Chapter 29 28. Three people and a war

On this day, three people, Ishihara Wanji, Itagaki Seishiro, and Doihara Kenji, all appeared at the home of Miyake Miyake. The chief of staff of the Kwantung Army called them to discuss how to deal with the aftermath of the Japanese military operations in the Northeast—in what ways? Forms of domination over occupied lands.We will explain the results of the discussion later, but I would like to talk about these three people here. This is a very symbolic combination, because without these three people, the planning, manufacturing, launching and even the result of the September 18th Incident-the establishment of a puppet Manchukuo is like a series without the protagonist.

Before joining the combat army, Ishihara was a military instructor. He is rich in war theory and strategic thinking. He is a rare think tank figure in the Japanese army. Withdrew from the military.Itagaki is a soldier full of action. He is the host of the incident instigated by young Japanese officers. In the future, the division he led will also be a strong force in the Japanese war of aggression against China.Doihara is a China hand who is well-known in the upper class of China. Unlike the previous two Japanese military officers who were enthusiastic about military operations, he has been shouldering the secret mission from the highest Japanese military authority from the very beginning. Establishing a puppet regime controlled by Japan in Northeast China and even in the whole of China, of course, is consistent with his identity as a Japanese spy.Among the three, except Shi Yuan, the other two were Class-A war criminals after the war and were eventually sentenced to death.Although their encounters in the future were different, they were all representatives of the young Japanese army during the September 18th Incident. It was only through the interaction between them that Japan launched its aggression against China in a "categorical" manner, although its policy of aggression against China was established.

For the title of "Chief Architect" who launched the September 18th Incident, Ishihara is well-deserved.He, a high-achieving student of the Japanese Army University, was sent to Berlin to study European military affairs with an excellent grade of second place in the 1918 class.Compared with other well-behaved Japanese officers, his thinking is broad and far-reaching. When he graduated from the Japanese Army University, some people even commented on him: "Ishihara's mind is the most outstanding since the founding of the mainland."Later, he went to Berlin to study and study European military history, and his understanding of Clausewitz and other Western military theories was no less familiar than other Japanese military officers' familiarity with Togo Heihachiro or Dashanyan's works.

In the eyes of ordinary Japanese military officers, war may mean killing and looting, but Ishihara is more inclined to view war from the perspective of international relations and the rise and fall of civilization, and even believes that the final war is related to the fate of the world.According to his logic, Japan is the representative of Eastern spiritual values, while the United States is the representative of Western spiritual values, so a war between Japan and the United States involving the conflict of two civilizations is inevitable.Therefore, in the early years, Ishihara considered and designed Japan's military strategy with the United States as the ultimate imaginary enemy.The grim situation is that Japan, which is a small country, cannot compete with the United States, which has a new continent. Therefore, the establishment of an East Asian alliance including Japan, "Manchukuo" and China has become Ishihara's short-term goal.

Perhaps, it was this kind of thinking that was the real reason why he asked to serve in the Kwantung Army.Only by occupying Manchuria and Mongolia can the door to China be opened to the south. At the same time, the rich resources in the Northeast can also become an inexhaustible source of occupation and support.Therefore, it can be said that Ishihara came with the purpose of making the Kwantung Army a vanguard in occupying Northeast China. In October 1928, Ishihara went to the Kwantung Army Headquarters in Lushun as a staff officer and served as Daisaku Kawamoto's assistant.That year, he and Kawamoto formulated the "Plan to Capture Fengtian City" and submitted it to the Kwantung Army's staff meeting for discussion.The plan is based on outnumbered enemies, and in the event of an incident, it is necessary to "eliminate the troops near Fengtian with lightning speed and overthrow its regime."After half a year, Kawamoto suspended his post.Perhaps this should have been a setback for Ishihara, but it turned out to be Colonel Itagaki Seishiro who succeeded Kawamoto. He and Ishihara were old acquaintances. When they were in Sendai, Japan, the two discussed the fate of the empire, and the talk was very speculative.Later Japanese war historians said that the two of them were a "perfect match" in the history of Japan's war against China.Of course, the September 18th Incident instigated by the two was far more successful and "exciting" than Colonel Kawamoto's.

In 1935, Ishihara, who was promoted to major general, was transferred to the General Staff Headquarters as the head of the Operations Department.At this time, his strategic thinking changed.With the rise of the Soviet Union, he believes that this enemy is the biggest and most direct threat to Japan, and Japan's military power is not yet the opponent of the Soviet army.For this reason, he advocated that tensions with the United States and European powers should be avoided for the time being until the direct threat from Russia eased.Postpone the final battle as long as possible. The above-mentioned change in Ishihara's thinking has also changed his thinking about China.He began to abandon the idea of ​​using force to form the East Asian Union, and emphasized the need to use moral persuasion and demonstration as the means to win China to join the group.In his view, it would be extremely foolish for Japan to get bogged down in a protracted war in China.Such a war would give Japan's real enemy, the Soviet Union, a window of opportunity.

In July 1937, on the eve of the Japanese army's full-scale war against China, Ishihara insisted on revoking the mobilization order twice. He also said at a meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs one month before the outbreak of the war: "As long as I am alive, I will never let anyone A soldier was sent to China." His subordinate Military Affairs Bureau Chief Akira Muto retorted: "This is really strange, aren't you the perpetrator of the Manchurian Incident! We are just following your cause." At this moment, Ishihara, deeply I deeply feel the irony of history.Since then, Ishihara has been criticizing the war in his country that went astray, and he was gradually excluded by the Japanese military circles, and finally had to fade out of the Japanese military circles.

Ishihara has a historical sense of imperial strategy in mind, and he rose up in the Japanese military circle as a strategist. He once vigorously promoted the Japanese war machine, but was finally abandoned by this war machine that had turned too fast. It is Shi Yuan's tragedy; but it is precisely because of Shi Yuan's introspection and criticism of the war that he was not tried as a war criminal by the Far East Military Tribunal after the war-or is this a comedy of Shi Yuan? Unlike Ishihara, Itagaki more reflects the characteristics of a professional soldier, whether it is his family background or his origin itself.His grandfather Itagaki Naosaku was a lecturer to the feudal lord and a Shintoist; his father Itagaki Masatoku was deeply influenced by Japanese Confucianism and was also a devout Shintoist.Itagaki was deeply influenced by his grandfather, and he set up the ambition of "becoming a general when he grows up" since he was a child.He successively entered the Sendai Army Local Infant School and the Tokyo Army Non-commissioned Officer School. In 1904, he participated in the Russo-Japanese War and served as the platoon leader. In 1913, he entered the cradle of Japanese Army officers - the Japanese Army University to study and graduated in 1916. In 1929, he served as the head of a certain unit of the Kwantung Army and was stationed in Shenyang, China.Back then, Daisaku Kawamoto resigned because of the bombing of Zhang Zuolin, and Itagaki was transferred to be a senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army.Here, he met his old acquaintance Shi Yuan, and they both thought of the conversation they had had in Sendai, so they quickly embarked on the established path—the core "duo" who launched the September 18th Incident hit it off.

In the eyes of young Japanese military officers, Itagaki is a typical "handsome talent" who is tolerant, generous and decisive in his dealings with others; Ishihara is admirable for his profound thoughts, but he is not easy to approach.But when these two are together, they can learn from each other and complement each other.Itagaki is a senior staff officer. He has both experience in leading troops in war and experience in intelligence work in China, so he is a suitable person in charge for launching an incident.Almost all of his early positions were related to China. His long-term research and observation of China made him, like Doihara and Honjo Shigeru, the reputation of "China Hands" in the Japanese military.His theory on Northeast China is: "In the war against Russia, Manchuria and Mongolia are the main battlefield; in the war against the United States, Manchuria and Mongolia are the source of supplies. Relationship."

Less than a year after he cooperated with Shi Yuan, the two jointly planned and he mainly organized three "staff trips" that traveled almost all over the three eastern provinces.The young and strong officers of the Kwantung Army headed by the two took field reconnaissance in Harbin by car, made terrain judgments before the attack, and studied the advance positions after the Songhua River operation and the occupation of Harbin.The offense and defense in Qiqihar, Hailar and other places, and the possible encounters in the east side of the Xing'an Mountains, etc., have all been carefully studied in their minds.These three staff trips made important preparations for the Kwantung Army to launch military operations throughout the Northeast.

On the night of the incident, he was in charge of the Fengtian Secret Service. After Lieutenant Kawamotoshou reported to him the news of the successful blasting of the Wicker Lake Manchurian Railway, he was the first to issue an order to the Kwantung Army to attack the Peking Camp. The "advantage" of a Japanese officer who has led soldiers and fought in battles with rich combat experience has been brought into full play.Of course, he was still very firm. It is said that when the Japanese diplomat Morishima went to try to stop the Kwantung Army's adventurous behavior, he drew out his saber to show that the actions of the Japanese army were never under the control of the diplomatic department. It can be said that throughout the September 18th Incident, Itagaki's life as an imperial soldier reached the "peak of glory".Later, when the Japanese war of aggression against China broke out, he served as the head of Japan's elite 5th Mechanized Division, but his operations in China were lackluster.After that, he also held other important positions in the Japanese mainland, and in 1941, he finally realized his long-cherished wish of "becoming a general" when he was young.However, all of this seems to be less "honorable" than the "Itagaki Colonel" in the September 18th Incident. On December 23, 1948, Itagaki was put on the gallows in the execution room of Sugamo Prison in Tokyo, and died a few minutes later. Compared with the above two, the relationship between Doihara and the September 18th Incident may not be so close. However, in Miyake Miyake's home on September 22, after all, he was the first to propose the establishment of "Mongolian Five with the Japanese as the leader". "National Republic"—that is, the plan of Japan's puppet Manchukuo. Moreover, this plan is not a stroke of genius, but a long-term goal of his many years of spy work in China. Doihara was born in a peasant family in Okayama Prefecture, Japan. He was admitted to the Japanese Army Non-commissioned Officer Academy in his early years, and then entered the Army University for further study. After graduation, he was sent to the Japanese Secret Service in China, the Banxi Mansion in Beiping, as the head of the Japanese secret service. Sakanishi Rihachiro's assistant began his spy career in China for more than 30 years.It is worth noting that he came to China as a member of the General Staff Headquarters, so it is reasonable to think that he shouldered some kind of secret mission from the highest authority of the Japanese Army. In 1918, he was transferred to the Beiyang Government as an advisor to the Heilongjiang Warlord. In 1920, he was appointed as the commander of the Japanese infantry battalion. In 1920, he went to Europe to inspect military affairs. It is said that Doihara can speak authentic Chinese and is also proficient in four Chinese dialects. He often wears Chinese gowns or Chinese tunic suits, and joins Chinese gangs.He tried his best to understand China's history and customs, and was especially interested in the inside story of Chinese politics, officialdom habits, and struggles among various factions—in short, things that belonged to unspoken rules.Shigeru Honjo and Seishiro Itagaki, who are familiar with China in front of him, are nothing compared to the big witch.His home is often full of singing and dancing. In the singing and dancing of Japanese maiko, information from China flowed into his ears. Therefore, he also got the title of "Lawrence of the East". Doihara and Yan Xishan were classmates at the Japanese Non-commissioned Officer School. From 1919 to 1920, he went to Shanxi many times to "reminisce" with Yan. Yan naturally treated this well-known Japanese classmate as a guest of honor.So he asked Yan to "travel" to various places in Shanxi, and Yan generously agreed.Therefore, he made a detailed consideration of the geography of Shanxi's military bases, paying special attention to the geography of Yanmen Pass, a fortress in the north of Shanxi, and recorded in detail the places where heavy weapons could pass.After the July 7th Incident, the Japanese army invaded Shanxi. The Shanxi defenders believed that the Yanmen Pass was a natural danger, especially the Tiejia Pass in the north of the pass.But the Japanese army quickly crossed the Yanmen Pass from the most dangerous Tiejia Ridge based on the map drawn by Doihara, which surprised the Chinese defenders. It was not until very late that they figured out why the Japanese army was more familiar with the terrain. On the eve of the September 18th Incident, Doihara was transferred from the head of the secret service stationed in Tianjin to the head of the special service stationed in Fengtian.This transfer was not accidental, because he had already set his sights on Puyi when he was in Tianjin, and getting Puyi from Tianjin to the Northeast was also his greatest contribution to Japan's strategy of Manchuria and Mongolia. Not in Fengtian, but in Tokyo to report his thoughts on "fundamentally solving" the Mengman problem to the highest authority. Many years later, when Puyi recalled his contact with Doihara, he described an image of Doihara after "disenchantment": At that time, there were all kinds of mysterious legends about him. Western newspapers called him "Lawrence of the East", while Chinese newspapers said that he was accustomed to wearing Chinese clothes and was good at Chinese dialects.According to my understanding, if his activities in China are like encouraging me to leave the customs, he does not need the deceit and scheming of the legendary Lawrence, as long as he has a face on the gambling table and can take lies as the truth. .He didn't wear Chinese clothes when he met me, but he wore a Japanese-style suit.His Chinese didn't seem to be very good. In order not to make mistakes, he still used Yoshida Nakataro as an interpreter between us. ... He was forty-eight years old at the time, the muscles around the eyes showed signs of relaxation, there was a small mustache under the nose, and there was a gentle and submissive smile on his face from beginning to end.The only feeling this smile gives is that not a single thing the man says is unreliable. Although this real Doihara is not as magical as in the legend, it is "ingenious and clumsy". Just from the fact that "not one word he says is unreliable" shows how terrifying this spy is. After the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against China, Doihara, who was promoted to lieutenant general, also served as the commander of the division and led the troops to directly participate in the Japanese army's war of aggression against China.However, about a year later, he was transferred back to China to join the "Special Committee on China" composed of land, sea and foreign representatives, responsible for preparing for the establishment of a unified puppet regime in the occupied areas of China, and set up an office in Shanghai - Doi The original agency.But this time he failed. He failed to instigate Wu Peifu to be the head of the puppet regime, and let another Japanese spy organization "Mei Organ" take the lead—they took the lead in instigating Wang Jingwei. It is said that Doihara always regarded himself as a junior when interacting with people, and seemed to be indifferent to world affairs. Therefore, not only did the Chinese dignitaries not strengthen their guard against him, but they liked him quite well.The Chinese hate people who are honest on the outside but treacherous on the inside.