Chapter 4 Reasons for the Formation of Sanqi's Traitorous Theory

This book is not written for Qi Shan to reverse the case.I don't like Qi Shan either.What's more, the work of reversing the case was done by Professor Jiang Tingfu as early as the 1930s.I also disagree with Mr. Jiang's basic point of portraying Qishan as a diplomat who is "far ahead of his time".In my opinion, Qishan was just an ignorant official in the "Chinese Empire" in dealing with Sino-British relations during the Opium War, and he was not shrewd at all.The purpose of writing such a large number of words defending Qishan is not to defend Qishan itself, but to think about these issues prominently:

Why is Qi Shan called a traitor? How did this statement come about? What are the pros and cons of this statement? In my opinion, when reviewing the research on the history of the Opium Wars in the past, these issues are very important and should not and cannot be avoided.This book serves as an introduction and reflects my own thinking process. The criticism against Qi Shan actually started a long time ago. Examining the Chinese sources of the Opium War, accusations against Qi Shan abound even during the war.Most of this kind of criticism can be classified as the third and fourth crimes we have already mentioned.The first batch of Chinese writings appeared after the war. Among them, the most representative of the thoughts of the people (especially the scholar-bureaucrats) at that time, and also influenced the people of the present, are "Daoguang Yang Ship Zheng Fu Ji", "Yi Fu Wen Ji" and " Chronicle of China and the West".Without exception, these works took a critical attitude towards Qi Shan, portraying him as a "treacherous minister" of the Qing Dynasty.

Why is this? From a utilitarian point of view, this statement is first of all beneficial to Emperor Daoguang. In a society where imperial power is supreme, the Son of Heaven is said to be the most holy and bright, who does not allow and "should" make any mistakes.Although the emperor held almost unlimited power, he should bear varying degrees of responsibility for all events; however, people at that time could only criticize politics at the ministerial level.As a result, the "traitorous minister model" in traditional Chinese historiography and philosophy was born: "traitorous ministers" deceived the monarch, abused their powers, formed cliques for personal gain, and acted arbitrarily and evilly, resulting in the decline of the country's fortunes;This type of model prevented the emperor from directly taking responsibility for bad things. At most, he employed people who were careless and ignored, and let "treacherous officials" take responsibility and act as scapegoats.If this is not the case, the emperor will be directly criticized.This violates the Confucian "rituals", which scholars and students will not and will not do.

From this, we can get an explanation. Although the decision to "compromise" was made by Emperor Daoguang, the responsibility for the failure of "compromise" should be borne by Qi Shan, the executor.On the contrary, if the "compromise" strategy wins, it should be attributed to the "Holy Judgment", and Qi Shan, as the executor, will not have much honor.In fact, some historical writers and writers at that time had already dabbled in the "compromise" decision-making process, and alluded to the chief military minister Mu Zhang'a should be responsible, but no one dared to point the finger at Emperor Daoguang.

If we attribute this phenomenon of only opposing treacherous officials but not the emperor to the cultural despotism at that time, then we would underestimate the social function and force of the ideologically dominant Confucianism.It can be said that under the circumstances at that time, the reason why the vast majority of bureaucrats and scholars only criticized Qi Shan but not Emperor Daoguang was not out of ideological repression, but precisely out of ideological self-consciousness. According to the "traitor model", we can also infer that if Emperor Daoguang continues to reuse Lin Zexu, and if Lin Zexu is not immune to failure in the end, then Emperor Daoguang will never bear the responsibility for this failure, but only Lin Zexu Swallow this bitter fruit alone.It is very likely that Lin Zexu would be denounced as a "traitor" at that time, and it is very likely that Lin Zexu will not have the image of Lin Zexu today.

According to Confucianism, according to the system of the Celestial Dynasty, according to the concept of "Yi Xia", and according to the psychology of the people at that time, the only correct way to deal with those unruly "barbarians" is to have a "big soldier attack" and kill them all. "Pianfan does not return".However, the fact is that it is just the opposite, just like a joke. In this war, the dignified dynasty unexpectedly suffered a disastrous defeat, and the mere island barbarians succeeded in their ambitions.This is a difficult problem that puzzled the writers and writers of historical materials at that time.However, none of them can look at the problem from the perspective of the general trend of the world and Chinese society itself, so it is impossible to see that the crux of the problem lies in the cultural relics system of the Celestial Dynasty that they like to talk about.For the failure that has become a fact, they refuse to admit defeat with their mouths and hearts.

Since "suppressing barbarians" is the only correct way, they logically deduce that the reason for the failure of the war lies in the ineffectiveness of "suppressing barbarians".The reason for the ineffectiveness of "suppressing barbarians" was further deduced to be due to the sabotage of "treacherous ministers".It is obviously not enough for Qishan to be a "treacherous minister", so there are Yilibu and Yu Buyun in Zhejiang, Niu Jian and Qiying in Jiangsu... In the writings of these historical authors and writers, a group of "treacherous ministers" appeared, large and small. ", the failure of every battle is the result of "treacherous ministers".The diametrically opposed to treacherous ministers are loyal ministers who serve the country loyally.Ever since, they used their pens to pin the hope of victory on Lin Zexu, Guan Tianpei, Yuqian, Chen Huacheng and other people who advocated or practiced resistance.Their conclusion is: As long as Lin Zexu is reused, China may win. If the coastal officials are all the same as Lin Zexu, and if the military, government and auxiliary are all the same, China will surely win.

It is one of the most evergreen and common theorems in classical Chinese political science to use loyal ministers and reject treacherous ministers.In these historical materials and writings, treacherous ministers are destroyers of traditional Chinese political norms—even making peace with “barbarians”; loyal ministers are defenders of traditional Chinese political norms—resolutely and uncompromisingly “suppress barbarians.”The standards here are very clear. By the way, the reason why Lin Zexu was applauded at that time was not because of his skill in "knowing barbarians" or "teaching barbarians". Most people at the time were not clear about these contents that were not appreciated at that time, and Lin Zexu himself did not promote them.He was supported by everyone because he showed that he could not share the sky with the "Niyi".

It cannot be said that using the theory of loyalty and treachery to explain the Opium War is completely useless, because, to a certain extent, it also summarizes or reflects the historical reality that some officials died heroically and some officials were greedy for life and afraid of death.However, this theory does have its fatal flaws: The direct conclusion that can be drawn from the theory of loyalty and treachery is that if China wants to win the war, it only needs to remove Qi Shan and his party and reuse Lin Zexu and his comrades, without touching China's status quo.That is to say, it only needs to change a few people, and there is no need for reform.

The final conclusion that can be drawn from the theory of loyalty and treachery is that in order to make loyal ministers succeed and avoid treacherous ministers, it is necessary to strengthen China's discipline and ethics and strengthen Chinese traditions.In other words, what the Opium War exposed was not the disadvantages of the "Celestial Dynasty" or the backwardness of China; This is done.Therefore, China's task at this time is not to reform the old system, but to strengthen the old system. From this, another explanation can be obtained. Those historical writers and writers who have no way to find out the real reason for China's failure just let the "treacherous ministers" bear the responsibility that should have been borne by the old Chinese system, so as to protect the emperor. In this way, the status of China's sexuality, famous religion and cultural relics system has been preserved.Here, Qishan is not only a scapegoat for Emperor Daoguang, but also a scapegoat for the old Chinese orthodoxy.

What needs to be explained is that the theory of loyalty and traitors and the "treacherous minister model" are not unique phenomena in the history of the Opium War, but are common methods in traditional Chinese historiography.It is precisely because of its special function of protecting the monarch and the orthodoxy, that it is often used by bureaucrats and scholars to explain historical phenomena that they cannot or are unwilling to explain.This theory and model, after their long-term missions, has become the most familiar and most acceptable method of historical analysis for ordinary people, and it still has its influence today.It is on such a basis that Qishan's image of a "treacherous minister" quickly gained public recognition. To sum up, I think that the historical materials during the Opium War and the early works after the Opium War describe the image of Qi Shan as a "treacherous official", no matter how historically true it is, due to its theoretical limitations, it cannot be compared in general. is still wrong. Confucius wrote "Spring and Autumn" as a warning to the world, using Zhou rituals as the standard, and establishing the principles of "good and good" and "evil and evil".This concept, which is generally recognized and accepted by traditional Chinese historians, is also widely used by them in various works to regulate people's thoughts and behaviors in real life. "Good and good" and "evil and evil" are the traditional norms of Chinese historiography.It adheres to historical records, but focuses on reality. Starting from the concept of "Yi Xia", "suppressing barbarians" is the proper meaning for the rampage of "against barbarians".Starting from modern nationalism, resistance to foreign aggression is the right thing to do.This established roughly the same standard for evaluating right and wrong for different types of historians who studied the Opium War in different periods. "Suppression of barbarians" and resistance are correct, and all actions that are different or opposite to this are wrong. After the Opium War, the military aggression against China by the foreign powers did not stop, and the Second Opium War, the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese Sino-Japanese War of Sino-Japanese War of 1898-1895, and the Eight-Power Allied Forces’ War of Aggression against China occurred one after another.The national crisis is unprecedentedly serious.By the 1930s, Japan wanted to destroy China even more.In the face of such a world, the early scholars of Shilin and the later intellectual groups, in order to warn the world, violently criticized all officials who advocated compromise and surrender in history, and all officials who advocated resistance in history, All warm praises.Obviously, the criticism of Qi Shan and others during this period was undoubtedly a warning to all those who advocated compromise and surrender at that time. Facing the situation of Japan’s frenzied invasion of China in the 1930s and 1940s, any suggestion of compromise among Chinese government officials at that time was an excuse for subsequent surrender, which would eventually lead to betrayal of the country.The typical example is Wang Jingwei, who was famous in the early days and was despised by everyone. The model of "compromise→surrender→traitor country" has many prototypes in real life during this period.Around this period, the model of "compromise" or "surrender" or "traitorous" was also widely used in the field of history.Qi Shan also changed from a "traitor" to a "traitor". The change of Qishan's role reflects the hostility of people in that era to all those who compromised or surrendered to imperialism.History pays attention to objectivity, but the subjective wishes of historians are always incorporated into historical works.Among them, some people are unconsciously expressed in historical works because of their hatred of imperialism and contempt for officials who compromised and surrendered in reality, while some people consciously hold up what was recognized by the historians at that time as Wrong standards of "goodness and goodness" and "evil and evil", belittling everything of Qi Shan who advocates compromise, and admiring everything of Lin Zexu and others who advocate resistance.Qi and Lin appeared at an unprecedented degree of opposition and became irreconcilable poles. As a result, a phenomenon emerged. The theory of anti-mythology and anti-ghosting in historical theory coexisted with the practice of mythology or ghostization in historical works.The "magnification of the original work" was caused unintentionally by differences in personal emotions and doctrines. Now, driven by the needs of reality, and in the application of the principles of "good and good" and "evil and evil", the original work has been artificially enlarged to the greatest extent possible. to zoom in.They used passionate words to warn people that compromise is the most despicable thing.This kind of historical works and articles written to warn the world have gone beyond the scope of historical research and become a kind of propaganda. In November 1931, two months after the "September 18th Incident", when the situation in Northeast China was tense, Mr. Jiang Tingfu published an article "Qi Shan and the Opium War" in the "Journal of Tsinghua University", praising the compromise Qi Shan diplomacy , Belittling Lin Zexu's reckless actions, this cannot but arouse strong and lasting rebounds from many Chinese intellectuals, including historians.In connection with the speeches of the "low-key club" of some intellectuals during this period, Mr. Jiang's thesis was also regarded by some as the propaganda of another proposition. Advocacy is not the same as research. The purpose of the propaganda at that time was to inspire the people to devote themselves to the national cause of resisting Japanese imperialist aggression without hesitation.Historical figures and events are just props in the hands of propagandists, and there is no need to study them in detail.Enough researchers have said enough about the nature and purpose of the research that any reader can appreciate the difference. The case of historiography is somewhat peculiar.It already has the function of propaganda.Since Confucius wrote "Spring and Autumn", the propaganda function of traditional Chinese historiography has been especially valued by people. The long-term existence of the principles of "good and good" and "evil and evil" is to a large extent adapted to the needs of propaganda.For a long time, Chinese historians often confuse themselves with propagandists, or are keen to serve propagandists, so there are sayings such as "spending big money", "using the past to satirize the present", "innuendo historiography" and so on.Although propaganda is only one of the social functions of historiography, and it is not the most important one, in the face of unprecedented national crisis, historians unconsciously or consciously play the role of propagandists. very easy to understand. We should not deny the legitimacy and rationality of this kind of propaganda today, but looking back, we can see with regret that although the study of the Opium War during this period has made progress in terms of the international situation and the internal situation of Britain, However, the confrontation between Qi Shan and Lin Zexu is still used as the main line of the narrative, but the "treacherous minister" and "loyal minister" are changed to "traitor" and "patriotism" respectively; , "resistance", and so on. The "treacherous minister model" and the role of propagandists illustrate the past history of the Opium War, and many issues, including Qishan, still need to be verified, analyzed, and evaluated.However, various situations in recent decades have restricted the conditions and atmosphere of research in many ways. Until today, most of the major works and treatises on the history of the Opium War we have seen, as well as the narrations in many modern Chinese history works, seem to have inherited the basic arguments of the past.The critical work has just begun, but I have stopped unconsciously.A large number of papers and works seem to have only perfected the original conclusions and marked the times.In some works, it seems that the line of patriotic resistance represented by Lin Zexu and the line of traitorous surrender represented by Qi Shan are in conflict with each other.And on other occasions, people seem to be competing on the level of praise or the intensity of denigration, to see who is praised highly and who is scolded severely. After the Opium War, especially in recent decades, the situation in China has undergone tremendous changes, which has enabled historians to have a deeper understanding of the essence of the Qing Dynasty and the entire modern Chinese history.However, this new understanding does not seem to have changed the old conclusions of the history of the Opium Wars, but instead mixed them together.This resulted in the contradictory phenomenon of the basic views of the current Opium War: Putting together such disharmonious arguments, it reflects the deep consciousness of historians—the spirit of not admitting defeat, always thinking that China was not irretrievably defeated at that time, and still had hope of winning.This discordant argument is put together, and it is the historian who brings resentment and hope together in his heart. The historian's spirit of not admitting defeat, in essence, is still a love for the motherland that has been plagued by disasters.