Chapter 8 6 buy short sell short

I'm making my own strides in the current conditions. warren.Buffett, Letter to Partners, October 1967 Graham's generation retired, taking with it the brutal memory of the Great Depression.Wall Street is aware of the rise of a younger generation, many of whom hadn't been born in 1929, and are tired of the endless reminiscences of their predecessors.What's more, they have no memory of the frenzied years that preceded the Crash.For them, there is nothing wrong with speculation. The bullish stock market of the 1960s was as new to them as first love, and even the stocks they traded were new—electronic offerings, giant conglomerates, small growth stocks.All of this requires a kind of loyalty, and it seems that loyalty is enough at this point, and stocks are going up.

When Buffett's fund was small, these didn't bother him at all, but as his capital expanded, Buffett gradually became uneasy.The conflict between having more cash to invest and fewer deals to do got him into trouble.He complained a lot about the situation where he had to come up with new ideas under pressure and gradually stretched the strings too tightly.Indeed, his letters in the late 1960s read like a chronicle turned upside down.While Wall Street has become more euphoric, Buffett has become more skeptical. In early 1966, he took the fateful step of closing the partner's business and turning it into a new account:

There's only one way this initiative will work, and that's if it's used nationwide.And I also reminded Susie that if we had more kids, it would be up to her to find some other partners for them. At the same time that Buffett was closing his valves, Wall Street was flooding, and the Vietnam War was driving the stock market to an all-time high.While young people were parading through the streets, their parents, seeing the expanding effects of the war, lined up at the Stock Exchange.Mutual funds have sprung up, and the Dow.The Jones Industrial Average crossed the 1,000 mark for the first time.It hit the psychological mark three other times, but closed at the magic number each time.

By the spring of 1966, however, the market had plunged into dizzying abyss (new money was panicked), and investors gradually turned their attention to short-term investments. Some of Buffett's partners called him to warn him that the market was headed higher.For these calls, Buffett dismissed them one by one. He raised two questions: ① If they knew in February that they would be in May.The Jones was going to be at 865, so why didn't they let me get in the market then? ②If they don't know what will happen in the next three months from February, how can they know what will happen in May?

Undoubtedly, such proposals from partners are only convincing when the future is clear. For some reason, commentators of the market tend to have a peculiar blind spot, and they habitually assume that once the "uncertainty" of the current moment is indicated, they will have a certain clarity about the future period until the judgment. the opinion of.In fact, even if they cannot predict the current uncertainty ① Buffett is also constrained by the federal securities laws, which stipulate that partnerships can only have 99 partners.According to his lawyer Dan.Mona said the investment

His number of people was well over 99, but not over the 99 "partner cap"—his solution was to count a large number of investors as individual small entities. "It's in line with the letter of the law," Mona said. "I don't know what the letter really means." Nor does it in any way affect their conclusion that there will be no new dark clouds hanging over the future outlook. Let me say it again: the future is never clear to me. (If it seems obvious to you in the next few months, give us a call — or, for that matter, the next few hours as well.) Buffett tries to avoid making predictions about the stock market, and he never buys or sells stocks based on people's opinions.He prefers to try to analyze the long-term business prospects of individual companies, thanks to all his biases in logical reasoning.One can "predict" the trend of the stock market, just as one can predict where a bird will fly from when it leaves a treetop, but that is guesswork rather than analysis.If he had ever sold stocks "just because some astrologer thought the price tag might be too low," he warned, they would all be in trouble.

road.The Jones Index did start to move lower and only reached around 700.But the broader market is frothing.Twice, just as Buffett was about to start buying stocks he thought were hot, competitors snatched them up. (Like most professionals, Buffett builds up his position in the market gradually so as not to cause the price to rise when he buys it himself.) One kind of stock is out of his defined range, while another is picked up by others. .But that didn't make him crazy. In this situation, Buffett keeps his secrets, sometimes to the point of paranoia. His brokers understand that Buffett's stock picks should never be discussed under any circumstances, not even in the office.According to one of his bridge friends in Omaha, Kay.Buffett even believes the nearby Blackstone Hotel tapped his Kaiwitt Square office through telescopic magnification technology, Kettle said.Kettle added that Buffett hired a security firm to check, but they found nothing.

The real problem wasn't that people were stealing his stock but that he couldn't find enough stock that met his criteria.And also because Graham's disciples are so numerous that they are yanking fruit from the tree with the help of computers. By early 1967, Buffett felt compelled to remind his partners that some new mutual funds had recently outperformed his performance.Plus, he warned that his source of inspiration had become "bits and bits" despite his frantic efforts to maintain it day and night.His tone was ominous, and if his wellspring of inspiration "dries up completely, you will have honest and prompt notice from me so we can take other steps".

It is worth noting that these dire predictions by Buffett are in direct proportion to the dizzying frenzy in the halls of Wall Street.For many money holders, these are scrambling years. Electronics stocks blew up like a hurricane, and every new issue was treated like a second Sirlox.Could it be that an expert in electronics has suddenly risen on Wall Street?If anyone asks such a question, he has misread the era.Wall Street is superstitious about electronics.Even a toad like the American Music Guide has become a king by calling itself the Sound of the Universe Electronics. Immediately after the rush to high technology, under the impetus of huge enterprise groups, such as International Telephone and Telegraph Company, Litton Industries Group (Litton Lrddustries), Leitwei Company (Ling-Temco-Vought), etc., set off a wave of wave of mergers.The public distrusted bureaucracy in that self-assured age and taught these giant organizations the secrets of competition (such as technology).

Then there was a sudden intrusion into the market of "letter shares," unregistered shares, often issued by companies with a lot of uncertainty.Therefore, the price is also very strange.Every fashion has its ebb and flow. When a fashion fades, a new trend takes its place.then During the 1960s, Wall Street entered a more poignant era of speculation. The rudimentary form of the speculative age originated from the "performance fund", which is a replica of the traditional mutual fund.This new type of fund does not seek to outperform the market over the long term, but rather over successive quarters, months, weeks, and even hours.Performance funds are usually run by bearded thugs who want to make money as quickly as possible.They frequently switch from one stock to another, rushing to the hottest stocks, like an actor rushing to one house after another to keep the applause alive.Simply put, their goal is to catch currency swings.Lard.Chay, the manager of the Manhattan Fund, is the prime example of this group.Allegedly, the slightest hint of Chaye's involvement in a certain stock was enough to cause a small panic.That's because the gang simply didn't want to stick with Howard.Buffett-style independence.He is just a young, empty-handed and moneyless contemporary figure.

What kind of young man was he?He came from a prosperous middle-income family and graduated from an excellent business school; he was not thirty years old, or younger; There is a kind of self-confidence, a kind of erudition, almost close to a kind of arrogance.He can blurt out the latest clichés, words like "performance," "concept," "innovation" and "synergy," and he talks fast and works hard. Speculation is on Fred.It was epitomized in Carl, who guided the public and became the head of a corporate fund.In 1967, his profit reached 116%, far exceeding Buffett's performance in any one year.Carr invested in tiny, so-called boomerang companies as well as piles of unregistered letter stocks.He was revered by the news media as the epitome of "ruthless and decisive".A poster child for the rising generation, Carl installed a telephone in his Beverly Hills bathroom and drove to work in a Jaguar.His office is decorated in op art.His strategy was simple: "We don't fall in love with anything. When we wake up in the morning, everything is for sale—every stock in our portfolio down to my clothes and my tie." In nominal terms, those who buy and sell short are getting richer.If stocks in general are going up, why not simply make a buy?This question haunts Buffett from time to time.In his diary he recorded his reactions, both from his own interests and those of his partners. "The 'investment fad' of today," he writes, Not entirely to my intellect (perhaps this is my bias), and most certainly not to my liking. I'm not going to invest my money in this way, so I'm sure I won't be doing it with your money. According to his son Porter, Buffett put himself and Glenn together.Compared to Miller's story, it's a Hollywood ballad about a bandleader trying to find his "own" voice. For Buffett, the so-called correct voice is not just about making money, but pure reasoning.Owning a right in a stock has the same effect as making a good move in a game of chess.Neither Glenn.Or Miller, or Bobby.Whether it's Fitter or not, Buffett just doesn't want to get out of his own world. If some technology that I don't understand is critical to an investment decision, let's not get into the deal.I don't know more about semiconductors and integrated circuits than I do about the mating habits of certain animals. It seems that the more blinding the speculative success, the more eager Buffett is to put it on the brakes.In fact, he plastered the walls with newspaper clippings about the 1929 crisis as a reminder.He has no Op Art decor, nothing of Beverly Hills flair—just a pile of lone Moody books neatly arranged on the radiator, and a few photographs, and his office is very Like the office of a more successful dentist.The reception area is hung with Franklin's motto "The Fool and His Money Are Quickly Spent" and a photograph of Wall Street from 1830.There's nothing like Fred here.Buffett doesn't even have a stock ticker for activities like Carl's. (The market boards quote stock prices every minute, and nearly every professional investor has a computer device or its equivalent and checks them off 24/7.) Buffett's portfolio seems to date back to when he started doing news briefings.In 1966 and 1967, the partnership purchased a pair of retail stores, Hochschild & Cohen & Co., a department store in Baltimore, and the other, United Cotton Stores, for about $15 million. A chain of clothing stores.In each case, Buffett bought not liquid amounts of shares but entire businesses.Among fund managers, this is unheard of.Buffett often bought stocks with the idea of ​​long-term holdings, but he was locked in by Hochschild Store and United Cotton Store.There's no way he'd pick up the mic and be like selling Fred.Carl's tie will sell it.Plus, the notion that inner-city retailing is outdated is a gross understatement.Both plants are cheap, and Buffett thinks he can make a lot of money as an operator. He has some understanding of the retail industry, but only from a single point of view of finance. When he posed an inquiry about United Cotton Stores, his sweeping knowledge of the business world overwhelmed the store's 63-year-old owner, Benjamin.Rosner was taken aback.But when Rosner offered to show him the store, Buffett declined, explaining that he wouldn't understand what he was looking at.He just wanted Rosner to read him the last five years of balance sheets over the phone.The next day, Buffett telegraphed back a price.When Rosner accepted, Buffett took Charlie with him.Munger came to New York to sign the deal. The United Cotton Stores can be described as shabby.Its stores are located near the decaying inner city, and Rosner, whose architect is also planning to retire.Buffett felt the need for a Sancho again.Panza-like characters.Buffett asked Rosner sternly if he could stay on for another six months to help him make the move.Privately, Buffett told Munger: "One thing we don't have to worry about is this guy is not going to stop." Rosner, a descendant of Austrian-Hungarian immigrants who opened a Chicago clothing store in 1931, is a typical self-made man, with a $3,200 share of a $44 million-a-year business.Like other self-improvement men, he is a slave to his work and a dictator of his employees.His work ethic, clinging to every penny, reminds Buffett of his grandfather, the former king of the Buffett & Sons grocery store.Rosner (who Buffett likes to tell about) once counted the number of sheets on a roll of toilet paper to avoid being scammed -- he's definitely a Buffett kind of guy.He flattered Rosner, and although he asked Rosner for his monthly financial statements, he never got involved in Rosner's stores and affairs.As Buffett had predicted, Rosner quickly found himself in no rush to retire and began to squeeze new profits out of the failing business. Baltimore retailer Hochschild couldn't do the same easily salvaged, not only because the main store was already dilapidated (one side of the store was only accessible via a stairwell), it required ① Rosner stayed in the job for 20 years.When leaving office, he said to Buffett: "I'll tell you why it survives, it's because you forgot You bought the business and I forgot I sold it. " Adding capital from time to time to maintain market share, and downtown Baltimore is pretty run down.Cheap or not, Buffett quickly realized how stupid he was. Another long-term "deal," that of Berkshire, a textile manufacturer.Hathaway also has many problems.The ready-to-wear industry is in a bad mood.Just like Saul.As Paso had warned.In midsummer 1967, Buffett solemnly informed his partners that there was no sign that Berkshire's situation could improve. Meanwhile, Wall Street is brimming with unprecedented joy.Not only was it profitable but it was - for the first time since the 60s - interestingly high volume.Just imagine that when Buffett first started his business in the 1950s, the turnover on the New York Stock Exchange was 2 million shares a day. By 1967, it had reached 10 million shares.The happy elf was captured in the palm of Hoffman's hand.He visited the exchange that summer and threw handfuls of dollars down the hallway as the clerks on the ground floor scurried around grabbing the loot. On the west coast, Clary.Bell's customers all stood in front of the market machine and cheered and shouted "up, up, up", said.The Jones Index is back around 900. It seems that at this moment, Congress convened another hearing, what else could it be?In August, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) economist Paul.Samuelson is like Ben ten years ago.Graham also appeared before the parliamentary banking committee.This time the topic is about the proliferation of mutual funds.Samuelson provides evidence that 50,000 mutual fund salespeople -- one for every seven investors -- are scouring the country.Most are clearly incapable of anything, yet rely on the high wages that abound in industry.It's not uncommon for mutual funds to charge investors an 8.5% upfront sales surcharge.That's not enough to cover management expenses for the year, just enough to cover marketing expenses and keep the salespeople in shoes (Buffett, by contrast, only takes a share of profits, but no prepaid and non-management cost).According to Samuelson: Only 91.5 cents of every dollar I put out earned me profit and capital appreciation, and 9.5% of that amount was lost in selling expenses. A by-product of the mutual fund boom has been the rise of official-class investors.For the first time, professional investors -- mutual funds, pension funds, etc. -- wield more influence in the market than retail investors.Buffett's view is that professional investors are just as speculative as amateurs.He saw that the fact that the pros kept their cool heads and the amateurs fell prey to impulse was reversed.An astute observer noted: One might suppose that competition among investment professionals, with judgment and learning lacking in the average private investor, would correct the whims of some ignorant individuals.But the real situation is that the energies and skills of these professional investors and speculators have been diverted in other directions.Because most of them are actually less concerned with making an excellent long-term forecast of an investment's earnable returns over its lifetime than with forecasting changes on a traditional valuation basis before the public.Their concern is not how much an investment is really worth to the investor who bought it to "keep" it, but how the market will value it in three months or a year, given a host of psychological factors. Actually in 1936, John Maynard.Keynes once described these situations.Although Keynes can certainly be considered a macroeconomist, Buffett realized from reading his works that he also had considerable insight into the market.In fact, Keynes' career path foreshadowed Buffett's in some ways.Earlier, he was working on currency, corn, cotton and He lost a lot of money while speculating in rubber. Later, he reflected on his mistakes and became an advocate of long-term and selective investment.He followed the markets dispassionately, spending an hour each morning watching them, compiling a star profile for himself and the King's accounts.His speeches as chairman at the annual meeting of the National Mutual Life Insurance Society were widely celebrated in London in the 1930s for their enormous influence on market prices. Buffett believes that Keynes's ability to look at problems so pertinently in the "speculative" era lies in his deep understanding of how the public will affect stock market prices.The stock market itself is a cluster, made up of people who follow the price at any given moment.This amorphous mass of people is revaluing every day, if not every hour.However a given corporate image - say Walter.Disney - changes are much slower.It is unlikely that public enthusiasm for all MPs will change much from Tuesday to Wednesday, and sometimes not for a month or two.Therefore, most of the fluctuations in Disney stock come from changes in how the company is perceived by the public, not from changes in the company itself. These professional investors rely only on extra-human cunning to stay one step ahead, that is, to stay one step ahead of the rapid changes in people's opinions.Keynes said: We have reached the third stage, when we have to use our ingenuity to predict what the general opinion of people wants, what the general opinion of people is. The same skepticism about public opinion can be seen in Buffett.Buffett sees the public as a potential source of some sort of pool of wisdom.The point of view that any one member of the group alone subscribes to is not a collection of each part, but a creation of behavior and feeling. Buffett uses the story of an oil prospector to illustrate this meaning.The oil prospector arrives at the gates of heaven to hear the dismayed news that the "courtyard" reserved for oil workers is full.After being granted permission to speak a few words by St. Peter, he exclaimed: "Oil has been found in Hell"—and every oilman in Paradise set off in search of the treasure of Hades.St. Peter was impressed with him and told him that there was enough room in heaven now.Buffett said: The prospector hesitated. "No," he said, "I think I'll go with the rest of these people. There may be some truth behind the rumours." Buffett is from Ben.Graham heard the story, but he didn't put it in writing until much later, and it seems apt in an age of speculation.Performance funds make a big splash on these "story" stocks.That is, a stock that embodies a simple concept (such as "Oil has been found in Hell") that is quickly digested. One such notorious example is the "National Student Deal," which was released to the public for $6 and was worth $82 within a year. The national student trade is Cortez.Wesley.The product of Randall's mind, it is formed by the aggregation of more than 30 enterprises with the purpose of serving college students.For example: books, notebooks, youth airline fees, etc.In this way, he combined the public's frenzy for corporate groups with a novel "story" - young people.Besides, Randall, the damned salesman, flattered the securities analysts, took them on tours to his castle in Virginia, and talked them on the phone from his jet.Every year, Randall predicts a triple win rate. And each time, he achieved his goal—although without some assistance from the company accountant, he could achieve this goal.Wall Street believed in him and pushed the stock price to $140. Some people can't help but think of Galbraith's comment, "It may be worth living poor for a long time for instant wealth." As for Bankers Trust Company, Morgan Trust Company and Harvard Endowment Fund also bought Randall's stock. One wonders how gullible these exemplars of the rich can be.The answer is that they are all afraid of being left behind, and the choice they face is: either buy the popular stock, after all, it is gaining value, or take the risk of temporarily falling behind.And those who are left behind cannot even add new capital for a quarter or two. For money managers in the age of investing, there are no second chances here. McGeorge in 1967.One of Bundy's comments was watershed.Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, is also an excellent representative of conservatism.Bundy gave his endowment managers strict tasks—tasks not about being too bold, but not being brave enough: Our first impression is that long-term prudence has cost our College far more than recklessness or taking undue risks. The statement stunned Wall Street.If the Ford Fund encourages people to take more risks, what kind of trust business is so timid?Moreover, Bundy, a former national security adviser and one of the architects of the Vietnam War, backed up his words with his deeds.He squandered the fund's income in the hope that he would make up for the shortfall by playing brilliantly in the markets.As he told Fortune magazine, "I may be wrong, but I never hesitate." By October 1967, months after Bundy's encyclical had become public knowledge, Buffett issued a statement of his own that seemed like an opponent of the Pope. Unlike Bundy's self-confidence, Buffett was actually very Nothing but suspicion.The partnership has 65 million assets, but where should he invest them?Good deals are a thing of the past and the game has changed. Wall Street is placing more and more bets more rapidly.Buffett told his partners that it is true that this game of giving full play to one's potential will be very profitable.In the meantime, these trendy stocks will indeed continue to rise.However, Buffett is "convinced" that he can't do these stocks well, and he doesn't want to try it. What he may do is not to prove how absurd the price is, but only to persuade others. When the game doesn't go your way anymore, only people can say that the new way is all wrong, bound to cause trouble, etc.In the past, I have had such contempt for this behavior from others, and I have seen how people are punished for evaluating conditions based on past experiences rather than current conditions.I am basically out of step with the current conditions.But I am sober on one point: I am not abandoning an old approach I understand its logic to, even though it might mean giving up easy profits for an approach I do not fully understand and have not successfully applied. practices, and methods that may result in substantial and permanent loss of capital. Some employees lied about "wolf coming" and were fired by partners who were engaged in short trades as the shocking reality lay in front of them: Buffett beat him.The Jones index's target was lowered by 10 percentage points.From now on, he will work towards a moderate goal: an annual profit of 9% or more.Jones 5 points -- any target is lower than before.The partners who had a better chance all "rationally" decided to leave him. "And you must believe that I deeply regret such a decision." At the same time, there are hints here.Buffett has more than 10 million private property, and he wants to adopt a method that is less stressful than when he was "young and thin".It is surprising that at the mature age of 31, he started to think a lot, and he wanted to pursue a non-economic activity or a business activity where money was not the only consideration. What's remarkable in this musing is that, seen in the mirror, Buffett retains that rational, almost mechanical objectivity.His unusual insight made him understand that as long as his stated goals remained the same, he would feel the pressure to keep working hard.So, like changing the equipment on a lab rat, he lowered his goals. Basic self-analysis tells me that it is impossible for me not to give my all to achieve the goals I have publicly promised to those who have entrusted their capital to me. But Buffett hasn't let his "give it all" down.No one in his family had experienced a "stress reduction method," nor did they believe he could actually do it.As young Susie recalled, it was impossible to penetrate the fog of his concentration. Not long after his letter—the day Susie got her driver's license—she went out for a drive and accidentally ran into another car, knocking her father's Lincoln out of a small pothole.Naturally, Susie was worried that it would be bad if the news reached her father.She recalled: I cried all the way upstairs, and Dad was reading the newspaper.I said, "Dad, I broke your car." He didn't even look up, and I started crying again.After about 5 seconds he said "Okay, is anyone hurt?" I said "No". I waited there and he didn't say anything or look up. This is the so-called new pressure-reducing Buffett.After a few minutes he realized he needed to say a few words about fatherhood, so he poked his head into Susie's room and said, "Remember, Sue, that guy is a fool." That was all he said.After dinner that night, Susie wanted to use the car, and he gave it to her without a word. Buffett's investment record apparently does not miss a single detail, and shortly after his letter, he reported a 30% advance in partnerships in 1967—Bi Dow.Jones gained 17 points, most of it from Amtrak, which has surged to $180 a share, and at its peak it accounted for 40% of the total portfolio.In this 13 million investment, Buffett made a profit of 20 million (he never told his partners the source of his wealth).He's also from Walter.Disney makes 50% of the profits. Perhaps because his results were so bizarre, his partners overlooked the fact that this period was indeed a rather difficult one for him. (Lots of people have written in asking if businesses have ever really gotten out of step—that's what Buffett assured them, and it definitely happened.) That's because his vision of giving up "huge, easy profits" is true, but it's not that easy to do.In fact, he made only one premise the fulcrum of his career—that his hunch was right and Mr. Market was wrong.Witnessing the success of "buying short and selling short" is undoubtedly torture for him. In early 1968, Buffett turned to Ben, at least one person he felt he could understand.He suggested: Why not gather a group of past books under the name of the master.Graham's student?Buffett invited a large group of old friends, including Bill.Ryan, Marshall.Weinberg and Tom.Mannap (and some non-Graham students, such as Charlie Munger) and so on, in San Diego Nearly together.He implored people not to bring "any Security Analysis later than the 1934 edition."It was clear from the protective tone he used in his letter that Buffett was worried that someone would try to steal the spotlight from his hero. Today, I spoke with Ben, who would love to get together with this "chosen" group on Friday, January 26th (when we interact with each other).I know some of you have a penchant for giving speeches (I feel many fingers pointing at me), and I am eager to explain that he is the bee and we are the flowers.As I looked at the address, I felt the danger of relegating the conference to a sort of Turkish rug auction.Instead of jumping at the opportunity to explain to him how many brilliant minds he has overlooked from us, we should look at it from the perspective of what we can learn from Ben. Maybe he's worried about outspoken Charlie.Munger.He found many of the things Munger taught stupid, and he kept rethinking them.In Munger's view, it's better to pay a fair price for a good business than to cut rates for a nasty one.Too many cheap businesses are so full of problems that the "deal" is not worth it at all. Buffett certainly knows this.Another passage of his is more telling, admitting not long ago that while he's still primarily a Graham-style deal hunter, "everything that has really struck me emotionally over the years has been more heavily on the quality side." Of course, he had Amtrak and Disney firmly in his mind.Still, he counts Grahamian stocks as his bread and butter: "It's safer money." His teachers remain influential. 在去加洲的路途中，这帮人中有许多在拉斯维加斯聚会，巴菲特激起了伙伴的激情。但是格雷厄姆的信徒们认为玩吃角子老虎机不利于即将组成的新联合的准备工作。如巴菲特在格雷厄姆—纽曼公司时的前任同事沃尔特。施格斯所说：“我们去了锡泽斯宫——那儿税很低，食物也很便宜。” 和格厄雷姆的会面安排在圣迭戈优雅的科罗拉多饭店里，格雷厄姆带着一种苏格拉底的架式走了进来。“你们是一群精明的年轻人。”他开始说道，“我给你们做个测试，这儿有十道辨别正误的题目。我提醒你们，它们相当难。”没有人答对半数以上的题目，除了芒格的法律合伙人罗伊。托尔斯以外——他怀疑其中有诈，于是每题都写上正确。格雷厄姆的目的是想说明一个貌似容易的游戏也可以让人绞尽脑汁——这正是对投机时代巧妙的提醒。 汤姆的合伙人，埃德。爱德森说：“我们喜欢和本呆在一起。”但是这次会面高潮突降。格雷厄姆生病了，于是提前离开，而且也丧失了扮演“蜜蜂”这一角色的乐趣。于是这个集会实际上成了巴菲特集团核心的聚会。 他的朋友们都很聪明，很有野心，但是心胸狭小。Henry.布兰特是个天生忧心忡忡的人，但同时也是一个工作狂。他总是在行囊里装上阅读材料，然后在比奇。波因特俱乐部四处散步。傲慢自大的戴维“桑迪”戈茨曼经营着曼哈顿的首家投资咨询公司。他唯一感兴趣的是他自己和其他人的财务状况。 （举个典型的例子，在哈佛商学院吃晚饭时，戈茨曼便转向一个他刚刚认识的妇女问：“你有钱吗？”） 马歇尔。温伯格是一个外向型的胖胖的单身汉。他是一个美学家——只对他的金字塔和鲁宾斯坦感兴趣。还有两个折衷派人士埃德。安德森（将货币经理转换为行为心理学的化学家），以及查理。芒格，但是他们都有一共同之处，那就是对华尔街的喜爱。他们都对投资有强烈的好奇心，却很少面对面地和格雷厄姆一起谈西班牙文学或是古希腊文。 在圣迭戈，这些信徒花了两天时间来交流他们对市场的同样严峻的看 Law. “我们都对缺少机会而深表遗憾。”安德森说。巴菲特怂恿杰克。亚历山大，他在哥伦比亚的同学谈谈他的主意，但他却对自己的观点守口如瓶。 让人怀疑的是，在离开圣迭戈时，他对股市的看法是否真的有了任何改善。 事实上，巴菲特逐渐开始觉得管理证券组合有如一场激烈的竞争。某人叼着一个雪茄烟头吞云吐雾一番后就将它扔掉，转瞬而逝的质量并不令人满意。但是从自己长期投资的与伯克希尔和联合棉花公司类似的控股公司中，以及从和他们经理如霍雷肖。阿尔杰，本。罗斯纳的共事中，的确要承认，这样的公司很难都达到美国捷运公司那种令人兴奋的利润额。but: 当我和自己喜欢的人打交道时，我在生意中找到了一种激动人心的感觉，（又有哪种生意不是这样的呢？）用投入的资金实现可观的回报（比如10～12％）。通过在一种格局和另一种格局之间来回奔波来挣得多点的百分比收益，似乎是一种很愚蠢的作法。 提这样一个合理的问题：如果不能产生“多点的百分点”的话，合伙人们又怎么会对它如此着迷呢？严格地从投资回报的角度来看，弗雷德。卡尔的举动似乎更有意义。“我们不会爱上任何东西。”然而巴菲特，虽然是沉醉于他的投资当中，似乎有一些不同于数学的东西——一种对持续性的渴求——隐藏在它的背后。他喜爱奥马哈，喜欢本。格雷厄姆，还有他的朋友们。 他的一生充满了对持续性的渴望。他最大的恐惧就是由死亡引起的极端不连续性。书信也有一种不持续性。和他曾经百思不得其解的其他哲学的困惑一样，他无法确定自己该在什么位置来划分这条线——即什么时候该持有所喜爱的企业，而在什么时候实现利润。在华尔街上再没有其他人曾经考虑过这样的问题。 1968年，国家陷于一场政治的动荡中，而股票的交易却达到了疯狂的地步。“大屏幕”的一日平均成交量走到了1300万股，比1967年的纪录还要多30％。在1968年6月13日那天，成交量暴增到2100万股。行情机飞快地发出哐哐的声音，似乎随着每一次反战游行者和荷枪实弹的士兵的交锋，它显得越来越响亮，就好像逐渐升高的政治温度在华尔街引起了高烧。 在那个充满着暴力和对暗杀的震惊的动荡不安的夏天，股票交易所被大量的买卖单据忙得喘不过气来，这在它的历史上是破天荒第一次。而且如此这般持续了许多天。人们可以在寂静中听到求救的呼喊，但是市场还在不断结集，就像一个醉汉想要喝完最后一瓶酒，连天已经大亮都毫不知晓。 经纪商理查德。詹瑞特给它起了个诨号叫“巨大的垃圾市场”。新的股票在发狂地发行，比如美国四季护理中心、肯德基炸鸡公司以及应用逻辑公司等等。巴菲特注意到一笔可观的数额被变成连锁信件的股票促销模式，这场游戏的参加者中有的人轻信他人，有的人自我催眠，还有的人愤世疾俗。 他的脑海里记起了弗里德里克。梅茨的那个例子。这个自诩为罗宾。胡德的人在一所自己取名为“集体广场”的办公室里，与之共事的还有一个被他称为自己的“花朵孩童”的年轻职员。梅茨把大量的资金投入到一种名叫奥米茄的信件股票之中。信件股票没有作价市场，因此它的价值是不确定的。梅茨在计算了自己的资产之后，确定奥米茄的价值为每股16美元。这是一个很有趣的数目，因为梅茨是以3.25美元的价格得到股票的。就这样，在奥米茄的外表或前景没有丝毫变化的情况下，梅茨基金就反映出了超过40％的账面赢利。 尽管巴菲特不到40岁，但他觉得相比之下，自己已经进了“老年人病房”。他曾一度鄙视过自己竞争者们出现的懈怠，但是他们现在也表现出了“严重的高血压”。他注意到有个基金的管理人员宣称，单从每周或每小时股价做出研究是不够的，“证券必须以分钟间隔来进行研究。”巴菲特评论道，“这种人使我觉得出去取一趟百事可乐都有负罪感。” 很容易就可以想象出这些言论也许是来自一个对华尔街一无所知的乡巴佬之口，他写信给他家里一个叔叔描述着城里发生的令人震惊的事情。巴菲特无论如何不会与华尔街脱离开来。实际上，他每天都和股票经纪人以及交易商打交道，而且每天数次。坎托—菲茨杰拉德（Cantor Fitzgerald）的总交易商阿特罗斯尔开玩笑地说，这些年来他肯定已经和巴菲特说了“一亿句话”。 巴菲特的交际圈子非常广泛。事实上，如果说他在奥马哈所得到的情况即使不比在纽约的人掌握的情况更好的话，至少也是一样好的。他从奥马哈得到了一种均衡的感觉。有一天，当他开车路过一家麦当劳时，他对儿子豪伊说，“要赢得好的信誉需要20年的时间，而要毁掉它，5分钟足矣。如果你明白了这一点，你做起事来就会不同了。” 人们感到惊奇的是，一个股票市场的奇人能继续留在内布拉斯加，尤其在这样一个快节奏的时代。巴菲特在1968年谈到《邓恩评论》时说：“奥马哈和任何别的地方一样好，在这儿你可以看到整个森林；而在纽约，很难看到树木外的其他东西。” 但是，纽约人有名的“内部消息”途径又怎么样呢？ 巴菲特回答道：“有了足够的内部消息，再加上100万美元，你可能会在一年内破产。” 这确实是一句非常中西部风格化而且揭露本质的话。它的下文就是美德得到的回报也许就是罪恶——这与华尔街上普遍接受的箴言恰恰相反。 看看巴菲特在同一年，即1968年对家庭保险公司的投资，就更说明问题了。他在几个星期的时间里都买进股票，以汤姆。克纳普的曼哈顿公司，特威迪。布朗和克纳普作为经纪商。一天，当特威迪。布朗为他买进了价值5万美元的股票后，霍华德。布朗，他的交易合伙人，接到了奥马哈打来的一个电话。他放下听筒，然后说“真太奇怪了，沃伦说别买了”。 第二天，家庭保险公司宣布自己被城市投资公司以高价接管了。巴菲特有可能听到了内部消息，但他没有要这5万美元的股票，意味着他错过了一个获利的浪潮。他明明知道买下它是合法的行为——虽然任何人都会留意到，它看来有那么一点令人可疑。 巴菲特是否感到自己的美德或是个人利益处于某种危险中——或是两者兼有——与此事几乎没有任何关系。他认为个人利益和美德常常倾向于一致，因此人们还是有可能把它们妥善处理的。不用说，这种观点在他的华尔街同行的头脑中常常是缺乏的。 巴菲特常常去纽约，春天和苏茜一起，也有别的一些时候。他在广场，和许多商界人士和朋友们见面。在他们中间，有投资顾问桑迪。戈茨曼、比尔、瑞恩，《幸福》杂志的作家甘罗。卢米斯以及未来的旅馆业主拉里。蒂施。所有这些人物都是非常富有的，而且彼此联系相当紧密。 尽管苏茜很喜欢去艺术家咖啡屋，巴菲特还是和朋友们在斯特奇熟食店之流的低级餐馆里吃饭。在这里，他可以要一份他不喜欢的牛肉汉堡。一次， 马歇尔。温伯格鼓足勇气提议他们去吃一点不太清淡的东西——去日本牛排屋。 “我们为什么不去鲁本斯餐馆呢？”巴菲特反问。 温伯格指出他们在前几天已经在鲁本斯餐馆吃过午饭了。 “那就对了，”巴菲特说，“这样你就知道那儿饭菜怎么样了。” “按这种思路，我们该天天去那儿吃啰？”温柏格说。 “当然，为什么不天天去那儿吃呢？” 还有一次，巴菲特在环境优美的和声俱乐部吃午饭，一同进餐的有萨姆。斯泰曼，她是桥牌冠军，同时也是巴菲特的一位投资者，斯泰曼的妻子。 斯泰曼对巴菲特身上那种中西部特有的不拘礼节有很深的印象。她回忆道： 在我回到我住的上城区后，沃伦也到上城区来了。我想再和他会一次面，他说他觉得在纽约很受限制——问我是否愿意和他一起从61大街走到79大街去？这还是在纽约兴起慢跑风尚之前的事。我们迈着飞快的步伐沿着麦迪逊大街走着。他穿着他生意场上的衣服，他充满着对自由的向往。 试想一下这个穿着毫不入时的网球鞋的华盛顿男学生。人们都不习惯看到一个奥马哈的牛仔在麦迪逊大街上行走。通常，人们也不习惯一个坐头等舱的数百万的富翁看上去好像是穿着衣服睡觉的。他们心目中的华尔街是JP摩根那样的。而他们在巴菲特身上看到的是威尔。Rogers. 有一天晚上，鲍勃。马洛特，数据文件公司的总裁在第五大街偶然遇到巴菲特，他在那走来走去，活像一只迷途之犬。巴菲特解释说他正在度量一家叫顶级企业的百货商店下面的土地尺寸，具有堪萨斯血统的马洛特得出结论说：“巴菲特毫不自负，简直让我不敢相信他是在康涅狄格的格林威治成长起来的。” 到了1968年底时，牛市逐渐显得底气不足了。公司集团的泡沫都破碎了。查拉尔德。查伊的曼哈顿基金在305基金中的排行也一落千丈，跌到299位，迫使查伊不得不就此罢休。12月份，证券交易委员会暂停了对奥米茄权益的交易。对于弗里德。梅茨和他的花朵孩童，这无疑是当头一棒。而梅茨基金，拥有30万股奥米茄股票，这个曾是全国排名榜首的基金，它的资产面临着突如其来的资产流失。在万不得已的情况下，梅茨说明证交会停止了赎回（就似一家银行关上了出纳柜台的窗口）。梅茨，正如所发生的事情一样，在纽约希尔顿饭店面对一群蓝筹股听众陈述投资前景。可笑的是在他自己的基金灰飞烟灭的时候，他还在四处传授他的行家观点。这令人啼笑皆非的事却好像倒被梅茨自己忘却了。“我们没有理由比担心1968年更担心1969年会发生什么。”梅茨充满信心地说道。后来，“窗口”又打开了，他的基金下跌了93％。 而梅茨不过是一个征兆而已。当他的基金摇摇欲坠时，可以清楚地看到他绝不是最后一个。布尔汉姆公司的沃尔特。斯特恩早就表示过了他的担心。 他认为在熊市里，人们一定会慌不择路地拼命抛售，就像他们当初买进一样。 诚然巴黎和谈给市场打了一剂强心针。在1968年12月，道。琼斯指数爬升到990点，而华尔街又把希冀的眼光放到了一系列不切实际的目标上：促成越战结束，而且使道。琼斯指数升到1000点。 巴菲特的合伙人企业在1968年锁住了4000万的赢利，也就是说赢利率 59％，他的资产增加到一亿零四百万美元。在缺乏灵感的情况下，管理着空前多的资金，再加上市场达到了顶峰，巴菲特经历了业绩最红火的一年。他击败道。琼斯指数不仅仅是5％的差距——自己订的最低目标——而是50个百分点。他说，这结果应视为一种反常行为，就像有一局桥牌中赢13墩一样。 “这次是他做的最后一手。” 这时，牛市正断断续续发出死亡前的呻吟，华尔街不管价格高低拼命推荐热门股票。美林银行买进了市赢利率为39倍的国际商用机器股票（IBM），宝丽来还推动施乐（Xerox）达到50倍赢利率，布莱尔公司将雅芳公司的股票利率抬到56倍。在这样的赢利水平下，一个将雅芳公司全部买下的购买者需要半个世纪的时间来抽回他的资金。难道它有可能“值”那么多吗？一位基金经理回答这一问题说，人们在特定时刻认为某种股票价值多少，股票就值多少。他补充道，每一笔学院捐赠都觉得自己“应该持有IBM，宝丽来和施乐以及其他各种股票。因此，我认为他们会做得不错”。巴菲特提醒人们记起一个表面上不明显的区别：价格是你所付出去的，价值是你所得到的。 这些都再没有任何意义了。最后，局面再也无法扭转，他对寻找股票彻底失望了。在1969年5月，《商业周刊》称弗里德。卡尔是“美国最优秀的投资组合经理”。在同一个月，这个奥马哈人拿定了主意。担心自己陷入对苦难不幸的哀叹，同时也担心所得的赢利付之东流，巴菲特做了一件非同寻常的事，他宣布隐退了。有关他开始清算巴菲特合伙人企业的消息震惊了他的合伙人。就在这个时候，当市场正在牛市的高潮中时，他却准备退出了。 我无法适应这种市场环境，同时我也不希望试图去参加一种我不理解的游戏而使自己像样的业绩遭到损害。 隐藏在他这一决定背后的勇气是独一无二的。在华尔街，人们决不会关闭企业，将资金偿还——不会在鼎盛时期，也不会在他们业绩最佳的年份后。 没有人会那样做。巴菲特可以有许多种选择，他可以只售出他的股票，将它的资产换成现金，然后等候机会。但是每个合伙人都渴望他来运作，他总是感到一种无法推卸的压力，要带领整个联盟。自从1967年那封标识着分水岭的信以来，他曾经试着减轻工作压力，但是，只要他在“这舞台上”，就绝不可能轻松。 如果我要参与到公众中去，我就身不由己地要去竞争。我明白，我并不想毕生都在忙于超越那只投资的兔子，要让我放慢脚步，唯一的办法就是停下来。 在他的朋友迪克。霍兰的印象中，巴菲特在仔细审视他的一生，尤其是他将如何处置他的金钱——他现在拥有的总财富达到了惊人的2500万。对于他的合伙人而言，巴菲特正暗示着要改变自己的步伐。 你们中的有些人要问：“你下步预备怎么办？”我对此没有任何答案。我只知道当我60岁时，我将会尽力去实现一些个人目标，而这些目标与我在20岁前订下的目标是不同的。 巴菲特告诉《奥马哈世界先驱报》说他希望把大量的时间“尽可能而且 有效地花在有关人类问题的研究上“。在另一次访问中，他说他想追求一些不仅仅为了赚钱的利益。 巴菲特立即就开始着手这项工作。奥马哈不允许犹太人进入奥马哈俱乐部——一个位于市中心的商业人士常常光顾的用餐地点。巴菲特有不少犹太人朋友，其中包括尼克。纽曼，他经营着一家奥马哈杂货连锁店，而且他对自己被拒之门外极为愤怒。巴菲特对俱乐部委员会提起过这件事，他被告知说：“他们（犹太人）有自己的俱乐部。”（奥马哈也有许多乡村俱乐部，每个俱乐部都各行其事。）在巴菲特看来，这显然是一种错误的做法。 迄今为止，奥马哈的犹太人家族已经有一万年的历史了。他们一直都为整个社会做着自己的贡献，他们和其他人一样参与了奥马哈的建设，而他们却不能像约翰。琼斯一样加入那个俱乐部。约翰是一个新来的中等阶层的联合太平洋公司职员，他一转到这儿来就加入了俱乐部，这样做是不公平的。 当然，巴菲特并不打算在奥马哈俱乐部外面领导一场抗议游行。他极具特色地选择了一种被动和间接的策略，这样他可以巧妙地转移负担。他向全犹太人的高地乡村俱乐部申请作一名名义上的成员。 高地俱乐部成立于1923年，是由一位曾在奥马哈的公开课堂上被众人嘲笑为“kike”和“sheenie”（对犹太人的蔑称）的犹太籍高尔夫选手创建的。 60年代，反犹太人的事件就已屡见不鲜了。而奥马哈的犹太人做好被非犹太社会所完全接受和欢迎的准备。高地俱乐部中坚持种族纯粹主义的人士强烈反对巴菲特的加入。他们的感觉是：“这是我们的俱乐部，他们会将它夺走的。”巴菲特的朋友们以及俱乐部的自由派人士，其中包括奥马哈的犹太法学家们都赞成种族融合。这场争论相当激烈，但是在1969年10月1日，巴菲特被接纳了。然后他回到奥马哈俱乐部，通知他们说“犹太人俱乐部”不再全是犹太人了。现在，奥马哈俱乐部无法再找借口了，只有迅速接纳了一些犹太人。 巴菲特后来坦白了他此举的动机——带着一种强烈的感情色彩——他开玩笑说他加入高地俱乐部是因为“那儿的食物更好一些”。实际上，他很少去那里。除了他对公民权的关注之外，人们都怀疑他对犹太人有种特殊的感情——也许是稍微有些对本。格雷厄姆的崇敬之情。拉比。迈里。克普特一家是巴菲特家的常客。他觉得巴菲特是一个“犹太人哲学家”（巴菲特总是和克普特开玩笑说他为自己的女儿挑选了一个“出众的犹太男孩”。） 在奥马哈人的印象中，有关高地俱乐部的这段插曲常在心头隐约出现。 它把巴菲特与他的约翰。伯彻父亲分隔开来，拉比。克里普里，曾经和霍华德一起就霍华德对公立学校祷告仪式的支持问题讨论过一番。他说，沃伦的“手势”是对着（他父亲）做出的一种非常强烈的反应。我认为他把它当作了一种政治声明。 巴菲特还参与了具有开创性堕胎事件。苏茜在计划生育的活动中非常活跃，沃伦和她一起强烈支持将堕胎合法化（那时在许多州里还是非法的）。 到了1969年，加州高级法院同意听取利昂。贝洛斯的上诉。利昂。贝洛斯是一名医生，他因把一名妇女归为堕胎主义者受到起诉。查理。芒格曾在报上读到有关贝洛斯的事情，然后打电话给巴菲特。两人决定承担此次起诉。 芒格把贝洛斯说成是一次个人的运动。他组织了两份案情摘要，一份由178名医学院院长和教授联合签名，另一份则由芒格自己起草并拿给17位知名律师签名。在1969年9月的时候，贝洛斯取得了划时代的胜利——第一次 一部堕胎法被宣布为是违反宪法的。①从巴菲特的角度来看，高地俱乐部的插曲和贝洛斯事件之间有着相似的本质。他偏袒了他认为是团体利益的一方，而摒弃了宗派主义。在他这种理性的、股票选择者的观点中，社会在拥有开放的机构和减少不需要的婴儿数目方面的利益远远超过了隔离主义者和反堕胎主义者那种狭隘的利益。 除了政治之外，巴菲特把1969年的大多数时间都花在了对投资组合的清算上。他的叔叔弗雷德碰巧在同一时间宣布了巴菲特父子公司的关闭——这个家族杂货店恰好在100年前开业。在秋天的时候，沃伦和苏茜很合时宜地举办了一个聚会。他们邀请了180位客人，还从斯特奇熟食店弄来三明治和成架的腊肠。巴菲特家的大门被一串闪烁的小灯照得灯火通明，门两侧还放置着一对3英尺高的百事可乐瓶子。不论是政治家、商人，还是黑人和白人，乃至“富有的人和尚在奋斗中的人”都纷沓而至。妇女们有的穿着鸡尾酒宴的服装，有的穿着喇叭裤、裙裤，还有的穿着迷你裙。参加聚会的人在日光浴室里画了两个穿紧身衣的女孩子。WC菲尔德和梅。威斯特在网球场上一显身手，还有从一台机器里炸出的香喷喷的爆米花。一位客人说他根本不知道奥马哈有“所有这些人物”。 与此同对，巴菲特所做的隐退的决定开始显得精明起来。直到5月份，道。琼斯指数在1000点附近盘旋不下。在6月份，它下降到900点以下，一个个的高空飞行者都坠落了。李腾工业集团——公司集团时代的标志——从它的极盛点下跌了70％；另一个是莱特维，从169美元跌到了25美元。华尔街的证券经纪所纷纷关门倒闭。股票交易厅的标语“在美国商界拥有你的份额”悄无声息地飘落了。业绩基金彻底溃败下场了。 刚在5月份，被《商业周刊》奉为神明的弗雷德。卡尔，就在12月份洗手不干了。只留下企业基金堆满了未清算的信件股票。它在1969年下跌了26％，而在这场浩劫结束前，它又跌了50％之多。科尔特斯。兰德尔的国家学生市值——被重新估价，从140元掉到了3 12 元。road.琼斯工业指数在1969年以平均800点收盘。 杀手已经来监，到1970年5月，股票交易所的每一种股票都比1969年初下降50％，四季护理中心——68年垃圾市场的宠儿——以91美元跌到32美元。电子数据系统在春季的一个交易日降了50点——致使它那拿破仑一世的建立者，H.罗斯。福罗特的财产被残酷地减少了4亿4500万。福特基金组合也变得支离破碎，迫使麦乔治。邦迪不得不咽下这口苦果。 巴菲特在1969年竭力维持了7％的收盈水平，这是合伙人企业最后一次运作。尽管这是结束的一年，它还是超过道。琼斯18个百分点。巴菲特长期以来预计的下滑年月并没到来，他在每一个季度都有赢利，并击败了市场的尺度——道。琼斯工业指数。 假如一个投资者在1957年投资1万美元到道。琼斯，13年以来的总利润将达到15260美元。同样的数额如果投资到合伙人企业中，扣除巴菲特自己的份额后，会产生150270美元的利润。用另一种算法，巴菲特的投资组合以29.5％的年利率增长着，与此相比，道。琼斯指数则是7.4％，人们也许能在其他领域找到可以与此相媲美的东西——有音乐领域的莫扎特，在棒球领域的1927年扬基队。然而在投资业世界里，没有任何东西能和它相比。 投资公司都想买下他的合伙人企业，但巴菲特将他们一一拒绝了。但是，还有一个问题：没有解决他从前的投资者们将把他们的金钱投到哪里去呢？ 巴菲特只给了他们一个名字：比尔。瑞恩，格雷厄姆班上循规蹈矩的人，他正在建立一个新的共同基金——塞凯亚基金。巴菲特的许多合伙人都对它进行了投资。 巴菲特说它将在城市债券里投入大量自己的资金，并且，他写了一封最后的长信答应帮助他的合伙人去做同样的事情（但他申明他将不再继续提供投资咨询），这封信，既随意又散漫，但是内容非常具体。在一个地方——记得这正是纽约城财务危机看到一丝曙光的5年以前——巴菲特勒住思想的骏马，写下一段忠告。 你们将发现我不买大城市发行的债券，我对如何分析纽约市、芝加哥、费城等等的股票毫无主意。（一个朋友曾提到有一天，纽瓦克准备以令巴菲特深感不安的诱人利率出售债券，因为纽瓦克给这些债券起了一个不好听的名字。你对纽约市的分析会和我做的一样好——我承认很难想象它们会在一段时期内不能偿付款项。我用在债券上的方法和我用于股票上的十分相似。如果有什么是我不明白的，我就会将它忽略掉）。 除了它的两个投资外，合伙人企业把其他投资都做了清算。这两个投资分别为伯克希尔。哈撒韦和戴维斯菲尔德零售店、服装连锁企业的控股公司①。这样，每位合伙人都可以选择用股票或是现金的形式获得伯克希尔和戴维斯菲尔德的利益，而巴菲特选择了股票。 我觉得两种证券都是非常体面的长期持有工具，而且我很高兴自己的净财产中有相当大的一部分投到它们当中去。 他恳请他的合伙人们在考虑伯克希尔时——伯克希尔是两个投资中更大的一个——把它当作一个企业，而不是一种“股票”。但是他的计划有点含糊难懂。一方面，他对纺织业并不重视；而另一方面，他又很喜欢管理它的那个年轻人。他允许它一年应该增长10％左右，但并没有做硬性规定。另外，尽管他希望参与伯克希尔的政策设立，但他的合伙人们都明白他没有任何义务要“从其他地方获得利润”。 桥牌冠军萨姆。斯泰曼认为巴菲特已经黔驴技穷了。他把自己的伯克希尔股票以43美元/股出售给了巴菲特。但是许多投资者继续持有。他们无法知道伯克希尔。哈撒韦公司将变成什么样子，也不知道巴菲特在重新塑造它的过程中投入有多深。但是巴菲特清楚地表明，他将保留他的伯克希尔股票，正如忠实的德。安杰利斯的看法：“任何人只要有一点头脑，都会听他的。” ① 巴菲特幸运地把总部在巴尔的摩的霍克斯切德卖给了通用超市，而且没有遭受任何损失。