Home Categories Biographical memories Margaret Thatcher: The Road to Power

Chapter 55 Section 7 Labour's Nemesis

Labour's time is running out. That history, along with Harold Wilson in 1976, left Jim Callahan with a bad hand.Like a good poker player, he uses skill, player grace, and simple bragging to delay failure as long as possible so that he can bide his time and suddenly conjure up an ace or two.However, 1978 turned into 1979, and bad luck followed. On Tuesday 12 December, unions representing the NHS and local authorities rejected the 5 per cent limit on capital increases, announcing they would strike over the New Year. At the end of December, the weather was not beautiful, and there were deliberate disturbances. Snowstorms, storms, and floods hit one after another. On Wednesday, January 3, the transport workers union called a strike by truck drivers to demand a 25% wage increase. Two million workers face layoffs.Patients in hospitals, including those with advanced cancer, were left without treatment.Liverpool gravediggers strike.Rubbish piled up in Leicester Square.With the government's obedience, union shop representatives circulated permits to allow trucks carrying "vital" supplies to pass through the picket lines.In short, Britain is paralyzed.More damaging to the Labor government, however, was the fact that it handed over the management of the country to the union's local councils.

Can we seize this opportunity?This may be due in part to a program we collectively call the "Stepping Stones" codename.We have been working on this project on and off since the summer of 1977 in the utmost secrecy.It is by John.Hausken figured it out. He was a very capable demobilized soldier who was one of the first to start a computer software company.He later sold the company in order to concentrate on public affairs.Before we met with him, John had been in contact with Keith Joseph at the Center for Policy Studies.He and his colleague Norman Strauss expressed an unabashed disdain for the short-term behavior of political decision-making in general and the shadow cabinet approach in particular, an attitude that was at once fresh and sometimes exasperating.The two argued that we couldn't win if we didn't codify all our policies into one strategy.In this strategy we need to predetermine the sequence of actions to be taken.That's how the strategy got its name.When I first heard this statement, I was not impressed.We met for lunch on Fulard Street on Sunday, and I said at the end of the meeting that they ate a whole hunk of roast beef, but I don't know what the hell I got out of the conversation.Alfred Sherman, who attended the meeting, said next time they would bring sandwiches.

But in a different context, when considering long-term issues, I began to appreciate the depth and taste of John Houskenth's analysis.Ironically, given how things were going, the paper he and Norman Strauss prepared in the fall of 1977, entitled "Stepping Stones," which later served as a framework for discussion, was both persuasive and It's like a policy in itself.The theme is that union reform is our top priority; without it other aspects of the national revitalization agenda will be stymied.But only a Conservative government that wins this debate can implement this platform.In the next general election, it will not be enough to win a large majority if it is only based on dissatisfaction with the performance of the Labor government since it came to power in 1974.So instead of sidestepping the trade union issue, as many colleagues would like, we should try to open up this debate.And the debate is not scary: unions are increasingly becoming a burden on the Labor Party and, in turn, a political asset to us.With wisdom and courage, we can turn around a situation where even talking about "confrontation" is filled with feelings of withdrawal and defeat.

At the end of November 1977, I met the author in the House of Commons for drinks and dinner, and I became enthusiastic about his analysis and spoke a lot (with Keith Joseph, Angus Moder, Willie Whitelaw) .Immediately afterwards, we set up the "Stepping Stone Project" steering group and met in January 1978, recommending that shadow cabinet ministers and relevant personnel be divided into groups to formulate plans to promote this strategy through speeches, pamphlets, and writing articles.There is also a "Policy Exploration" group, made up of stronger and more reliable cabinet members, including Keith Joseph, David Howell, Nigel Lawson, Norman Lamont, who joined John Howe Skens worked with Norman Strauss to develop policy recommendations within the general theme of the "Stepping Stones Project".

But before carrying out this plan, it is first confronted with skeptical or hostile colleagues. At the end of January I convened a Leadership Steering Committee meeting.At the meeting our arguments stalled.Colleagues applauded the "Stepping Stone Project" paper, but warned that nothing more should be done—a famous avoidance technique.We should avoid being "too obtuse or controversial" (Francis Pym), we are "against appeasement and confrontation, but there should be a third way" (John Paton).Peter Thornycroft, Ian Gilmore, Jim Pryor all expressed a degree of skepticism.John Davy was candid when he said that "if we were honest about the unions, we would lose the election".

Chris Patton once submitted a paper to the conference, expressing doubts about the "stepping stone project".His basic inclination is that as an opposition party, he should adopt a pragmatic attitude rather than act in accordance with ideology, which is beyond doubt.However, I agree with the authors of the "Stepping Stones Project" that strategy alone is not enough to transform Britain.The majority at the meeting grasped at the straw offered by Krice's paper, expressing a foolish desire to unify the ideas of Parton-Hauskens.I had to submit.Actually they want to kill the Stepping Stones project, but I won't allow it.

It took a month to get Project Stepping Stone back on track.But even at this time Chris Patton's work is "parallel" and people who oppose it, such as Jim Pryor and Ian Gilmore, are still in charge of several very important "research groups" .John Houskenth had hoped to persuade Jim Pryor to forge a new course on the trade union question, and Jim promised to speak on the "Stepping Stone Project", but when he delivered, there was no new development in his attitude.Although the Policy Research Group produced some useful ideas (some not so good), it failed to address the important issue of wage policy, and by the end of the summer of 1978 the entire Stepping Stones project had ground to a halt.Nor has it had any impact on the drafting of the election manifesto: if a general election campaign is held in October, the election manifesto will offer few important measures for trade union reform.

The collapse of the government's 5% capital increase policy in the fall of the same year revived the "Stepping Stones Program".The Labor Party Conference refused to accept the Government's wages policy and Keith Joseph immediately came to see Willie Whitelow and me to express his disappointment that we had not gone on.There have been suggestions on various occasions to replace Jim Pryor, and the timing is clear to move forward without taking such drastic steps.In mid-November I then scheduled a Stepping Stones Steering Group meeting. At this and subsequent meetings, Jim was still able to block the proposal for a second vigorous campaign on the union question that winter.Peter.Sonny Croft strongly supported him.Peter was never a friend of Project Stepping Stones: at one point he even suggested that all Project Stepping Stones report closing headquarters be burned down.Nevertheless, opinion within the party began to turn in my direction.Without the industrial chaos of a "winter of discontent", no amount of discussion would be enough to persuade cabinet members, advisers, and MPs to seriously consider trade union reform.

Even then they need leadership.In this regard we have made very little progress since 1975.The position Jim Pryor occupies as shadow employment spokesman could easily veto new policy on union reform.Although on Christmas Eve 1978 we persuaded him to agree to an extension of our policy.i.e. funding union states that voluntarily hold secret ballots - we'll provide cash for pre-strike voting costs and union election costs - it doesn't really mean much.Indeed, to the average voter, our secret ballot policy was indistinguishable from Labour's policy: in November 1978 the Prime Minister proposed that unions could legislate on secret ballots if they so wished.

I spent Christmas and New Years in Scotney with anxiety, watching the crisis grow.Like Christmas 1974, the bad weather kept us from going for our usual walks.And I have a lot to do.I read the papers on unions sent in by various policy groups, and I brought along a big bag of news summaries and information summaries from interested outsiders.I spent many hours studying industrial relations law textbooks, going back and reading the original laws of Parliament, reading through the most important legislation since 1906.Every time I turn on the radio or TV, I get worse news.I returned to London with one resolution: the time had come for a tough policy on trade unions.

Finding a podium to speak was not difficult.Before Christmas I had agreed to be interviewed by Brian Walden on Sunday 14th January on Weekend World; I moved the date up a week to 7th January.When I arrived in London in the New Year, I met with Alfred Sherman, Gordon Reese and several other close advisers who continued to brief me.Things change fast in the industry and it's hard to keep up, but it will be very beneficial for me to have the latest facts at my fingertips in the next few weeks. On Wednesday, January 3, Jim Pryor stepped in to intervene in policy change.In a radio interview with Robin Day, he strongly opposed mandatory votes before strikes ("It's something that cannot be forced anyway"), refused to legislate on strikers' subsidies, and commented on non-union members not being able to hire "The Closed Factory" said: "We want to deal with this quietly... It's better to be quiet than to make a big deal about this kind of thing." David Howell and Michael Heseltine asked him about When asked about criticism from union leaders, he said: "I don't think their criticism is fair to union leaders, who are currently making good proposals to their members, who are often saying no." In Weekend World "I have a very different tune." With any power comes responsibility, and with any freedom comes duty.Unions have had (and have had) enormous power for many years... (and) that's what needs to be debated - how unions use their power.I am a member of Congress and I am not in Parliament to give them a license to damage, destroy, injure others with impunity from the law, if I see this happening I have to act. " Although I note that we do not make firm commitments to concrete measures until they have been fully considered, Brian Walden and I have enumerated the possible changes, which are, of course, ahead of the schedule my colleagues would like.I reiterated what Jim Pryor announced that we will raise funds for secret ballots and union elections before the strike.But I'm implying to enforce it if necessary.I raised the possibility of a law denying social security if a vote is not held before a strike.I also mentioned that it is possible to limit strikes in important industries.I announced that we would include short-term social security income in taxes and that workers in "closed factories" facing unemployment due to strikes would have the right to appeal. The next day, Jim Pryor responded to my interview on TV.He said there was no agreement between us on social security benefits for strikers, and he opposed mandatory secret ballots.Thankfully, others have responded much more positively.I left the team.People saw that I was going to fight.Messages of support and new ideas were pouring into my office. Most meaningfully, I received a request from Lord George Brown, the former Deputy Leader of the Labor Party, to invite me to a conference. He came to my office in the House of Representatives on Wednesday, January 10, and drove to Scotney for further talks on Saturday.George Brown has more knowledge and experience of the labor movement than almost any current leader - that is to say including the leaders of the unions and the Labor Party.He quit the Labor Party in 1976 (as an independent member of the House of Lords staff), he was increasingly hostile to the power of trade unions and published powerful newspaper articles. He told me how the hard left entered some of Britain's most important trade unions that have influenced and held positions of influence and power. He said that the immunity granted to trade unions by legislation since 1906 was being exploited in a new and ruthless way. Changes that need to be accounted for. My interview at Weekend World and the outpouring of support I received contrasted sharply with Jim Callahan's reaction to his speech three days after his return from the Guadeloupe summit.His going abroad at such a time of crisis is politically damaging in itself, reinforcing the impression that the government is paralyzed in the face of the strike.The press coverage of the summit did him no favors, and the prime minister sat in the Caribbean sun with other leaders, all dressed casually, a sight that contrasted dangerously with events at home.But the ultimate disaster was the impression he made on the press when he landed at Heathrow.Although he did not use such phrases—"crisis? What crisis?"—the myth faithfully reflected his attempt to narrow things down.His unhurried and capable image was never restored. I later reflected on why Jim Callahan, the shrewdest of politicians, stumbled into this mistake.No doubt this was partly due to the weariness of the transatlantic flight.This brings me to a lesson that will always be in my heart: do not make public remarks after a long time abroad or upon arrival from a long trip.But there were deeper roots to his missteps.Indeed, I always thought it was some kind of retribution.Jim Callahan has built his entire political career on an alliance with the leaders of the main church.It's been a winning formula for him, if not for the country.The union can no longer be appeased now, but he has no other policies in his pocket.Only this explanation can explain why he was overwhelmed by the crisis) and reacted impotently in the face of the crisis.The government cannot even take the decision to declare a state of emergency.I have seen in the cabinet of Ted Heath's government that the effect of declaring a state of emergency can be very limited.Another option for the government is to try to reach an agreement with the unions on a voluntary basis to limit the influence of the pickets, but this is clearly futile. What do we do next? Parliament will resume on January 15.I wrote to the Prime Minister asking for a full statement and debate on the industry situation.We have already scheduled a program on the party's political radio for Wednesday, January 17, and the drafting of the speeches has already begun. My speech for the debate was perhaps the most exhaustive preparation I have ever made for an appearance in the House of Commons.A few months ago, I had someone else prepare a speech for a no-confidence vote debate: it was unsuccessful, and I have since resolved not to borrow others' hands for important occasions.And I don't need to write a full-text manuscript, it's better for me to use an outline to speak.When I prepare my speech, it is like making a tax list, estimating my financial resources, marking them with colored pencils, and drafting a few pages of handwritten speech outlines. As long as I glance at them at the stage, it can prompt me to outline the framework of my speech.Colleagues from the frontbench and backbench have also come to help me, some with information about their constituencies, some with a legal perspective, especially Ian Rancival and Leon Britton.Affected companies sent faxes with their latest news; the Confederation of British Industry sent daily news summaries; Dennis told me the plethora of news he heard every day; we all read the papers carefully. My initial thought was to make a slamming, but basically traditional speech from the Opposition's point of view, beating the government and asking it to change course.But after my weekend at Scotney on January 13-14 and my return to London on Monday, several people urged me to take a different approach.Bod Utley and Peter Thornycroft wrote to me suggesting that if the government were to change the legislation to break down the union bastion, I could speak in support of it.Ronnie Miller and Chris Patton, who are preparing the party's political broadcast speeches, have also floated the same idea. My own immediate thought is to avoid proposing cooperation, and there are several reasons for this.First, unlike my coalition-minded colleagues, I believe that the task of the opposition party in general is to be in opposition.Our thinking is fundamentally different from that of the government, and our main task is to convince the people of our country that our thinking is desirable.Secondly, in fact, we haven't figured out whether we want the government to accept our expressed desire for cooperation, or whether we want the government to reject our expression.Expressing a desire to cooperate before thinking through the issue is dangerous.It is likely that Jim Callahan's government would not or could not accept anything that went to the heart of the matter.Therefore, in order for our gestures to be credible, we need to set our goals low on reform measures.And if the government does accept our offer, we have to lose, at least temporarily, the chance of driving it out of government.Also, changing trade union law alone is not enough to solve Britain's deep-seated economic problems: addressing them requires a more comprehensive strategy, which socialists are unlikely to agree to. On the evening of Monday, January 15th, I called a steering committee meeting.Most of my senior colleagues were in favor of conditional offers of cooperation, and at this time I was approaching the idea myself.The important thing is to reform, and if the government is going to introduce reform measures, how can we oppose it?Showing that offering help increases our moral authority.Like most of those who favor the idea, I believe our position will be moderated, fully justified, and unlikely to be accepted by the government.The details are hard to judge: Labor could be persuaded to agree to negotiate a ban on strikes in key industries, agree to taxpayer-funded secret union ballots, and perhaps even agree to guidelines for the abolition of sympathetic picketing, though It is doubtful whether one can agree with the last point.Likewise, I know that if the government accepts our offer, we will need to keep our promises in order to preserve our honor.Agreed to express a desire to work with the government on some selective measures that would be difficult for Jim Pryor and his supporters to refuse support should a Conservative government take them in the future. The outcome of the meeting was that the Steering Committee agreed that if the government was on picket lines (to ensure the flow of vital goods), enacted legislation to abolish sympathy picketing, encourage trade union elections by secret ballot, and if the government committed to Negotiations, the government can trust the Conservative Party to support.The evolution of worldly affairs is a strong proponent. The next day, it was up to me to present the debate.I began by describing the shape of the crisis: widespread obstruction of overland movement of goods, in many cases as a result of sympathetic picketing against companies not directly involved in the dispute.British Rail issued a simple statement: "No trains today." The Confederation of British Industry reported that many companies had been suffocated because they lacked raw materials or could not deliver products.Ports are also chaotic, causing difficulties for exporters.At least 120,000 people have been laid off, and the number may reach 1 million by the end of the week.In particular, the food industry is in disarray, and basic raw materials such as cooking oil, yeast, salt, sugar, etc. are increasingly in short supply.And there was the strike last winter, the truck drivers' strike, the bakers' strike, the nursing home and hospital workers' strike, the news broadcasters' strike, the airport and auto factory strikes, the gravediggers' strike. I went out of my way to attack in my statement.I expounded on the point George Brown made to me, that unions were increasingly dominated by leftists.I remind the great moderate Shelley Williams, who participated in the picket line at Glenwick.I made a conditional statement of support for the government that the Steering Committee endorsed, and I made a condition of cooperation that the government take action on "closed factories"; I feel very deeply about this issue.must be included. The Prime Minister then spoke, and he began in startling fashion: I congratulate this esteemed lady for her most effective performance in Parliament, her manner of debating has been excellent, with a demeanor which this esteemed lady should be proud of. " The beginning is good.But all the prime minister could offer in his speech was more concessions to unions - impunity for capital increases above 5 per cent, tighter price controls, an extension of the "salary differential" principle so that public sector workers could be expected to increase income.All these expressions are intended to entice unions to sign up to a new wage policy.But he made no mention of the excessive power of trade unions, which everyone but the far left sees as a major problem. The Prime Minister did not respond directly to my statement.His foothold is definitely good.The question now is whether I repeat my statement on our party's political radio show the next night, or simply attack the government's paralysis by saying a Conservative government will reform trade union legislation. I still didn't feel at ease, and the next day I stepped up my speech.After all, we have made a statement, and the higher our profile, the more binding we are on my reluctant colleagues, the more public support we have.So we went ahead and started filming my speech in my room in the House. time to now.The whole political climate has changed.Before Brian Walden interviewed me we were a few percentage points behind Labor in the polls, we are now 20 points ahead.One could sense our willingness to take on union militants.To take on union militants, which was a burden to us before, is now an advantage.Within the Shadow Cabinet, opposition to the ideas of Keith Joseph, Geoffrey Howe and myself from Jim Pryor, Ian Gilmour and others was also effectively suppressed, at least at the time, as far as Personally, I am not without the strange realization that I instinctively feel attuned to the majority of the nation, both when I speak and how I feel in general.Moments like this cannot be forgotten because they are rare.This moment must be seized to change history.
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