Chapter 73 Section 5 Strong Defense

These four principles all have one thing in common in the first place: Only the fifth principle, strong defense, can make them effective.The same arguments that Ronald Reagan and I made in the 1980s are still valid.Defense spending is an investment in peace because it is not armaments themselves that cause war.Wars are caused because potential aggressors believe they have sufficient military superiority to prevail in aggression.This investment must continue year after year, even when threats seem vague or seem remote, because high-tech defense programs are only effective over a long period of time.The only "peace dividend" we have a right to expect from victory in the Cold War is peace itself, not the opportunity to spend more money on welfare and a culture that is itself dependent.

Granted, all this has changed dramatically due to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the end of the Warsaw Pact, and finally the collapse of the Soviet Union, so it is right that the West should re-examine their defense spending.But I now think that the spending cuts I announced as Prime Minister as Alternatives for Change went too far.Naturally, plans announced later went even further.Personally, I disagree with all the optimism people had when discussing national defense politically at the time.But I did overestimate the likely process of turning the Soviet Union (or Russia) into an "ordinary state"—a stable, liberal democracy that posed no particular threat to the West.

We don't know whether Russia will eventually move towards democracy and a free enterprise system.If Russia is to follow the old path of restoring the former Soviet Union to become a new Russian Empire, this cannot be achieved through a peaceful path.Nor will it leave Russia's relations with the West unchanged.In any case, it is obviously not in our strategic interests if Russia is to get closer to the heart of Europe again.Likewise, if Russia were to devote its meager financial resources to any such imperial strategy, it would necessarily mean abandoning the task of continuing economic reform and political liberalization.In this way, we can see that its domestic and foreign policies will return to the practice of the former Soviet Union, and Russia is still a formidable military power.

The various crises and turmoil experienced by the countries of the former Soviet Union have resulted in a massive outflow of advanced weapons, at a time when other irresponsible states were eager to acquire them, a process that has deepened the threat we face.Clearly, the West must maintain its defenses. Since 1989/90, it has been impossible to assess the threat from only one perspective, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, in formulating our defense plans.Our task is much more complex.In such situations, politicians tend to balance the views of various lobby groups rather than take a long-term strategic view of possible threats and the required responses.The added difficulty is that not only Great Britain, but also the United States, France, Germany and Italy, are all disarming.Those in the know are now claiming that even though we have front-line equipment to intervene where necessary, there are some big problems with support and supply.Coupled with the ineffectiveness of UN-sanctioned interventions, our reductions in armaments come across as indecisive and unwilling to commit.

Another important destabilizing factor concerns the future role of NATO.It is right and necessary to re-evaluate it, as I have suggested.In particular, NATO, as a force for maintaining stability and strengthening transatlantic ties, must use and expand its influence more fully.But as far as I can see, this is not done.In particular, partly because of the impetus of federalism in Europe and partly because of a different approach to Bosnia, NATO has been unable to perform satisfactorily in its vital task of underpinning the US commitment to European defense.In fact, NATO itself has been seriously damaged.

NATO should also welcome the Central European countries—Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia—as full members at their behest.Given the European Community's slow and indecisive approach to admitting these countries to full membership, NATO's decision is a blow to pro-Western democracies in the region.Seeing countries like Poland and, for example, ex-Soviet member Kazakhstan as having the same relationship with the West only serves to confuse the different commitments NATO has undertaken.The fact that NATO allowed Russia, or more precisely, the anti-Western forces in Russia, to make decisions for NATO on this issue made the problem even worse.It does Moscow democrats no good to submit to such submission, because it shows that those who threaten are more likely to be heard than those who cooperate.

Expanding NATO is not just a military move, it also affirms the independent status and "European" status of the countries of Central Europe.If NATO drew a "line" on its eastern border, like Ukraine and maybe the Baltic states, they "wouldn't have been (at least in the beginning) to the right of this "line", but now it's lost. Someone said Good: "Just being close to NATO ... can influence the political psychology of the countries between the Baltic and Black Seas, giving them more confidence in the political power of freedom.All these developments tend to make the peace of Europe much stronger.

This is all the more necessary because the Gulf War confirmed what I believe must be done, that NATO's military must be able to operate "outside" its borders.The potential for serious threats is now indeed global in scope.This is not to say that NATO military forces should be mobilized whenever there is an internal crisis in some distant country, but that the big regional threats are necessarily about us.Some potentially serious dangers are clearly visible. Once there is an overt incident of aggression and our interests are at stake, military intervention, whether under the auspices of the United Nations, NATO, or other agencies, should be strong, swift, and effective.The purpose must be clear, the risks must be weighed, counterattacks must be made as much as possible, and sufficient reserve forces must be deployed.Of course, every international crisis is different and, therefore, the provisions must be adapted to each individual situation.But the taboos to be guarded against are always the same—the purpose is not carefully considered, the consensus is too much considered before action is taken, and the strength of investment is not enough.

Unfortunately, all major military interventions under UN command since the end of the Cold War have been frustrated in one way or another by some or all of these problems.The Gulf War, which has kept Saddam Hussein in power and given him the weapons and financial resources to terrorize the Kurds and the Arabs of the swamp, continues to test the resolve of the international community.This major lapse in judgment stems primarily from a lack of clarity of purpose and an overemphasis on resolving problems through international agreements rather than victories.But Desert Storm at least effectively guaranteed Iraq's abandonment of Kuwait.

As I said earlier, there is nothing to praise about the intervention in the former Yugoslavia, despite the high personal qualities and sometimes heroism of some of those involved.The reasons for the intervention were at least as clear as Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait.Acting initially under the guise of Yugoslav institutions, the well-armed aggressor Serbia attacked first Slovenia, then Croatia, and finally Bosnia.What should have been a clear policy of arming victims and helping them attack military targets from the air was misrepresented as a cause of peace and humanitarianism.

This policy is an illusion and there is no peace to preserve.So this humanitarian force is either unable to help the victims, or conflicts with the aggressors.Western diplomacy without military action has no power to compel aggressors to engage in serious negotiations, and an unfairly enforced arms embargo effectively means mediating on the side of well-armed aggressors against poorly armed victims.Indeed, almost every moral principle or specific regulation has been violated in dealing with this crisis.It should at least provide the next generation of politicians with a case study of what not to do. Isn't it shameful that events in Bosnia and Croatia prompted the United Nations intervention in Somalia in December 1992, led by the Americans?No one can criticize this humanitarian act of intervening and alleviating the terrible suffering caused by a veritable civil war.But insufficient attention was paid to the political and military issues involved.It was quickly recognized that humanitarian efforts cannot succeed in the long term without restoring order in the country.But there appears to be no power inside Somalia capable of restoring order. "The intervention thus presented itself with a painful choice: either the UN colonizes Somalia and spends decades in 'state-building', or the UN forces withdraw in due course and Somalia returns to the Its previous anarchic state. If it was the former case, since the United States would not be suzerain, the UN had to give it to a local country like Egypt for a new trusteeship, or to a former colonial power, which probably Means the Italians. If this is not done—and in fact it is not—then in the future it will be up to civilian aid agencies and private charities to feed the hungry and help the sick. Military intervention that does not achieve its purpose, It raises as many problems as it solves. The results of the interventions in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda collectively have shaken the self-confidence of major Western countries and tarnished the reputation of the United Nations.But there has been a growing tendency that, over the past few years, the Security Council appears prepared to expand its legal grounds for intervention, culminating in the most recent intervention in Haiti in September 1994.In fact, we are witnessing a dangerous combination of that tradition—theoretical claims increasingly disproportionate to concrete measures.All of this may have further unwelcome consequences in the long run. If there is one threat that now approaches the weight of the Cold War, it is Islamic fundamentalism.Policymakers are indeed justified in their concerns.The implications for Europe, the Middle East and Russia are indeed high if more moderate or secular Muslim countries fall into the hands of Islamic extremist regimes. But it's one thing to estimate a danger and quite another to know how best to overcome it.In the past, the West's catastrophe has been its misjudgment of Islam's political potential.It is clearly seen that "the two Middle Eastern countries torn apart by violence and internal strife since the 1970s were previously considered the most stable, modern and Western-oriented, namely Lebanon and Iran." There is a danger that, when discussing "fundamentalism," we will see conservative-minded Muslim countries as an inevitable hotbed of Islamic revolution.In fact, the umbrella of "fundamentalism" covers a range of distinct and often antagonistic phenomena, from the Shiites in the Gulf and Lebanon with links to Iran, to the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, The "Third Way" to Colonel Gaddafi.They are very different from many devout Muslim "fundamentalists" who simply seek to return to the ascetic practice of Islam. I have stated what I believe to be the principles of Conservative foreign policy.However, there really is no substitute for common sense.During my tenure as Prime Minister, I always believed that aggression must not be rewarded.If it succeeds, it increases the threat to our peace and security.I also think that future aggressors are far more sane than most people think.They will ask themselves whether those of us who might oppose them have the weapons to do so, whether we have the means to deploy those weapons in time, and whether we have the will to do so in the first place.Therefore, we must show our resolve. Finally, there's what I've come to call Thatcher's Law: "No matter how well prepared you are, the unexpected will happen." Of course, how you handle it is the real test.