Chapter 25 The counteroffensive of East Zhejiang

On October 18, 1841, when Emperor Daoguang was looking forward to the success of Zhejiang with great hope, he received a memorial from Hangzhou General Qi Mingbao, informing Zhenhai of the fall and Yuqian's martyrdom, and asked: "Quickly give the ministers of the Jian faction to lead the troops, send more The Beijing camp and the strong soldiers from all provinces also came to Zhejiang to suppress and suppress them, in order to overcome them.” Emperor Daoguang immediately awarded Yi Jing as General Yangwei, and transferred 12,000 troops from the eight provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, and organized a large army again to conquer "Niyi".

After the Yongzheng Dynasty, the military commanders sent by the Qing government to lead the expedition, the names of their generals were no longer newly created, but the old names of the previous dynasty were used.Its seal was also returned by the commander in chief.For example, General Jingni of Yishan was named in 1717, and it was first used when Funing'an conquered and suppressed Vanarabutan.The Yangwei general who conferred the Yi Jing this time has a longer history. It was created in 1646 when the Qing Dynasty just entered the customs. It was first used by Prince Duoduo of Deyu when he conquered Mongolia and other ministries.Moreover, the name of General Yangwei was used most frequently in history, as many as seven times, the most recent two of which were Emperor Daoguang's conquest of Zhang Geer in 1826 and the rebellion of Yusufu and his son in Xinjiang in 1830.Obviously, Emperor Daoguang used the seal of General Yangwei again this time, hoping that this auspicious title, which has been victorious after many battles, could protect the Qing army and "raise its might" in the southeast as it did in the northwest in the past.

Like Yishan, Yijing, who was ordered to go out this time, is also a member of the royal family, and his blood is closer. He is the fourth grandson of Emperor Yongzheng, the political enemy of Fuyuan General Yunti.Yijing's grandfather, Yongxuan, who was named Prince Heshuo Chengzhe, had no experience in the Goma campaign and was a famous calligrapher and painter.His father, Mian Yi, was granted the title of Dorobeile. Yijing's experience is similar to that of most recent members of the royal family, and he mainly moved among Beijing officials. In 1816, he became the first-class bodyguard from the fourth-rank clan, and later served as Fengchen Yuanqing, cabinet bachelor, deputy governor, minister, and commander of the army. In 1830, he once went out with the previous general Yangwei for a long time, and then sent Heilongjiang generals and Shengjing generals abroad for a short period of time.During this expedition, he had a total of various positions in the official post: co-organizer, official secretary, infantry commander, Zhenghuang Banner Manchuria Commander, Chongwenmen Supervisor, and Zhenghongqi Clan Chief Patriarch.There are so many positions and positions, and there are honors and vacancies (big scholars), essential vacancies (official ministers, infantry commanders), and fat vacancies (supervisors of Chongwenmen), because the Qing Dynasty implemented the system of Manchu and Han vacancies. Manchus, especially He is a clan, and his official career is more open; more importantly, he is a minister trusted by Emperor Daoguang, and he is promoted the fastest among the clans of the "Yi" generation.

Yijing left Beijing on October 30 after receiving training in Beijing. On November 8, I went to Tai'an, Shandong, and on November 22 to Yangzhou, Jiangsu.However, after he arrived in Jiangsu, he stopped suddenly and stayed in the Suzhou area for two full months. Compared with General Yishan of Jingni, General Yijing of Yangwei seems to have a different atmosphere. According to Bei Qingqiao, a secret agent of the Yijing, who claims to be "inside and outside secrets, he can tell seven or eight of them": Yuqing, Zang Yuqing, a native of Suqian County, Jiangsu Province, is an "old friend" of Yijing, and this time he joined the Yijing shogunate as one of the main staff.However, as a military commander, Yijing actually hesitated between the two strategies of "appropriation" and "war", which is very puzzling.However, there were also some unusual signs from Emperor Daoguang.

On October 19, 1841, Emperor Daoguang issued an edict from the cabinet: "Qi Shan was released with Jia En and sent to the Zhejiang military camp to serve as atonement." Go after the fall.Emperor Daoguang let Qishan go to Zhejiang with Yijing this time, does it mean that Emperor Daoguang also hesitated in the two strategies of "care" and "war"? However, Qishan did not go to Zhejiang later, but was transferred to the Zhangjiakou Military Station as a drudgery.In this regard, people often quote Liang Tingfang's statement that, at the suggestion of Zang Yuqing, Yijing played to prevent Qi Shan from coming to Zhejiang.This statement seems wrong.Emperor Daoguang changed the decree to send Qi Shan to the military platform, and issued it on October 24.At this time, Yijing had not yet left the capital, and he saw the Zang family after leaving the capital.Bei Qingqiao said otherwise:

According to this statement, Yijing strictly refused Qishan to go with him when he asked for training, and it was difficult for the two senior officials who already had a gap to help each other; The records of Dushi Zhan and Fu's "ambiguity" are contradictory, making people wonder which is right and which is wrong. Although the mentality of Yijing and Emperor Daoguang at this time is unpredictable, we can clearly feel that the scene when Yijing went to war was much more dull than when Yishan went to war.Emperor Daoguang no longer had the happy fantasy of "soldiers go out to suppress and capture the barbarian chiefs", and Yijing also did not have the complacent dream of "coming soon to suppress, and then playing a victory".After a year of war, their estimate of the difficulties seemed more realistic.

Yijing's personal experience made him unfamiliar with the army, and he had no idea of ​​"barbarian" high-level strategies, so he imitated the ancient style in collecting opinions from all walks of life and recruiting talents.It is said that there is a wooden cabinet outside his camp gate, and anyone who is willing to contribute can enter the title of the book. It is reported three days later that those who know the "barbarian" service can state their gains and losses face to face.During the two months in Jiangsu, there were 400 suggestions and 144 effectors, forming a huge "think tank".There is no record in the historical records of the brilliant strategies of these people, but Zang Yuqing, the "old friend" of Yijing mentioned above, left a shocking statement:

1. In terms of employing people and political affairs, he recruited Lin Zexu to come to Zhejiang and Xiangzhou to work hard to encourage the spirit of fighting the enemy to the death; he killed Yu Buyun and other fleeing generals, and tried his best to stop the wind of fleeing. 2. In terms of combat guidance, 6,000 soldiers from Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Henan were recruited as a new force, 10,000 were recruited from the north of Lu, Bian, Jiang, and Huaihe, and 20,000 were recruited from the south of the coastal bandits, salt lords, and fishermen; Nanyong is the eyes and ears, and the north is brave and courageous, and divides the three cities of Ningbo, Zhenhai, and Dinghai. When the ship meets the ship, it will be burned. Rewards will be offered, and rewards will be given as soon as they are reported. People fight on their own, and they will fight regardless of the place." And wipe them out."

From the perspective of modern military academics, most of the various military strategies I have seen in the Opium War are far-fetched; in contrast, Zang Yuqing’s above-mentioned proposal is quite insightful, but it seems difficult to implement Overgrown.Lin Zexu was dispatched from Zhejiang to Xinjiang not long ago, and at this time he was working in Xiangfu River Works. If he invited Lin to return to Zhejiang, wouldn't it force Emperor Daoguang to go back on his word?Yu Buyun is the former enemy commander in Zhejiang at this time, if he is killed, who will replace him?Judging from the interrogation that lasted for half a year, this "Prince Taibao" could not be executed casually.The most valuable part of Zang's proposal is the "Fu Yong Scattered Warfare" that "does not distinguish between land and water, and does not match the brigade", "man fights for himself, and fights regardless of place", which really has the charm of modern guerrilla warfare.However, this method of warfare requires good organization and guidance, and soldiers must also be trained to be familiar with the tactics. Otherwise, the "rewards" that motivate soldiers and bravery are likely to become a source of false reporting of the results; moreover, this method of warfare is protracted. Chinese and foreign historical experience, if the British army is to be "suspicious and panicky at every step", it will take several years instead of months. Although Zang also mentioned "unscheduled days", he does not seem to have expected this. For a long time, if this is the case, whether Yijing can persist and whether Emperor Daoguang can tolerate it has become a question; moreover, this kind of warfare must have corresponding economic mobilization measures. According to Zang's 6,000 The new army, 30,000 hired soldiers, and a year's military expenditure of more than 2 million taels, the Qing Dynasty's finances could not support it.It seems that Zang Yuqing has found a boat to cross the river, but has not yet mastered the skills of sailing.Yijing didn't use this trick later.

It is very likely that Yijing reached a tacit understanding with Emperor Daoguang when he was in Beijing, so he stayed in Jiangsu for two months, and there were many complaints. open-minded attitude.According to Yijing’s self-reported reason, the 6,000 powerful troops that “had gone on expeditions” in Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and other provinces have not yet arrived (it takes about four months for Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu to transfer troops to Zhejiang), and they have already arrived in Zhejiang. The reinforcements in the four provinces of Anhui, Jiangxi and Hubei are all weak troops, not enough to rely on. I am afraid that if he arrives in Zhejiang early, instead of being unable to control the enemy, he will be able to control the enemy.This method of fully preparing and not rushing to fight is also in line with the military principle of "planning and fighting" that was regarded as the standard at that time.

Similar to Yijing's situation, Pu Dingcha is also in a dilemma at this time.On the one hand, after occupying the three cities of Ding, Zhen, and Ning, he sent letters to Liu Yunke, Yu Buyun and others several times, expressing his willingness to negotiate with the "Minister of Plenipotentiary" of the Qing side, but there was no reply; Hong Kong, Gulangyu Island, Dinghai, Zhenhai, and Ningbo are no longer able to assemble a strong enough force to launch the Yangtze River Campaign that Elliot had planned before leaving office (to be described in detail later). The British army fought.Therefore, after occupying Ningbo, the British army once harassed Yuyao on October 20, 1841, and then from December 27, 1841 to January 12 of the following year, captured the three cities of Yuyao, Cixi, and Fenghua without bloodshed. Not for a long time, quit immediately.It can be said that there was a five-month pause in the war at this time.Pu Dingcha himself also returned to Hong Kong in January 1842, moved the office of the General Supervision of Commerce with China from Macau to Hong Kong, and announced that Hong Kong and Zhoushan would become free ports.I didn't go north until June of that year. Although the British army’s military operations against Yuyao and other places were not large-scale, Liu Yunke, the governor of Zhejiang, was not as calm as Yijing. He sent troops to Jiangsu every now and then, urging Yijing to go to Zhejiang as soon as possible to hang the banner, as if he was afraid that he would bear the burden of losing the city and land alone. responsibility.But Yi Jing was unmoved, and behaved as if he was still serving as the Minister of the Ministry of Officials in the capital. Suzhou, where Yijing was stationed at this time, was known as a paradise on earth at that time, a place where gold powder was prosperous.Singing pavilions and dancing pavilions are the most touching and emotional.There are 6 members of Yijing's entourage, who were originally Langzhong, Yuanwailang, Yushi, Master, Bitieshi, Zhongshu and other fifth-rank, sixth-rank and even seventh-rank Beijing officials. The following officials must kneel when they meet and greet each other, and they must call them "adults", and the followers of Yijing have followed suit and called them "little star envoys".Under these "little imperial envoys" and "little star envoys", there were hundreds of Beijing soldiers accompanying them.This group of people prostitutes, drinks alcohol, extorts money and bribes, and makes a mess.Every day, Wuxian County (the capital of Suzhou) supplies more than 80 seats, costing hundreds of yuan.Just like a later catchphrase, the front is tight, and the rear is tight. Suzhou has shown a completely different atmosphere from Hangzhou, which is also a paradise city 300 miles away.Yijing didn't want to suppress it at first, but slander suddenly arose, so he had to move the camp for more than a hundred miles, and entered Jiaxing, Zhejiang on January 21, 1842. Within a few days, the Sichuan-Shanxi force that Yijing had been waiting for finally got news. By February 13, except for 250 soldiers from Shaanxi-Gansu and 300 soldiers from Sichuan, the rest had arrived in Zhejiang.This group of fresh troops who came from 4,000 miles away, had no military discipline, and even left behind a group of people who "captured young men along the way, plundered board doors, carried a soldier with four people, and lay down." into the city" reputation.By this time, Yijing had no reason to wait and see, and rushed to Hangzhou on February 10 (the first day of the Lunar New Year), and after making some arrangements, he rushed to the frontline Cao'e River area on February 27.At this time, it was 131 days since the day he left Beijing. Theoretically speaking, the Zhejiang Qing Army originally had more than 30,000 soldiers, more than 10,000 reinforcements from other provinces, and more than 90,000 hired soldiers from other provinces and this province.However, I have explained in the first chapter that it is difficult to transfer troops from this province; and the thousands of soldiers who could be transferred were defeated in the two battles of Dinghai and Zhenhai. Tune.Most of the recruits in this province do not leave their hometowns, and very few can be recruited.Therefore, in reality, the Qing army that can maneuver in Zhejiang at this time is only the 12,000 reinforcements from other provinces that arrived after the Battle of Zhenhai, and the strong soldiers from Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu and the province hired by Yijing and others. There are said to be 20,000 people. However, the more than 30,000 brave soldiers cannot all be used for offense. Let's look at the specific situation: 2,000 reinforcements from Hubei, of which 1,000 were stationed in Hangzhou and 1,000 were stationed in Haining; 2,000 reinforcements from Jiangxi, 1,000 of which were defeated in Yuyao, and were sent to Lihai and other places north of the Cao'e River. The other 1,000 Yijing thought they were not strong enough and ordered them to guard the grain platform; 1,000 reinforcements from Anhui, of which 600 were stationed in Hangzhou; 2,000 reinforcements from Shaanxi and Gansu, of which 800 were stationed in Zhapu; 200 of them were stationed in Hangzhou.In this way, there are only 6,000 reinforcements left in other provinces, and among the strong and brave, there are also defenders everywhere. However, the remaining soldiers and bravery still cannot be used for offense. General Yangwei Yijing went from Hangzhou to the Cao'e River area, and set up a camp in Dongguan Town, Shangyu County, west of the Cao'e River. He sent 1,000 reinforcements from Henan and 200 artillerymen from Shanxi and other places.It is about 70 kilometers away from Ningbo, which was occupied by the British army. Yijing claimed that he could take care of the front road (Ningbo, Zhenhai) and the back road (Hangzhou).Counselor Wen Wei set up a camp at Changxi Ridge in the northwest of Cixi County, leading 800 Jiangning bannermen, 400 Sichuan reinforcements, 400 guns and artillery from Shanxi and 400 Anhui reinforcements, a total of 2,000 troops, here It is about 40 kilometers away from Zhenhai. It is said that it is the rear route for attacking Zhenhai and Ningbo Bingyong. In this way, although Emperor Daoguang mobilized 12,000 troops from various provinces, only 1,600 soldiers from Sichuan (later used to attack Ningbo) and 1,200 soldiers from Shaanxi and Gansu (later used to attack Zhenhai) were actually used for attacking. Hired Yong and Yu Ding, whose quantity and quality are unreliable.In order to deter the British army, Yijing "proclaimed 120,000 to 30,000 elite soldiers" to the outside world! What is Yijing's design for such a grotesque way of deploying troops? In terms of dividing troops to guard Zhapu, Haining, Hangzhou, etc., it is easier to understand.If Yijing succeeded in attacking Ningbo, Zhenhai, Dinghai, etc., and the British army retreated to the sea, if they took advantage of the false attack to attack Zhapu and other places, wouldn't the Qing army care about one and lose the other?What's more, it was widely rumored that the British army would invade Hangzhou Bay and take the provincial capital directly from Haining, which made Zhejiang Governor Liu Yunke panic all day long. However, why did Yijing camp more than half of the remaining 6,000 Qing troops in Changxiling and Dongguan Town?The later results made me finally understand that Yi Jing was here to save his life.The 1,200 people in the Dongguan Town Day Camp were only used for self-defense, while the 2,000 people in the Changxiling Day Camp became a shield.Once the Qing army's counterattack in eastern Zhejiang failed and the British army launched an offensive, they could use the resistance of the Qing army in Changxiling to buy him time to escape! Compared with the formation, Yijing's choice of attack time is not only ridiculous. First, on January 25, 1842, Yi Jing and Minister of Counselor Wen Wei dreamed at the same time in Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province that the British army had abandoned land and boarded a boat, and sailed to sea together. The return of the weapons to the ship is regarded as a "good omen".On February 10th, Yijing went to Hangzhou to take a lottery at the Guandi Temple in West Lake, which is said to be the most effective. When the soldiers arrived, they all wore tiger-skin hats, thinking that "this is where you should receive your merit."Therefore, he selected the "Four Yin Auspicious Periods" (four shifts on the 29th day of the first lunar month in the 22nd year of Daoguang, that is, Jiayin time on Renyin month Wuyin day in Renyin year, from 3 to 5 am on March 10, 1842) as At the time of the attack, Duan Yongfu, the commander-in-chief of Anyi Town, Guizhou Province, who was born in Yinnian (Year of the Tiger), was the main general to attack Ningbo. Let him be a "five tigers against the enemy"! The results of wars under the guidance of superstition can be imagined, but it reflects the mentality of people in the pre-scientific era. Auspicious numbers, magic lotuses, and dream-telling still have their charms today, but they were really popular at the time. The power to dominate people's will. Probably with the support of this superstitious power, on March 6, 1842, Yijing published a memorial with a length of more than 4,000 characters, detailing his plan to counterattack the three cities of Zhejiang, and accompanying the memorial he presented the Checklist and battle map for Assailant Raiders.In this memorial, we no longer see his previous guilty conscience, but overflowing with strong self-confidence.According to Bei Qingqiao, before the war, Yijing also held a competition to write "Lubu" for his staff, and he won more than 30 articles. He Shiqi, who was familiar with him once, wrote a huge article, elegant and elegant..." It seems that he conducted a special "exercise" of writing for this victory in the battle. After Emperor Daoguang saw Yijing's plan, he was deeply moved by it. Zhu commented: Such Zhu criticisms were also seen in the memorials of Yang Fang, Yishan, Yan Botao, Yuqian and others. Emperor Daoguang waited too long for "Jieyin". In the early morning of March 10, 1842, after more than four months of hard work, the Qing army finally launched the only counterattack in the Opium War in eastern Zhejiang to regain lost ground. According to Yijing’s plan, the Qing army attacked Ningbo, Zhenhai, and Dinghai at the same time: for Ningbo, Duan Yongfu, the commander-in-chief, led 900 soldiers from Sichuan, 300 from Yu Ding, and 400 from Hebei Zhuangyong, a total of 1,600 soldiers. 600 soldiers from Sichuan and 200 soldiers from Yu Ding acted as auxiliary attackers. Taking Dayin Mountain in the southeast of Yuyao as the forward base, they cooperated with the 17 hired soldiers who sneaked into Ningbo City earlier to occupy the city; , Lieutenant General Zhu Gui and others led 800 Shaanxi-Gansu soldiers, 100 Yu Ding soldiers, and 500 Henan Zhuangyong soldiers, a total of 1,400, serving as the main attacker, and more than 500 Shaanxi-Gansu soldiers served as auxiliary attackers. The base, together with Team 11, which had sneaked into Zhenhai City earlier, cooperated internally and externally to recover the city; at Meixu between Zhenhai and Ningbo, 3,900 brave soldiers were dispatched to "intercept" the British troops who attempted to escape between the two cities. To Dinghai, Zheng Dingchen, the son of Zheng Guohong, the former commander of Chuzhou Town, who was killed in the battle, led 5,000 water warriors from Chongming, Chuansha, Dinghai and other places, and marched from Zhapu to occupy Daishan, preparing to attack the British ships moored in Dinghai. fire attack.It can be seen from this plan that in order to make up for the shortage of troops, Yijing used a large number of hired soldiers. However, this counterattack, which had been prepared for more than four months, collapsed in less than four hours. At 0:30 am on March 10, the British ship Columbine moored outside Ningbo was suddenly shelled twice, and there was no movement since then.At 3 o'clock, the Qing side released four burning fire boats, rushed towards the British ship Sisostes, and were led to the shore by the British small boats.At the same time, the soldiers of the Qing army opened fire on the British ships outside Ningbo City with small firearms, but to no avail; at the same time, they attacked the south and west gates of Ningbo City.The Sichuan soldiers in charge of attacking the city (some of them were Tibetan native soldiers) were extremely brave, and once attacked the city with the cooperation of Neiying.The British army hurriedly mobilized artillery to bombard it, but the narrow streets in the city made it impossible for the Qing army to evacuate and hide, and they were massacred.At dawn, the Qing army saw that the situation was over, so they hurriedly withdrew from the city. At 3 o'clock in the morning, the Qing side launched ten fire boats in Zhenhai in an attempt to burn the British ships in the port, but they were dragged to the river bank by British small boats.At the same time, the soldiers of the Qing army bravely unleashed small hand-held firearms and charged at the west gate of Zhenhai.One company of the British army stationed there opened the city gate and took the initiative to go out of the city to fight, and several companies of the British army in the city also went out of the city for reinforcements.Because Zhu Gui's troops of the Qing army who were in charge of the main attack did not arrive because they lost their way in the dark, they failed to fight and retreated. It is worth noting that the Qing army did not use artillery when attacking the two cities of Ning and Zhen. During the battle, the firepower was exceptional and they failed to kill the enemy.According to British records, during the Battle of Ningbo, only one British soldier was killed and several were injured, while there were no casualties in the Battle of Zhenhai. After dawn, the British ships Queen, Sisostes and the small boats attached to the warships searched along the rivers southwest and northwest of Ningbo, destroying a total of 37 fireboats. As for Qing Fang Shuiyong who was stationed in Daishan and was about to attack Dinghai, he was dispersed by the British steamer Nemesis and some small boats as early as March 8, and failed to launch the attack.Although Zheng Dingchen later led the Shui Yong to a fruitless fight in Dinghai on April 14, it was whitewashed by Yijing as a big victory. At this time, the British sea and army commanders who were in Zhoushan rushed to Ningbo after hearing the news, and the British army turned from defense to offense. On March 13, Guo Fu, Commander of the British Army, heard that the Yu Buyun Department of the Qing Army stationed in Yuyao was about to attack Ningbo, so he led 600 troops and marched towards Fenghua with the support of the ship Sisostes.However, the British army only advanced about 10 kilometers, and found that Yu Buyun's troops had fled the night before. On March 15, the commander of the British navy, Baga, and the army commander, Guo Fu, learned that Cixi was the advance base for the Qing army to launch an offensive. They led 1,203 soldiers from the sea and the army to take the ships Queen, Nemesis, Fredison and Some small boats marched towards Cixi at 8 am.At noon that day, the British army arrived, immediately occupied the county seat, and attacked the Qing army camp in Dabaoshan outside the city.Zhu Gui and other units of the Qing army who returned from Zhenhai failed in the battle, and Zhu Gui died in battle.Compared with the casualties of the Qing army, the British army only paid a small price. At this time, Wen Wei, the Minister of Counselor stationed at Changxiling, about 20 Li northwest of Cixi, heard about the battle in Cixi County and Dabaoshan, and instead of leading his troops to reinforce, he led his troops to flee that day. On March 16, the British army entered Changxi Ridge and burned the empty barracks left by Wen Wei. On March 17, the British army returned to Ningbo. Yi Jing, who was camped far away in Dongguan Town, west of Cao'e River, heard the military report from the front, and was terrified and desperately wanted to escape.Staff member Zang Yuqing tried his best to dissuade him, but Fang persisted overnight. On the evening of March 16, Wen Wei fled to Dongguan Town. When he learned of the battle situation, he ordered Wen Wei to retreat to Shaoxing, while he himself led his troops westward overnight, crossed the Qiantang River, and retreated to Hangzhou.And the reason he later stated to Emperor Daoguang was that the purpose of his trip was to check the defense of Jianshan in Haining on the north bank of the Qiantang River! For such a defeat, for such a defeat, I really don't know what to comment! When I was researching the history of the Opium War, it was the Qing historical materials that made me most difficult. What is not true (can be cross-checked with various historical materials, and can be verified by British materials), but almost all historical materials focus on upper-level activities (although many historical data authors are unaware of it), while they are not aware of what happened around them. The description of the lower level activities is too brief. Because of this, I often ask myself, can the real history be written just based on the activities of the top? But one day, when I was looking up materials in the First Historical Archives of China, I was excited by two memorials written by Yu Shi Lu Xianji and Zhejiang Governor Liu Yunke.It took me a whole day to transcribe these two documents with a total of more than 4,000 words.It tells us the story of an official named E Yun. Eyun, formerly known as Lianbi.We don't know much about his background and experience, except that he was a criminal officer, moved from Nanjing to Hangzhou in 1837, and was a candidate for Zhili prefecture during the Opium War. At the beginning of 1841, E Yun went to Zhenhai and asked to take effect.Yuqian, the imperial envoy, knew that he was not careful, and was afraid that he would make trouble if he stayed, so he gave him a generous gift and ordered him to go.Liu Yunke, the governor of Zhejiang who was in Zhenhai at that time, thought that he used to be a colleague of the Criminal Ministry and was in a poor situation, so he also gave 30 taels of money.After E Yun left Zhenhai, he disappeared. At the end of 1841, Yangwei General Yijing went south and stationed in Suzhou.E Yun went to work again.Yijing's entourage and infantry commander's seventh-rank pen post style Lianfang is his cousin.Relying on Lianfang's introduction, E Yun also claimed to be able to seduce traitors. As an internal agent, Yijing sent him to handle affairs. He traveled between Jiangsu and Zhejiang many times. He once went to Hangzhou to meet Liu Yunke and talked about his relationship with Lianfang. It is said that he is also related to Yijing.Seeing that it was irregular, Liu Yunke took precautions. After E Yun was dispatched by Ziyue Yijing, he moved his family to Shaoxing.Lu Xianji, the censor, said that he "deceived and deceived, and did nothing wrong." Liu Yunke, the governor of Zhejiang, said that Zhejiang officials knew his nature, but because he was an official sent by Yijing, he "had to deal with it as usual."The former should be hearsay with insufficient evidence; the latter obviously intends to protect local officials in Zhejiang.However, E Yun's misdeeds in the counterattack in eastern Zhejiang were finally revealed. According to E Yun's self-proclaimed: He was ordered by the Yijing to recruit 500 township braves and 5 leaders in Houshanbo, Cixi County. From January 9th to April 19th, 1842, a total of rations and equipment were provided. , ship price, etc. totaled 16,956 thousand yuan, and hired 53 Liang Yong. From February 12 to April 19, the ration was 1098.8 thousand yuan; after Yijing ordered Yong to be dismissed, he hired Liang Yong with the approval of Yijing. There were 17 Fujian Tongan ships, 348 people including Shui Yong, and from April 19 to October 3, the ship price and rations totaled more than 12,000 taels of silver.The above totaled more than 12,000 taels of silver and 18,054.8 thousand Wen of money. According to the accounts of each grain station: Eyun later hired 500 brave men in the mountain park, and paid 2,860 thousand Wen and 4,585 taels of silver at Caojiang Liangtai; in the name of continuing to employ 113 of them, they paid at Shaoxing Liangtai Silver 4374 taels.The above totaled 9124 taels of silver and 2860 thousand Wen of money. Comparing the two accounts of income and expenditure, E Yun received 2876 taels of silver, 15194.8 thousand Wen, in addition to the money received.For this amount of money, E Yun claimed that in addition to persuading the donation, he donated 12,000 thousand Wen, "please reward me"! Candidate officials who live in poverty donate so much money all at once, and where it comes from is obviously very doubtful. According to Liu Yunke's investigation: after the fall of Ningbo, the local gentry in Houshanbo, Cixi County hired brave men to defend the village.E Yun went there, claiming to be transferred to Caojiang, to be used by the camp, and to pay each brave 1,500 Wen for set money, disk fees, equipment, etc., and each brave agreed. On February 8, 1842, E Yun led the brave to set off from Houshanbo, and arrived at Cao'e on February 11.At the time of departure, only 500 Wen was given to each brave man, and 300 Wen was given for rations starting on February 12. On March 7th, 50 Eyun Boyongs were ambushed outside Zhenhai City; 150 Boyongs were handed over to Shaojiadu in Xixiang, Ningbo, who had passed through Pu Yisun in Sichuan Province; 50 Boyongs were Zhang Yingyun, the magistrate of Sizhou 50 self-retained guards were stationed at Qingdao Temple outside the east gate of Cixi; the remaining 200 were ordered to lead the leader Huang Desheng to take part in the battle against the west gate of Ningbo on March 10.After the failure of the counterattack in eastern Zhejiang, all the brave men fled one after another. By April 1, they were all ordered to evacuate. From this point of view, E Yun's method is very clear.We assume that the 500 Houshan Boyongs are all in full, that E Yun can distribute the ration money as scheduled without any deductions, and assume that none of the braves fled after the failure of the counterattack in eastern Zhejiang (these would be miracles at the time); Then, the fixed money and ration money that E Yun actually spent totaled 7,450 thousand Wen.Comparing this amount with the amount of money he received in Liangliangtai in Caojiang and Shaoxing, and taking the parity rate of 1,600 Wen to 1 tael of silver at that time as the rate, E Yun made a total of 5,631 taels of military expenses by over-reporting the date and falsely reporting Liu Yong! Due to the lack of information, we still don't know what methods E Yun used on Tongan Chuan and Yongshang, but we can be sure that he will only pick up money from inside and not outside. However, things are not over yet.E Yun claimed to donate 12,000 thousand Wen through hiring Yong.According to the "Regulations for the Discussion and Discussion of Maritime Donations" issued by the Ministry of Households and the Ministry of Officials in November 1841: civilians donate 12,000 taels of silver and are given the title of Taoist; The amount of the donation is discussed; the excess of the donation is recorded as 500 taels plus a first-level record; the candidate Zhili prefect donates 8,000 taels of silver, which will be used by the class as soon as possible... etc. According to the regulations, 1,000 Wen was paid at the time of donation According to the practice of calculating 1 tael of silver, with his donation of 12,000,000 Wen, if he wants an official title, he can get the "taoist title plus a four-level record".It can be seen from this that E Yun has not only made a fortune, but also can be promoted or get real vacancies! The Opium War was an unprecedented disaster for the Qing Dynasty, but it was a rare opportunity for E Yun. Moreover, it is worth noting that the more people like E Yun, the more they sing the tune higher than anyone else. He speaks better than anyone else. E Yun is a small person, he can be so corrupt and perverting the law by relying on his cousin who is a seventh-rank pen post.Although we cannot infer from the case of E Yun that this was the case for all officials in the Qing Dynasty, at that time, it seemed that it was not a secret to use hired bravery to make money for the country.Numerous private records have documented this.In accordance with the rules of the Qing Dynasty at that time, the manufacture of military weapons, the construction of fortifications, the deployment of defense soldiers, etc., all related to money, could be eroded from it. And E Yun was exposed, and it was purely accidental.Censor Lv Xianji only heard and reported, and Emperor Daoguang ordered Jiangsu and Zhejiang officials to investigate.It happened that Liu Yunke, governor of Zhejiang Province, had a gap with General Yangwei Yijing, so he took this opportunity to pursue the matter and play it truthfully.If Liu and Yi reconcile, with the bad habits of officials and officials protecting each other at that time, it is very likely that there will be an ending of "no factual evidence".After Emperor Daoguang received Liu Yunke's memorial, he ordered the governor of Liangjiang to investigate again. I didn't find the corresponding materials, so I don't know what happened to E Yun later. Yijing's main force in the counterattack in eastern Zhejiang was hired bravery.From the example of the 500 Houshan Boyongs employed by E Yun, we have already seen that these hired warriors have neither undergone strict training, nor are they organized in line with the principles of modern warfare; The ration money came, and he was sent to the battlefield only 20 days after arriving at the barracks.How can such a hired brave have combat effectiveness?How could he not get cold feet?Conversely, it can be imagined that if they didn't escape, wouldn't they die in vain?Such a sacrifice is of no benefit to the country or the nation, but it is an irreparable and unbearable disaster for themselves and their families.In this regard, how is E Yun and others driving untrained hired braves to the front line different from killing people? After I finished copying the two memorials of Lu Xianji and Liu Yunke, I sat in the spacious reading room of the archives and stared blankly at the two documents.I speculate on the thoughts of E Yun and those hired braves who don't know their names, and think about the relationship between government officials and the fate of the country. All kinds of associations are unstoppable and come one after another.It was dark, the lights were on, and people were leaving.I just realized that I have been sitting for a long, long time, and I have thought a lot, a lot...