Chapter 24 Chapter 23 Criticize Zhang Guotao

Since the first, second, and fourth armies joined forces, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China began to prepare for criticizing Zhang Guotao.The initial work was carried out in secret.When the staff of the Red Army headquarters arrived in Baoan with Zhu De and Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong met with some cadres to understand the situation.Comrade Wang Weizhou recalled: In Baoan, he went to see Chairman Mao with Comrade Liu Bocheng, and he reported to Mao Zedong face to face the fact that Zhang Guotao had rebelled against the party, opposed the Central Committee, provoked the unity of the First and Fourth Front Armies, and discriminated against them.Mao Zedong said to Wang Weizhou: At present, the Fourth Red Army has not yet fully crossed the river in northern Gansu to join the Central Committee, and at the same time, the cadres of the Fourth Red Army have not fully realized that the revolution has suffered undue losses due to Zhang Guotao's wrong line.Do a deep check on this question, hopefully you're prepared.At the same time, he was also asked to keep it secret for the time being.

After Zhang Guotao came to the Central Committee, although he still retained his position as the General Political Commissar of the Red Army, he ignored some specific matters except for attending the Political Bureau meetings of the Central Committee.He can no longer speak his mind like he did in the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army, dominating the king.During this period, Lin Yuying talked with Zhang Guotao several times as a representative of the Communist International, pointed out his mistakes, and hoped that he would have an explanation to the central government.He himself was aware of the seriousness of his mistakes, so Zhang Guotao wrote the article "Looking at the Past from the Present" on February 6, 1937, in which he made a preliminary review of his mistakes and admitted five points:

First, they did not fully estimate the objective situation during the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns", the characteristics of the enemy's strategies and tactics during the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns", and the characteristics of the unbalanced development of the Chinese revolution. subjective error. Second, when it became necessary for the Central Red Army to break through, the seriousness of the enemy's pursuit was far greater than the oppression given by the enemy when the Fourth Red Army marched westward. This point is also underestimated.This obliterated the heroic struggle of the Central Red Army's Long March and the strength of the Bolsheviks.In the long march of a large Red Army, downsizing is inevitable. Finally, the strategic goal of rendezvous with the Fourth Red Army and the preservation of a large number of cadres are demonstrated. Criticism on Central Resolution.

Third, because of the above two points of view, and at the same time overestimated the losses suffered in the five "encirclement and suppression campaigns", doubts arose about the strategic policy proposed by the central government at that time.Although they agreed on the policy of going north, they understood the policy of the central government to go north as nothing more than the reality of long-term large-scale mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare, and proposed another strategy of creating base areas in the northwestern region. Fourth, he also underestimated the achievements of the Central Soviet Area in the construction of the Party, the Soviet and the Red Army, and expressed disapproval and misunderstanding of the criticisms given by the Central Soviet Area for the mistakes and shortcomings of the Fourth Front Army based on the experience of the Central Soviet Area.

Fifth, under the condition that the left army's northward movement was hindered, it was thought that since the northward movement would become a large-scale mobile war, it would be better to take advantage of the situation and go southward.Therefore, it became a confrontation between going north and going south, and the Red Army moved separately, which developed into an incorrect understanding of the central line and an organizational confrontation. Zhang Guotao reluctantly admitted his mistakes in obscure words.At the beginning, he scolded the central government for "running away", but now it has been replaced by "large-scale mobile warfare".He set up a new central government and expelled Mao Zhou and Zhang Bo from the party, just saying it was "organizational confrontation".Such an understatement, exaggerating.When it comes to key issues, Zhang Guotao still refuses to admit his mistakes.

Concerning the struggle between going south and going north, he said: "If there was no organizational confrontation between the party and the Red Army when going south, then going south and going north would be nothing more than a dispute over military strategy. If you think going south is a failure, then it shouldn't be." Regarding the responsibility for the split, he admitted: "At that time, the Party Central Committee directly led the first and third armies to go north, which was indeed the correct action to implement the policy of going north. It was absolutely wrong to denounce it as an escape route. responsible, but the host who went south should be responsible.”

Regarding the establishment of a separate "Central Committee", he admitted: "The most serious mistake is the opposition in the organization. Denying the Central Committee since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Committee and calling itself the Central Committee. This is the result of political errors and a manifestation of organizational errors in principle. The Bolshevik China What the Communist Party should not have." All in all, Zhang Guotao's evaluation of himself is: "From the time when the First and Fourth Front Armies joined together to the December resolution, I myself did make the mistake of opposing the Party and the Central Committee. Although the December resolution began to change, there was no Continuing this mistake and shifting towards the path of unity with the party, but this mistake in the past should be pointed out seriously.”

The central government was not satisfied with Zhang Guotao's first review. On February 27, 1937, Kaifeng published a long article in Yan'an with tens of thousands of words-"Where are the differences between the Party Central Committee and Guotao's line?"The article is divided into 13 parts, involving the estimation of the political situation, the problem of going south and going north, the unity of the first and fourth fronts, party building, the elimination of counter-revolutionaries, and the national united front.Due to space limitations, we cannot quote Kaifeng's full text.Most of the content was discussed by the Central Committee with Zhang Guotao when they were in Northwest Sichuan, and we have also described it earlier.However, in this article, Kaifeng disclosed some content that had not been mentioned before, reflecting the basic attitude of the central government towards Zhang Guotao's issue.

Regarding the split between the first and fourth fronts, Kaifeng wrote: "When the central government found out that Guotao had privately sent secret telegrams to Xu and Chen south, he had detailed the disadvantages of going south, and advised him to lead his team to go north. But Guotao did not There was no turning point, and the central government had to send another telegram to Guotao... Comrade Guotao did not accept the telegram from the central government at all. So the central government gave Xu and Chen instructions, and Guotao an order, ordering the general political commissar to immediately lead the left army to Assi , Brazil, and Ban Youkai." He also wrote: "The strategy of going north is decided by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and no one has the power to change this policy without going through the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. However, Guotao can use his private will to change this strategic policy. What qualifications does he have as a political commissar?... How can such a confused political commissar strengthen the party's absolute leadership in the Red Army? Because Guotao himself was so confused about the relationship between the party and the Red Army, the cadres under him had to call out the words 'solve the central government by force'. In Guotao's secret orders to Xu and Chen, they must thoroughly fight the central government."

The nature of Zhang Guotao's mistakes, as Kaifeng said, was raised to an unprecedented height.Chen Changhao showed all the telegrams Guotao sent to Xu and Chen to the central government, so the central government argued with Zhang Guotao for several days.But I have never heard of anyone in the Fourth Front Army saying that they want to "solve the central government by force."Kai Feng's article was the first to mention "secret telegrams" and "solution of the central government by force" in the process of criticizing Zhang Guotao, thus summarizing Zhang Guotao's mistakes to "line struggle".

For Zhang Guotao's warlordism, Kaifeng made a big crusade.He wrote: "Guo Tao's warlordism is manifested in the following issues: First, the corporal punishment system in the Red Army has developed to the apex. Because there is no class-conscious discipline, they have to rely on beatings, scolding and shooting to maintain the execution of orders. Feel free to People can be beaten, and people can be shot at will. This can be seen everywhere in the Fourth Front Army in the past. Second, the discipline of the residents is not based on close ties with the residents. Because the Red Army is an army of workers, peasants, and the people, they are not Standing above the people. Third, the policy of ignoring the people. Instead of educating the Red Army cadres in Marxism-Leninism, we only want them to obey and follow blindly. Fourth, cultivate the orderly system. This is more or less learned from Feng Yuxiang’s army.” At the end of this long article, Kaifeng concluded to Zhang Guotao: "The political line represented by Comrade Guotao is a form produced in the Soviet movement, a line of right opportunism and warlordism. His objective The root cause is due to China's warlord system and peasants' narrow and backward consciousness, and the reflection of hooligans' destructive consciousness. His subjective reason is that Comrade Guotao has the root of past mistakes. At the Fourth Plenary Session, Guotao opposed this kind of mistake, but He did not completely clean up his mistakes. He was isolated from the Central Committee and developed without the leadership of the Central Committee. It became the route of retreat and escape of Right opportunism and the route of warlords and banditism in the Soviet movement.” Kaifeng's article quoted extensively, using a large number of internal documents of the Red Fourth Front Army.From the minutes of the Zhuo Mu Diao meeting, to Zhang Guotao’s many speeches at the cadre meeting of the Fourth Red Front Army, the articles published in "Must Read for Cadres", as well as the internal telegrams and instructions of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army.It shows that the central government has a relatively complete grasp of Zhang Guotao's remarks and activities during the split from the central government.This article is the prelude to a comprehensive criticism of Zhang Guotao's line, and the climax is yet to come.However, Kaifeng’s article demoted the Fourth Front Army to nothing, and vilified this large and glorious Red Army team into a team of "bandits" and "warlords".This also set a precedent for criticizing Zhang Guotao's tendency to expand. Although Zhang Guotao left the army, his influence in the Red Fourth Front Army cannot be underestimated.At this time, the West Route Army was still fighting bloody battles in the Hexi Corridor. The 4th Army and the 31st Army in northern Shaanxi were both old troops of the Red Fourth Front Army. Criticizing Zhang Guotao in the Red Fourth Front Army could achieve the desired results and whether it would cause the troops to panic. Chaos and out of control.Mao Zedong felt uncertain.He needs to have first-hand information and a solid understanding of the ideological situation of the Red Fourth Front Army troops. From February to March 1937, he sent Luo Ruiqing, dean of education of the Red Army University, to visit the Second and Fourth Front Army in the name of inspecting the troops. Luo Ruiqing carried out Mao's mission seriously.In name, it is to inspect the Second and Fourth Front Armies, but the focus is on the Fourth Front Army.From the end of February, Luo Ruiqing inspected the training, life, and political and ideological conditions of the troops during the day, listened to the reports of the heads of the troops at night, and talked to some of the main leaders alone.After walking nervously for a month, on March 22, he wrote a long report to Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian and Lin Biao (Principal of the Red Army University) at the Qingyang Step School. Regarding the basic situation of the Fourth Front Army, Luo Ruiqing pointed out: After the division, "among the cadres, leading cadres, ordinary party members, and soldiers, they did not understand the correctness of the party's line and the mistakes made by the leaders of the Fourth Front in the past." .Luo Ruiqing emphasized: Zhang Guotao's influence in the Fourth Front Army is still very deep.A specific example is that when talking about the issue of "going south and going north", most people think that "going south and going north" is right. Luo Ruiqing admitted: The composition of the troops of the Fourth Front Army is excellent.Those from Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Tongnanba accounted for 80% of the entire army, and the vast majority of cadres above the company level were old Red Army soldiers from Hubei, Henan, Anhui.Warriors are physically strong, intelligent and lively.With good education, a large number of cadres can be produced.But the political level is very low, and some people are dissatisfied with exposing past mistakes, because their superstitious belief in (Zhang Guotao) far exceeds their understanding of the party.Although political work has established some systems and organizational forms, the specific content of the work is still poor, and some even have no. Luo Ruiqing's report concludes: "Some cadres are irresponsible and even bored at present. I think there are probably the following reasons: 1. The activeness in the past generally involved more compulsion and less self-consciousness; 2. The old compulsive management 3. Fear and boredom of the hardships of the past; 4. In the past, I only knew individuals, and everything was pinned on individuals. Now the party's concept has not replaced the superstition of individuals. " Luo Ruiqing's report reflected many problems in the Fourth Front Army.The key is that Zhang Guotao's influence still exists. Many cadres in the Fourth Front Army have not yet realized the seriousness of Zhang Guotao's mistakes, drew a clear line with Zhang Guotao, and truly stood on the position of the central government.Therefore, Zhang Guotao must be thoroughly criticized.Much work remains to be done on this issue.Not only Zhang Guotao himself, but cadres at all levels also have the need for self-examination. At this time, many cadres in the Fourth Front Army also felt heavy pressure.The dispatch of people from superiors to inspect the troops, the changes in the leaders of the 4th Army and the 31st Army, and the reposting of Zhang Guotao's inspection and Kai Feng's article by the central government are all signs that a major struggle within the party is about to begin.Bad news from the West Route Army kept coming. When Zhang Hao, the political commissar of the West Army Aid Army, announced the failure of the West Route Army in mid-March, the cadres and soldiers of the 4th Army and the 31st Army burst into tears.Some people are depressed all day long, can't cheer up, and don't know what kind of fate will befall them. Zhang Guotao was extremely saddened by the failure of the West Route Army. He felt: "If the army on the one hand was left with only a skeleton during the 25,000-mile Long March, then the backbone of the West Route Army was also broken by the enemy." The failure of the West Route Army caused strong reactions in northern Shaanxi.Since the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement campaign in the Central Soviet Area in 1935, the defeat of the West Route Army was the most serious loss suffered by the Red Army.Of course, the central government must be held accountable.More than ten days after Chen Changhao telegraphed the failure of the Central West Route Army, in March 1937, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in Yan'an. The topic from the 23rd to the 26th was the task of the CCP after the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Committee, while from the 27th to the 31st the topic was to criticize Zhang Guotao's line. Those present at the meeting were: Members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhu De, Bo Gu, Zhang Guotao.Alternate member Kai Feng. The cadres in charge of the Red Front Army were Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Xiao Jinguang, Luo Ronghuan, Lin Boqu, Chen Geng, Dong Biwu, Liu Yalou, Cai Shufan, and Mo Wenhua. He Long and Ren Bishi, the leaders of the Red Second Front Army. Red Fourth Army cadres Zhou Chunquan, He Wei, Fu Zhong, Ni Zhiliang, Wang Weizhou, He Changgong, Shao Shiping, Liao Chengzhi, Zhu Guang, Luo Shiwen, Xie Fuzhi. Guo Qian, Li Zhongquan, and Luo Huamin were former cadres of the Sichuan-Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee of the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army. Gao Gang, Guo Hongtao, and Dai Jiying, former leaders of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi. Four Red Army women cadres: Kang Keqing (Mrs. Zhu De), Liu Qunxian (Mrs. Bogu), Jin Weiying (Mrs. Li Weihan) and Li Jianzhen. Attending the meeting were: Wu Liangping, Feng Wenbin, Liu Changsheng, Du Liqing, Xu Teli, Zhou Xing, Wang Lin, Wang Guanlan, Qi Hua, Hu Yaobang, Zeng Xisheng, Liu Shenglian, Zhang Zhenkun, Tan Jiashu, Tan Yulin, Yang Xiushan, Yu Daisheng, etc. . Several important figures were absent from the meeting.Zhou Enlai was negotiating with the Kuomintang in Hangzhou; Liu Shaoqi led the work of the Northern Bureau of the Communist Party of China in Tianjin; Deng Fa went to the Soviet Union.Not long before the meeting, Lin Yuying was sent to other places to engage in labor movements.Zhang Guotao approached Zhang Wentian several times and asked Lin Yuying to attend the meeting.Because Lin Yuying is the mediator between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Zhang Guotao, and also the most important insider.Without his presence, many issues between Zhang Guotao and the central government would not be clear.But Zhang Wentian rejected Zhang Guotao's request. After the meeting started on March 27, Zhang Guotao made the inspection first.He admitted that he had made mistakes in line, retreat and escape, and anti-Party and anti-central forces after the first and fourth front armies met. He admitted that he had underestimated the national revolutionary movement, the victory of the Central Red Army, and the strength of the people, and he had underestimated the strength of the enemy. Too high, so pessimistic and disappointed, advocate retreat.Regarding the issue of going north, he admitted that he had doubts about the policy of the central government, and admitted that Zhu De supported the central government and the majority of cadres supported the central government, which prompted him to change.However, after going north, it changed to go west, which still underestimated the national revolutionary movement.He stated that he would resolutely fight against his own mistakes, and that he should check well the problems that he has not yet understood. Commander-in-Chief Zhu De made a speech criticizing Zhang Guotao's mistakes, and described his struggle with Zhang Guotao when he went south.He said: Zhang Guotao has completely become a personal commander of the party since the period of Hubei, Henan and Anhui.He doesn't believe in parties, he doesn't believe in classes, he only needs a party of individuals, not a party of Bolsheviks.Because both the party and the Red Army have organizational principles, but Guotao does not want these principles.During the rendezvous, he showed great disrespect for the Central Committee and thought he was Leninist.This is one of the sources of his opposition to the Party and the Central Committee.Since announcing the central government's escape, he has despised the central government even more.Later, a meeting was called to oppose the central government, and I said: "I am the commander-in-chief, so it is not easy for me to participate." Guo Tao scolded the central government, and of course I was also scolded.From the Aba meeting to the Songgang (Zhuomudao) meeting, he did a lot of crimes against the party and the central government.At the Songgang meeting, I pointed out: "Don't oppose the Central Committee." When they joined the Second Front Army, they had to publicize the Central Committee's "mistakes" to the Second Front Army.I said, "Don't propagate it. In any case, it will not be publicized at the time." He didn't believe it, and got angry, saying that I was attacking him. Criticizing Zhang Guotao's mistakes, Zhu De finally said: "Comrade Guotao is an old party member, but his thinking is mechanical materialism, and he only looks at the form and not the content. I hope that Comrade Guotao admits his mistakes. Put the party first, don’t forget the party. Only by believing in the party can you lead the revolution, and there is no way out if you break away from the party’s position.” Commander-in-Chief Zhu's words are reasonable and restrained.Zhu De is a witness to what Zhang Guotao did in the past.What he revealed was completely true, and Zhang Guotao could not deny it.But Zhu De extended a helping hand to Zhang Guotao with a generous mind, and patiently helped him recognize his mistakes so as to correct them.Compared with Zhang Guotao's insult and persecution of Zhu De when he went south, it shows the noble character of Commander-in-Chief Zhu.Zhang Guotao was convinced of Zhu De, and he did not deny this even when he wrote his memoirs decades later. In his speech, Comrade Ren Bishi criticized Zhang Guotao's splitting behavior after the second and fourth front armies joined together.He pointed out: Zhang Guotao convened a meeting to make arrangements before the second and fourth armies met, and everyone was only allowed to say that the first army was bad, but not the shortcomings of the fourth army.After the second and fourth front armies met, Zhang Guotao sent people to send written materials attacking the leading comrades of the Party Central Committee, and also sent a "committee" to the second front army to conduct anti-central propaganda.Later, Zhang Guotao also ordered that the Sixth Army Corps be handed over to him to command, and planned to change the leaders of the Second and Sixth Army Corps.It also insisted on convening a meeting of cadres of the Second Front Army to seek consensus.The leaders of the Second Front Army boycotted Zhang Guotao and pointed out to Zhang Guotao that he did not recognize the mistakes of the central leadership.Ren Bishi said: Zhang Guotao did not want to join the army on the one hand. After arriving at Hadapu, Zhang Guotao proposed that Qihama should cross the Yellow River.After the opposition of the leaders of the Second Front Army, he gave up his original attempt.However, Zhang Guotao still wanted to use his main force to go out to Xia and Tao. The basic intention was to cross the west of the Yellow River and refused to join the army on the one hand, which was opposed by everyone.Ren Bishi looked back at history and said: Before and after the "August 7th" meeting, Zhang Guotao did not agree with the party leading farmers to carry out land struggles; during the Nanchang Uprising, he wanted to prevent the uprising; at the "Sixth National Congress", Zhang Guotao was a representative of the "right"; Zhang Guotao thinks it's a fantasy, maybe not at all.Ren Bishi believed that Zhang Guotao had been unable to see the revolutionary situation and the changes in class power for a long time.Because of his deep factional prejudices in the party, it reached its peak after the first and fourth front armies joined forces.He insisted on going south, which consumed a lot of strength of the Fourth Front Army.After the Wayaobao meeting, he actually did not change much. During the several days of the meeting, the speeches were very enthusiastic.Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, He Long and others criticized Zhang Guotao's crimes of splitting the party and the Red Army. Kang Keqing exposed Zhang Guotao's crimes against the Central Committee during the Aba Conference and the persecution of Zhu De, Liu Bocheng and other comrades.Fu Zhong, Wang Weizhou, Luo Shiwen and other comrades of the former Fourth Front Army exposed Zhang Guotao's crimes of implementing warlord rule in the Fourth Front Army and cracking down on the persecution of revolutionary comrades.He Wei and others reviewed the mistakes they made following Zhang Guotao. Mao Zedong made a long speech at the meeting on March 30.He pointed out: Zhang Guotao's line is undoubtedly all wrong.We welcome his change, which is the central government's cadre policy.Zhang Guotao's philosophy can be summed up in a word as confusion, in which the main things are mechanism and empiricism.He only recognizes what he can see, so his thinking is anti-theory and anti-principle.His constant portrayal of himself as a practical man just proves that he is a true empiricist.After we received the news that Chiang Kai-shek had been captured, he cited dozens of reasons to demand that Chiang Kai-shek be killed.If Zhang Guotao wants to correct his mistakes, he must first give up his empiricism.He only sees the part but not the whole. He only knows that there is today but not tomorrow.Due to scientific analysis, we can foresee the laws of movement, which means strategic mind in military affairs, which is exactly what Zhang Guotao lacks.Zhang Guotao's mechanistic theory only sees the form, not the content.He regarded Japan and Chiang Kai-shek as monsters with infinite power, suffering from the disease of fear of Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, saying that even ten times the current power could not defeat Japan, and he only thought of the role of the rear echelon in the revolutionary war.He could not see the contradictions between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.He does not recognize the internal contradictions of things, does not know that there are contradictions in the Red Army and the Communist Party, and can only resolve these contradictions by strengthening inner-party struggle, ideological education, and inner-party democracy. Talking about the struggle in the Long March, Mao Zedong said: Zhang Guotao's early days in Hubei, Henan and Anhui could not be said to be an opportunist line.Since the beating of Liu Xiang, the opportunist line has been completely formed.After he arrived in Northwest Sichuan, he created a federal government and a Politburo.After the rendezvous, the central government wanted to move north quickly, but he stayed put, and the central government tried its best to accommodate him and appointed him as the general political commissar of the Red Army.But as soon as we got to Maoergai, it was the opposite. It was completely wrong to use the barrel of a gun to censor the line of the central government and interfere with the composition and line of the central government. It completely lost the principle of organization.The Red Army cannot interfere with the line of the Party Central Committee. Zhang Guotao committed the greatest stain and crime on the issue of splitting the Red Army.When the Left Army and the Right Army were in charge, Ye Jianying stole the secret order for us to read, and we had to go north alone.Because the telegram said: "Go south and thoroughly launch the inner-party struggle." If you were a little careless at that time, there would be a fight. Mao Zedong's last words shocked all the comrades present.Mao Zedong did not mention this matter at the meeting of the Russian circles. Except for Kai Feng's article, this was the first time Mao Zedong mentioned this matter at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.Except for Zhang Guotao, the other parties were not present.Ye Jianying was in Xi'an, while Xu Xiangqian and Chen Changhao were still wandering on the road.In the days to come, the most original source of any mention of the "secret telegram" during the Long March was Mao Zedong's speech at this meeting. Mao Zedong continued: After the establishment of the anti-Party "Central Committee", the Central Committee still adopted a patient attitude.At that time, Zhang Guotao's telegram was very fierce, and the words "forbid you to use the name of the central government" came all over the place.However, we were very cautious. The resolution passed by the Central Committee on opposing Zhang Guotao's mistakes was only distributed to members of the Central Committee. Mao Zedong finally said: Since Zhang Guotao joined the party, he has worked under the party line for several stages, but the problem of his history of opportunism must be pointed out.We should ask Zhang Guotao to change with a sincere attitude, abandon his mistakes, and start from scratch in the future. On the last day of the meeting, Zhang Wentian made a concluding speech.He enumerated the mistakes of Zhang Guotao's line and Zhang Guotao's opportunism in history, basically repeating Mao Zedong's speech and synthesizing the speeches of comrades.He emphasized several issues that should be paid attention to in the struggle against Zhang Guotao's line: 1.Ruthlessly expose Zhang Guotao's line to educate all comrades in the party.Otherwise, there will be no unity within the party. 2.The struggle against Zhang Guotao's line must be separated from the cadres of the Fourth Front Army.These comrades thought that Guotao was the party and were deceived by Guotao.We must help them oppose the Guotao line and help them progress. 3.Comrades who have made mistakes should not be retaliatory, and the method of persuasion and education should be used mainly to make them change. 4.For those who make mistakes (referring to Zhang Guotao), don't trust them lightly, but look at their actual performance. 5.To eliminate Zhang Guotaoism, we should strengthen education within the party, expand democracy, develop self-criticism, and solve problems in principle. Regarding everyone's request to expel Zhang Guotao from the party and revoke his party positions, Zhang Wentian suggested not to make an organizational conclusion for the time being, and to give Zhang Guotao a chance to correct his mistakes.His words were unanimously approved. At this time, Bogu, who presided over the meeting, asked Zhang Guotao to express his attitude.Zhang Guotao stood up in frustration and said: "The speeches of all of you, especially the speeches of several comrades of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, have educated me even more. I understand that I made a serious mistake, and the consequences are great." As he spoke, he burst into tears Standing up: "I declare my mistakes bankrupt now. All the things in the past died yesterday, and all the things in the future will live today." But the people present sneered in disbelief. Then, Zhang Guotao answered some specific questions raised in the meeting, such as the elimination of counter-revolutionaries, opposition to the central government, the Aba meeting, and the killing of comrades such as Hu Di. Zhang Guotao admitted that it was his own crime.But there are several issues he refuses to admit.One is Zeng Zhongsheng's death, which he said was not his order.The other is "resolving the central government by force", which Zhang Guotao denied.He said: "What I want to explain is that if it develops to frame the commander-in-chief and solve the revolutionary comrades by force, if this is done, it will be counter-revolutionary." Zhang Guotao finally said: "My mistake was indeed against the Party and the Central Committee. My mistake was very serious. I agree to give me an organizational conclusion. But I disagree with one thing, that is, not to treat me as a party member, but to treat me as a party member. Counter-revolutionaries. I think I am different from the Trotskyites and Chen Duxiu. I am firmly on the side of the Communist International, so I have the right to request that I be treated as a party member.” At the end of the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee that criticized Zhang Guotao's line, the "Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the Mistakes of Comrade Zhang Guotao" was passed, which systematically summarized and criticized the mistakes of Zhang Guotao's line.The main content is: 1. In leading the Fourth Front Army, Zhang Guotao made many major mistakes of political principle. "From the withdrawal from the Sichuan-Shanxi Soviet Area to the establishment of the Second Central Committee, it was the period when the retreat line of right opportunism and warlordism reached their peak. This is an anti-Party and anti-central line." 2. "He used all his strength to create a personal system in the Red Army. He regarded military power as higher than party power. His army could not be mobilized by the central government. He even went so far as to use the army to intimidate the central government, relying on the strength of the army, demanding Reorganization of the Central Committee. In the end, he disregarded all the orders of the Central Committee and went south on his own initiative to split the Red Army and establish the Second Central Committee, which caused an unprecedented split in the Chinese Party and the Chinese Soviet movement.” 3. The southward movement was "not only fundamentally wrong in terms of anti-Party, anti-Central and splitting the Red Army, but also a complete failure in the southward movement itself." "Because of the southward action, the Red Army was far away from the anti-Japanese advanced positions, which weakened the influence of the Red Army in the whole country and the power to promote the rapid establishment of the anti-Japanese national united front, and also caused losses to the Chinese revolution." 4. Although Zhang Guotao abolished the Second Central Committee, he led the Fourth Front Army of the Red Army to the north.But he "was always hesitant to go north to join the Central Committee, and he did not understand the correctness of the Central Committee's line. The main reason for the West Route Army's advance to Ganbei and the serious failure of the West Route Army was that it did not overcome Zhang Guotao's line." 5. "Zhang Guotao's line is the reflection of the narrowness of the peasants, the destructiveness of the lumpen proletariat, and the ideology of the Chinese feudal warlords in the proletarian party." leadership, whether it is a national revolution or an agrarian revolution, is bound to fail to achieve complete victory." 6. The Central Committee "expresses its great satisfaction for the great progress made by the cadres of the Fourth Front Army under the direct leadership of the Central Committee and the correct understanding of Zhang Guotao's line. Comrade Zhang Guotao should be responsible for the mistakes made by the Red Fourth Front Army in the past. All attempts and conspiracies to deliberately interpret the struggle against Zhang Guotaoism as a struggle against all cadres of the Fourth Front Army and to put the cadres of the Fourth Front Army in opposition to the Central Committee should be severely punished.” After the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, Zhang Guotao thought about it behind closed doors for several months, and in June 1937 he wrote another review: "About My Mistakes", admitting that "I not only fully agree with the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on my mistakes, but also It is the greatest education for myself. I should use this resolution to completely correct my mistakes and fight resolutely against my mistakes.” "I myself declare that my erroneous line is completely bankrupt. Every comrade's relentless struggle against my mistakes is the most important guarantee for the Bolshevization of the party." In fact, Zhang Guotao was unconvinced in his heart, but just compromised.Some of his subordinates came to vent their dissatisfaction. Zhang Guotao comforted them and said: "When I was Maoergai, I had every reason to criticize the political line of the CPC Central Committee at that time. But the situation is different now. Mao Zedong and others first connected with the Communist International. In implementing the policy of the anti-Japanese national united front, we also formed an alliance with Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, and after the Xi’an Incident, we are expected to reconcile with the Kuomintang. These achievements have changed our intention to oppose Mao Zedong. What’s more, the West Route Army has suffered such a tragic defeat. Take the blame and blame yourself, and have no intention of debating right and wrong with others. Therefore, I hope that ordinary comrades can concentrate on studying, review past mistakes in work, and stop expressing anti-central government." After the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, Peng Dehuai, Ren Bishi and others were instructed by the Central Committee to convey the spirit of the meeting to the troops of the Second and Fourth Fronts and carry out the struggle against Zhang Guotao's line.However, criticizing Zhang Guotao's line in the Fourth Front encountered great resistance.What is going on between Zhang Guotao and the central government, in many cases, even military division-level cadres don't know, let alone grassroots officers and soldiers.Especially when the superior criticized Zhang Guotao's warlordism and banditism, many people couldn't figure it out.The same is the Red Army, how did you become a "bandit" after following Zhang Guotao?The three-month critical struggle showed a tendency to expand, which caused ideological turmoil among the cadres of the Fourth Front Army.According to the "Report on the Political Work Situation of the 4th Army in the Fourth, Fifth, and June Three Months" issued by the Political Department of the 4th Army to the former General Secretary on July 12, 1937, the fleeing phenomenon of the 4th Army was relatively serious at that time, and a total of 131 people escaped. Many are cadres.Many cadres are panic-stricken. When superiors transfer cadres to study, they suspect that they have "problems" and "I am afraid they have made mistakes."Some refused to leave the army to go to school on the pretext of "illiteracy" and "failure to learn". The situation of the 31st Army is similar. Military political commissar Guo Shushen reported in a telegram to the Central Committee on May 1: "The desertion of troops was very serious in April, with a total of 86. The main reason is the lack of political education and management leadership." The struggle against Zhang Guotao's line gradually expanded, and the "anti-warlordism" struggle also started in the Second Front Army.At that time, the troops of the Second Front Army were stationed in Yunyang. "Suddenly ordered by the superiors to carry out a struggle against warlordism and guerrillaism in the Second Red Front Army. The main spearhead of the anti-warlordism was aimed at He Long. Since He Long enjoyed a high reputation in the Second Red Front Army Prestige, this unpopular struggle ended hastily, and nothing happened."When He Long mentioned this matter later, he was still angry.He said: "Yunyang town is anti-warlordism, and anti-guerrillaism is attached. Anti-warlordism is against me. I told Xiaoguan (Xiang Ying): If you are against it, you will not leave. I will leave only when you give an order." The magnification of the struggle finally led to the tragedy. On April 3, 1937, a "riot" occurred at Yan'an Red Army University.A group of senior cadres of the former Fourth Front Army, including Xu Shiyou, Wang Jianan, and Hong Xuezhi, were arrested on charges of "fleeing with guns" and "murdering Chairman Mao". General Xu Shiyou had a more detailed memory of the cause of this incident after the founding of the People's Republic of China.He said: "After arriving in Yan'an, some people said how long or short Zhang Guotao was, and I didn't say a word. As long as you didn't talk about me, I didn't care. I was very sad when the West Route Army failed, and I didn't have a good rest for half a month. Plus Going against the Zhang Guotao line, I heard a lot of nonsense, some said I was Trotsky, some said I was a bandit. The cadres below looked down on the comrades of the Fourth Front Army. I was very angry. I was so sick that I vomited blood and went to the hospital to recuperate. I thought: When we opposed Chen Duxiu and Li Lisan in the past, we cadres only knew that they were wrong. As for how they were wrong, we didn’t know what it means to be wrong in policy and line. I have never participated in such a big struggle meeting. I was really afraid of the struggle meeting. At that time, I wanted to fight quickly. I went to the front to fight the enemy to the death, and I didn’t want to hold this struggle meeting. In addition, there were rumors that Zhou Chunquan, He Wei, and Zhang Guotao were going to be shot. I was also one of Zhang Guotao’s military-level cadres. , can’t be without my business. I also feel that it is too wrong to be executed here. I have brought all these honors in the Southern and Northern Wars. Is there a crime if there is no merit? At that time, I thought that the Party Central Committee was fighting for power and profit, and wanted to get rid of us. I This understanding was a big mistake, so I was basically shaken. My attitude was very dissatisfied, and I was extremely depressed during the illness. "I was on sick leave, and the struggle meeting became more and more intense day by day. At this time, all the military-level cadres of the battalion, regiment, and division of the Fourth Front Army came to see me, and there was no one who did not cry. For three days in a row, especially the crying of the military-divisional cadres,对我影响很大。过去都是老同事，现在都感觉没有出路。我想了几天，想出办法来了。他们来看我时，我对他们说：我们回四川去。那里有刘子才，他们有一千多人，又是我的老部下。在这里某某说我们是反革命，要枪决；我们回四川去，叫他们看看我们到底是不是革命的。愿去的就走，不愿去的也不要告诉中央。 “到第二天，有二十多个团级干部、两个营级干部、六个师级干部、五个军级干部都愿意走。当时我们决定不带张国焘、何畏、周纯全，因为他们都要骑马。我们决定步行七天七夜，通过陕北到汉中、巴山，会合刘子才的部队再说。一切计划是我作的，路线也是我划的。” 但是，许世友等人的出走计划走漏了风声，被红大的人渲染成“暴动”和“谋害毛主席”，报告给校长林彪。经上级批准，许世友等人被红大校方和政治保卫局来人拘禁。经过审查，“谋害毛主席”的罪名不能成立，定性为“拖枪逃跑”。1937年6月6日，延安最高法院举行公审大会，宣读对许世友等人的判决。从轻判处许世友、洪学智、王建安等六人一年半至六个月不等的有期徒刑。并在6月9日的《新中华报》上发了消息。 在审查过程中，负责这个工作的董必武同志发现许世友等人是冤枉的，向中央作了反映。张国焘回忆：“负责审理四方面军干部的董必武，更在事实上缓和了这个斗争。他和那些被捕者一个个亲自谈话，结果证明何畏、许世友、王建安等反对者并没有组织性的行动，他们的背后也没有人指使和操纵。只是对于抗日军政大学的斗争方式表示不满，因此愤而反抗。董乃将多数同志释放，少数人判短期监禁。被判禁闭的人，都是提前释放。所有被释放者，仍回到军政大学继续学习。”三个月后，9月25日，任八路军第120师359旅旅长的陈伯钧来延安看望老战友，与罗瑞卿、刘亚楼等共进晚餐。“饭后又回抗大，遇四方面军干部王树声、许世友、詹才芳等，简单说了几句话。”说明许世友等此时已恢复了自由。 毛泽东听了董老的汇报，也觉得这件事处理得太过分。中央批判张国焘，但对四方面军的广大干部战士是应当好好团结的。毛泽东当时没有公开表态，采取冷处理的办法息事宁人。这时徐向前回到延安，毛泽东听了徐关于西路军情况的汇报后，要他去看看许世友等人，做些工作。当时徐向前的处境也很不好，只能说几句安慰的话。后来许世友、王建安等去了山东根据地，在抗日战争中立下战功。实践证明他们是我党我军的优秀干部。1944年10月25日，毛泽东在延安整风的一次讲话中说：反国焘路线是有些过分的。如37年在红大，今天也讲，明天也讲，讲得人家根本不想听了还要讲。……关于红大“暴动”的事情，说许世友等人想杀我，给他们作了反革命暴动的结论。现在这个结论要修正。他们当时是有错误的，但自抗战以来，许世友任胶东军区司令员，王建安任鲁南军区司令员，他们的工作都有成绩，说明他们是好同志。这里得出一个教训：是过火斗争引起他们这样干，这是不对的。不能搞过火斗争。毛泽东的这番话明确否定了红大“暴动”事件，为四方面军的干部平了反。 红大事件后，反张国焘路线的斗争有所降温。张国焘自己觉得颜面扫地，没法干下去了。他说：“我决心搬出延安城，再也不愿问党内的事。我在延安近郊，游山玩水，并寻觅适当的住所。果然，在延安北面的山上，找着了一所破庙。其中有一个石头的窑洞，可供居住。我督率我的卫士们去修理，不仅使窑洞焕然一新，而且在庙的左侧还开辟了一个小广场。不到两周，我就迁到新居去了。”后来中央给张国焘安排了临时的工作，由抗大教务长成仿吾出面，请张国焘到抗大讲政治经济学。 1937年8月，陈昌浩回到延安。他见到张国焘，满面羞愧，自承应负西路军失败的全部责任，听候党的处罚。在中央书记处责令下，他写了长达7万言的报告。中央以《陈昌浩同志关于西路军失败的报告》为题，于10月5日发给中央有关负责人审查。 陈昌浩的报告共分9章，在叙述了西路军自渡河以后的征战过程和一系列决策经过后，总结了经验教训。他认为西路军失败的客观原因有四点：一、马步芳、马步青为保持其领地而和红军死战；二、民族矛盾致使统一战线工作无法进行；三、二马在骑兵与数量上占有优势；四、我军在武器、地形、气候与战术上的诸多不利因素。在主观原因上，他承认自己在政治上不能克服国焘路线的影响，自己是“国焘路线之第一个负责执行者”。在战略战术上连续失误，加上政治思想工作薄弱，导致西路军的失败。但是他声明：“西路军指战员为着党中央与军委所赋予的任务而坚决斗争，粉身碎首饥冻疲困，在最困难与从未遇过的困难条件及残酷万分的血战中，一般说来没有灰心失掉，没有投降困难。而为求战胜敌人完成任务，而斗争到最后一滴血。干部极大死亡，战士宁死不辱，而表现极英勇的斗争。”他说：“虽然西路军对中央与军委指示执行的不充分，但西路军自成立之日起是站在党中央正确路线之上来努力的。我以为西路军虽然根本失败，我个人虽犯了很大错误，特别是不能克服国焘路线的错误，但我还是坚信西路军一般政治路线是执行中央的正确路线，决不是继续与执行反中央的国焘路线的。” 中央不能接受陈昌浩的报告。因为毛泽东已经给西路军下了结论。在1936年12月发表的《中国革命战争的战略问题》一文中，毛泽东写道：“被敌人吓倒的极端的例子，是退却主义的张国焘路线。红军第四方面军的西路军在黄河以西的失败，是这个路线的最后的破产。” 在中央的严厉批评之下，陈昌浩又写了第二个报告。这次他来个全盘自我否定，上纲上线地把自己与张国焘路线联系起来。他写道：“中央正确路线与国焘错误路线是绝对相反的，而不可调和的。前者是领导革命到胜利之路，后者是领导革命于失败之路。革命历史证明得很清楚：如果政治路线正确，环境虽劣，自力虽小，可以导革命于胜利；虽一时受到挫折，而终结必归于胜利。如果政治路线错误，环境虽好，自力虽大，可以导革命于失败；虽一时幸而胜利，而终结必归于失败。五次围剿中央红军虽受挫折，而二万五千里长征胜利，抗日民族革命战争实现，这是中央路线一贯正确之铁证。四方面军虽有川陕苏区之胜利，而川陕苏区之自动放弃，南下基于挫败，番区之无出路及西路军之严重失败，这是国焘路线完全错误之标志。西路军既然没有克服国焘路线，就不是执行中央路线。” 陈昌浩以虔诚的认罪态度，将所有的帽子都扣在自己头上。他的盲目检讨起了反作用，中央认为他言不由衷，很不老实。徐向前也反对陈昌浩这种唯上是从的作风，在回忆录中说：“西路军第一把手陈昌浩思想上有包袱，患得患失，当断不断。他是军政委员会主席，政治委员，有最后决定权，对西路军的行动，能起'拍板'的作用。但是，这个同志的精神状态，很不理想。原因是他在红四方面军南下期间，一度支持过张国焘的分裂主义，后见共产国际不承认张国焘的那一套，知道自己犯了错误，包袱沉重，不易解脱。他曾向我流露过：南下的事，共产国际肯定对四方面军另有看法。为了四方面军的前途，今后应唯共产国际和党中央的意见是从。陈昌浩同志愿意改正错误，紧跟中央，无可非议，但是，作为一个党的高级干部，决不允许夹杂某种个人得失或山头主义的情绪在内。党内斗争嘛，谁能一贯正确？犯了错误，该检讨就检讨，该工作就工作，没有必要迫不及待地去表白自己，洗刷自己，从一个极端跳到另一个极端。在西路军期间，陈昌浩自始至终以紧跟中央，'回到'正确路线上来而自居。对于上级的指示，奉为金科玉律，不敢越雷池一步，简直到了一切'唯上'的盲从地步。至于敌我力量对比如何，战场实际如何，哪些行不通的指示应向上级反映，哪些事关全军命运、战局胜负的问题需要机断处理，则一概置诸脑后。我们之间的两次争论，便充分证明了这一点。”陈昌浩一错再错，不但没有为西路军挽回名誉，反而断送了自己的政治前途。 1937年10月，中央政治局常委开会讨论西路军失败的教训。陈昌浩在会上作检讨。毛泽东在发言中基本重复了3月批判张国焘的那些话，指出张国焘路线实质上是逃跑主义、军阀主义与反党反中央的路线。因“七七”事变爆发，抗日战争进入了一个新阶段。红军改编为八路军奔赴山西抗日前线，批判张国焘路线告一段落。张国焘担任陕甘宁边区政府副主席，陈昌浩则继续反省。1939年8月周恩来去苏联治疗右臂，陈昌浩随行离开延安，去苏联接受共产国际的审查。