Chapter 53 SECTION 5 1978 WITHOUT ELECTIONS

Not only was 1978 a year of immigration, it was also a politically difficult year for the opposition.Economic conditions have improved thanks to some fiscal measures under pressure from the International Monetary Fund. In January 1978, the inflation rate fell below 10% for the first time since 1974, and it continued to decline.Unemployment also fell gradually from its peak in August 1977, although there was a sharp increase in the summer of 1978, with 1.3 million unemployed in December of that year, 120,000 fewer than the previous year.With the support of the Liberal Party, we succeeded in forcing a penny reduction in the base rate of income tax: but this in itself may reduce the economic shadow which has so much unpopularized Labor, and to us favorable.

We suspect that Jim Callahan wants to follow a path of incremental improvements leading up to the fall elections, campaigning on a "safety first" platform.A big hurdle in his path has been the realization by the Liberal Party that a Liberal-Labor coalition is politically a disaster for the Liberal Party.But to end the alliance with the Labor Party, they have to face at least the possible consequences of supporting the Labor Party in the general election. They are unwilling to face such consequences, so the idea of ​​​​breaking up with the Labor Party has also weakened.As for the polls, Labor was almost tied with us in the summer) although we outpaced Labour in August-September, they were 5 points ahead of us in September-October (after the difficult Conservative Party conference) and the Liberals fell short double digits.

In this context, I have tasked people with drafting an election manifesto, written by Chris Patton and the Department of Research, based on an initial draft drawn up by the Shadow Speaker. I read the manuscript in July and was not impressed.To appeal to various interest groups, the draft lays out costly promises that obscure what should be clear and concise themes.I said that the next draft must emphasize several central topics, such as tax cuts, strengthening the internal and external defense of the country.Meet these commitments first, and only complete other commitments that require money if you have spare capacity.In fact, I've been reminded how little real progress we've made in analyzing the situation and formulating policy during our three years in office.I disagree with this view.If we continue to think this way, how can we change the country?

It is encouraging to see a change in the party's propaganda work.Gordon Reese is back as the party's central propaganda minister.Putting Tim Bell and Saatchi-Satchi on account of party propaganda through Gordon; this is an important starting point in our political operations.It goes without saying that I know that in order to get our message across we need the best people on the side.There is no problem with the promotional content being designed by the publicity department.But politicians need to resist the temptation to assume they are experts in areas in which they have no experience.I often decline to make suggestions for promoting taste or sensory effects, and I leave the creative work to the specialists.From the beginning I found Tim Bell, Saatchi's deacon, who was in charge of the accounts, very cooperative.Like Gordon, he has a sense of politics as well as a sense of humor.When I first met Tim I laid out the basis for our partnership and I said, "Politicians usually have a lot of toes and you have to be careful not to step on those toes. However, I don't have toes and you have to tell me the truth ."certainly.I'm not that self-restraining in practice.

Saatchi & Co breathed new life into the party's exhausted broadcasting model.Inevitably it will be accused of being indecent and overly simplistic.But the judgment of the party's political broadcast should not be based on the comments of party loyalists, but on whether ordinary viewers with no strong sense of politics choose this program or dial to other channels, and whether it wins the audience's attention pity.In this regard, the change in our approach to outreach has resulted in a great improvement. In the summer of 1978 we launched a campaign to put up the "Labor Party is dead" poster. This campaign was more important than the work done for the 1979 general election.Tim, Gordon and Ronnie Miller came to Scotney on a Saturday in June 19-78 to run a campaign on this topic for my approval.This is another new attempt.Unemployment, although approaching 1.5 million, is usually "Labor's problem".Our posters are full of pictures, using words and a picture of a long line waiting for relief to depict unemployment.That said, we chose topics that we wouldn't normally use as the subject of a movement, like the welfare state, where Labor is generally thought to have the upper hand - and this poster also shatters the notion that in party propaganda Your opponent should not be mentioned directly in the .However, the Saatchi company understands and convinces me that this can be disregarded in such party propaganda.Designed to undermine the confidence of our political opponents, posters should therefore be limited to conveying a simple negative message.

In general, the government works better during the summer recess, when politics cool down.The campaign we've engineered will keep politics hot, and there's no doubt there will be a strong reaction.So after much discussion I agreed to start this movement. As expected, the movement has reverberated.Dennis Healy lashed out.But the more Labor denounces it, the more effective our propaganda will be.The press had to print our posters just to illustrate the issues at issue, thus amplifying the effect of our propaganda.It was so successful that we ran a series of campaigns on other themes, each with the Labor Party saying "it's dead". After the autumn of 1978, our political image was better than expected, and our position continued to strengthen during September and October, one of the reasons being the effect of propaganda.This has some implications for influencing the prime minister's decision on whether to call a general election.

Only Jim Callahan can say exactly why he didn't order a general election that fall.Of course, I expected him to order a general election, especially after his speech at the annual meeting of the trade union meeting, at the end of which he sang inappropriately "That's me, waiting at the church..." The mocking tone refused to tell people what he would do.Two days later, on Thursday 7th September, I was visiting Birmingham when a call from Downing Street told me that in the Prime Minister's radio address that evening (we know the schedule) Jim Callaghan would announce no Hold a general election.

I respect this secret tip given to me in advance.We actually didn't even tell the campaign at our headquarters.I was emotionally unbalanced at the time, knowing that there would be no general election in the near future, and receiving exciting well wishes from supporters who didn't know there would be no general election.When I was visiting a technical training center, workers from the opposite factory came out to wave to me and shout: "Maggie, good luck to you".I try to restrain myself and go about my schedule quietly while considering the correct response. The Prime Minister's message has been a disservice to people, and I feel the same way.But I know others will feel even more frustrated, working around the clock, giving every indication that this will be a close contest, and putting the party on the alert.Later that night, I called Tim Bell to find out how he and Gordon Reese were feeling.In fact.The two went to a west London restaurant to drink champagne and refresh themselves.I had apparently just woken Jim up from sleep.I asked where I could find Gordon, and suddenly he said "God, my house was burglarized".Yes, he was stolen.He reluctantly walked to the bed and went to bed, not noticing that the house had been stolen.

The following evening, I used the time allocated to the Leader of the Opposition on the radio program to answer the Prime Minister's radio address.Ironically, given what happened after his speech, the Prime Minister attempted to defend himself by saying that he had not sought a new mandate because the general election would do nothing to improve the situation in the coming winter.I replied: "However, some of us are looking further ahead than this winter. We don't believe that the UK needs to grind in the lowest gear. The more delays the worse, and the worse it will take longer to straighten up. But I Believe that once we have a government with confidence, things will get better. The people have confidence, confidence comes from the people; the government needs authority at home, and the government needs authority abroad."

Can we win the 1978 election?I believe we can enter government with a narrow majority.But it only takes one or two mistakes and we lose the election.And, if we win, what happens next?The Labor government's wage policy has been dismantled, the trade union has voted against renewing the social contract - and next month's Labor annual conference will vote to reject any wage growth cap, so the fig leaf has been ripped off.The Ford auto workers' strike has shown that the government's 5% "capital increase standard" can no longer solve the problem.Years of distortions in prices and wages and emotional bruises are playing out in a climate of discontent and unrest, as was the case with the Heath government.

If we had been faced with this situation in the winter of 1978-1979, we would have been crushed, as eventually the Labor government was crushed.First, I will insist that all negotiations on "standards" and "limits" must be withdrawn immediately.Such a move would be deeply unpopular and perhaps unacceptable to most shadow cabinet members, for reasons I will explain later.Second, even if we adopt cash constraints in the public sector and market constraints in the private sector rather than some sort of wage policy, the danger of disruptive strikes is high.We will not be given a mandate to limit the power of trade unions, as we were the following year, and it is likely that the three-day week introduced in 1974 will only reinforce in the public mind the impression that the Conservative government was provocative He was defeated by the trade union. Without the horrors of the winter of 1978-1979, without the exposure of the essence of socialism, the achievements of the 1980s would have been much more difficult. After all, we can wait.While I cannot claim that I foresaw what was to come, I believe the basic attitude of the Labor Party cannot be sustained.In exchange for the consent of union leaders to limit wages, the Labor government implemented an economic policy of expanding state control, reducing the scope of private enterprise and expanding the power of trade unions.If this strategy is implemented to a certain extent, it will collapse.Union leaders and the Labor left will see that their power has been strengthened and they are no longer interested in capping wage growth.Nor will unionists answer the call to make sacrifices for policies that have clearly failed.The overall economic impact of socialist policies would be such that Britain would fall further and further behind its competitors in terms of productivity and living standards.After a certain level, this can no longer deceive the masses, the foreign exchange market and foreign investors.But if it is assumed that the basic mechanisms of a liberal political and economic system are still functioning, then socialism will collapse.And that's exactly what happened that winter.