Chapter 43 Section 6 Liberal Party and Labor Party Alliance

Before describing the outcome of the crisis, it is worth retracing some background on the "decentralization" debate, which has since resurfaced with greater vigor.The dispute - at least until its final conclusion in March 1979 - has caused almost as much trouble for the Labor Party as for the Conservative Party. Because the SNP had had a lot of support at one point - which turned out to be only a short period of time - at the SNP conference in May 1968, Ted promised to devolve power in Scotland.Ted's "Lance Manifesto" took many Conservatives by surprise, even those in Scotland.I've never appreciated the policy, and the entire UK Conservative Party in general isn't enthusiastic about it.But Ted insisted on doing so.He established a committee headed by Alec Douglas-Home to draw up detailed plans.Alec's proposal was passed at the Scottish party conference before the 1970 general election and was written into the manifesto (no promise of devolution for Wales).The promise of "decentralization" during our party's 1970-74 rule, however, was less mentioned.Although the Kilbrandon Royal Constitutional Committee had put forward a detailed devolution package and reported it in October 1973, our party's February manifesto only promised to study the report, while Labor promised they would legislate on the matter.

After the general election, Ted firmly believed that our party should devolve more powers to Scotland to win back our support, and appointed Alec Buchanan-Smith as Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland to take charge of this matter.At the Scottish party conference in May, Ted reiterated our policy of "devolution", promising to fund a Scottish development fund from North Sea oil field money, which went further than Homem's proposals in terms of funding) in this policy Basically, we are committed to an election after October 1974 - and our support in Scotland has dwindled further despite our numerous devolution measures.In fact this is the first time we've come in third in a general election.

There have never been many worries about this new policy adopted by our party.A small group of Scottish Conservative MPs in particular, including my old friend Betty Harvey-Anderson, began speaking out loudly after October 1974.They believed that the proposal to create a Scottish Parliament would threaten rather than strengthen the unity of the United Kingdom.They don't see the need to adopt the same strategy as Labor, let alone propose a bigger one than Labour's.The opinions of the Scottish Party itself are also extremely inconsistent. Opponents of "decentralization" representing grassroots opinions and left-leaning Scottish Party leaders such as Ai Shi Buchanfu-Smith, Malcolm Rifkin and George Younger have opinions Contrary.

This is what was left to me when I first took the chair of the party leader.Ted has awkwardly hung my party on this hugely painful hook and left me with a tricky task: untie it, as an instinctive Conservative Unionist I don't like 'devolution' Promise of.But I realize that there is a huge investment in this program, and I can't change the direction of policy right away.If I do that, a lot of people will quit, which I can't afford, and for the time being I just have to accept the status quo. I have Willie Whitelow lead a policy group on decentralization.In the shadow cabinet we discussed Willie's proposals for a directly elected parliament in good time, and agreed with them to introduce proportional representation, but we did not commit to a system that many devolved Conservatives wanted Proportional representation, their fear that the SNP would win in Scotland under a simple majority electoral system, they don't seem to be averse to a future system of political unions in the south or north, I'm unimpressed by that.

At the Scottish party conference in Dandy in May 1975, I repeated, as briefly as possible, my commitment to a directly elected Parliament.Talking to those who attended made it clearer to me that there are some Scottish Conservatives who disagree sharply with their leaders on this issue.I was more disturbed - and so were everyone else.During the summer, Conservative MPs in England began to express doubts about the devolution of power in Scotland, partly because of its detrimental effect on the unity of the United Kingdom, but also because of their deep strategic basis: if Scotland had its own parliament It would have too much representation in Westminster Parliament while retaining its current (large) share of seats.In addition, the Labor Party is at loggerheads on this issue because of disagreements. It is clear that "decentralization" is no longer a topic that is conducive to embarrassing the government in terms of strategy.I had a series of meetings with backbenchers.They have the same concerns as I do.This exacerbated my anxiety.By the end of 1975, backbenchers were strongly opposed to "decentralization".At this point, Alec Buchanan-Smith and Malcolm Riverkander, even more out of touch, came up with the idea of ​​an independent Scottish administration.This goes further beyond Home's proposal and brings us into the realm of Labor's strategy.

The government's white paper proposing direct elections to parliament in Scotland and Wales was published in November.But how the shadow cabinet should respond to this is very different.In preparation for the debate on the White Paper in January 1976, Alec Buchanan-Smith and Ian Gilmour called for a reference to the Conservative Party's commitment to the Scottish Parliament in the text of our amendment, against " The "devolution" people argue that if we don't repeat this promise, the abstention of those who oppose "devolution" in the Labor Party may win us.For the time being I've followed the advice of Alec Buchanf-Smith.

The debate continued in 1976.Julian Amory and Maurice Macmillan have shown themselves to be strong leaders in the Conservative camp's opposition to "devolution".Willie devised a scheme which it was hoped the whole party would rally around him, which I used at the Scottish Party Conference in Langs in May.We reiterate our support for direct elections to the Scottish Parliament but state our opposition to any scheme based on the government's proposed White Paper.For emphasis, I added: "I cannot support such a Scottish parliament, none of us can support such a parliament if we think it could put the United Kingdom in danger." The audience in Perth The response was good, but it clearly did not resolve intra-party disputes.

I began to assert our opposition position, and in November, when the Bill was announced, I had dinner with two constitutional lawyers, Professor Yandry of Birmingham, to discuss its details.I also met with the constitutional scholar Neville Johnson several times.The more I hear, and the more I read this Bill, the more dangerous it seems to the United Kingdom.It has brought bureaucracy and endless bickering, and it is increasingly unlikely that it will appease the Scots who want independence.Furthermore, the results of a private opinion poll conducted by our party in November 1976 confirmed my suspicions about the possible impact of the "devolution" issue on the election results.Scots are divided: the government's 'devolution' plan has just 22 per cent support - less than our party's (26 per cent) and even less than 'no change' (23 per cent) .Only 14 percent favored independence.A far-reaching constitutional change requires far more public support than that.

Asked in November-December 1976, the bill was about to undergo its second reading in Parliament (debating whether to adopt the bill).The shadow cabinet held four debates on whether to vote against the bill by issuing an urgent notice requiring Conservative MPs to attend parliamentary debates.We can no longer afford to be ambiguous.Not only the vast majority of our backbenchers, but also most of the shadow cabinet ministers are not in favor of "devolution", at least not in favor of anything similar to the views of the "white paper".But there is a deep-rooted belief among proponents of "devolution" that they believe it is the only way to prevent Scottish independence, and even some who dislike devolution are cautious lest they appear anti-Scottish or Beyond the impression of the leader of the Scottish Conservative Party.But it wasn't until finally, at a marathon meeting that ended in the early hours of Thursday, December 2, that we decided -- with a notable minority dissenting, including Alec Buchanan-Smith -- as soon as he issued a request to Conservative MPs Urgent notice to attend parliamentary debate to vote against the motion.

I don't even imagine that if we do this, no one will resign in protest.I want to minimize the number of resignations without weakening the attack on "decentralization".The morning after the Shadow Cabinet meeting, Malcolm Riverkander, George Younger, John Corrie, Hector Munro, Hamis Gray and Russell Fairgrave (Scottish Party Chairman) came to me and said that Alec Buchanan-Smith should be given a dispensation to abstain from the vote or all six of them would resign from the frontbench.I disagree with this.I was annoyed that the conversation was published in the Financial Times the next morning.The ""Conservative Reform Group"" representing the left of the party - when it was formed I wrote to one of its founders, Robert Carr, in hypothetical ignorance, what exactly they were trying to "reform" - They described us as "determined to commit suicide at the Scottish election". Backbench MPs were different. When the committee's decision to issue emergency notices was announced that night in 1922, there was loud cheering. Of course, when Ted Hill I was not surprised when, four days later in Glasgow, he suddenly announced that he himself would not vote against the bill. Alec Buchanan-Smith duly resigned as shadow secretary for Scotland, while Malcolm Rifkander also resigned. Four other frontbenchers also wanted to leave but I rejected their resignations and even allowed one of them to contradict us in the debate and vote for the government. None No party leader could be more lenient than I. To fill the vacancy left by Alec Bucamf-Smith, I brought in Teddy Taylor from the Department of Trade as Shadow Secretary for Scotland, and his fierce patriotism Love and stability have long left a deep impression on me.

It's really daunting when you know that this debate, and possibly even this vote, will reveal your side's divisions, and you'll have to speak from the front bench.But the speech I gave at the second reading of the bill on Monday, December 13 was just the kind of rhetoric I like.I have said very little about our own proposals, other than to briefly mention our commitment to a parliament in Scotland, and I have highlighted many of the contradictions and inconsistencies in the legislation itself.The debate is over. Twenty-seven Conservative MPs, including Ted Heath and Peter Walker, abstained. Five voted in favor of the government's claim, including Alec Buchanf-Smith, Malcolm Rifkander and Hamish Gray.But there was disagreement within the Labor Party: 29 Labor MPs abstained and 10 joined us in voting against.The 45-vote majority that emerged on the second reading belied the same unhappiness the issue brought to the Labor Party as it did to us.And the problem is not over yet.During the debate the prime minister hinted that the government would hold referendums in Scotland and Wales - a promise that has since become key to addressing "devolution". Francis Pym had by this time taken over from Willie as frontbench spokesman for "devolution".But he and Teddy Taylor have very different views on how to approach the bill.Francis wanted to make it work, Teddy wanted to make it dead, and in the end the bill died, and the government was defeated by a majority of 29 votes when the bill came to a close in February 1977 (with 22 Labor MPs voting with us consistent).Suddenly the government finds it has lost popular support, and the government always wins an effective majority when the issue of "decentralization" is far from being taken seriously.Although the Labor Party will introduce new "devolution" bills later this year.But we are encouraged by the dire situation ahead of them. What exactly will happen is far from clear. On Thursday 17th March 1977 the government refused to challenge our motion and adjourned parliament after a debate on public spending because they feared a defection by left-wing Labor MPs.I immediately called this almost unheard-of breach of normal procedure a "disgraceful failure".We have had to table a motion of no confidence in the government which, if successful, would lead to a general election.As cautious as I am naturally, I think this is going to happen.In my report to the Central Council in Torquay that Saturday I reminded the party that a general election was approaching. The parties and their stewards have pulled out all the stops for days.I don't want to be dragged into it.Liberal leader David Steele has indicated they may be prepared to keep Labor in power if the conditions are right for them.Topics such as "industrial democracy" and tax reform have become public discourse in order to directly elect members to legislate in the European Parliament on the basis of proportional representation.But no one believes Liberals will be swayed by minor details about whether to back Labour's decision.For the Liberals they have two big questions to answer: Will they be blamed for keeping an unsupported government in power?Or will they be credited with softening government policy?I myself don't believe they'll have any kind of contract with the government - that's certainly not possible unless there's a formal coalition with a few Liberal ministers in the cabinet, but it's hard to imagine the left wing of the Labor Party putting up with that practice. In fact, my calculations of the political balance of power were generally correct, but I ignored the important factor of vanity.Although the Labor Party-Liberal Party alliance is not small for the Liberal Party, it is not for Jim.Callaghan has endless benefits, but it does give Liberal party speakers the thrilling illusion of being themselves important. After the vote of no confidence in the Opposition, I was attacked for not being prepared to do some kind of deal with the Liberals.I didn't think about it beforehand, and I don't regret it afterwards. After the defeat in the general election in February 1974, the Conservative Party tried to bring the Liberal Party over to form a minority government. This lack of transparency fully demonstrated its danger.What's more, even in the present situation, I don't need to bother with these irresponsible eccentrics of the Liberal Party. I have enough burdens. Members believe in what our future government should do. Of course, now that we are against "devolution", it is even more impossible to win the support of nationalist parties.Conservative-minded Fine Gaelers should support us.In Irene Neve and I they should know they have found strong supporters in the United Kingdom.Their demand for additional seats in Westminster to make up for their province's under-representation is likely to be supported by any government, because they make sense from a fair point of view.But their general distaste for the Heath government's abolition of Stormont Parliament - the body that ran Northern Ireland controlled by Fine Gaelists from 1920 to 1972 - and Enoch Powell, who is now the Democrats serve as MPs representing the South Hills area - personal vendettas mean we can't really count on their support. In fact, there is very little we can do to affect the outcome of an election.Small parties will base their positions on whether it would be in their interest to hold a general election.To measure this, everyone goes to the polls.The results of the survey show that the Conservative Party will be elected and form a government with a large majority, which will greatly reduce the ability of some other individuals with different views to influence the government. Hours before I was due to introduce a vote of no confidence in the House, I was told the Liberals would back the government.I'm appalled that they would agree to such shabby terms.Obviously these conditions will first be in effect during the current session of Parliament.Liberals cannot be part of the government, but will have separate links with ministers and be represented on a joint advisory committee chaired by Speaker Michael Foot.The government is committed to direct elections to the European Parliament and "devolution" (free voting on the basis of proportional representation).Promised to find time to pass the Liberals' homelessness bill and agreed to limit the size of planned legislation on direct Labor party organization under local authorities.This is not an attractive condition.Knowing that we were facing a certain level of failure, and knowing what was going to be thrown at me by the press and our supporters, I was at a loss for what to do about the situation. Angus Maude helped me draft the statement.We decided to keep it very short.In fact, it's too short.In fact, this speech was drafted when a general election appeared to be on the way, so it was more inclined to make a positive statement about our policies than to attack the details of the government's policies.Of all the speeches I have made, this one was the worst in the press.Of course if we ended up winning that day, no one would blame me for reading the lengthy Westminster phone book in full.But in politics, as in life, "what ifs" never get the job done.As I drove down Fllard Street late that night, it wasn't that I wasn't getting a good response in the House, or even that the government had won a majority of 24 votes, to my dismay.What saddens me is that after all this effort, it seems that our chances of getting the UK to start turning around look as slim as ever.