Chapter 45 Section 2 East and West

One of the first foreign politicians I met as leader of the Conservative Party was President Gerald Ford's secretary of state, Henry Kissinger.My admiration for Dr. Kissinger has grown over the years, and—though from different perspectives—our analyzes of international events have increasingly converged.However, at this time I was uneasy about the direction of the West's policy towards the Soviet Union, of which he was recognized as the mastermind. I do recognize the significance of Richard Nixon's "opening to China" in his power game with the Soviets.This was an important part of the victory of the Cold War, which permanently separated China from the Soviet Union.As for the "connection problem"—that is, the recognition of the link between one problem and another in bilateral relations between states, it is, in Henry Kissinger's own words, "the creation of a network of rewards and punishments to produce the most favorable The result"—in my opinion, that prospect was marred by the weakening of President Nixon's domestic standing by Watergate.I am extremely skeptical of the "détente" strategy.

My gut feeling is that détente is a soothing loanword that masks the ugly reality that plain English would expose.It is difficult to see the difference between appeasement and détente.It was introduced against the background of the election of a Congress controlled by ultra-liberal Democrats after Watergate, the paralysis of the United States, and the collapse of South Vietnam.While people worship the concept, it would be a lack of caution to bluntly attack it, but I've come as close to doing so as I can.This not only reflects my liking for blunt speech, but also because I am convinced that many people in the West are being deluded into thinking that their way of life is in fact being mortally threatened, yet they think they are safe and secure.

The first condition for confronting and defeating this threat is that the European Union should have insight into what is happening; the second and no less important condition is that we should muster the will to change it.Even with Britain's precarious economic situation we still have the means to fight back as part of NATO and led by the US.But we cannot imagine that this will always be the case.Sometimes declines—not relative but absolute, not confined to one domain but in economic, military, political, and psychological domains—may become irreversible.Urgent action is required, and with urgency comes risk.Accordingly, my first major foreign affairs speech was a risk.

Developments continued to confirm my analysis. The defense white paper of the Labor Party government announced in March that it would cut the defense budget by 4.7 billion pounds in the next 10 years.That same month, Alexander Shelepin, the former head of the KGB, now in charge of the "trade unions" in the Soviet Union, arrived in Britain as a guest of the trade union meeting, and the following month Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese communists in various chaotic scenes, leaving the U.S. added trouble.Cuban "advisors" are beginning to arrive in Angola to support the communist faction of the People's Liberation Movement of Angola there.However, what triggered my decision to speak was what I had heard and read about the preparations for the Helsinki summit.

The idea of ​​convening the Helsinki Conference came from the Soviets, was warmly welcomed by Chancellor Brandt's West Germany as a contribution to the New Oriental Policy, and was then accepted by the Nixon administration and included in its agenda. To bring the Soviets into talks to reduce their military superiority in Europe—a mutually balanced reduction in force—and to respect the human rights of their peoples.But what did the Soviets want?This is the most intriguing question because, as the skeptics suspect, they are not going to live up to the agreement they signed, so unless something important to them is going to happen, they won't Go find this trouble.Dignity may be the only answer.The Soviet Union and its satellite states—particularly some of the potentially more vulnerable regimes in Eastern Europe—may have felt safer if they had received international recognition.

But do we want them to feel more secure?Arguably, one of the most exploitable weaknesses of a totalitarian dictatorship is its paranoia of feeling insecure because the regime itself is not approved by the people and thus inefficient or even incapable of making decisions.If the Soviets felt more secure, if the dignity afforded them greater access to credit and technology, if they were treated with tolerant respect rather than suspicious hostility, how would they take advantage of these advantages? This of course leads to the next question: what were the underlying motives of the Soviet Union?If the Soviet leaders were rational, perhaps a little rigid, but open to persuasion, not unlike the political elites of our countries, then a de-escalation of tensions with the West would indeed lead to a more peaceful and stable world.The problem is that no one who really understands the Soviet system believes this is the case.That system is based on an ideology that shapes every individual and institution within that system, in subtle or crude ways.Evidence of this is its ruthlessness towards the small minority who dare to speak out against it.The fate of dissidents is not just something to arouse sympathy or outrage in the West: it is a statement about the nature and aims of a system that sees them as a grave threat to its existence.But to know the truth about the Soviet Union it is not necessary to listen to Alexander Solzhenitsyn—although, as I will recount, his words had a powerful influence on me.One need only turn to the dull article in Pravda to confirm how the Soviet leadership viewed détente and the resulting initiative for the Helsinki Conference:

Peaceful coexistence does not signal the end of the struggle between the two world social systems.This struggle will continue...until the complete and final victory of Communism on a world scale. [Pravda, August 22, 1973] In other words, there will be no relaxation in developing Soviet power and communist revolutions around the world.If this statement is a true reflection of Soviet intentions - and there is ample evidence that it is - any lessening of external pressure on the Soviets will only give them more means and opportunities to "bury us" result. If I were to challenge accepted wisdom on these issues, I would need expert help.But most specialists have seized the easy and lucrative opportunity of Soviet studies, gaining official approval, busying themselves with exchanges with "approved" Soviet academics and the press, and being extremely professionally smug.However, I heard from John O'Sullivan of the Daily Telegraph that there was a man named Robert Conquest, a British historian and bold critic of the Soviet Union.I asked him to help me and together we wrote the speech I gave at Chelsea on Saturday 26 July 1975; this was only arranged a few days before the event.I did not speak to Reggie Maudlin or anyone else in the shadow cabinet about this up front as I knew that would only invite dissuasion and admonishment and would undoubtedly be leaked - especially if something went wrong Wrong words.

I began my remarks by placing the enormous military power imbalance between the West and the Soviet Union in the context of the retreat of Western power.I drew attention in particular to the growth of Soviet naval power, pointing out that the Soviet Navy as a global power possessed more nuclear submarines than the rest of the navies of the world combined, and more surface ships The need to protect the coast and merchant ships of the Soviet Union.I argued that nothing was more important to our security than America's obligations to Europe, and went on to say that an isolationist Britain would encourage an isolationist America.

I went on to discuss the upcoming Helsinki summit.I'm not attacking détente directly, I'm actually asking for "real" détente.But I quote Leonid Brezhnev's June 1972 speech to illustrate the real intentions of the Soviets.Brezhnev once asserted that peaceful coexistence "by no means means that the ideological struggle may be relaxed. On the contrary, we must prepare for the fact that this struggle will intensify and become an even sharper form of confrontation between different systems Prepare". We have long known that human rights will be the subject of a far-reaching verbal understanding in the so-called "third basket" of the Helsinki package - "Cooperation in humanitarian and other fields".But I don't trust the sincerity of the Soviets: indeed, since their whole system rests on repression, it's hard to see how they could possibly abide by the agreement.I think for many of those in Helsinki - and not just those on the communist side - the commitment to human rights may be seen as rhetoric rather than a clear condition that must be strictly scrutinized .So I specifically mention:

We must work for a real de-escalation of tension, but in our negotiations with the Eastern Bloc we must not accept words or gestures as real de-escalation.The rhetoric from the summit will mean nothing unless Soviet leaders show that their established attitudes are indeed beginning to change. That's why we strongly support those European and American speakers ,) who insist that unless at least some progress is seen in the free exchange of people and ideas, there will be little significant progress on the road to a solid peace of. The reaction to this speech confirmed that I was a loner.The Helsinki Accords were widely welcomed.I can imagine those intelligent people shaking their heads at my impulsiveness and indiscretion.Reggie Maudlin immediately came to see me on Fllard Street, annoyed that I had given such a speech without consulting him, the content of which he did not agree with.I didn't budge.Indeed, Mr. Brezhnev's apparent satisfaction with the achievements of the Helsinki conference convinced me to return to this subject: he described it as "a necessary summary of the political end of the Second World War".In other words he saw it - and perhaps fully including the promise not to change Europe's borders except "by peaceful means and by agreement" - as recognizing and legitimizing Soviet control of Eastern Europe.They got Eastern Europe by force and deceit at the end of the war.

The Helsinki summit of 1975 is now viewed with approval because dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe used the terms of the agreement as a platform for their long-running struggle against communism.And, in fact, by making human rights a treaty obligation rather than domestic legislation, it gives dissidents leverage that they can leverage.Their courage, however, would have been almost insignificant without the renewed resolve and defenses of the West, especially the United States, that followed.These practices prevented the expansion of Soviet communism, which had previously made them feel psychologically that expansion was a historical necessity.Expansion gave them a psychological force about their historical inevitability.This pincer movement—a reinvigorated West and dissidents—didn't just negate the gains the Soviets had gained from Helsinki, namely increased legitimacy and greater recognition by the West.Without this movement, Helsinki would be just another step on the road to failure. After I delivered my speech in Helsinki, I did not receive an invitation to visit the Soviet Union.This is not surprising.Such invitations may be received if the leader of the opposition party is someone else.But I feel it is important to deepen my understanding of the communist system in practice.So when I was invited to visit Romania I accepted.I already know something about this country, acquired when I was Education Secretary.As improbable as it seemed, a regular Anglo-Romanian educational seminar had developed, held annually in Bucharest and Cambridge, alternately.My Romanian exchange partner is Mircia Marita, a brilliant mathematician.Like other "cultural" events under communism, these seminars had a largely political and diplomatic purpose.Having said that, I don't think I have any doubts about the cultural wealth of Romania itself - not just Bucharest, known as the "Paris of the Balkans" (before Ceausescu's self-important 1980s late devastation of architectural plans), but also the gleaming and brightly colored Bukovina Monastery Church, which I visited in September 1971.Not surprisingly, the Romanians were eager to continue edifying me after I became leader of the opposition, and that served my purpose for the time being. I visited Romania for the second time in early September 1975, when it occupied a unique place in the communist world.Nicolae Ceausescu, following in the footsteps of his (already disreputable) predecessor Gheorghe Dej, had charted a path for Romania to independence within the Warsaw Pact; for example, in 1968 he visited Prague , with apparent sincerity, expressed support for the Polish reform movement and vehemently condemned Russia's suppression of it.At the time I also shared the general Western view that Romania should be given cautious support in the hope that its example might lead to further fragmentation within Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe.In effect, Ceausescu was playing a ruthless game that at any moment he saw fit, ethnic tensions (with Hungary), East-West rivalry (between NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and communism Competition within the world (between the USSR and China) was exploited. Between my two conversations with Ceausescu in 1971 and 1975 he had further strengthened his position.Although he had become the de facto leader in 1965, it was not until 1974 that he combined the responsibilities of party leader and head of state and government.From then on he indulged his political fantasies even more freely.What we in the West don't fully appreciate is that Ceausescu was both a throwback to Stalinism and its methods, and in fact a rentback to more traditional Balkan absolutism, the rise and fall of his family. The display of wealth and power is the ornament of the latter essence.Ceausescu himself has never seemed to me to be a remarkable figure, a cold and unfunny man who spews a stream of statistics and behaves artificially and formally.We discussed the Soviet threat, and he gave me a lengthy account of Romania's astonishing economic success, which was later faithfully reflected in the guides, diplomats, and factory managers' presentations.He is especially proud of the level of "investment", which must have dwarfed the West, as a share of national income.In practice, of course, misguided investment is a typical feature of a planned economy; it is in this that Romania is misguided more than any other country, and its people, with the exception of the ruling elite, live in poverty . I was also shown around a scientific institute specializing in polymer research.My guide was none other than Elena Ceausescu, who had already begun to indulge in a personal fantasy world as absurd as her husband's, but with different human consequences: she was determined to Work on polymers won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry.As it turned out later, she could barely tell what was a polymer and what was a polygon.But thanks to the fortification of translators and long speeches, she gives a fairly good performance. In other respects, however, Romania does display more characteristics about the communist system.I visited a factory and heard a flurry of talk about the company's achievements from the people in charge—I presume they were management people.I said, "That's interesting, but can I talk to the union leaders here? Maybe they might want to add a few words." Their faces were full of surprise. "That's us!" they replied.What individual factory workers—or, indeed, neighbors whose houses the factory is sending puffs of thick brown smoke over their houses—might have to say is another matter.For Romania's trade unions, as in highly developed socialist countries, are political rather than industrial institutions. A little later I had dinner with members of the Romanian "Parliament".It was explained to me that in order to stand for parliamentary elections one must first be a member of an approved, that is, a reliable communist trade union.They showed me a list of about 35 such institutions.As I looked down, "Beekeepers' Union" caught my eye.This opportunity is irresistible.I started asking them questions in a serious way.How powerful is the beekeepers group in parliament?Who is its leader?What about factions?Is there an anti-beekeeper faction?The night passed quietly, more quickly than usual. A final practical lesson for me is to assume that someone is always overhearing you, something any Western politician or businessman visiting the Eastern Bloc is amply told to remember as soon as possible.This is annoying for someone like me who is only in the country for a few days. Ceausescu's Romania has long since reflected this in an advanced form, though for me and my entourage it was more of a laughable affair than a tragedy.I was told long ago at the British embassy that one of our diplomats was anxious to find a nanny for his young child and did not know how to place a suitable advertisement in Romanian newspapers, and they decided that the easiest and surest way was to Talked to a surprised friend on the embassy phone about his urgent request.Apparently, without embarrassment, a Romanian official suggested a candidate in the course of a slight conversation on a very different subject. Richard Ryder and I were put up at the State Guest House.Interestingly, there is an open wooden lattice window in the ceiling of the living room, no doubt for ventilation, but probably for other purposes as well.I can't get the TV to work when I want to listen to the news.Richard's attempts to do so were unsuccessful.Someone knocked on the door while we were fiddling and it was the hotel staff who helped us get it right. Even before this visit, I had few illusions about the oppressive nature of the regime.Regardless of what the West's strategic interests may demand, I firmly believe that pressure to increase respect for human rights should be sustained, especially while the ink on the Helsinki accords is still wet.The group of Romanians in exile in Britain learned that I was about to visit and sent me a list of five political prisoners, begging me to strongly demand their release.I immediately agreed to do so.But somehow the Foreign Office got wind of it and tried to dissuade me firmly on the grounds that it would alienate Ceausescu in a senseless way.A senior civil servant himself pointed out why my intentions were highly ill-advised.His words did not impress me.In Bucharest I gave that list to the Romanians and said that these people were wrongly imprisoned and must be released.I was glad to see they were released later. Undoubtedly the most important foreign trip I made in 1975 - and probably the most significant of my tenure as Leader of the Opposition - was the visit to the United States in September.Of course, I already knew something about America; and I liked and admired most of what I knew.However.It was the first time I had the opportunity to meet all the leading political figures there, and to do so on somewhat equal terms.I was assured that the media would pay full attention to this, although this was mainly for the depressing reason that British shares had fallen in rare cases.American newspapers, magazines and television programs are focusing on the precipitous decline of the British economy, the growth of trade union power, the expansion of the socialist state and the perceived collapse of national self-confidence.Besides the schadenfreude, there is clearly some nagging worry that the United States itself, after the fall of Vietnam and the trauma of Watergate, is suffering from a different kind of deep crisis and that it might meet the same fate as Britain . I discussed the situation with Norman Lamont, an early supporter, working alongside Ross Childs, who enabled him to keep me informed about what was going on in the City of England and abroad.He had just returned from the United States, where he spoke to politicians, officials and opinion makers.I got the impression, and it turned out to be correct, that the Ford government's confidence had begun to increase modestly, making them all the more concerned about what was happening in the UK.The prime minister has been to Washington recently and he has done little to change the perception of the state of affairs in Britain.All our difficulties he claims are greatly exaggerated.A different and more serious attitude is expected.I am determined to have this attitude. Gordon Reese flew to New York ahead of me to make media arrangements.He called me just before I left London to say that expectations for my trip were so high that I should make the first speech I was about to give, at the Socio-Economic Institute in New York, a giant star. Bomb, instead of giving a low-key speech as originally planned, saving the main speech for later in Washington.This required me and Adam Ridley to rewrite the speech at the last minute like crazy, and this left its mark on the speech.Much of the speech was perfectly on point.It begins by confronting American commentary on the deplorable state of contemporary Britain head-on and with serious treatment.I then draw attention to what I call the "progressive consensus" view that the state should actively promote equal relations on many fronts: in the provision of social welfare and in the redistribution of wealth and In terms of income".I then go on to analyze in detail the manifestations and effects of these claims, such as overtaxing, discouraging business, extracting profits, defrauding savers through inflation and negative interest rates, and apparently relentless growth in public sector and government spending. Unfortunately, Conservative Central Headquarters added drafts and, more seriously, appended to the "final" text to the press a passage saying that curbing government spending, like restricting the number of hemodialyzers, requires tough pains decision.In fact, under the Labor government, hemodialyzers were already limited in number as part of an unacknowledged treatment rationing system.Still, to state this bluntly—especially in a light-touch form—is to do yourself a favor.While scrambling to prepare the speech, Adam and I got it through.Fortunately, when Gordon saw a copy of the speech in New York, he immediately grasped the potential damage and deleted the offensive part.All press releases to be issued usually come with a formal condition that "the actual speech shall prevail."That way he was able to call the editors on Fleet Street to say that the pages in question, although they had been received from Central Headquarters, had not been actually adopted and so did not need to be reported.They respected him enough to do so; but the front page of The Sun had temporarily adopted the headline "Maggie Says Let 'Em Die" in prominence before it was replaced by some milder headline, really. It was a close call and survived. Indeed, the main message of the speech received the greatest attention on both sides of the Atlantic.Immediately upon my return I was attacked by the Labor government for belittling Britain abroad.In fact, the message about Britain that I brought to America was essentially a message of hope, that the country had potential enough to withstand even socialist influence.Foreign Secretary Jim Callaghan later graciously criticized me for including "debatable passages" in my US speech, and his criticism found a faithful echo in the British embassy where I stayed.A senior embassy official spoke against me in a briefing to the American press.Gordon Reese quickly discovered what had happened.I had a scathing exchange of letters with Jim Callaghan on this when I returned to England. When I became aware of the attempts to make me into this shape, I used my address to the National Press Club in Washington to point out that if the present socialist policy were abandoned, Britain would have the fundamental strength to ensure its rapid recovery .Shifts in popular opinion, opposition to the far left, our country's vast energy reserves, and our scientific latent capacity - with 72 Nobel Prizes, more than France, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium combined - all prove that in the long run Be optimistic. Now we are slowly finding our way.Admittedly, judging from some reports on the UK, the situation is still serious, and they are right to report so.But something is changing...I see signs that our people are ready to make the tough choice, to take a harder path.We are still the same people who once fought for freedom and won.Adventure, inventiveness, and determination are still part of our character.We may be suffering from a certain English disease now, but our organism is sound, and we have the courage and the will to achieve total victory. During my visit to the United States, I met with several key figures in the Ford administration.Dr. Kissinger is something I have known for a long time.But this is the first time I've met Bill Simon, a free-market Treasury secretary who has jettisoned the wage and price controls imposed by President Nixon.I also met with the very experienced James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, the leading figure within the US government against détente. I was also received by President Ford himself.He was a big, genial man who had been thrust into a high position unexpectedly and suddenly.He has come to like the job, which perhaps surprises him and surprises others as well.He has gathered or inherited a capable man around him and has shown the Europeans that the United States, despite these great upheavals in domestic politics, continues to have obligations with regard to their security.In fact, he has the strengths and weaknesses of what current political parlance calls "a pair of safe hands."He's not the type to take issue with accepted orthodoxy, which I increasingly think is to be blamed.But he was a reassuring and steady figure who helped America heal from the wounds of Watergate it had caused.After a troubled period after he pardoned Richard Nixon, his administration's fortunes are improving.He has yet to declare his intentions for the Republican nomination and a certain governor named Ronald Reagan is running a genius and effective campaign.The prospects for President Ford's re-election looked good.I left America hoping he would be successful. I returned to London to find that the news coverage of my trip to the US had changed my political status.Even Labor's feigned righteous indignation helped.Because the more people pay attention to my arguments, the more seriously they are taken.I also quickly became aware of changing attitudes within the upper echelons of the Conservative Party.Those who saw my ascension to leadership as an annoying and temporary fluke had to think again.Not only was I clearly taken seriously by some of the most powerful figures in the free world, the warnings I made in Helsinki seemed less outlandish and more prescient. At the end of September, the Cubans, acting as proxies for the Soviet Union, began sending troops into Angola in large numbers. Resistance to the Angola People's Liberation Movement collapsed in December when the US Senate overturned President Ford's policy of providing aid to anti-communist forces there.I thought and read more about it during the Christmas break, and I decided to give another talk. This time I did business as usual and told Reggie Maudlin of my decision.The fact that Reggie even provided me with a draft of my speech is perhaps evidence of his uneasiness at the prospect of me speaking.Unfortunately, his draft is not available.As Dennis puts it, "It's so flimsy it doesn't even scrape the cream off the rice pudding." Bob Conquest has now left for the more politically profitable Hoover Research in California So I asked Robert Moss to help me.Robert was the foreign affairs editor of The Economist, an expert on security and strategy, a co-founder of the National Liberty Association, which fought aggressive union power, and a destined best-selling novelist, as it turned out. He's an ideal candidate. My speech at Kensington Town Hall on Monday 19th January was similar in scope to the previous year's Chelsea speech, except that it was more focused on defense issues and contained stronger language about the Soviet threat.The speech condemned the Labor government for "dismantling our defenses at a time when Britain and its allies face the greatest strategic threat since the war".The speech offered a different analysis of Soviet intentions than the moderators. Russia is governed by a dictatorship of patient and far-sighted men who are rapidly making their country the foremost naval and army power in the world.They don't just do it in self-defense.A large, mostly landlocked country like Russia doesn't need to build the most powerful navy in the world just to guard its own frontiers.No.The Russians are focused on world domination, and they are rapidly acquiring the means to become the most powerful empire the world has ever seen.Those in the Soviet Politburo need not worry about the ebb and flow of public opinion.They put the guns before the butter, and we put almost everything before the guns. " I warned about the power imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe, where the latter outnumbered us by 150,000 men, nearly 10,000 tanks, and 2,600 aircraft.But I stress that the defense of the West cannot be guaranteed only in Europe: NATO supply lines must also be protected.This means we cannot ignore what Soviet-backed troops are doing in Angola.In any case, if what they did there was warranted, they could well conclude that they could repeat it elsewhere. The reaction to this speech, especially among the more thoughtful sections of the British press, was far more favorable than to Chelsea's. The Daily Telegraph headlined the editorial "The Truth About Russia". The Times acknowledges that "the West is complacent".The Soviet Union's response was not slow either.The Soviet embassy wrote a letter to Reggie Modlin, and the ambassador himself went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to protest.A stream of savage attacks came from various Soviet propaganda mouthpieces.But the person who coined the term "Iron Lady" and used it to describe me was some blindly superior officer in the office of the Red Army newspaper Red Star, whose imagination surpassed his judgement. When Gordon Reese read the words of the Red Star in the Newspaper Federation telegram, he ran to my office in ecstasy and told me about it.I quickly saw that they had inadvertently placed me in a respected position as their toughest European opponent.This is their greatest help to me. A few days later I visited the British garrison along the Rhine, and my Kensington speech ensured a warm reception there.Someone took a picture of me driving a tank, and it didn't hurt me at all at home.Unbeknownst to the outside world, my career came to an even more dramatic end during this visit than the one in November 1990. Cranley Onslow, one of the party's defense spokesmen, Richard Ryder and I boarded an aging twin-engine propeller transport plane and flew from our British base in Rheindalen to where we would be Overnight to Olinghausen. (The original plan was to go by helicopter, but the weather wasn't good enough.) Shortly after takeoff I got my speech out of my briefcase and got to work.After a while I realized that there was something unusual about the loud humming of the engine.It was cold in the cabin.外面是浓浓的极冷的大雾，仔细看我能够看见机翼上结成的冰。就在此刻一位机组人员过来说发生了问题，我们不得不返回莱茵达伦去。从他的神态上我能觉察到情况严重，我迫切要求知道确切的麻烦是什么。原来是雾太浓，驾驶员无法把握方向。还不止这些，我们现在显然是在崇山峻岭中盲目飞行。这就是为什么驾驶员已使我们的飞行保持在最低速度，如果再放慢速度飞机就有停飞的危险。但愿大雾会散去，他能找到摆脱困境的办法。更糟的是，测量我们空速的仪器失灵了。我停止了关于讲话稿的工作并把它小心地放进我的公文包，往后仰靠，闭上我的眼睛并思考一些甚至比政治更重要的事情。不知怎么地，我们设法回到了莱茵达伦。我从来没有比触觉到我脚下的柏油碎石时感到更加宽慰了。 吉米·卡特于１９７６年底当选为美国总统，使白宫有了一个把人权放在对外政策议事日程首位的人。 但是我不久就对卡特政府对外政策方针的另外两个方面感到担忧。首先，处理人权问题时没有联系更广泛的政治与战略问题来考虑，而且实际上还带有某些道义上的天真。即使是最大的理想主义者出于道义考虑而制定的政策、也得讲求实际。有许多凌辱人权的政权一例如在拉丁美洲和中东的一些军人政府——但它们的压制性比独裁主义政权要小一些。 此外，一个自由国家不仅对它本国而且也对非自由国家所负有的首要职责是生存下去。因此没有必要为支持一个暂时为更大的西方利益服务的然而又是令人讨厌的政权而表示歉意，尽管我们应该始终一贯地运用我们的影响去改变它最恶劣的弊病。不幸的是，卡特政府内部的糊涂思想与意见不和妨碍了它奉行这样一种健全的方针。如同我们将看到的，卡特强调伊朗的人权帮助推翻了伊朗国王，而代之以压制性更强并且反对西方的阿亚图拉·霍梅尼政权。如图帕斯卡尔指出的，道德的第一原则是思维清晰。而就卡特政府而言不清晰的思维给人权和西方利益带来了显然是更糟的结果。 我的第二点批评是，人权政策是不可能自立的，因为简单的理由是权利最终必须用武力来维护。在２０世纪７０年代的情况下，这就要求美国在军事上强大得足以抵制和扭转苏联造成的对自由世界的威胁。然而卡特总统对裁军承担了热情的许诺。表现为他废除了Ｂ１战略轰炸机以及后来又重新推动了卡特总统与苏联人一起倡议的第二阶段限制战略武器谈判。因此令人啼笑皆非的是，卡特总统发现他只能采取行动来改善与西方有关联的国家的人权状况，而不是改善那些敌对的和强大得足以无视他的行动的国家的人权状况。 至于第二阶段限制战略武器谈判，有可能就具体的方案进行争论，但就战略来说，真正重要的事实是，苏联近年来一直在远比美国人快得多地武装着自己。任何侈谈"武器限制"的协议必然导致承认由协议稳定下来的军事均势。只有从一个方面来说进行大力的武器削减，或者说从另一个方面来说重新加强美国的防御力量，才能扭转形势。然而，如果在盛行的舆论情况下这两种情况都没有真正实现的可能性，那么达成一项大体上相当于限制战略武器协议的东西，就会对西方有利，因为这至少将会阻止苏联人的进展。不管是哪一种情况，美国都早已失去了它的核优势，而这时西方很久以来已经放弃在常规武器方面与华沙条约组织保持平衡的企图。尽管这类统计必然是粗略的，但从下表可以看出变化的规模： 美国和苏联的战略核力量 １９６６年１９７６年 美国洲际弹道导弹９０４１，０５４ 潜艇发射弹道导弹５９２６５６ 远程轰炸机６３０３８７ 苏联洲际弹道导弹２９２１，５２７ 潜艇发射弹道导弹１０７８４５ 远程轰炸机１５５１３５ 来源：《军事均势》，１９７６-１９７７年，第７５页。 实际上，由于苏联人生产了他们的逆火式轰炸机，成倍地增加了他们的核潜艇并开始集中部署对准西欧的ＳＳ２０核导弹，情况将会是更加恶化。 这些事实与数字是任何感兴趣的人都可以得到的，但对此感兴趣的新闻记者却太少了。但是他们实际上低估这个危险吗？我曾经密切注意乔治·基根少将所作的关于苏联对带电粒子射束研究情况的报道，他最近从美国空军情报部主任一职引退。该射束对弹道导弹的攻击可以提供远为有效的防御，因而可能提供一种技术使防务概念彻底改革。卡特政府低估了这种威胁，只是在里根总统发起他的战略防御倡议时，人们才确切了解这些危险并采取了削弱苏联优势的行动。然而，早在１９７７年３月，《航空周和空间技术》杂志就发表了基根将军关于苏联全面威胁的范围的言论。他论证说，美国人一贯低估苏联军事实力和备战的规模，得出了灾难性的结论，"苏联今天在发动、进行一场全球性冲突并从中生存下来的能力远比美国及其盟国大得多。直到两年后发生了入侵阿富汗事件，多数西方政治家才开始用这种思想方法来思考问题。 当我于１９７７年９月再次访问美国时，卡特政府还在享受其政治密月的乐趣。卡特总统带给白宫一种新的不拘礼仪的看来符合时代气氛的作风。虽然人们对于他的某些任命有些不安，但把这主要归因于华盛顿对外来人的不满。他拥有他的国务卿赛勒斯·万斯和他的国家安全顾问兹比格纽·布热津斯基这两位卓越的助手，他们在观点上的分歧当时还不明显。 当吉米·卡特出席西方七国首脑会议时我曾于５月间在伦敦会见过他。尽管我对他的对外政策的怀疑日益增长但我还是喜欢他并期待与他再次见面。我们在白宫讨论问题时，总统极想为他最近提出的缔结全面核禁试条约的倡议进行说明和辩解。虽然他已清楚地掌握了细节并且是个有说服力的倡导者，但是我没有被说服。由于我确信可靠的核威慑力量的极端重要性，并且知道核武器必须经过试验才能成为可信之物，因此我不能随声附和这项政策。 同样地，在罗得西亚问题上我无法同意卡特总统或者说还包括赛勒斯·万斯和美国驻联合国大使安德鲁·杨所偏爱的解决方针。美国人坚持认为罗得西亚的安全部队应予解散。但我知道这对白种人——他们仍然享有对"武装斗争"的军事优势——来说如果没有某种真正的和平保证是永远也不会接受的。美国人还玩弄着对南非实行制裁的主张，这在我看来是同样地判断失当，因为考虑到如果他们想要说服伊恩。史密斯实行妥协的话，他们就需要南非政府站在他们这一边。 至少这一次我并不需要同大使馆的怀有敌意的情况介绍进行争辩，那样做将会令人啼笑皆非，因为新大使彼得·杰伊是卡拉汉的女婿。当这项任命宣布时曾经有人大声指责裙带关系。但是我个人是喜欢并钦佩彼得·杰伊的。他对货币经济学的了解会使他成为影子内阁的一位受欢迎的吸收对象。虽然如此，我不得不承认，我在对英美商会发表讲话的引言部分怀着某种恶作剧的喜悦心情引用了吉姆·卡拉议在前一年的工党年会上讲话中的一段话。在该讲话中这位工党首相说： "我们过去常常认为，通过减税和提高政府开支就能度过衰退，找到出路并增加就业。我十分坦率地告诉你们，现在已不存在这种选择，而且过去采取这种做法时，它也只是把更大剂量的通货膨胀注入经济，跟随而来的则是更高水平的失业。" 这是一个公开的秘密，这段没有特点而又稳妥的话正是由彼得·杰伊起草的。 事实上，我在美国期间所碰到的唯一窘迫情况是吉姆·普赖尔与基思·约瑟夫之间的一次公开分歧。他们对关于格伦威克事件的卡斯曼勋爵的报告以及对什么是非工会会员不得雇用的"封闭式工厂"的灭确政策持有不同意见。记者团的成员们对于这一点的兴趣大于对我在华盛顿会谈结果的兴趣，因而我不得不发表两次声明以试图平息事态。但是重要的实质性问题只有在我回国以后才能理顺。 与此同时，美国政策的方向和苏联野心的程度都存在着不确定性，这越来越使人们把注意力集中于那些在两个集团之间很不自在地保持平衡的国家。在这些国家中南斯拉夫具有特殊的重要性。自从铁托元帅在１９４８年同斯大林决裂以来，南斯拉夫就一直处于一种异常的然而重要的境地。在可怕的早期镇压与大规模屠杀之后，铁托和他的同志们已经多少变得开明些，因为环境迫使他们指望西方提供财政支援和安全。这逐渐使南斯拉夫朝着某种假资本主义和准自由主义方向移动。如果铁托的每个行动不曾受到某种独特的英国社会主义者的奉承讨好，这类进展甚至还会更多。事实上，铁托的真正天赋在于他像个幻想家。他说服了东方与西方这二者，或者甚至还有南斯拉夫的一部分舆论，使它们相信这个国家是国际大比赛中的一个重要参赛者。其登峰造极的代表作就是在铁托倡导下成立的所谓第三世界国家"不结盟"运动。 到２０世纪７０年代中期时，这个国家的经济问题日益增多。南斯拉夫人依靠西方的信用贷款营造了一场消费繁荣，在"自治"的招牌下，一种混乱的半资本主义逐渐形成。生活水平比其他共产主义国家高，这在某种程度上是由于南斯拉夫在海外的工人的汇款所致；但相应来说，如果生活水平不得不下降，对该政权的影响就可能更加严重。 铁托本人的健康象征着南斯拉夫的脆弱性并在支撑着脆弱的南斯拉夫。人们广泛地预料，铁托去世后南斯拉夫将发生混乱，那时苏联人是否会再次接管控制局面，这是一个公开的问题。铁托在８５岁高龄时还在控制着局面，但是身体有病。我想去南斯拉夫访问已有一段时间，但是由于铁托身体不好无法接待我而使我的访问两度推延。 然而，在１９７７年１２月初的一个严寒的日子里，在南斯拉夫总统自第二次世界大战以来的一位战友和老朋友菲茨罗伊·麦克利恩先生的陪同下，我到达了贝尔格莱德。我的第一项义务是攀登１５０级台阶上到阿瓦拉山顶向巨大的阵亡将士纪念碑敬献花圈。我没有穿保暖的外套，因而到我们下山时我觉得寒冷彻骨。然而，总的政治接待是十分热情的，不只是政治家们，甚至一些共产主义报纸也是如此。 作为"铁娘子"，我被看成了解南斯拉夫人每天生活在苏联可能进行干预阴影下这一事实的人。看起来似乎矛盾，这一点正是使这个国家团结一致的主要原因之一。只有冷战结束，南斯拉夫各民族才能实现真正的自决。关于这一点的一个例证是，设午宴招待过我的联邦国民议会主席基罗·格利戈罗夫现在是新近独立的、虽然是陷入战火的马基顿共和国的总统。 菲茨罗伊·麦克利恩和我在贝尔格莱德铁托的家里拜访了他。他的个性很强，保持着某些对于他过去火焰似游击队生活的外露的炫耀，但无疑丢弃了说明他战后统治地位的内在的坚强。我们讨论了关于苏联威胁的问题并取得广泛的一致意见。关于他身后之事这个隐隐呈现的问题没有包括在我们的会谈中。也许他早已断定，尽管有宪法规定的一切详尽的保证条款，这还确实将会是场大灾难。 在我启程去南斯拉夫之前，艾尔弗雷德·谢尔曼曾要求我向铁托提出密络凡·德热拉斯案件问题，后者是铁托以前的朋友和同事，而且多年来一直批评国内事务。德热拉斯是最近获释的若干政治犯之一，但据我所知是继续受到骚扰的对象。似乎很有可能他很快又会消声匿迹回到监狱中去。我决定放一炮试探一下铁托的态度。我假装天真他说我对德热拉斯获释感到非常高兴。铁托对我怒目而视。 "是的，他已出来了。"总统说，"但他目前在玩弄他的老花招。而且如果他继续扰乱我们的宪法，他就会径直走回监狱去。" "哟，"我回答说，"像德热拉斯这样的人在监狱中将比在监狱外对你造成更多的伤害"。 菲茨罗伊·麦克利恩插话说，"她说得对，你是知道的。" 铁托严厉地看了我一眼。在他转而谈论其他事情之前暂停了一会儿。据我所知，德热拉斯呆在监狱外面，在塞尔维亚总统斯洛沃丹·米洛塞维奇的统治下，他为了独立思考遭受到更多的骚扰。 从１９７７年底直至１９７９年６月大选，通过阅读与讨论对外政策，我认为没有什么重大理由去推翻或修正我的判断与分析。英国、欧洲与美国的舆论反对同苏联进一步妥协的态度不断强硬起来。苏联人自己在对付内部不同意见和对外冒险活动方面表现得越来越不谨慎。到这时非洲之角已经引起了苏联的野心：埃塞俄比亚的统治者和门格斯图上校已经开始同索马里进行一场长期战争。１９７８年４月苏联利用假情报获得了一次重大成功，迫使卡特总统宣布推迟生产中子弹，中子弹本来也许有助于实现欧洲的军事均势。次月，苏联持不同政见者尤里·奥洛夫被判入狱７年，他在此之前成立了赫尔辛基小组以监督赫尔辛基协议执行的情况。７月间持不同政见者阿纳托尔·萨兰斯基和亚厉山大·金斯伯格因"鼓动反苏"分别被判人狱和到劳动营服役１３年和８年之久。对于任何自由之友来说这都是一个令人心碎的时刻。由于处于在野的地位我几乎不可能做什么事情来改变这一情况。 实际上，虽然我在当时并不明了，有３个事态发展正在展示出阻挡苏联推进的长远前景。第一个看来似乎是矛盾的事态是他们已经变得过于傲慢。极权主义者蔑视反对者是一种天生的而且往往是致命的特性。苏联人相信，西方政治家们的失败表明西方国家的人民已屈从于失败。如果稍微讲求一下方式并多一点深谋远虑，苏联领导人本来可以得到大得多的利益。他们的做法，尤其是１９７９年对阿富汗的入侵，激起了西方的反应并最后摧毁了苏联。 第二个事态发展是１９７８年９月一位波兰人当选为教皇。约翰·保罗二世将会在东欧点燃一场从根本上震憾苏联帝国的革命。 最后是罗纳德·里根出来认真地竞选美国总统的职位。我在１９７５年成为保守党领袖后不久曾见到过里根州长。甚至在那时之前我已经知道了一些关于他的情况，因为在２０世纪６０年代后期的一天晚上，丹尼斯回家后对罗纳德·里根刚刚在军事研究院发表的卓越讲话赞不绝口。我亲自阅读了该讲话文本，很快就明白了丹尼斯所说的意思。当我们见面对我立刻被他的魅力、幽默感和直率所征服，在随后的岁月中我阅读过他的讲话，这些讲话把减税视为创造财富之本，主张用加强防务取代缓和。我还阅读过他隔周一次向加利福尼亚州人民广播的许多讲话稿（他的新闻秘书定期寄给我）。这些讲话我全都同意。１９７８年１１月在英国下议院我的的办公室内我们再次见了面。 在早期，许多美国政治精英，但不是美国选民，认为罗纳德·里根是个不能认真对待的右翼的自行其是者（我以前在某个地方听说过这一点）。现在他被许多富有思想的共和党人看作他们返回白宫的最佳入门券。罗纳德·里根无论取得什么经验，他都不是以牺牲他的信念为代价而这样做的。我发现他的信念比以前更坚定了。当他离开我的办公室时，我在思考如果这样一个人是美国总统的话，情况将会有多大的不同啊。但是在１９７８年１１月这样的前景似乎还很渺茫。