Chapter 7 4. Douglas MacArthur and Shigeru Yoshida-2

Yoshida was the fifth son of a Satoshi who was closely associated with the Meiji Restoration. During the occupation of Japan, primogeniture was abolished.Prior to this, sons below the eldest son were often adopted by other families.Yoshida's adoptive father is a man named Yoshida Kenzo.He was a friend of Yoshida's biological father's family. He died when Yoshida Shigeru was seven years old, leaving behind a solid family fortune. After graduating from university in 1906, Yoshida became a career diplomat.Perhaps because of his rural background, he was initially sent to work in China, which is a slow path for diplomats to advance.He had to spend most of his time in the high standard of living he inherited from his family.However, Yoshida's marriage is shrewd.His wife Yukiko is the daughter of Earl Makino.The count was a trusted advisor to the emperor.

Makino attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as a member of the Japanese delegation.He had the 40-year-old Yoshida join him in the event, which greatly enhanced the young diplomat's status. The Japanese went to Versailles with optimism about Wilson's open door policy.According to the spirit of Wilson, Makino suggested adding a clause in the treaty that clearly stipulates that all ethnic groups enjoy equal rights.But Britain, deeply suspicious of Japan and its growing naval power, vetoed the clause, backed by the United States.Yoshida found that the idealism of the Meiji Restoration and the open-door policy were no match for the harsh realities of postwar international relations.He returned home sad and disappointed.

The last time I saw Yoshida was in 1964.At that time, he invited me to dinner at his estate in Oiso.The retired Prime Minister, now eighty-six, recalled his experience at Versailles at length.He said he often speculates that history would have played out differently if Western powers had been more receptive to Japan's views after World War I.I find it particularly impressive that Yoshida never made himself feel bad about Britain or America because of these experiences.It was a sign that Yoshida had a great personality and strong convictions at an early age. However, the Paris Peace Conference had an impact on him.International hostility toward Japan increased.The 1924 U.S. Exclusion Act banning all Japanese immigrants from entering the United States is an example.He, like many other Japanese, has become increasingly concerned about ensuring that Japanese products have a salable market in Asia and that there are enough raw materials for Japanese factories. While serving as the Japanese Consul General in Shenyang from 1925 to 1926, he played a considerable role in his country's conquest of Manchuria in the 1930s.

Yet Yoshida is by no means a politically hipster.He began to part ways with militarism just as Japan succumbed to militarism. During a trip of Japanese ambassadors abroad in 1932 and 1933, he met Colonel Edward House, who had also been at Versailles - a close aide and advisor to Wilson during the Great War.House offered Yoshida a piece of advice—the same advice he had given the Germans before World War I—House said: In settling foreign disputes, if Japan resorts to violent means rather than peaceful means , Everything that has been painstakingly managed since the Meiji era will surely be reduced to ashes.

Yoshida, who was influenced by Confucianism who was pro-Western after the Meiji era, had become an active advocate of internationalism at this time.When he returned to Japan, he delivered House's message to those who would listen.These practices increased the distaste for him among the "politicians in uniform". In 1936, a group of renegade military officers staged a premeditated coup in Tokyo—in which Count Makino narrowly escaped his death—and militarists took control of Japan.Soon, the new prime minister nominated Yoshida as foreign minister, hoping to build a line of defense against the militarists.But the proposal was rejected by the military, and Yoshida was appointed ambassador to the UK.

His appointment was fortunate for two reasons: First, it kept Yoshida out of Japan.At that time, due to the nuisance of "secret detectives" in Japan, the military's opponents were in danger, tortured, imprisoned, and some were even assassinated: secondly, during the three years, his further understanding of British politics, Firmly established his moderate pro-Western political philosophy.If the dream of the Meiji Restorers had been realized, Japan could have become British in many respects: Japan could have been a powerful and influential country with a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary system, and a strong civilian government. island nation.In Beijing, the military prison was directly damaged.So, he was transferred to a cell in the suburbs. (He later wrote: "I thought how unfortunate it would be if I were burned alive." He was released shortly thereafter and returned to his estate in Oiso, forty miles south of Tokyo, where He recuperated. He mistakenly believed that he would spend the rest of his life there as a retired diplomat of minor fame.

Early one morning during the occupation of Japan, Yoshida was driving on an abandoned road between Oiso and Tokyo. "Two American soldiers suddenly appeared in front of me and signaled to my driver to stop," he later wrote. "I guess they were going to stop the road. But they were trying to return to Tokyo and lost their way." Soldiers." Yoshida then gave them a lift. "We didn't get very far before they handed me chocolates, then chewed gum, and finally handed me a cigar." This is one of Yoshida's particular favorite stories. "I remember thinking," he wrote, "that it was natural, as far as they were concerned, that they were doing it at the time. It was the inherent goodness of ordinary Americans that nothing happened during the occupation of Japan." Conflict." A group of liberal Japanese intellectuals I met in 1953 seemed to share this view.They told me that while there was considerable anti-American sentiment in Japan, it was not due to the actions of the American military.

The friendliness of the United States must have been a reason for the success of the occupation of Japan.Another reason is that the Japanese accepted the reality of being defeated with indifference, and frankly accepted the changes that accompanied the defeat.MacArthur immediately realized that these qualities of the Japanese people would enable Japan to have a successful and encouraging start after entering a state of occupation. On August 30, 1945, MacArthur flew to Yokohama, where he established a temporary command.Nearby were some kamikazes who refused to surrender and 250,000 armed Japanese soldiers.Although the world war ended two weeks ago, both sides still look at each other with a high degree of mistrust.

Many Japanese expected the victorious Americans to take over their country to do what they themselves had done before: rape and pillage.Many Americans, in turn, feared that the emperor would flee into the mountains with the remnants of his army and wage a protracted guerrilla war.No one would believe that the army that made the "death march" in the Philippines and fought to the last man on Sulfur and other Pacific islands would soon surrender. No one but MacArthur himself.He also ignored the advice of his aides and insisted on landing in Yokohama alone and completely unarmed.He didn't even allow his aides to carry sidearms.He was convinced that a show of absolute fearlessness would tame the disobedient Japanese more than a show of force.This is a special gamble.But MacArthur got it right, and he landed safely in Yokohama.Churchill called it the bravest single act of the Second World Dacheng.

It was by using the method mentioned above that MacArthur actually became a demigod figure worshiped by the Filipino people, and established a similar relationship with the Japanese people—a relationship based on absolute mutual trust.He always cemented the relationship with this inspiring belief.Many people at the time—the British, the Russians, and even some in Washington—still insisted that Hirohito be treated as a war criminal.The emperor also made an exception to go to the US embassy and told MacArthur that the responsibility for Japan's war should be borne by him alone. However, the general saw the awe of the Japanese nation for the emperor.Even after the surrender, he remained the spiritual pillar that united the Japanese people.Hirohito's radio address in August 1945 asking his people to "endure the intolerable" and surrender was one reason MacArthur was able to land safely at Yokohama.MacArthur soon fell in love with reading again, and he didn't put on airs to the noble monarch who was neglected at the time.In the end, the commanding palace decided to remain the emperor, living in harmony with him throughout the occupation.According to MacArthur's 1947 constitution, Hirohito became the constitutional monarch.The Constitution places a number of specific restrictions on his courtesy role.At that time, MacArthur also received many advices against this decision.He was able to make this decision, in addition to his insight, but also because of his deep understanding of the history, culture and people of the country he governs.

Later, MacArthur did not completely abolish the absolute authority of the emperor and turn it into his own.He established his permanent headquarters in Japan on the opposite bank of the palace moat.During his five-year reign, he was as reclusive and secretive as Hirohito had been before.Every day, people can only see him in his office, his home in the US embassy, ​​or on the way to and from the two places. Between 1945 and 1951, he left Tokyo only twice to go outside Japan. During this period, Hirohito visited factories and farms, sometimes appeared on the baseball field, and went among his people, which was not done before.Although power has passed from him to MacArthur and - in 1952, to the people - there is still an impression that General MacArthur, like the previous shoguns or Meiji Restorationists, is still the Emperor's purpose to govern the country. When talking about MacArthur, a Japanese said, "The emperor can't find a better person than him." Although Yoshida was a supporter of parliamentary democracy, he was loyal to the emperor.He believes that MacArthur's above-mentioned approach to the emperor is the reason for the success of the occupation of Japan, which is more important than other factors.To a large extent, this is why Yoshida loves MacArthur so much. When the sixty-six-year-old Yoshida became Japan's third postwar prime minister in 1946, he felt rather unexpected and reluctant.With MacArthur purging those who had ties to militarism, the conservative Liberals were practically left without a candidate for prime minister. At that time, Yoshida had left Oiso to serve as foreign minister.Liberal leaders instead want to hand him the top leadership job.Reluctantly, he finally agreed, but forewarned the party that he was going to avoid party quarrels and inflation.At that time, he was only regarded as a caretaker prime minister, but later he was prime minister for seven years and formed cabinets five times. He was a decisive, sometimes unbearably blunt leader.For example, he had a sincere respect, though wary of learning that could be applied to society; and he had no special interest in scholars unless they agreed with him.He publicly called on people not to be a "degenerate scholar".In his New Year's message in 1947, he said that "traitors" had appeared in the labor movement.This fueled nationwide strikes, forced MacArthur to order the truth himself, and brought down Yoshida's first government. In 1953, he made safer reforms that had been difficult to implement during Japan's occupation, but was blocked by a Socialist member of parliament.In a fit of rage, he called the MP a "Ba Ge Ya Lu" (asshole).His opponents have launched attacks for this, casting a vote of no confidence in his government.However, he still won the subsequent elections and continued to do so. Yoshida, the Churchill of Japan, managed the country according to one of the most realistic creeds of Churchill of England.Churchill once wrote: "In times of crisis, people who are not prepared to do things that are not in line with the trend, and who cannot be calm in the face of noise, are not suitable to be ministers." Undecided, public opinion mixed.Yoshida steadfastly went his own way and acted according to his own intuition, just as his father-in-law Earl Makino praised: "Shigeru may lack an attractive personality, but he is a person with a strong heart. From this point Said he was trustworthy." He was not as suspicious of the Japanese as Konrad Adenauer was of the Germans. He condemned only his country's imperialist clique for the catastrophe wrought by World War II.A relative of the Prime Minister told me: In fact, Yoshida has absolute trust in the people of his country, and firmly believes that as long as their leadership is honest, they can rebuild their homes. He often wears a beret and a long cape, and walks the streets of Tokyo, listening to what people say about him.He was rarely recognized, and more than once he was heard to be a "bare" prime minister.He didn't take the statement as an insult.Criticism of his strategy has come mostly from the minority, as they bear the brunt of it, and from the anti-Yoshida press second.He was found to be spirited, even funny.Other politicians accused him of calling an opposition member in Congress a "bastard".However, one American reporter wrote that calling a taxi driver "Bagyalu" might get "a grin, not a frown" because people sometimes just take it as Just a catchphrase. Yoshida was sometimes as tough on his subordinates as he was on his political opponents. On one occasion, he held a banquet for William Siebold, and also invited a Japanese diplomat who was about to serve in the United States to attend.The official and his wife left the banquet hall early to catch the last train back home in the suburbs.A few days later, Siebold learned that Yoshida had rescinded his appointment to work in the United States because the man had left the ballroom before the VIPs.Yoshida believes that the diplomat's actions are intolerable to Japanese gentlemen and those who will soon serve as Japanese representatives abroad. Though he can be bossy at times, he has a reputation for listening to experts and advisors before making decisions.He is not the type to be arrogant and stubborn, unwilling to change his mind in the face of a new situation or a salutary dispute.He respects those who have more experience in a field than he does.Yoshida, for example, knows he's not very good at economic policy.Therefore, like Eisenhower, he consulted businessmen more than bureaucrats in economics.In fact, he is one of the few Japanese prime ministers to appoint businessmen to his cabinet.More importantly, like de Gaulle and Adenauer, he is good at selecting capable finance ministers-Hayato Ikeda is one of them. He was protected by Yoshida and later also became prime minister. Although Yoshida lacked economic knowledge, he had some intuition for grasping basic economic issues.He was convinced, for example, that Japan must modernize its industrial base in order to succeed in the postwar international market.That's right, "Thankfully, Japan was reduced to ashes due to air raids," he once joked, "If Japan now introduces new machinery and equipment, it will become a country whose production capacity far exceeds that of the victors In order to dismantle the machine, we paid a huge price. However, this destruction was caused by the enemy." Although Yoshida liked to joke, it turned out that he was completely correct. From my first conversation with Yoshida in Tokyo in 1953 to the time when he invited me to dinner in Oiso in 1964, I found that his behavior in private was quite different from his irascible appearance in public. different.In private conversation, he was intelligent and reassuring.His words are sometimes difficult to immediately grasp for Westerners unaccustomed to dry, Japanese humor. In 1953, at a banquet entertaining us, Yoshida said to Mrs. Nixon sitting next to him: an American destroyer has docked in Tokyo Bay, "please tell me that they are here to protect you from us. ?" The Prime Minister, with his stern face and modest crew cut, seemed serious at first.We didn't realize he was joking until we spotted a twinkle in his eye and a slight smile on his face. In diplomatic situations, Yoshida often tells the truth.After the war, many Asian countries clamored for compensation for war losses.Indonesian President Sukarno may indeed have this intention in mind when he paid a state visit to Japan.The prime minister took the offensive. "I look forward to your arrival," Yoshida said pleasantly. "The typhoons that frequently blow from your country have caused serious damage to Japan. I am awaiting your arrival to claim compensation for the damage your typhoons have caused to our country." After speaking, Yoshida smiled happily.Rarely in his life was Sukarno completely stunned as he was this time, and decided not to raise the issue of war reparations. With the self-confidence that comes with age and a certain almost innate sense of superiority, Yoshida runs the country with interest and lives his life.Every morning at just six o'clock, he walks around the prime minister's residence, scytheing the weeds around his beloved bonsai.Entertainment is a great social activity.He's a natural storyteller and a great listener.He is also a rider.When Yoshida was a child, he was one of the few children around his family who could ride a horse to school.After he became Prime Minister, he rode horses in the Royal Stud. He likes all kinds of food except Chinese food.He loves special flavored sake and smokes three cigars a day.He liked to read the biographies of Japan's most eminent diplomats, and he also read books in French and English, and was familiar with literature in both languages.When he suffers from insomnia, he relies on reading to fall asleep instead of taking sleeping pills. Like an orthodox Meiji Japanese, Yoshida read the New York Times and The Times of London every day, marking articles and passages he thought his assistants should read and sending them to the various departments.He had little time for Japan's vast press, which he considered unruly and overly opinionated.Sometimes, he meets alone with journalists he admires.However, he also often expressed his attitude to the wider press in an unmistakable way.He once had the police chase journalists away from a chrysanthemum viewing, and would often drive photographers away with a cane. Yoshida loves his wife Yukiko deeply.She is an amateur poet whose works have been admired by Japanese critics.She combines Japanese themes with foreign looks.There is no doubt that the poems were based on her recollections of the places where they lived when Yoshida was on missions abroad.She died two months before the war broke out.During the three months when she fell ill and was hospitalized, Yoshida was by her side every day.The wife of American Ambassador Joseph Grew also visited her every day and brought her soup made at home. After the auspicious day, he did not remarry.Once, when someone asked him what his plans were for the sequel, he said simply, "Since my wife died, I haven't thought about it." After Mrs. Yoshida passed away, the official hostess of his family was his multilingual daughter Mrs. Kazuko Azeng.She is sometimes referred to as "the one who holds power behind the throne", although she despises the term. On the eve of our visit to Japan in 1953, William Bullitt, who served as the ambassador of the Roosevelt administration to Russia and France, told me that, in his opinion, Mrs. Zeng and Mrs. Tzu, like Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek, were the first husbands on the international stage. In the forefront of people, she meets this standard in all aspects.She was extremely intelligent, elegant, and a valuable companion to her eminent father.Once, she said to me: Many leaders are great men, but not good husbands, "I would rather have the latter".It was clear, though, that she thought her father was both. It is generally believed that although it was not in the general's nature to ask MacArthur to repay Yoshida's effusive public praise, a strong personal friendship did exist between the two of them. Every morning, before MacArthur and his son Arthur went to the headquarters and school respectively, they would lead their beloved puppy and walk happily around the embassy.A relative of Yoshida told me one thing: Yoshida went to MacArthur's office one day and found the general very depressed.MacArthur said one of their dogs died suddenly and unexpectedly. Since then, Yoshida fell in love with Arthur as if he was his own son.The prime minister did not say anything to MacArthur, but quietly found a photo of this pet and handed it to his minister of agriculture and forestry, asking him to find another dog that was exactly the same as this dog. After the Industrial Research Institute found one, Yoshida put it in his personal car, took it to the American embassy, ​​and gave it to Arthur.MacArthur watched happily from the sidelines. On another occasion, he gave MacArthur a refined toy horse, which he had bought for Arthur when he was traveling in modest clothes on the streets of Tokyo.A few days later, when Yoshida visited MacArthur's office again, he saw that the toy horse was still at the general's desk. up, next to his favorite corncob pipe.Yoshida asked MacArthur why he hadn't given it to his son.The Supreme Commander, a little embarrassed, said he was having fun himself.Later, he reluctantly gave the toy to Arthur. Perhaps the most convincing evidence of MacArthur's respect for Yoshida was his allowing Yoshida to remain prime minister.As a result of the Allied occupation of Japan, more than 200,000 Japanese—including the former president of the Liberal Party who had been replaced by Yoshida—were purged.If the prime minister had defied MacArthur on this or that issue, the general could have just as easily purged Yoshida as he had done.Instead, he has also been known to weed out Yoshida's political rivals at the prime minister's request. Just as Yoshida did not use humility or non-friction to win the favor of the Japanese people, he did not win MacArthur's respect through submission. In 1946, when he was selecting the members of his first cabinet, the streets of Tokyo were filled with demonstrators protesting food shortages.He immediately released the rumor that unless MacArthur promised to ship a large amount of food from the United States, he would no longer appoint cabinet members.He also said privately, "Once the Americans see the red flags waving in the hands of people all over the country for a whole month, they will definitely send food to Japan." After MacArthur heard these words, he sent a covered jeep to take the new prime minister to his office.Twenty minutes later, Yoshida returned, looking very composed.MacArthur has promised that during his time in charge of Japan, he will never let a Japanese starve to death.Yoshida immediately agreed to complete the cabinet formation that night. MacArthur had to sell his above opinions to Washington.At that time, some self-righteous and good people in Washington opposed the use of stockpiled military supplies to feed America's former enemies.Therefore, he wrote: "Either give me bread, or give me bullets." As a result, Washington still sent food, so that MacArthur could fulfill his promise. The spirit of initiative is strictly limited.His administration spent most of its time responding to instructions from MacArthur and his staff.Some reforms he accepted wholeheartedly, others he resisted but had to accept; still others he opposed and eventually withdrew. Yoshida was splinted.His opponents branded him a scapegoat for America. When we visited Japan in 1953, Ambassador John Allison told me that some of the anti-American sentiment in Japan was actually anti-Yoshida sentiment because of his pro-American posture; The staff thought he was a nuisance and tried to remove him when he formed a second cabinet in 1948. Yoshida supported MacArthur's broad goals for Japan: demilitarization, democratization, and economic recovery.The general's land redistribution program and new constitution were among his first and most influential achievements.These decisive blows swiftly shattered the two foundations of Japanese militarism: peasant discontent pervasive in the Japanese army; As of 1945, most of the land cultivated by farmers was still owned by landlords. According to MacArthur, this situation "essentially amounts to slavery."Yoshida also believes that rural discontent could have ignited the communist revolution in Japan as easily as it fueled militarism in the 1930s.Following the line laid down by MacArthur, the Yoshida government conceived a plan for thorough land reform. By 1950, 90 percent of Japan's arable land had been owned by farmers. MacArthur's land reform brought two kinds of awareness to farmers: Individuals can make a fortune; production can be promoted through stimulation.After the completion of this land reform, communism in Japan has almost completely become a phenomenon confined to urban areas, because MacArthur has quietly taken away the communists' large tracts of rural areas.As biographer William Manchester noted, "It is a real irony that MacArthur will be remembered by millions as a man who wanted to solve communism on the battlefield." It is also ironic that Taiwan's "economic miracle" - which can be compared with the Japanese "miracle" in character rather than scale - may also be due in large part to Chiang Kai-shek's arrival from the mainland Taiwan soon after implemented the result of an enlightened land reform program.If Chiang Kai-shek had been able to carry out this plan on the mainland, Mao Zedong could not have exploited rural discontent to make China's communist revolution a success. If MacArthur's most obvious goal was the reform of the agricultural system, then one of his most thorny issues was the bloated political system of Japan's upper-level institutions. The Japanese people have no clear political and civil rights.MacArthur gave them these rights with astonishing speed.He issued the habeas corpus, removed all restrictions on civil liberties, and dismissed 5,000 secret police officers. He also gave women the right to vote, believing, as he confided to an aide, that "women don't like war." Fourteen million women voted for the first time in April 1946—many apparently thinking that MacArthur would punish them if they didn't.Thirty-nine women, including a well-known prostitute, were elected to Congress. Some Japanese politicians who long for a democratic system in Japan believe that it is an ominous omen for prostitutes to participate in elections: a neurotic and veteran congressman even went to the headquarters of the occupation army, and in front of MacArthur, he tore up the relevant newspaper.The Supreme Commander asked him: How many votes did this woman get?The congressman sighed and said: 256,000 papers.MacArthur later wrote: "At that time, I replied to him as solemnly as possible: Then, I should say, there must be more people with warmer occupations than hers who participated in the election." The new MPs, including the prostitute, sent congratulatory letters. In MacArthur's "school", the textbook on democracy was MacArthur's Constitution.When Yoshida's predecessor's Japanese government encountered setbacks in redrafting the Prussian-style Meiji constitution, the general, yellow legal pad in hand, drew the outlines of the new constitution himself.The final draft written by his subordinates in Japanese, which is not very proficient, is the product of the combination of the highest executive council system in the United States and the British parliamentary system. It abolished titles of nobility, provided for the non-use of force in the settlement of disputes with foreign nations, and enumerated rights.Most importantly, it puts the Japanese people in power and treats the emperor only as a "symbol of the country".After this constitution was adopted by the Diet, the Emperor declared it the law of the country. The MacArthur Constitution was often criticized, with many saying it was illegitimate because it was written by foreigners and imposed on a weakened, powerless nation.However, so far, Japan has not given up all attempts to amend this constitution.Most Japanese also apparently favor the Emperor as a constitutional monarch. MacArthur deftly fought back Soviet attempts to overtly influence the occupation of Japan.They were nominal partners of the United States in the occupation of Japan.When Stalin's people in Tokyo said that the Russians might occupy the northernmost island of Hokkaido, MacArthur asserted that as soon as a Russian soldier set foot on Japanese soil, he would throw him in prison.In this way, MacArthur saved Japan from being divided into a communist north and a non-communist south. However, the communists inside Japan were much more cunning and harmful. When Stalin finally released the Japanese prisoners of war during World War II in 1949, they had already been indoctrinated and placed as cadres.In the years since the Soviet Union ordered the Japanese Communist Party to emphasize illegal terror tactics and abandon its policy of seeking a "peaceful revolution," the violence instigated by the Communists continued to escalate. When I went to Japan in 1953, I had a strong feeling that the violence instigated by the Communist Party had provided a legal basis for the party's arrest.Before MacArthur was recalled in 1951, he and Yoshida had already purged Communists from the government and business departments.To my surprise, however, I found that Yoshida, the most staunchly anti-communist figure I had ever met, opposed the unreserved disempowerment of the Communist Party—unless its threat to Japan continued to intensify. He was especially elusive about our vacillating attitude toward Communism between 1945 and 1950. "It's funny Americans," he once said. "When you came here in 1945, we put all the communists in prison, and you asked us to release them all. Now, you want us to put them in prison." Prison. You know, that would take a lot of work." By 1953, Yoshida was probably less inclined to take further action against the Communists, as the Japanese economy was recovering at full speed and land redistribution had been completed.When I talked to some farmers, I found that they were full of enthusiasm and vitality.As a result of the above, the Communist Party suffered a crushing defeat in the elections. Still, Yoshida worries about the Communists.In a meeting I had with him in 1953, he also mused over the question of "our natural inclination to sympathize with communism," expressing concern about the tendency of young intellectuals to support left-wing radicals.Mrs. Atzen added at the time that intellectuals supported the Communists because it was fashionable. "It's not fashionable to be conservative," she said.The problem was compounded by the fact that Communist slogans about liberty, equality, and workers' rights sounded slightly louder than MacArthur's reforms.According to Yoshida, many Japanese lack an intuitive sense of what democracy is, confusing it with indulgence and anarchy.MacArthur was making big strides in his experiment in democracy; Yoshida had to keep it from boiling over. For example, MacArthur was eager to encourage the free labor movement.But his subordinates - including many idealistic, young, gregarious engineers - recruited members of the Japanese Communist Party to help them form a new union.Not surprisingly, these communists were prone to unreasonable demands, strikes and violence.Amid the hoarse clamor from the socialist opposition, Yoshida seized the moment to make changes to the new labor law.Most unions finally broke away from the Communist Party. Americans are not only keen to push antitrust laws -- not just to weaken big conglomerates or conglomerates like Mitsubishi -- but also have their eyes on a thousand or more smaller companies.Many operatives in the occupying forces mistakenly believed that the root of all evil in Japan and the United States in the 1930s was big business.Yoshida rightly believed that Japan would not survive without a healthy business sector and a resistance to the anti-monopoly movement. Many plans to break up the monopolies were finally abandoned. In 1953, the Yoshida government enacted strict anti-monopoly laws. Yoshida was severely criticized by liberals in Japan and the United States for resisting some of the reforms that MacArthur's staff insisted on.But he was proven right in retrospect, because many of the measures, from labor, business, and education reforms to strengthening the legal system, were not applicable to postwar Japan.在一段时间里，吉田固执地反对那些日本难以接受的、激进的改革，以便保护他的国家利益。这是麦克阿瑟对日本的占领获得成功的一个关键因素。 虽然吉田在缓和占领军某些走极端的国内措施方面起了主要的作用，但是，他留给后人的最大遗产，还是其明智的外交政策。这包括两个部分：反对大规模地重整军备。这是一个与错综复杂的国际情况联系在一起的国内问题；决心寻求与美国订立和平条约，并缔结安全联盟。这些政策加在一起，意味着日本不需要付出什么代价，就可以保证国家的安全，并且可以把它的全部注意力和资源用于建设世界上最大的一个经济大国。 作为一个美国人，我并不支持吉田外交政策的全部内容。 但是，作为一个领导人和领导能力方面的观察员，我从他的见地和他大幅度地推动了经济的恢复方面，欣赏他的外交政策的稳键。在冷战的现实向日本和美国压来之前，麦克阿瑟就认识到，日本应该成为一个新型的国家，一个永远放弃通过战争解决与别国争端的企图的经济大国。他使用了"东方的瑞士"这个词，并将这种想法写进了麦克阿瑟宪法第九条关于"不要战争"的条款中。 弗农·沃尔特斯曾经告诉我，"大部分将军们只注意到了结束战争。麦克阿瑟的视野却超越了战争的界限。"日本宪法的第九条就是最具体的证明。麦克阿瑟耳闻目睹了两次世界大战的恐怖，梦想着出现一个不再需要战争的世界。不幸的是，他的这种乐观态度为时过早。在四十年代未，许多美国人认为第九条的规定是一个错误。由于苏联和1949年出现的共产党中国就在日本西边的侧翼，日本需要具备某种自卫的手段。朝鲜战争爆发后，麦克阿瑟带领他的大部分军队去朝鲜，并在日本组成了一支七万五千人的保安部队——后来称作自卫队。吉田认为，日本虽然已经放弃了进攻性的战争，但在受到别国侵略时，不应该放弃正当的自卫权利。他不顾社会主义者和和平主义者的反对，立即着手建立一支尽可能有效的武装力量。 显然，不管七万五千人的军队如何有战斗力，也不可能保卫一个面积相当于一个半英国的岛国。但是，在1951年独立之前和之后，吉田都顶住了要他进一步扩军的压力，其原因大部分是经济方面的。他说："在目前的经济条件下，那怕建造一艘战列舰，也会打乱政府的财政。" 杜鲁门指定约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯详细拟订日本和盟国之间的和平条约。杜勒斯利用他的地位，试图对吉田施加影响，要他重新武装日本。但是，当他第一次提出这个问题时，这位首相就回答："别说废话。"不过，这个问题到了艾森豪威尔任内还是继续存在。杜勒斯当了国务卿之后，仍然关心这件事。 1953年，在我出访日本前夕，杜勒斯建议我在东京公开谈论一下这个敏感的问题。以试探美国和日本双方的反应。我在11月19日的日美协会午餐会上的讲话中指出：自从美国把这部宪法的第九条加在日本头上以来，形势变得严峻和危险起来了。我们希望有一个和平的、不受武装征服的威胁的世界，但这种希望已经被苏联的侵略行径粉碎了。 我说，因此，第九条是好心办了错事。"我们犯了一个错误：原因之一，是因为我们错误地判断了苏联领导人的意图……我们现在才认识到，在当前的世界形势下，自由国家的裁军将会导致战争；原因之二，是因为我们想要和平，也相信我们已处于和平之中。从1946年起，我们已经加强了军备，相信日本和其他自由国家也一定会分担重整军备方面的责任。"日本新闻界以通栏大标题报道了这个讲话。毫不奇怪，他们强调的主要之点，不是放在我呼吁重整军备上面，而是强调我承认一美国犯了错误。 吉田的反应是有礼貌的，但又是不明朗的。他直到1954年退休以前，一直坚持自己的立常从那时起，日本的国防支出缓慢地增长了。但比较起来，仍不到日本国民生产总值的百分之二。美国则占百分之六。苏联的国防开支却高达百分之十八。虽然自卫队已经逐渐成熟起来，在规模上也增加了三倍，但它仍旧弱小得近乎荒谬。举例说，日本穿军服的人比北朝鲜、我相信，日本为自身的防务付出更多的力量是绝对必要的。不过，我不能因为在这方面和吉田意见不一而对他吹毛求疵。一位优秀的外交政策制定人的标志之一，是他能以尽可能少的代价，为他的国家获得尽可能多的好处。根据这一标准来判断，吉田制定的政策是很出色的。 象他的许多其他政策一样，从政治上来看，上述政策对他也是危险的。他既要反对大规模地加强军备，又要支持和鼓励自卫队，这在政治上是得不到什么好处的。当和平主义在日本蔓延开来时，随时都会把绥靖政策塞给他。由于把日本的安全置于美国的羽翼之下，他又会同时招致主张重整军备的右翼分子和反美的左翼分子的愤怒。 公开接受某种形式的泛亚中立主义，这在政治上对吉田会更好办一些。然而，他知道，对于一个弱小的国家来说，中立是毫无意义的。他提醒那些持不同意见的人回想一下日本古老的格言："井底之蛙，不知天高地厚。" 吉田是现实主义的，完全知道日本必须防御来自外敌的侵略。事实上他也很清楚，日本人民缺乏足够的力量承担抗击外敌的所有代价。但他很聪明，知道美国会付出这些代价。 吉田的与美国结成安全联盟的政策，是日本意见最不一致的一项外交政策。批评者们说，它会把日本变成一个事实上的美国的殖民地。在1960年重新修订这项政策时爆发的骚乱，使艾森豪威尔总统取消了对日本的访问。它还成为二十年来一直争论不休的根源。这一条约尽管受到批评，但对日本发展成一个经济上的超级大国还是发挥了巨大作用的。 如果他简单地屈服于他的对手要"美国佬滚回去"的沙文主义的压力，接受被委婉地称为"全面的和平"的方案，即一个包括中国、苏联和被剥夺了必要的自卫权利的日本在内的协议，那么麦克阿瑟所说的"东方的瑞士"就可能变成东方的芬兰，即一个事实上的共产主义卫星国——可能名字不是这样。 相反，日本能够一心一意地进行经济建设，并创造出世界各国所羡慕的生活水准。 1954年吉田下野后，又活了十三年。看到自己的政策结出了果实，他感到极大的满足。他的对手曾经说过，他会使日本成为"亚洲的孤儿。"相反，他帮助日本成为一位巨人。 吉田的政策能够结出果实的另一个原因是，从1957年到1972年，他的继承者岸信介和后来的池田勇人及佐藤荣作——他们都是"吉田学校"毕业的——继续执行了他的政策。我有幸认识这三位人物，发现他们都是世界第一流的政治家。很多伟大的领导人难得推荐年青人继位，因为他们被自己的成就迷住了，以致于认为没有人可以取代他们。这是人之常情，但吉田是一个难得的例外。 我经常被吉田和西德的康拉德·阿登纳之间的极其相似之处所打动。他们都是在七十高龄还继续当政的。三十年代，两人都勇敢地反对极权主义者控制他们的国家。战后，他们又都主持了战败国的恢复工作，并使它们成为经济上的超级大国。 在1954年吉田的世界性访问中，他们在波恩相会了。吉田对阿登纳说，由于他们的环境和背景是如此地相似，他总觉得自己是在与德国进行一场友好的竞争。 然而，他们两人也有着显著的差别。吉田精心地为他的大藏相池田准备了接班的台阶。阿登纳对待他那位能力与池田相当的财政部长路德维希·艾哈德的做法却是十分蹩脚，以致于艾哈德1959年与我议论到这个问题时，竟控制不住他的悲伤的感情。 比起阿登纳来，吉田没有必要那么自傲。一个领导人在离开政治舞台以后，看到自己的政策还在长期起作用，事实上就是最大的自我满足。他的诀窍是，不要认为自己是能够扮演某一角色的唯一演员。阿登纳落人了陷井，吉田却从容地避开了它。 我在担任总统之前就已经认识佐藤。我在总统任期内，又和他进行了内容广泛的会谈。我们的会谈最有意义的成果，是冲绳岛的控制权于1972年归还日本。甚至到了那个时候，吉田似乎还是我们会谈中的一员。佐藤经常提起他的这位良师。这次会谈之前，佐藤派一位密使来华盛顿与亨利·基辛格进行预备性的会谈。为了安全起见，他用了一个假姓名，这就是"吉田先生"。 吉田和麦克阿瑟一直保持联系，直到这位将军1964年去世为止。1951年9月，当麦克阿瑟尽力促成的美日和平条约签字时，吉田很想见到这位将军。但是，杜鲁门和艾奇逊由于怀恨而拒绝邀请麦克阿瑟参加在旧金山举行的签字仪式。国务院还告诉吉田：他返回日本之前，在纽约拜访麦克阿瑟将是"不合适的"。吉田很失望。 1954年，吉田对华盛顿进行国事访问，成为大战以来第一个访问美国参议院的日本领导人。作为副总统，我有幸主持了参议院对他的欢迎。我能够把他作为"美国和自由事业的一位伟大朋友"介绍给大家，说明第二次世界大战结束以来，他和麦克阿瑟取得了多么巨大的成就。参议员们起立欢呼，向他表示敬意。 一个月以后，日本议会对他的第五届政府投了不信任票，他下野了。由于种种原因，包括许多他已无法控制的因素，他的声望低落了。他的政府里的某些成员与一起造船业丑闻有牵连。很典型的是，有些人批评他已经成为一个美国人，另一些人又批评他在访问华盛顿时未能得到美国更多的援助。后来，许多被麦克阿瑟清洗掉的保守主义者卷土重来，进行各种活动，力图攫取权力。在结束占领状况之后一年半的时间里，他仍然担任首相职务，并完成了尽可能多的业绩。政治上的清洗，也检验了他的工作水平和适应能力。 吉田快然下野了。他离去时的局势也是混乱的。对于那些反对他或不喜欢他的人，他总是不讲外交礼节和不客气的。甚至当他还是一位外交家时，也是如此。三十年代，他曾经劝告一位可厌的上司说，你要么老实点儿，要么把自己送进精神病院去。他作为首相参观日本动物园时，会用著名的政界人士的名字来叫猴子和企鹅。他不拘小节的做法，有助于减轻日本人民被打败和占领的痛苦，但也触到了他的敌人的痛处。 最后，他们终于为自己报了仇。1954年末，日本议会对不信任案的辩论是蛮横的。吉田有时停止作笔记，慌乱地"碍…碍…"着：他的对手们也祖鲁地大声叫嚷："碍…碍…"。 十二月中旬，吉田政府的左派和保守派的对手们联合起来反对他，通过了不信任案。原来以为他会在投票中再次获胜，结果却是相反，已七十六岁高龄的吉田终于被打败了。 除了佐藤以外，其他日本首相没有一位任期象吉田在任的七年零两个月那么长，也没有一位能够象他那样经受住任期内那种经常发生遽变、政治上动荡不安的境遇。吉田掌权的岁月，恰逢日本被军事占领时期；后来接踵而来的，又是短暂的民族主义浪潮、朝鲜战争、四十年代后期使人茫然的通货膨胀、五十年代初期同样令人茫然的经济复苏，以及动摇了日本根基的社会和政体方面的改革。 吉田下野后不久，就象失势的政治家通常所做的一样，隐居起来了。但他的门徒佐藤和池田还定期地到大矶去向他求教。他写回忆录和文章，偶而也接受他的继承者请他办的外交任务。凡年后，他对日本的稳定和经济上的活跃所作出的贡献，又开始得到广泛的赞扬。他去世时，依然是一位受到尊敬的老政治家。 吉田结束政治生涯大约三十年之后的今天，他又受到了新一代的尊敬。日本的政治家每当来拜访我时，经常对我说他们是如何钦佩他。不仅羡慕他的业绩，而且敬佩他的人品-他的勇气，他绝对的坦率，他在巨大的政治压力面前维护自己的信念和日本利益的智慧。正如戴高乐和邱吉尔仍然活在他们的人民的记忆里、特别是成为世世代代的青年人的榜样一样，吉田在日本又呈现出新的生命力。 1960年，在我竞选总统处于高潮之际，退休在大矶的八十二岁的吉田再次被请出来为他的国家效劳。日本政府请他率领代表团到华盛顿参加庆祝日本第一个外交使团到美国一百周年的纪念活动。我们邀请他和阿曾夫人到我家作客。饭后，吉田送给我一件雕塑品。他说，这是请一位日本艺术家专为我制作的。由于当时我的头脑里净是自己竞选的事，当吉田用一种含蓄的方式说明这件作品的标题是"胜利"时，我竞未曾报以表示赞赏的微笑。 在那年十一月的大选以后，他又给我写来了一封非常有礼貌的短信，说大选的结果是"令人悲伤的"。他还说，希望我会再度返回"国内和国外的"领导岗位。那时我特别感谢他的短信，因为他这种友好的表示是在我被击败时发来的，这比我获胜时来得更有意义；况且此后他也没有必要再作出这种表示了。吉田执政之时，就已经成为一名顽强的、老练的政治家。 他的敌人把他斥为冷酷无情和自私的人。但我对他了解得更清楚一些。在我处于逆境之时，事实向我表明，他是一位忠实的朋友。我对此是十分珍视的。 1964年的一次会议以后，我在大矶最后一次见到吉田。原定那年春天召开的这次会议，由于命运的两次不幸的捉弄而被推迟了。那年春天，我准备出访远东；吉田也邀请我到他家共进午餐。但在四月五日，即我将到达东京的前四天，麦克阿瑟去世了。吉田和阿曾夫人立即到美国参加他的葬礼。当我再次访问亚洲时，宴会重新安排在那年的十一月。 我们乘车行驶四十英里去大矶，交通比洛杉矶的高速公路还拥挤，使人神经极度紧张。这次旅行虽然有许多麻烦，不过述是很值得的。吉田穿着和服在门口迎接我。在我们以前的会见中，他总是穿着西服，还特别喜欢露出维多利亚式的高领。 第一次看到他穿着传统的日本服装，使我再次觉得明治维新的这种产物在很大程度上是东西方影响的混合体。我认识的所有日本领导人中，吉田似乎是最西方化、又最日本化的。后来我得悉，三十年代，麦克阿瑟在担任陆军参谋长时，有时在华盛顿的办公室里也穿着和服。 吉田的家宽敞舒适，但并不豪华，从那里可以看到富士山的壮丽景致。阿曾夫人再次担当我们的女主人，举止优雅。房间的装饰和陈设，反映了日本人通常有的、对协调和均衡的审美观。但就吉田家的情况而言，这又是东方事物与西方事物之间的均衡。西方的著作和日本的工艺品井排放在一起。吉田睡的是榻榻米而不是床，但在我们吃饭的平台上，用的却是西式的桌椅，而不是矮腿的日本式桌子。就连他招待我们的饭菜，也是日本菜和西式菜兼而有之。 在涉及到世界性的、内容广泛的交谈中，吉田追述起他与牧野伯爵的凡尔赛之行。在议论到我在1953年关于重整军备的讲话时，另一位客人弄错了日子。我还来不及说什么，吉田很快就纠正了他。我想，这个讲话给他的印象，一定比他当时流露出来的反应深刻得多。 他对戴高乐以及我对这位法国领导人的评价表示出特殊的兴趣。我告诉他，我不完全支持戴高乐的国际政策，特别是他在如何对待北约上的矛盾心理。我建议说，用特殊的、日本式的术语说，戴高乐在国际问题上"采取高姿态"的做法是可行的，因为他在国内获得了成功，很有声望。我接着说，就日本的经济力量而论，象戴高乐一样，日本政府在国际事务中也处于可以采取高姿态的地位，这为日本发展成为一个具有较强大的军事力量的国家提供了可能性。我明确地表示：我确信，"日本不会成为一个经济上的巨人和军事上、政治上的侏儒"。就象他在1953年所作出的反应那样，他有礼貌而坚定地避开了我的建议。 回顾1964年我们内容广泛的谈话，其中最重要的话题还是中国。这是十一年前的1953年我在东京第一次见到他时就谈过的话题。在那一次，由于当外交官而成为"中国通"的吉田告诉我，他毕生研究中国文化，对它一直深为尊重。他相信，正如没有哪个侵略看曾经永久地征服过中国一样，共产主义侵入中国以后企图消除孔夫子多少世纪以来的影响的做法，最终也是注定要失败的。吉田说，虽然中国的知识分子在1953年暂时的黯然失色了，但是，他们终究会胜过共产主义思想体系的。 然而，吉田不同意当时流行的蒋介石仍然可能在中国大陆发挥作用的观点。吉田争辩道，虽然蒋介石本人是一位儒家学者，但他疏远了知识分子，这在政治上是无可挽回的致命之处。 在这一点上，吉田与裕仁天皇的观点不一致。我这次访问见到裕仁时，他依然坚决支持蒋介石。 吉田与中国在哲学方面几乎具有天生的亲缘关系。这使他相信，增加中国与亚洲非共产党国家之间的贸易，最终会使中国抛弃共产主义，支持自由事业。象艾森豪威尔一样，他热忱地相信，潜在的敌人之间的贸易会导致和平。他还认为，中国介入朝鲜，这是一种脱离常规的行为。之所以如此，是因为它担心其边界可能受到威胁。他相信，中国人民本质上是爱好和平的，他们只会反抗侵略，不会发动侵略。 在美日和平条约提交美国参议院审议之前，吉田由于对北京持有上述的态度，使他向北京暗示，他想打开与大陆的关系。参加条约谈判的约翰·福斯特·杜勒斯告诉吉田说，如果他承认中国，参议院就可能拒绝这个条约——因为当时中国正在朝鲜和美国人作战——首相于是放弃了这一想法。我1953年访问日本的任务之一，就是重申杜勒斯的警告。我当时预言，对于他任何可能作出的、与中国共产党人接近的行动，美国都会作出强烈的否定的反应。吉田对我的预言没有表示不同意；但很明显，我没有动摇他对与北京重修旧好的意见的支持。如果他不是在1954年退休的话，日本很可能在五十年代就与中国重新建立关系了，而不必等到七十年代才这样做。 因此，在吉田1964年与我会见的议程中，中国问题仍占很重要的位置，这就不足为怪了。吉田和他的日本客人们对那年一月份法国和中国建立外交关系一事表示担忧，因为事前戴高乐并没有通知日本。吉田问我，美国是否也会这样做。当我说我不能替约翰逊政府回答这个问题时，前日本驻美国大使朝下幸一郎说，他在华盛顿有点令人伤心的经验：当美国官方宣布与日本有关的政策决定时，事先也不通知他。他预言，在将来某个时候，美国会不通知日本就直接与中国谈判。我有点未卜先知地回答——就象后来事实证明了的——我不能排除这种可能性。 我们在进行导致了1971年出人意料地宣布我将于翌年访问中国的消息的谈判时，讨论的情况不得不对日本及我们在全世界的其他朋友保密，因为任何泄露都会破坏这种刚刚开始的行动。当我宣布这一决定时，它在日本马上被称为"尼克松冲击波"。尽管人们常常认为，美国此次向中国打开大门是触发中日于1972年9月恢复邦交的火花，但实际上中国和日本多年以来就在进行贸易和非正式接触了。成群结队的日本人——包括政治家们——时常访问中国。因此，这两个国家建立官方的关系，与其说是尼克松冲击波造成的，毋宁说主要是吉田二十年之前就预见到的两国逐渐和解的必然结果。 吉田全神贯注地关心着政府的连续住等问题——有的工作可以由一位领导人着手进行，由另一位领导人完成它。我的拜会结束后，吉田陪我走向门口。在这个令人难以忘怀的时刻，吉田上述的想法显得更加清晰了。当时我对他说，我期望再见到他的那一天的到来。他笑着回答，"不，我想不会了。恐怕我太老了。但是你还很年轻（那时我五十一岁），你将来会走上领导岗位的。" 我见过的所有领导人中，吉田和赫伯特·胡佛一样，都是虽然年事日高、却越来越优雅大度的人。之所以这样，部分原因是因为他虽然下野了，但由他选定的、现在仍然尊重他的意见的领导人继续推行着他的政策。因此，他的内心是安宁的。 他确信，自己去世以后，他的优良政绩仍然会传于后世。 吉田1967年死于大矶，时年八十九岁。正在印度尼西亚进行国事访问的池田首相听到这个消息后，即刻飞回日本，来到大矶，当着众人在他的导师的遗体前痛哭。几天后，日本为吉田举行了战后的第一次国葬。 从政治意义上来说，麦克阿瑟生命的最后十一年却是白白地度过了。他的智力没有衰退。但是在五十年代和六十年代初期，由于种种原因，这些按理应该得到应用的智力并没有得到应用。 其原因之一是，派系斗争使他的名誉被玷污了。他1948年在日本工作期间，在共和党竟选总统候选人时插了进去，参加提名。但在第一次全国性无记名投票中，他仅得到了丢脸的十一票。他1951年从朝鲜回来后，又向议会发表演说，并在国内从这一头跑到那一头，开展反对杜鲁门的亚洲政策的活动。 在1952年的提名中，麦克阿瑟公开偏袒参议员罗伯特·塔夫脱，不拥护艾森豪威尔。在六月的芝加哥大会上，他被选出来为大会的讲话定调子；我们这些站在艾森豪威尔一边的人，当时对他的讲话可能会在代表大会上为塔夫脱拉选票这一点甚为关切。这位将军本人甚至认为，代表们可能会转而投他的票，把他看作"黑马"候选人。 但是，这次讲话是令人诅丧的。讲话稿虽然已经写好并已发出，但由于某种原因，它就象林肯所说的，"完全没有成功"。的商业家和政治家们，都在谈论着他成为1952年共和党候选人的可能性。除了艾森豪威尔以外，所有的人都在这样谈论着。当问题提出来后，他却巧妙地把话题转到欧洲和大西洋的前途上。 1951年5月，他的伙伴、来自堪萨斯州的参议员弗兰克·卡尔森坚持要我在访问欧洲之行中去拜访艾森豪威尔。他确信这位将军打算参加竞选如果这样，他将要求我支持他。在巴黎的盟军司令部里，我看望了艾森豪威尔，谈了一个小时。他热情地向我表示欢迎，但没有谈论他自己，而是夸奖我在阿尔杰·希斯事件的调查中的公正态度，并请我就美国对北约的观点作出估计。他具有罕见的能力，能够使他的来宾们感到没有拘束，认为是他们自己做的好，而不是他本人。结果，大多数人象我一样，在离开艾森豪威尔以后，变成他的热心支持者。 让官职找上门来、而不是用其他方法去谋取职位的做法，增加了他竟选总统获胜的机会。相反，麦克阿瑟1948年在日本任上时，尽管公务繁忙，还处处表现出在谋求官职的姿态。在杜鲁门解除他的职务以后，他的行动又给人以更加强烈的、他亟想成为政界人物的印象。 这不等于说麦克阿瑟不会成为一位好总统。他对外交政策问题有很深刻的理解。在日本期间，他表明自己能够处理好国内问题，能够用一种明智的、公正的方式，全面地处理好从劳工关系到教育问题等方面的事务。但是，他也为通货的稳定、稳健派的压力和财政政策的连贯性等问题所困扰。事实上，他年龄越大，在经济上就越趋保守。我在艾森豪威尔和戴高乐的生涯中，发现也有类似的问题。五十年代和六十年代初期，麦克阿瑟虽然再也不会担任公职了，但他还经常就预算的平衡、减税、恢复金本位制等问题教训我。 麦克阿瑟如果要当总统，主要问题可能是会出现如下的情况：他在行使政府权力方面所受到的各种约束，比他在部队当将军时或在日本担任占领军最高司令官时所受到的约束还要多，届时他将会发现，这是很难忍受的。另外，他一旦担任总统以后，又得处理伴随整个职务而来的、没完没了的日常琐事。 因此，麦克阿瑟在美国也象他在日本时一样。还需要有一位吉田式的人物，来把他富于想象力和创造性的政策付诸实施。 麦克阿瑟忙于在一大堆政治问题上追赶形势。然而，他又是时势和军事形势变迁的牺牲品。在第一次世界大战中。他由于在法国战壕里的英雄业绩而成为美国步兵们心目中的英雄。 到了第二次世界大战时，他则是六十多岁的人了，尽管有着同样的英勇的记录，却已经是一名"重新服役的超龄军官"了。 在两次世界大战之间，麦克阿瑟所代表的那些价值——勇敢、爱国主义、热爱自由——已经开始不合时宜了。它们虽然在第二次世界大战中复苏，但在朝鲜战争和在越南遭到近乎致命的打击之后，又再次褪色了。在第二次世界大战期间，象艾森豪威尔和布雷德利这样慈祥、谦逊和平易近人的将军们，就已显得更加符合于知识界、甚至美国大兵们的口味。总之，他们被当作本世纪的老百姓中的大人物。麦克阿瑟尽管有许多成就，包括在太平洋战争中运用他的战略拯救了数万名美国士兵的生命，但这些成就不可能掩盖他在人们心目中作为一个装腔作势的寡头政治家的形象。 他还想拨动美国公众的心弦，就象他从朝鲜回来时受到举国上下的热烈欢迎一样。然而，公众很快就对他产生了恶感，选举了他的对手艾森豪威尔当总统——他们两人都凯觎这个职位。这是公众作出的一种选择一他们选择了一位代表团结和稳健路线的人，而没有选择一位曾经是吵吵嚷嚷的党徒和经常引起争议的人。 道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟解放了菲津宾，重建了日本，又在仁川登陆和后来的日子里阻止共产党人控制南朝鲜。他作为一位引起激烈争议的人物回国，不久就从他的国家的政治舞台上消失了。究其原因，是几乎没人了解亚洲和麦克阿瑟本人，或是不了解这两者之间的关系，很少有人懂得麦克阿瑟的命运就是保护美国在远东的利益。他几乎是单枪匹马地为此奋斗了二十年。 作为麦克阿瑟的钦佩者，我从来也没有完全弄明白象他这样一位具有如此巨大和不言而喻的成就的人，为何在美国知识界中却是如此不受欢迎。在麦克阿瑟的大部分生涯中，困扰着他的那些