Chapter 66 Section 3 Maastricht Treaty

Clause A of the Maastricht Treaty nicely combines - at least cursorily - two alternative views of the treaty's purpose and role: By this Treaty the principal Contracting States have established among themselves a European Union, hereinafter referred to as "the Union".This treaty marks a new stage in the creation of an unprecedentedly close union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are made as close as possible to the citizens. The phrase "never closer union" is quoted from the original Treaty of Rome, although it is worth noting that in the Treaty of Rome it is in the preamble.For the first time, the Maastricht Treaty included it in an independent treaty text as part of the objective clauses of the treaty.But in any case, the concept of "Alliance" is clearly a major development of it - indeed "a new phase".Furthermore, Articles Day articulated the goals of this union, including "the establishment of an economic and monetary union, eventually including a single currency," and "maintaining its identity in the international arena, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, which includes eventually Developing a Common Defense Policy - which could ultimately lead to a Common Defense", and "Implementing Union Citizenship".It is therefore understandable why Chancellor Kohl made the following comments:

In Maastricht, we laid the cornerstone for the completion of the European Union.The Treaty on European Union opens a new and decisive stage in the realization of the European Union.In a few years, this alliance would lead to the United States of Europe, which the founders of modern Europe dreamed of after the last war. On the other hand, the phrase "decisions to be taken in this union are to be as close as possible to the citizens" and the British insistence on removing the phrase "objective of the union" from an earlier draft treaty gave the British government an excuse to claim that Yes, the Maastricht Treaty did devolve power to national governments accountable to national parliaments. The confusion of interests in the principle of "subordination" also arose from the British government's desire to give the impression that the Mayo was a liberalizing rather than a centralizing measure.Indeed, "Maio" added a new 3b to the Treaty of Rome:

In spheres not within its purview, it will, on the basis of Act on the principle of "subordination". The former president of the European Court of Justice has clearly described this wording as "long and incomprehensible".The past conduct of the European Commission provides no reason to believe that it will constrain the agency's activities.First, the Commission decides for itself whether or not something should be referred to Governments, based on the principle of "subordination".In practice, it is very unlikely that this provision will be enforced within the European Court of Justice.In any case, it will not be enforced in those areas which fall under the "exclusive competence" of the Community, making it impossible to enforce it in broad areas of Community law, such as most internal market measures and many social provisions.Anyone who has read this treaty carefully and intelligently will see that Prime Minister Cole has interpreted it much more accurately than the British Government has.Perhaps this is why the full text of the Maastricht Treaty was so difficult to come by in the first place, and why its interpretation prefers general terms and slogans.

In fact, attempts to portray the Maastricht Treaty as its opposite have met with limited success.Only anti-federalist MPs in the Conservative Party backed the treaty when they felt compelled to back the Prime Minister, so the debate really focused on what "exception rights" the UK was getting.In fact, the best way to say "Mayo" is to say that it doesn't quite apply to us.Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what effect these "rights to exception" will have on us, in law or in practice. I remember back in the summer of 1996, when John Major and I were discussing how to resist pressure for EMU, and I was getting ready for 11 other governments to negotiate another treaty for EMU.In this case, Germany and France may end up backing all the regional backbuying they insist on, when poorer countries see that currencies that reflect their economies will become uncompetitive.It also occurred to me that the Germans' fear that their anti-inflationary policies could be weakened by a gradual abandonment of the Deutschmark by the move to the single currency could be exploited in the negotiations.If we are to make our community partners slam on the brakes in the face of harsh realities that make them think twice, we must first be prepared to use our veto and make it known to the other side that we are prepared to do so.How things would have played out if this tactic had been used is of course impossible to say now.But despite the hysterical mantra, there's no real reason to fear we'll be "isolated."We can continue to benefit from the single market according to the treaty arrangements at that time, and of course we have to tolerate the invasion of the Common Agricultural Policy and the European Court of Justice.Total downfall exists only in the whims of panicked Tory MPs.

The problem with John Major's approach was that, while it was applauded at first, the fundamental problem was left unresolved.In this case, we may stop trying to win support for our alternative idea of ​​a community, and embrace a new European framework that does not suit us, while relying on special exceptions, which The right to exception ultimately rests on the good will and justice of those people and institutions whose purposes are very different from ours.As arguably arguable, this change in approach has indeed worsened our position by accepting some important principles about the future direction of this alliance.For example, accepting the general objectives set out in Articles A and B made it more difficult for the UK to contest its views of Europe in the future.

It later emerged that Britain had successfully negotiated two special exceptions.The first allows the UK to be exempt from the Social Charter regarding workplace and trade union rights; the second allows us to opt out of the third and final stage of monetary union.Governments are absolutely right to resist social provisions because they increase business costs, reduce flexibility and competition, and destroy jobs.But these exceptions relate only to the new provisions, not to other social policy directives in the Treaty of Rome as amended by the Single European Document.This would still allow Germany and France to impose their high social costs on the UK through the back door. A particularly important example is the "hours of work" directive of June 1993, which established a maximum working week of 48 hours, which indeed became a testing case.It is included in Article 118a as a "health and safety" measure.A qualified majority vote is required to take effect.The British government lodged a legal challenge with the European Court of Justice.But directives, whether on maternity leave or part-time employment, are still coming.All these measures have but one main effect - and, as the evidence arguably suggests, perhaps only one main aim - to reduce the flexibility and competitiveness of British industry and bring us into line with Europe.

Also, with our low social costs, there is no doubt that the French, especially, will do everything in their power to prevent investment and jobs from being diverted to the UK.For example, when the president of Hoover-Europe explained that, since the total remuneration costs in Scotland were 37 per cent lower than in France, it had been decided to transfer the production of vacuum cleaners from Dijon to Camberson, near Glasgow, , the French were outraged.This difference largely reflects the high social welfare costs required by French law.While British policy saw the need to keep regulatory burdens and business costs low, France denounced it as "social dumping".In this context, it will continue to apply and increase pressure on the UK to accept regulations that endanger its businesses.

Likewise, the right to exception in currency union is less impressive.It only gives us the right to exit the third stage of the monetary union, not the first or the second stage.In practice, it is open to debate how restrictive the first two stages were to the freedom of the British economy, although it was large by any measure.In addition, member states were asked to "see their economic policies as a matter of mutual concern".Guiding principles on economic policy are set by committees and councils of ministers, which then keep tabs on how member states comply with them through a mechanism called "multi-scrutiny".The committee has the power to keep a close eye on member states' public sector deficits and take action against member states if they deem the deficits "excessive".In the second stage of monetary union, its member countries must prepare for the independence of their central banks (as the United Kingdom has begun to do) and adopt and adhere to a "multi-year consistency plan" for the eventual establishment of the Currency unions adjust currencies.

Finally, each member state is required to "treat its exchange rate policy as a common interest".This creates a danger that other member states and European institutions will see the UK as obliged to rejoin the exchange rate mechanism, again subordinating its monetary policy to maintaining external parities.Although the de facto weakening of the exchange rate mechanism in 1992/93 made the future process of achieving the coherence of the Economic and Monetary Union less predictable than it was at the time of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, it may be possible to put The enlarged 15% exchange rate mechanism movement range is interpreted as "normal fluctuation range".This could allow an inner core of member states to start implementing the third phase of monetary union, only slightly later than the original timetable.The fundamental question of whether the UK has the right to exit stage three remains.Once the inner core has entered the third stage, forming the ECU bloc, there will be considerable political (and eventually legal) pressure on the UK to maintain the pound sterling and the ECU in accordance with its obligations under the second stage , thus following the interest rate of the European Currency Unit.If some member states became full members of the monetary union, the UK would have no seat on the board of the European Central Bank - the rate it sure expects us to follow.In these circumstances, the temptation is great for the UK to go ahead and participate in the third phase of monetary union.The Maastricht Treaty clearly stipulates that the third stage is "irreversible", which means that, at least under Community law, we have no right to withdraw and re-issue British currency later.This would entail a major loss of sovereignty and marked a decisive step towards Britain's immersion in the European suprastate.

Some argue that this will never happen because the breakup of the exchange rate mechanism shows the folly of fixing exchange rates in a volatile world.But this argument ignores two important issues.First, the history of wanting to accelerate the implementation of federalism in Europe shows that the objective situation.Circumstances will not dissuade the Federalists from abandoning their project.In fact, every setback to the plan only accelerated them further towards an irrevocable end.Second, it might avoid much of the instability caused by speculative flows of foreign exchange, which could be stopped by directly locking up the currency and the ECU should these speculative flows unravel the exchange rate mechanism.Of course, the consequences for weaker national economies are even more catastrophic due to the inflationary premium in the exchange rate mechanism.In due course, large regional shifts in economic activity, industrial decline, and sharp increases in unemployment in marginalized areas can, in turn, prompt large numbers of people to migrate across borders.

But we would be foolish to think that these consequences necessarily lead to the abandonment of the cause.Because good outcomes depend on the health and accountability of European democratic institutions.But the power of national political institutions is now being replaced by unified European institutions, and there is no real democratic way to check this.In any case, it is abdication of political leadership, waiting for unfavorable situations beyond people's control, and relieving people from carrying out policies that are in the long-term interest of the country. I am very concerned about the international implications of the Maastricht Treaty, which reflects my unease about it.This is almost as much reflected in my concern about the risks it poses to the UK.Although I spoke in Bruges in 1988 of the particular strength of British tradition and institutions, I was equally concerned with its impact on other European countries and the rest of the world.Ultimately, of course, it is up to the people in Germany, France, Italy and elsewhere to decide what kind of economic and political relations they want to have with each other.But it would be irresponsible, and indeed a bad European, for anyone to see these powers recklessly pursuing catastrophic goals without sounding the alarm. For the Germans to give up the Bundesmark; for the French to remain forever second-hand to their dominant eastern neighbor; for Italy to refrain from domestic political reform and look to the European Union to help it out; for Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland not to be the last It doesn't make sense to use their low labor costs effectively and instead rely on German subsidies; it doesn't make sense for Scandinavian countries to export their high social costs to other European countries instead of bringing them down.As for the ex-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, how can they be expected to coexist with regimes that impose high costs on the Community's monetary and social policies?It's hard to see them not becoming distant cousins ​​of a Delos-style European Union.Therefore, for the alliance's success, this policy brings the prospect of economic recession.For their neighbours, it creates instability.For the rest of the world, it drives them toward protectionism. For a treaty that would have done so much damage to all parties involved, the Maastricht Treaty could not even have united the Conservative Party.In fact, it has divided the Conservative Party in Parliament and in the country, losing faith in the government's discernment.Since part of our strategy is basically to prove to our partners that the UK wants to be "at the heart of Europe", trying to maintain an unsustainable sterling exchange rate within the exchange rate mechanism has led directly to a major economic downturn that might not have happened .The humiliating prospect of us leaving it has done further damage to the Conservative Party politically.All of these fundamental questions will arise again as we approach the 1996 intergovernmental conference. In November 1991, even before the full details of the Maastricht Treaty had been revealed, I fully expected that I would oppose it outright.For the reasons I have outlined above, my continued presence in the House of Commons will certainly cause further embarrassment to all concerned.Moreover, whenever a general election is held, the result may be that the overwhelming majority we had in 1987 would be reduced.It will make it harder for me to speak and vote as I mean.In any case, while I still sit in the backbench where I sat some 25 years ago - and I was quite happy as a young backbencher - I feel insecure now.The fun of being a backbencher comes from being able to speak up.However, I know that I will never be able to do this again.Every word I say will be read for or against John Major.Just showing up for meetings inhibited him, which in turn inhibited me.So I have decided to resign the seat of MP Finchley and accept a life peerage. Dennis's barony made me happy, and it made up for my ambivalence. The Conservative general election victory in April 1992 - a victory in which my achievements carried equal weight - the admirable courage of John Major and the appalling mistakes of the Labor Party, made me feel that I could again The debate about the future of Europe continues.