Chapter 11 07. Joe Stilwell and His Chinese Mission

Joe Stilwell was what makes the best of Americans—energy, resourcefulness, fortitude, enterprise, self-reflection.These qualities have sent us to the moon, and they have also taken us to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.In short, Stilwell is the poster child for the American virtues that have caused us much disaster at home and abroad, and which are on full display today as we reevaluate ourselves.Stilwell was our best man to solve China's wartime problems, but what he did was not perfect, he missed the point.American efforts in China during World War II were ill suited to the Chinese revolution, mainly because they had nothing to do with the needs of the people.

Stilwell was a promising young, bright and hard-working West Point cadet who demanded himself with responsibility and national honor.He was strong, a football quarterback and a quarter mile runner in Yonkers Sea, New York.He survived a grueling first year at West Point (two freshmen tragically died).He was of average height and light weight, but he was an excellent athlete.He has a strong nature. He served as an infantry soldier in the Philippines in 1904 and returned to West Point in 1906 to teach students in French and Spanish and coach physical training (basketball).He was assigned to Guatemala and Mexico in the summer, and returned to the Philippines in 1911 via Japan and China, where he witnessed the Chinese revolution for the first time.Already in the Far East he developed a special interest in foreign peoples and languages.

After teaching again at West Point (teaching history and Spanish), Stilwell, like soldiers of his generation, was abruptly removed from the peacetime routine of the military by the entry of the United States into World War I. In 1917, at the age of 34, he waited for the opportunity to show his talents.For the first time he discovered that he possessed a special method of training troops.At Plattsburgh, the U.S. military was tasked with training a million soldiers as quickly as possible.But soon, Army Major Stilwell was transferred to France because of his proficiency in French.He was the architect of the G-2 St. Michel offensive plan, working with George C. Marshall, the leader, of the G-3 plan.The St. Michel's plan was successful, and before peace came and the armies were reduced to peacetime sizes, wise soldiers were planning for the future.The military has not yet become a major industry. In 1919, Stilwell broke free from the depression of peace and became the first army language instructor assigned to China.He started studying Chinese at Berkeley and later moved to Beijing. He spent most of the 1920s mainly in northern China, studying the language for three years at the legation and then for three years with the 15th Infantry Regiment at Tianjin.George Marshall was there before him.Finally, in the late 1930s, Stilwell lived in Beijing as an army attache to the embassy, ​​during which time he traveled all over China.He loves people very much and loves to have a fun life in the wild when traveling in China.

The reason why China in the 1930s attracted Stilwell, an American, was neither because he enjoyed the privileges granted by unequal treaties in China, nor because of his modern consciousness, advanced education and advanced technology he had mastered.The real charm comes from the Chinese people themselves. They have endured all kinds of sufferings faced by human beings and unswervingly tried their best.By the time the Pearl Harbor incident broke out, Stilwell was undoubtedly the best military expert in the Chinese theater. He was very familiar with the terrain of the vast area, familiar with the local leaders and the huge problems they faced.

In the crisis of 1941, when Marshall was promoted to chief of staff, Stilwell was already the best military expert on China in the United States; one.In peacetime, of course, the military is reduced to the point where people can barely see their presence. In September 1939, the number of U.S. troops was only 174,000.Stilwell displayed extraordinary ingenuity and initiative in military maneuvers, and he was indeed a genius for the lightning attack. In 1940, he became a general, commanding and training a division in California.He never "talks on paper", he is an original soldier, he is absolutely strict with himself and others, and merciless, some people say he is a "cold-blooded animal".He is very close to his subordinates, and he is full of hostility towards those who pose as arrogant.He was strict with himself, dressed casually, and led the march in person.

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Marshall picked Stilwell to command Operation Sportsman, which would be America's first offensive campaign in North Africa.Marshall saw from the military exercises that Stilwell was "an outstanding strategist, rich in imagination, resourceful, and full of self-confidence; he has studied military history and is good at training."In terms of military exploits, Stilwell ranked first among the nine regiment commanders.Moreover, if he finally commanded the North African landing, he would undoubtedly continue to be promoted in the European theater, at least in the same position as Bradley later.The crisis in China changed all that.

The great conflict between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek can be seen from several angles in several collaborations.Not only do they have strong personalities, but they are typical of the personalities of the leaders of the two countries.From the perspective of the Chinese Revolution, Stilwell critiques the failings of the Chinese military establishment, which helps us understand the collapse of the Nationalist Party.Chiang's corrupt establishment is based on loyalty rather than efficiency.Stilwell sympathized with the soldiers at large and distrusted corrupt and bribed Chinese officials.

Stilwell's efforts to reform and build a modern Chinese military would, sooner or later, bring the old military authority to pieces.Chiang Kai-shek worked hard to maintain the central government's power in the army.Hungry new recruits, corruption of government officials, withholding of official pay, and loyalty over merit in the Kuomintang army, combined with the pressure of the Anti-Japanese War and the depletion of financial resources, resulted in an extremely conservative status quo in China. During World War II, our Chinese policy was to encourage the Chinese to keep fighting the Japanese with beautiful promises, money, and military equipment for its own benefit.It was also Roosevelt's naive idea of ​​helping postwar China to fill the power gap created by the victory over Japan - an American ideal that never materialized because it ignored the reality of the Chinese revolution.

If Stilwell's idea of ​​transforming the Chinese military came to fruition, he would have created the army and commanders who would ultimately destroy Chiang's establishment, and there would undoubtedly be some sort of military coup.Chiang was aware of the danger.Therefore, when dealing with Stilwell, who was backed by American aid, Chiang objected to this war-trained efficiency expert who was fanatical in pursuit of military exploits.Chiang's main concern was not efficiency, nor was it fighting. He was opposed to the revolution that the communists had been making.The war effort that the Americans demand from China will only further undermine the status quo in China.The United States wanted to provide aid to the Chinese communists, which greatly disrupted Chiang's impotent encirclement and suppression plan, and he had to do his best to prevent Stilwell from gaining actual command.Chiang successfully thwarted Stilwell's attempt, and in October 1944, Stilwell was recalled to China.

Stilwell made several efforts to launch an offensive against the Japanese, to which he was prepared to create a modern Chinese army in India, but he eventually realized that, in the final analysis, Generalissimo Chiang did not need such a modern army —He feared that he was out of control.Furthermore, Kuomintang China had exhausted its financial resources.Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why Chiang Kai-shek's Chongqing government had to wait and see the end of the war (in Kuomintang China, Pearl Harbor was called "Armistice Day"). Stilwell's efforts were confounded by Chiang Kai-shek's traditional strategic and tactical theories.Jiang followed the ancient classic war treatise "Sun Tzu's Art of War", emphasizing the importance of defense, letting the enemy move first and then annihilating him, and never took the initiative to attack except when he had an extremely superior force.

Under such circumstances, Stilwell was determined to hit the Japanese head-on in Burma first, drive them out of Burma and return them to China, which is perfectly appropriate.China is simply a country that will not be ready for any war.The jungle-covered valleys of northern Myanmar stretch southward, with complex topography crossing roads and supply lines from east to west.Therefore, Stilwell's achievements in launching the campaign across China and Burma can be said to be a heroic poem showing a high degree of wisdom.He is one of our most capable commanders, fighting alone at the far end of a supply line that has no priority at all.The development of science and technology has enabled sea and air forces to cross the Pacific Ocean, weakening the power of the Japanese, and the United States does not need to establish a base in China.When Stilwell showed up to Chiang that the United States had ordered him to command the Chinese army, the American war effort in China had begun to lose its anti-Japanese meaning.US aid has intervened in China's internal political struggles. If you look at Stilwell from the perspective of American foreign expansion, it is another matter.Stilwell failed, and so did Chiang.First, the self-important Americans were bent on defeating the Japanese and winning the war; the military was trained for this mission and the national ethos was formed.In pursuit of this goal, American soldiers are slaves to modern technology, driven by a sense of duty to develop the potential of organization and firepower, and to win in war: politics is not the first mission of the American soldier, nor is it The second mission, "Sun Tzu's Art of War", believes that the purpose of war is to make the enemy bend to his will and use all means to make him surrender.U.S. military experts are more concerned with the establishment of shock forces and the logistical supplies necessary to resolve and set up the battlefield. As for what may happen after peace is achieved, it is obviously not their responsibility.Nor were they asked to think about it when they were trained. Although in different ways and for different purposes, the Americans are still using China to achieve the common goal of defeating Japan.China does not want to be used, and it is obviously more concerned with domestic revolution. At this time, the Americans complained greatly.From this point of view, Americans, as foreigners, have little influence on the current situation in China.Stilwell took some Chinese-speaking State Department officials to meet with the communists in Yan'an, and this military observer mission (of course called the "Southern Mission" because it was going to enemy-occupied territory) seized the opportunity temporarily, and the Americans and The Chinese Communist Party may be able to develop a cooperative relationship that at least avoids fighting each other.At that time, the United States was growing stronger and would soon defeat Japan, and an objective assessment of China's reality seemed unnecessary.Under the circumstances, Special Envoy Hurley's response to this constructive cooperation was hasty and indifferent, and it quickly came to naught.Although no one explicitly pointed it out, the plan to put an American general in command of the Chinese army in early revolutionary China in the 1940s was a poisonous prescription.It is likely that the American military will be driven by law and order against this revolution.Americans naively imagined that Chiang's old regime might be saved by "reforms".If Stilwell had indeed taken command of the Chinese army, it would have caused a greater disaster than his recall.His replacement speaks to the failure of our war effort to save a failing regime. We can see Stilwell as a symbol of American skill, energy, practicality, and gritty, indomitable spirit, a man with a bad temper but kind and practical capabilities.He spent his China career in the era of Sino-US friendship, when there were extensive contacts between the peoples of the two countries.Fortunately, he did not live to see us turn each other into enemies and enter the nuclear age, which limits the scale of war.Stilwell belongs to the ranks of great men, from Hannibal to Robert Lee, who tried but were thwarted by fate.They live in an era that only pursues individual heroism, and this era seems to be far away from us. This review is Barbra W. Dasman's "Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945" (New York, Macmillan Publishing, 1971), published on March 1971 The New Republic on February 27 and Business Week on February 13, 1971.