Chapter 32 31. The United States is watching the situation with ambivalence

On this day, U.S. Secretary of State Stimson formally sent a memorandum to China and Japan, asking the two countries to stop military operations and withdraw their troops.When Stimson summoned Katsuji Idebuchi, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, he said: I have always respected and trusted the personality of Minister of Foreign Affairs and his policies. I have met Prime Minister Ruo in London, and I also respect and trust his personality and talents.Therefore, when this cabinet was established, I expected that under this prime minister, as long as Foreign Minister Motohara can be in office for a day, Japan will work hard for world peace.However, when such an incident happened today, I think the Japanese government must be very troubled. I really hope that it can be restored to the original state as soon as possible.Recently, a country said that it wanted to send a military attache to Manchuria for investigation, but the United States rejected this proposal.

The Secretary of State is like a shy young man, even if he wants to criticize others, he has to show full approval and kindness before putting it forward in a very tactful way; While pointing out the problem, don't forget to send a "sincere friendship"-although someone wants to intervene in the investigation of the September 18th Incident, we in the United States prevent him from doing so. On the same day, the U.S. ambassador to Japan also conveyed to the Japanese government the position expressed by U.S. Secretary of State Stimson on behalf of the U.S. government on the Manchurian incident, "It seems that Japan must bear the heavy responsibility for the expansion of military operations since the Shenyang incident."However, the U.S. envoy stated in the conveyance that "the U.S. does not want to interfere in Japan's affairs, and this article should not be regarded as a protest."

All of this shows that, although Japan's military actions in Northeast China have caused unease in the United States, it does not want to quarrel with Japan.The United States followed the course of events and Japan's actions with ambivalence. In the eyes of the world powers in the 1930s, the socialist Soviet Union was a complete "anomaly".In Japan's Manchuria strategy, the conceived future conflict with the Soviet Union plays a very important role; from the perspective of European and American powers paying attention to the September 18th Incident, it is also important to direct the war launched by Japan to the Soviet Union. The fulcrum of the United States is like this, and so is Britain and France.Therefore, in this sense, Japan launched a military operation in Northeast China, which is adjacent to the Soviet Union, and then sent its troops northward to attack the Soviet Union. This is the situation that all the powers hope to see. The damage posed by the established principles of international relations is negligible.

But in the eyes of Americans, there is another aspect to the problem.At that time, China was the only large piece of land in the world that had never been colonized. As a rising capitalist power, the United States did not have large colonies overseas, and missed the era of gaining huge profits through colonies. Holds the policy of open door and shared interests, and if Japan monopolizes Manchuria and goes further south, it will endanger the open door policy and its interests of the United States.When the Japanese army began to attack Jinzhou in late 1931, the United States was about to speak out.

As early as September 17, the day before the incident, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Katsuji Idebuchi, held talks with US Secretary of State Stimson and reached a secret travel understanding: the United States promised that it would not intervene in the upcoming incident ( Although not sure it was the next day), Japanese military occupation should be limited to north of Jinzhou. On September 20, Hornbeck, director of the Far East Bureau of the U.S. State Department, was ordered by Secretary of State Stimson to summon the Japanese ambassador to the U.S., Katsuji Idebuchi. On the 21st, the Chinese government in distress sent a call for help to the United States, requesting the U.S. government to point out to Japan that Japan's actions in Northeast China violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact.The Convention, also known as the Non-War Convention, was signed in Paris on August 27, 1928 at the initiative of US Secretary of State Kellogg and French Foreign Minister Briand. instrument of international policy, undertakes the obligation to seek peaceful solutions to disputes, and condemns war as a means of settling international disputes.Kellogg also won the 1929 Nobel Peace Prize for his outstanding contribution to world peace.However, the U.S. State Department did not consider it necessary to publish China's note, and did not give any reply, completely putting aside the Chinese government's request.On the same day, when the Secretary-General of the League of Nations Drummond asked the US government whether it planned to sue Japan for violating the "Kellogg-Briand Pact", the US Secretary of State Stimson immediately replied that the US did not consider such a Intervention is appropriate. On the 24th, the U.S. government sent notes with the same content to the Chinese and Japanese governments respectively, expressing "regret" and "concern" about the incident.It is hoped that China and Japan "respectively mediate their own armed forces" and "achieve actions to resolve differences" in accordance with international conventions and agreements.

However, the development of the situation after the September 18th Incident soon began to touch the bottom line of the United States. On October 8, the Japanese air raided Jinzhou.At this moment, the United States began to worry. It was afraid that Japan would expand into China's borders and harm the interests of the United States in China. On October 9, at a special cabinet meeting held in the United States, Secretary of State Stimson angrily pointed out at the meeting: Japan's actions showed that it had "treated various international treaties as a pile of waste paper".But then, the Secretary of State said full of worry that if the United States proposes any economic sanctions against Japan, it may lead to a war between the United States and Japan. The United States has no need to take this risk, so it can only exert diplomatic pressure, which is the so-called "moral sanctions." .The United States is so tolerant of the war launched by Japan in Northeast China. Apart from being unable to make up its mind to break the face with Japan, it still has a little luck - the Japanese may soon attack the Soviet Union, maybe in the next week .

In late October, President Hoover made this speech: Suppose the Japanese openly say to us "We can no longer abide by the Washington agreement because... we are already neighbors with Bolshevik Russia in the north, and if we have a Bolshevik China on the side, our existence is threatened, So, let us have a chance to restore order in China! . . . " We cannot raise objections. In early November, the Japanese army advanced to Heilongjiang, and the United States felt relieved that it was going to attack the Soviet Union.So Stimson declared to the Japanese ambassador to the United States on November 5 that the attitude of the United States towards the incident in the three northeastern provinces had not changed. On November 16, Weiss, the special representative of the United States to the Council of the League of Nations, made a speech in Paris and said: "For the sake of protecting the lives and properties of Japanese overseas Chinese, Japan's invasion of Manchuria is inevitable." However, when the Japanese army captured Qiqihar— —After the capital of Harbin Province at that time, it communicated with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, expressing that it had no intention of taking hostile actions against the Soviet Union.Moreover, on November 26, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, the Japanese representative to the League of Nations, notified the United States that Japan was going to return to attack Jinzhou.

So the United States couldn't sit still again. The State Council submitted a memorandum to Japanese Foreign Minister Kijuro Kohara through the ambassador to Japan, expressing "extreme concern about this"; neutral zone.But the Japanese army still occupied Jinzhou on January 3, 1932.In response, the U.S. government sent a note to China and Japan on January 7: In view of the current situation and the rights and responsibilities of the United States itself in this situation, the United States Government believes that it is obliged to inform the Government of the Empire of Japan and the Government of the Republic of China that the United States Government cannot recognize the legality of any de facto situation, nor does it intend to Treaty rights concluded between the Government or its agents detrimental to the rights of the United States or its nationals in China . any treaty or agreement in it; nor does it intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement that has been achieved by violating the terms and obligations of the Paris Convention on August 27, 1928, when China, Japan and the United States are all parties.

This is the so-called "non-recognition doctrine" in the United States. On January 8, the U.S. State Department issued a supplementary declaration, stating: The U.S. has no intention of interfering with Japan’s legitimate treaty rights in Manchuria, nor does it intend to intervene in any solution to the incident, but such methods must not damage U.S. rights in China.The basic point of U.S. policy is to take advantage of Japan's northward expansion and limit Japan's southward expansion, all of which must not hinder the rights and interests of the United States in China. The bottom line of U.S. policy was finally revealed: if Japan occupied the entire Northeast and had no intention of attacking the Soviet Union, as long as it did not harm U.S. interests in China, the U.S. government was ready to swallow this not so tasty fruit.

From the outbreak of the September 18th Incident to the end of 1932, the United States supplied Japan with arms worth 181 million U.S. dollars. When Japan’s attempt to attack the Soviet Union failed, the US’s China policy completely degenerated into naked pragmatic diplomacy. As long as Japan did not smash the US’s pots and pans in China, the US was even willing to partly sacrifice the principles and order established by the Washington Conference.At that time, the United States was still in the era of pursuing isolationism. It was on the New World, and it did not see the need to say "no" to Japan across the Pacific Ocean.

American strategists are not even as far-sighted as Ishihara Wanji.Ishihara originally positioned Japan’s imaginary enemy as the Soviet Union—this was a war involving conflicts of interests and ideologies; later, Ishihara positioned Japan’s imaginary enemy as the United States—this was a war to rearrange the positions of the great powers. It is also Shi Yuan's version of the "clash of civilizations" between the East and the West.The United States has gone the wrong way, and it has lost sight. Ten years later, in the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States paid the price for its policy toward Japan.