Chapter 30 Section 4 The journey of reversal

Three things happened in January and February of 1972. The miners went on strike, and the total number of financial problems and unemployment at the Upper Collard shipyard reached 1 million.These 3 things test the government's resolve and find it lacking) It's always shocking when unemployment hits a new high, especially the 1 million mark.Economists call unemployment a lagging indicator.We didn't understand this at the time, it just peaked and then started to decline. The increase in unemployment in 1971 was in fact a consequence of Roy Jenkins' tight fiscal and monetary policies in 1969-1970, which we could have waited for, given that monetary policy had been eased considerably in 1971, mainly fiscal deregulation, That is, the number of unemployed persons began to decline in 1972.In fact, Ted never believed this analysis, and he greatly underestimated the stimulus of credit deregulation.He sees the need for emergency fiscal measures to stimulate demand and reduce unemployment.This belief influenced various decisions he made.The irony is that since it leads to higher inflation, the next Labor government suffers the major brunt of inflation, and, because inflation reduces many jobs, rather than preserves them, it ends up leading to higher levels of unemployment.

The government's attitude towards Upper Cradle stems from the fear of the consequences of higher levels of unemployment.At the same time it was seen as surrender to the threat of left-wing militantism, and thus became a new crime for us. When we first discussed the company in December 1970, the Cabinet reacted rather strongly.It was agreed that the government would no longer support the Upper Cradle Group, but there was a lifeline: as long as the shipyard agreed to close the Cradle Yard and separate the Yarrow Shipyard from the Cradle Group, we would Credit guarantees will continue to be provided.The Yarrow Dockyard, which supplies vital equipment to the Royal Navy, appears to be salvageable.However, by June 1971, the Upper Collide Group declared liquidation due to its inability to repay its debts.Workers on Collydeside went on strike in protest. In July, unionists led by militant shop representatives seized four of the Collade Group's shipyards.

In the autumn of 1971, further discussions took place in the cabinet, but the government indulged in negotiations with the trade unions, believing that the unions could influence the militant workshop representatives.These people are the masterminds behind the occupation of factories by workers.The Cabinet Economics Committee agreed that the government would continue to provide funding to keep the shipyard open while the liquidators sought a solution.But only if the unions give credible assurances that serious negotiations over new working conditions will take place.Some of my colleagues have strongly criticized this approach, and they are justifiably wary that it is dangerous and looks like a concession to worthless guarantees.Funding has been provided, however, and negotiations are ongoing.

Unemployment, not the outlook for the shipbuilding industry, is now the primary issue openly before us. In November, Ted Heath asserted in a party political radio address: "The government is completely and unconditionally committed to growing the economy and reducing unemployment." On January 20, 1972, the crucial one million unemployment mark was breached up. We heard in the Cabinet on February 24 that the Economics Committee had agreed the day before to provide £35 million for the opening of 3 of the 1 shipyards.John Davies openly admits to us that the new conglomerate of companies will be very difficult to succeed commercially, and that he would not have proposed this if the overall level of unemployment had been lower than at present and the economy had recovered more quickly.There is a feeling of unease.It was pointed out that we can expect the reaction of our supporters to the decision to be violent.However, Cabinet approved it, and at the end of February, John announced the decision.It's a small but memorable inglorious episode.I had a purely personal discussion with York Bruce Gerdan, who was sharply critical of the decision, seeing it as a serious and inexcusable U-turn.I am deeply confused.

However, we all have other headaches at this point.When crafting industrial relations law, we focus too much on building the best possible legal system and not enough on repelling attacks on our programs.The same state of mind applies to the threat posed to the government and the nation by the National Union of Miners.Of course we know, miners and electricity.Workers hold an almost invincible card in wage negotiations because they can cut off electricity to industry and the populace. Following industrial action by electric workers in December 1970, a tribunal of inquiry headed by Lord Wilberforce was established.The court resolved the issue by recommending a substantial wage increase for electric workers the following February.However, there was a large and militant faction within the Union of Miners, who were at least as interested in bringing down the Conservative government as they were in showing workers' strength in raising miners' incomes, and in October 1970 the Union of Miners went on strike vote, narrowly rejecting the solution proposed by the National Coal Board.Fearing unofficial action, the cabinet authorized the National Coal Board to propose a productivity bonus in mid-1971.The National Union of Mine Workers refused again, after which Derek Ezra, chairman of the National Coal Board, offered immediate bonuses without consultation with the ministers, with no strings attached to increased productivity.The Cabinet accepted this fait accompli.Perhaps John Davies and other ministers are continuing to follow developments.If they did, I have no idea.And what happened later shows that even if we continue to pay attention to the development of the situation, there is no thought of looking forward.

It was not until early December 1971 that the issue of miners' wages came up in the cabinet, and it seemed quite fortuitously.The annual meeting of the National Union of Mineworkers in early 1971 substantially revised the rules for holding a formal strike.The revised strike requires only a 55% majority, rather than a 2/3 majority as in the past.It is believed that the ongoing vote of the National Union of Mineworkers had reached a majority of 59%.However, no one seems to be much worried about this.We are all assured that coal stocks are in any case high. This complacency is unfounded.At the last cabinet meeting before Christmas, Robert Carr confirmed to us that the National Union of Mine Workers was in fact calling for a national strike to begin on January 9, 1972.There are also more troubles over wages in the gas and electricity sector.And we only need to look outside to know that winter is coming, and all this means electricity consumption.But there was no real discussion in Cabinet and we all went home for Christmas.

It was suggested over Christmas that the strikes might not be unanimous but concentrated only in combative areas.But it became clear two days after the strike began.This action is for all to participate in.Cabinet then discusses whether we should use the "cooling off" provisions of the Industrial Relations Act.But it is said to be difficult to meet the legal standard for using the clause - "cooling off" orders are only authorized by courts when there is a serious prospect of facilitating a settlement.It is doubtful that such a prospect existed under the circumstances.The possibility of using voting provisions in industrial relations laws remains open.But there is no particular reason to think that forcing the NUM to vote would lead to anything other than a continuation of the strike and perhaps a harder line from the union.This uncomfortably demonstrates the fragility of the main weapon that industrial relations law has equipped us with.Furthermore, important parts of the law have not yet come into effect, and we also know that there is a lot of public sympathy for the miners.

Now, the pressure has increased for the government to intervene directly to try to end the dispute.In retrospect, comparing the situation in 19-72 with the possible miners' strike of 1981 and the year-long strike of 1984-1985, it is inconceivable how we failed to notice the "permanence" of the situation— —that is, how long we can keep the power station or the economy running with limited or no coal supplies—and how easily the Cabinet can be deceived into believing that there are large reserves of coal, why not consider whether these reserves Put it where you can use it.That is, is not actually placed in a power station.Mass picketing would effectively prevent oil and coal from entering power stations, and the issue simply wasn't on the cabinet's agenda.Instead, our response was to discuss the prospect of Robert Carr's mediation and the use of emergency powers that would allow us to take a few weeks longer by reducing power supplies to keep coal reserves at power stations.We have a lot of useless discussions about "turning public opinion to our side".But what can public opinion do to end the strike?That's another thing I've learned from the Heath years - and anyway, public opinion isn't on our side in general.During the Heath period, no fewer than five states of emergency were declared.Another lesson I learned from this period is that all the emergency connotations of the word "emergency powers" and related decisions cannot be expected to change the basic realities of a labor dispute.

The situation gradually deteriorated. The crisis arose on the morning of Thursday, February 10th when we were all in the Cabinet.A state of emergency had been declared for the first two days.Robert Carr was dealing directly with the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mine Workers to find a way out.John Davies announced the breaking news, telling us that workers' pickets have now secured from shipment most of the remaining coal reserves, and that there is not even enough coal to supply until next weekend.Thereafter, electricity production will drop to 25% of normal supply.A drastic curtailment of electricity is inevitable, and most industries will shut down.The attorney general reported that provisions of the Industrial Relations Act to deal with secondary picketing, boycotts of supply and induce other workers to take actions that would render commercial contracts unenforceable did not take effect until February 28.He argued that much of the worker picketing during the strike was legal.Several arrests were made under the penal code, but, as he puts it, "the activity of the workers' pickets made it very difficult and sensitive for the police to make decisions".

This is an understatement.Arthur Scargill, the left-wing leader of the Yorkshire miners who had set out to establish his pugnacious reputation among his activists, organized the politically motivated miners' strike I faced in 1984-1985.During the Cabinet meeting, Home Secretary Reggie Maudlin received a message to read to everyone.The Chief Constable of Birmingham asked the West Midlands Gas Board to close the Suterai Coke Warehouse because the trucks couldn't get in, and 500 police officers faced 7,000 pickets. To understand what he said, it was a violent victory that was legendary for the left.To many politician commentators, it proves that no one can hope to resist miners.The self-confidence of the police has been shattered.From this time onwards many senior police officers put more emphasis on maintaining "order" than on upholding the law.In practice, that means failing to uphold the rights of individuals against mob rule — although, to be fair, he said, the police lack the equipment and guts to take the necessary action.For me, what happened in Sutere was as important as it was for the left.I understand, as they do, that the struggle to bring trade unions to the rule of law is fought not in the debate halls of the House of Commons, or even in the magistrates' courts, but in and around mines and factories, where coercion and intimidation are Unimpeded rampage is allowed.

Now Ted Mingkin retreats.He appointed a court of inquiry headed by the well-known Lord Wilberforce.Today, the power crisis has grown to such an extent that we are left to sit in cabinet debating whether there will be enough time to wait for the National Council of Mines 11 to end the strike through a vote of its members.Organizing a vote can take more than a week.So when Wilberforce proposed massive wage increases, no one wanted to talk anymore.The capital increase he proposes is much higher than what is allowed under the voluntary wage restraint policy of "no more than 1%" that is in effect. But we were stunned when the militant majority of the executive committee of the National Union of Mine Workers rejected the investigative tribunal's recommendation, demanding more money and a whole host of other conditions.In the words of Joe Gormley, president of the miners' union, the list of demands is long. Ted called us together on the evening of Friday, February 18, to decide what to do.In short, this controversy must end quickly.If we still need to go another mile, let's get it done!Later that night, Ted summoned representatives of the NUM and the National Coal Board to 10 Downing Street and persuaded the union to drop its demands for more money while making concessions to other demands, which the NUM executive committee accepted. , and miners voted to accept it just a week later.This dispute is over.But its damaging effect on the government and, indeed, on British politics as a whole continued. The immediate effect of this incident was to convince orthodox people that there was no alternative to "totalism" in a country like Britain. The editorial in The Times of Sunday, February 20 clearly stated: If the government wants anything useful to emerge from the wreckage of its wages policy after Wilberforce's solution, it is that it has only one way to go, and it has to work with the CBI and TUC Formal, serious negotiations to establish a path towards an orderly income policy.This requires everything to do with industry, but above all the government itself to purge the old panaceas.This is not a loss of face, and the government can seize this last opportunity to rebuild economic policy. Shocked and bewildered ministers were willing to hear such information.Rising unemployment, the incident at the Upper Cradle shipyard and the humiliation of the government by the miners all led to a fundamental reassessment of the government's policies.I guess it was Ted first, and then the other ministers and cabinet members.This is not to say that he abandoned the entire Selsdon approach, but he abandoned some aspects of the approach while emphasizing others, adding a heavy dose of nationalist economic policy.It may be in keeping with his character and his love for the Continent that we have been ardent supporters of economic growth, but we are now doing it at the expense of sound fiscal health.We have always advocated the modernization of industry and technology, but today we rely on government intervention rather than competition to ensure modernization.We have been fundamentally confusing the theory of monetarism with the theory of wage-led inflation.We have now neglected the former, and accepted the latter, to such an extent that we have instituted the most comprehensive system of regulation of wages and prices that England has ever practiced in peacetime. None of these circumstances pleased me at all.But it is now clear that we are incapable of resisting union power.Trade unions force companies to liquidate by raising irresponsible wage demands, make workers unemployed, and bring national life to a standstill through strikes.Industrial relations law itself seems to have become a meaningless shell: it will soon become completely disreputable.I, like most Conservatives, am prepared to give at least one chance to a policy that includes some of the goals we set out in 1969-1970.I am even prepared for the time being to endorse some kind of statutory price and income policy as an attempt to limit the damage done by the outrageous and unreasonable abuse of the power of the trade unions.But I was wrong.State intervention in the economy is not the ultimate solution to overly powerful vested interests: it is quick to collude with them. Cabinet meetings do not normally take place on Mondays, so on Monday, March 20, 1972, I arranged a long-overdue scientific appointment in advance.For this reason, I did not attend the Cabinet meeting that day to discuss the budget and the new industry white paper.Both cabinet discussions signaled a change in strategy, and the two complemented each other.The budget carried out highly reflationary policies, including sharp cuts in income and purchase taxes, increases in pension and social security benefits, and additional investment incentives for industry.There were many rumors that Tony Barber and the Treasury were unhappy with the budget and that Ted had imposed it on them.The budget speech described the measures as helping Britain meet the challenges of joining the European Community.This fact somewhat confirms the rumors above.It publicly plans to stimulate demand massively, and it has been argued that, in the presence of massive unemployment and idle resources, raising demand will not lead to higher inflation.Monetary policy is mentioned, but it only emphasizes its "flexibility"; there is no quantitative target for the growth of money volume. On Wednesday 22 March, John Davies published his white paper on Industry and Regional Development, which was the basis for the Industry Act 1972.In the eyes of our supporters and opponents, this is an even more obvious U-turn than the budget.Keith and I, and probably others in the Cabinet, were extremely dissatisfied with this, and some of the dissatisfaction was expressed in the press.As far as I can recall, there was no prior discussion of the White Paper by Cabinet: it was presented to the House of Commons via the Budget Report, which was always kept secret during the drafting phase of the government in accordance with the confidentiality requirements of budgetary measures.From this point on I sensed that the hostility in the Labor seat had turned into contempt.I wasn't in the House of Commons at the time, but I read The Times' report of the combined reaction to John Davies' speech on the Industry Bill: None of the lame ducks seems healthier than Mr Davies, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.He opened the debate on the second reading of the Industry Bill with perhaps the best speech the House of Commons has heard since the government took office.In the end, the applause from the Labor bench and the almost total silence of the Conservative MPs showed more clearly than anything the Opposition could say how complete the government's turn was on pre-industrial and aiding the districts. I know I'm not the only Conservative who feels uncomfortable reading this stuff.Should I quit my job?Maybe it's time to resign.But those of us who don't like the current state of affairs have yet to analyze the situation and formulate an alternative course.In fact, he said, my resignation will not play a big role.My status is not high enough, so my resignation is nothing more than the smallest "local difficulties".I have all the more reason to praise the likes of York Bruce-Gedan, John Biffen, Nick Ridley and of course Enoch Powell, in their speeches to the House of Commons and in articles published in newspapers These foolish practices are exposed in . There is also a direct link between the policies pursued by the government since March 1972 and the very different course my government has pursued since.One is called Alan.Walters' brilliant but little-known monetarist economist resigned from the Central Policy Review Department and then not only sharply criticized the government's approach but also correctly predicted future developments. The approach we took in 1970 was dealt another blow: it happened shortly thereafter.This is the de facto demise of industrial relations law.It was never envisioned that the law would send individual unionists to jail.Of course, if the troublemaker must be martyred, there is no law preventing the unlikely event.A long-running dispute over "containerization" between employers and longshoremen provided an opportunity for this to happen, and in March 1972 the National Industrial Relations Tribunal convicted the Shipping and General Workers' Union of defying an order to allow ships into the Port of Liverpool. The nuclear union was fined £5,000.The union was fined £50,000 the following day for sub-picking action on the docks in defiance of a court order.The T&GW insisted that it could not be held accountable for the actions of its shop representatives, but the National Industrial Relations Tribunal ruled against that view in May.Then, all of a sudden, an appeals court overturned those decisions and ruled that the Transportation and General Workers union was not liable.Therefore, those workshop representatives are personally responsible for what happened.This is extremely disturbing because it opens up the possibility of union members going to jail.The following month, three dockworkers who participated in the boycott were threatened with arrest for refusing to appear before the National Labor Tribunal.At the moment 35,000 union members are on strike.Ultimately, the attorney asked the appeals court to block the worker's arrest.Then in July, five other dock workers were jailed for contempt. The left is ruthless.In Parliament, MPs rallied against Ted.The sympathy strike expanded.Resulting in the closure of national newspapers for 5 days.The British Trades Union Congress called for a one-day general strike.However, on July 26, the House of Lords overturned the appeal tribunal's decision and confirmed that trade unions were responsible for the actions of their members.Therefore, the National Industrial Relations Tribunal released the five dock workers. That was, by and large, the end of industrial relations law, though not the end of the fad on the docks.A national longshoremen strike ensued and another state of emergency was declared.The strike did not end until August, and most of the conditions of the dock workers were met.In September, the annual meeting of the British Trades and Trades Conference made matters worse, expelling 32 small trade unions that refused to follow the instructions of the Trades and Trades Conference to revoke their registration in accordance with the Labor Relations Act.As I share the party's passion for industrial relations law, I was appalled by this situation.