, saying that India's borders had already been defined and there was no need to hold further negotiations.Zhou Enlai suggested that the status quo in the disputed areas could be accepted when the border negotiations were held, but Nehru played tricks and agreed to maintain the "status quo", but China must return to the "status quo" before the construction of the Aksai Chin Highway. All areas claimed by India are withdrawn.Therefore, Nehru's so-called "status quo" actually refers to "before the status quo."Nehru turned a deaf ear to the opinions raised by the opposition parties in New Delhi, and his clamor of silent martialism intensified.Before long, he was claiming that the territories assigned to India in the almost forgotten and ineffective border schemes of those 19th-century British governors had "historically been India's frontiers" and had "negotiated with anyone" .China does want to own the Himalayas, which are the "crown of India" and part of India's "culture, blood and veins".China's "arrogance and impertinence, the show of force, make us suffer in silence".China wants to bully India, negotiating with China means retreating.
Nehru further stated that, in fact, the boundary had already been determined, "the current boundary has a history of nearly 3,000 years."
These strong words are inevitably somewhat contradictory. On August 9, 1959, Nehru said that the western border had never been defined, but by November he claimed that "anyone with any knowledge of history will admit that this traditional and historical border of India has been associated with the Indian culture and traditions are closely linked and have become an integral part of Indian life and thought".
The effect of these rhetoric is to convince the outside world that China is indeed as aggressive as the Western world thinks it is.But worst of all, the Indian prime minister himself was duped into seeing the presence of the Chinese in Aksai Chin as an aggression and decided to take action.As a result, he adopted an "aggressive strategy", sending Indian patrols to the Chinese-occupied Aksai Chin area to set up mobile outposts from 1960 to disrupt the normal activities of the Chinese in the area.Maxwell pointed out a very interesting parallel: India's tactics against the Chinese were in fact identical to the tactics of non-violence, passive resistance and non-cooperation that India had previously used against the British.The difference is that this time, instead of civil resistance by citizens, India sent armed troops to implement it.They want to force the Chinese to retreat. If the Chinese use force, they will be burned like the British in India.
For those professional generals in the Indian army, this strategy is very dangerous and absurd.At the east and west ends of the Sino-Indian border, China has supply lines, and vehicles can be used to provide supplies and reinforcements for border checkpoints.On the contrary, the new forward checkpoints built by the Indian army have no roads to provide them with supplies.All supplies, including water, have to be airdropped.Those patrolling at altitudes above 14,000 feet or 15,000 feet required high-altitude gear, but they often didn't even have winter coats.Indian patrol soldiers can only patrol with blankets and ammunition on their backs.
Faced with harsh weather conditions and logical absurdities, the Indian Army remained stagnant until the end of 1961.Later, Nehru switched to political generals to lead the army, and his strategy was carried out.These politicians have no experience in the army at all, and the politicization of command in the Indian military has made the Indian army, which is already at a disadvantage, even more incompetent and stupid in command.
In 1962, India implemented radical policies that hastened India's eventual defeat.India has set up outposts on its declared border, and the armies of both sides are in full swing, and the situation is very tense.India is still refusing to negotiate at this time.Zhou Enlai reiterated his claim, suggesting that the border issue should be resolved through negotiations, during which both sides retreated 20 kilometers until diplomats issued a negotiating statement.These were rejected by the Nehru government.The Indian side asserted that its unilateral statement was non-negotiable, and at the same time declared to the world that the Indian border guards were resisting Chinese aggression.Armed conflicts on the border began to appear, but China has been patient and has not fought back, although the Chinese army is much better equipped than the Indian army.
Indian politicians assured the generals that the Chinese would not fight back and would be forced to retreat. "Governments and the press in Western countries are cheering for India when they see India's courageous fight against what it sees as China's aggression."
By August 1962, at the gunpoint of Chinese outposts, India had established 40 checkpoints in Chinese territory claimed by China, each guarded by 12 to 40 soldiers.Relying only on airdrops, these soldiers were isolated and helpless, and became "hostages that Nehru and his civil and military officials in New Delhi asserted that China would never fight back."however, nehru cast India's dangerous risky move to force China to withdraw by force rather than through negotiations as an act of innocence by india's resistance, so any sign of concessions would be immediately opposed by officials in new delhi .Nehru made himself desperate.India sent 25 soldiers in summer clothes, carrying weapons, across the plateau checkpoint north of the McMahon Line, and into the solid Chinese bunker built on the ridge, and the armed conflict broke out.Many Indian generals opposed the near-suicidal move, but the political generals held the command.For example, to deliver food to a checkpoint at an altitude of 15,500 feet from an airstrip requires a porter to climb the mountain for 5 days, and it takes 10 days to go back and forth.In this way, there is almost nothing left of what he carries on his back except food for his own survival.Among the more than 2,500 soldiers outside the McMahon Line, only two or three hundred had winter clothes and tents, and none of them had axes or digging tools, let alone heavy weapons and sufficient ammunition.They were ordered to launch a small offensive, but on October 10 Chinese forces drove them back.
The Chinese counterattack of the Indian Army's offensive north of the McMahon Line set off a war fever in New Delhi and made New Delhi ecstatic.Zhou Enlai's proposal for both sides to maintain the status quo and hold negotiations was once again denounced as aggression."China's proposal meant (India) was seeking to survive by begging the mercy of an arrogant, expansionist neighbor," said Nehru, who began accepting military aid from the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union.Maxwell said: "People almost forget that the Indian army has actually begun to take offensive actions. The Indian government has rejected China's request for peace talks." At the same time, after the Chinese army repelled the Indian army, it began to build roads to support frontline positions; The Indian army was scattered in various undefended barracks, still believing that the Chinese would not dare to attack.
On November 17, the Chinese army launched a counterattack again, and within 3 days defeated the poorly supplied Indian army on the east and west borders.Many brave Indian soldiers died on the posts, and their bodies were frozen for months.The Indian political generals acted like headless chickens and caused the Indian army to suffer a total defeat. On November 21, 1962, China unilaterally announced a ceasefire, and gradually withdrew to 20 kilometers behind the actual control line at the western end, and withdrew to the north of the McMahon Line at the eastern end.In this way, the boundary requirements they have been suggesting for three years have been met.
But the Indian government has accepted the ceasefire in fact and openly opposed the negotiations on the other hand.Its aggressive policy failed, with the loss of two or three thousand Indian soldiers.But "no negotiation" is still India's policy. "On the issue of the border conflict, the outside world almost unanimously believes that China invaded India for no reason, which further confirms the impression that Beijing follows an adventurous, chauvinistic foreign policy." gained world opinion.
Neville Maxwell described India's incompetence, and many Indian and foreign observers have come to similar conclusions by studying India.Maxwell's description of the Chinese behavior in this incident was as reasonable as it later proved to be.Chinese negotiators have many ways to negotiate.Zhou Enlai's willingness to negotiate for the Aksai Chin Highway and the McMahon Line was in stark contrast to the Chinese military's uncompromising military actions at the Panmunjom negotiating table in North Korea.
We can see from the Sino-Indian incident that China handles the Sino-Indian border issue and the way it handles Sino-US relations is completely different.China has assembled a large number of troops on the border with India. When the border issue cannot be reasonably resolved through negotiations, it can only use force to protect its rights, but it has not done too much.In the Taiwan Strait, China's military power is not enough to compete with the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Therefore, China cannot use force to realize its demands on Taiwan. desirable condition.
Taking Taiwan as a border dispute must be analyzed from two different perspectives.One is in terms of legal procedures: "The Chinese people have stood up" and become the masters of the country, possessing Taiwan's sovereignty.In this new situation, how to solve the Taiwan issue?The United States supports Taiwan's independence, which Beijing sees as a continuation of the imperialist era.We admit this to ourselves. From 1895 to 1945, under the control of Japan, Taiwan has been separated from the mainland for 50 years. After 1950, Taiwan was again under the protection of the US Navy.
Therefore, eliminating the remnants of old imperialism has always been a principle of Beijing.We can note that Beijing demanded to renegotiate the McMahon Line and the Sino-Burmese border inherited from the British Empire in order to eliminate its imperialist elements, although the Sino-Burmese Agreement of 1960 and the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 both made China The boundary line originally proposed by the British was accepted.As for the Taiwan issue, most people believe that China is only formally allowing the world to recognize Chinese sovereignty.Both Beijing and Taiwan push for this, and both claim that Taiwan is part of China, although they still argue over who should rule all of China.
The second is the issue of de facto relationship.It is clear that Taiwan, as an island, has been politically independent from the mainland for more than 60 years, and this situation may continue for a long time.this is because there are many parties other than beijing who are interested in taiwan, including the taiwanese chinese, who make up 11 million of a total population of 14 million, vastly outnumbering those from the mainland, which controls the national government Chinese.The American public and the rest of the world may sympathize with the Taiwanese Chinese demands for autonomy.Japan and the United States have their strategic and economic interests in Taiwan. It can be predicted that Japan's interests in Taiwan will increase day by day, while that of the United States will relatively weaken.
If Taiwan's independence from mainland China becomes a reality in the future, then how to resolve the contradiction between Taiwan's autonomy and China's demand to recover Taiwan?The answer, if anything, is in the word "autonomy".In Chinese terms, the term self-government has a wide range of connotations and can refer to various degrees of central government control over autonomous regions.
20 years ago, China's performance in the border conflict with India showed that we must pay attention to China's legal and moral demands, as well as China's strength; Zhou Enlai's negotiators were flexible about practical demands, for example, they could The McMahon line drawn by the imperialists is accepted at the negotiating table as long as it does not constitute a strategic threat.From this, we can speculate that as long as Taiwan no longer poses a strategic threat, Taiwan's autonomy will be accepted and tolerated under certain circumstances as long as it does not undermine China's sovereignty; China will still resolve the threat with violent and short-lived border wars, as long as China feels strong enough to do so.In short, the Sino-Indian border conflict shows that China's expansionism is counterattack, not proactive or innate. As long as someone looks for trouble like Nehru, he will run into trouble.
This review is of Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London, J. Cape, 1970; New York, Four Corners, 1971), published April 22, 1971 The New York Review of Books, titled "Is China Provoking?" ".
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