Chapter 29 Chapter 29 Soros Talks About Soros

Section 1 How to Become a Wise Investor ——The way to success (1) "I can assume the market is always wrong". Q: There's a story going around on Wall Street these days that just across from the world-famous Mount Rathimore has another monument dedicated to the world's greatest financial tycoon.Two figures have been carved into the facade of that monument, one is Warren Buffett and the other is yourself. A: You can't find two characters that are so different anymore. Q: Do you think you deserve to be considered one of the world's greatest financiers? A: It's a good question, and I have to admit I'm - as it is - stuck on it.However.How long I'll be there is another matter.

Q: Now, you are not as active and confident in financial management as you were in the past. A: That's probably why I was lucky enough to be there. Q: The Quantum Foundation has become one of the most successful and high-profile investor entities of all time, and if dividends were reinvested, a $1,000 invested in 1996 would be worth more than $200 today. Ten thousand U.S. dollars.Is there anything very special about the Quantum Foundation?Are there many differences in the specific structure that make the Quantum Foundation so efficient? A: Yes, the structure of the Quantum Foundation is indeed different, because we have our own leverage mechanism.We position the foundation to grasp the larger trends and trends - we call it macro investment (Macro~investing) - in those dizzying market conditions, we also choose stocks first And stock groups, so, in fact, we are playing our game on many levels.If you think of an all-too-common list of securities as something flat or two-dimensional, as the name itself suggests, then I think that's the quickest way to go.Our list of securities is more like a building. It has its structure and its keel. Taking our securities capital as the basis, we will construct a three-dimensional university building. The various added values ​​​​of the main securities are enough. so that it is rock solid.I'm not sure it has made my own sense clear.Look at it this way, we buy stocks out of pocket, 50% of which we pay in cash and 50% on credit.We can borrow more than securities, and with $1,000 we can buy at least $50,000 worth of long-term securities.We can also sell stocks or securities short: "We borrow securities and then sell them, not expecting to buy them back cheaper later on." There is a place in the transaction regardless of the length of the period. These various positions cooperate with each other and strengthen each other to create this three-dimensional structure of profit and risk. Usually it only takes two days - one day at a time, one day at a time The next one-by-one will suffice to show exactly where our fund is.

Q: It seems that there are some differences between your fund and an ordinary list of securities. One is that you use so-called leverage; You have invested, for example, in addition to financial assets, you are also spending money in the currency field; third, in addition to short buying and short selling, you also intend to carry out long-term operations in those different asset industries, right? Answer: Yes. Q: You firmly believe that the various positions you occupy give your portfolio a risk-ready profile that reflects what you call the "macro" view. A: That's exactly what happened.

Q: Do the various derivatives also work?What do you think? A, in fact, its effect is not as strong as people think, we do adopt the way of trading index, sometimes for the purpose of hedging (so-called hedging, that is, buying spot and selling futures on the exchange or vice versa avoiding losses), and sometimes gaining market exposure either in the long run or in the short run.We don't play around with the privilege of buying and selling because we don't know how to blend them into the risks we are willing to take. When you earn the privilege of buying and selling, you are paying the experts a lot. Incentive funds, because they provide you with a kind of leverage, so that you can benefit a lot from it.Admittedly, having a seat in the stock market and being able to exchange it back is much more risky than winning the privilege of buying and selling, but when we face the actual risk, it is much more risky than using Have the initiative to buy and sell.We can still overcome these troubles better.When you pass the privilege of buying and selling, you are compensated for taking the risk.This is a profitable thing.It's just that it's usually incompatible with the risks inherent in a list of securities that can be manipulated, so that we rarely have the opportunity to agree to various buying and selling privileges, and it doesn't fit into our three-dimensional architecture—similar to A beam sticking out of a window and endangering the whole house is probably why we have relatively little regard for buying and selling privileges.

Q: When the Quantum Foundation was still in its growth phase, were you taking less financial risk than you are now? A: No, I'd say we're essentially taking less risk now, whereas in years past we often had to fight for survival. Q: What does that mean?For example, how much would you have to borrow on average to get $100 million? A: The data itself is meaningless because $100 million invested in treasury securities has a very different risk factor than $100 million invested in 30-year marketable securities.We can try to keep things simple.We do not have a practical or scientific way of measuring risk.People who are in all sorts of spinoffs usually have subtle risk considerations, we're all laymen, we're all still living in the stone age.If you think about it, that's true.

Q: Over the past 20 years, considerable progress has been made in measuring risk in investment accounts.Why didn't you adopt these quantitative scientific methods? A: Simply because we don't believe it at all, they are usually built on the assumption of market sufficiency theory which itself runs counter to my theory of incomplete understanding and the law of reflexivity (ref1exivity), I think that 99% of the time, these methods will work well.However, the remaining 1% of the time it will give shit.I just pay more attention to that l% of the time.I have discovered a systemic risk that cannot be mitigated by theories that assume the market is continuous.I was especially interested in discontinuity, and I found that those most prized measures were of no use to me.

However, we do try to simplify rather than complicate matters.For example, when we're dealing with the margin thing, we equate everything to a 30-year security.So we even exchanged a timetable for a 30-year security equivalent or something.We willingly invest our money along three axes: stocks, interest rates and currencies.Along each axis, our shadow flickers between plus and minus 100%.However, some of these risks play off and correspond to each other, so that we are almost reluctant to subject 100% of our securities to risk along any one axis. Occasionally, there is a fourth axis, because we have to show up in commodity trading from time to time.Recently, we also added a fifth level.I created a new foundation called: "Quantumindustria I Holdings" for the purpose of making industrial investments. The foundation reserves 20% of its assets as the same kind of macro holdings as the Quantum Foundation Invest, and that 20% of the assets are enough to provide support or purchasing power for the macro structure covering the entire foundation, and the rest is reserved as industrial capital. As for the non-used part of the foundation, in other words, that amount is reserved as The money that is not actually spent on industrial investment is temporarily invested in the shares of the Quantum Group. This is a brand new concept, and it may lead to a more sufficient and effective use of money than the Quantum Fund itself.

Q: Obviously, some kind of leverage device has played a decisive role in your success. If you hadn't used this leverage, what would $1,000 have become?In other words, how much of the Quantum Foundation's earnings have been attributed to this leverage device over the years? A: (mysterious smile) This is another question I can't answer.The Foundation should have been a whole different economic animal, because a lot of the actions we took were only practical because we used some kind of leverage.We are not willing to make a particular investment if it cannot be regulated by some kind of leverage.Leverage gives us far more flexibility than just having a two-dimensional list of stocks and doing things on our own.If brokerages are positive about interest rates, it is possible for them to extend the duration of their holdings to -- up to 15 years.However, when they have a negative attitude, they may make the average stock life very short.We have a much greater degree of freedom to fight freely and easily.When we are in a bear market, we can sell short; when we are in a bull market, we don't have to buy long-term securities; we can buy short-term securities, but our hands are not idle, and we can use many methods.

Q: Would that be more effective? A: Maybe so.Let me give you a recent example: at the beginning of 1995, if you were bullish on interest rates, as bullish as we were, or if you believed that the Federal Central Bank (that is, the Federal Reserve) would stop tightening money policy, you can make a fortune in short-term securities and relatively little in long-term securities, because short-term securities work much better than long-term securities. Q: Because of a shift in the output curve. A: Yes, we do do this so-called "yield curve trade" (yield curve trade) from time to time, that is, long-term securities and short-term securities complement each other, which has been recognized by many Wall Street insiders trying to minimize their risks. do it.However, we don't engage in much output curve trading, because we usually focus on the general direction of interest rates, if the purpose of the securities market in it is just a side dish.In contrast, many great insiders do nothing but trade one type of security against another.

Q: Considerable work has been done on analyzing the success of financial managers, and it is certain that asset allocation management explains at least 80% of stock portfolio outcomes, with stock selection and other factors accounting for only about 20%, Do you have any thoughts on asset allocation? Answer: No, I think what you said may be correct, because we earned most of our assets in the "macro", and "macro" is the three-dimensional equivalent of asset allocation.It can be more efficient because on a portfolio you can only allocate a fraction of the securities that fit a particular investment philosophy, whereas with our macro view we are usually able to allocate more than our assets.

Q: Is there anything else that makes the Quantum Foundation so special, exceptional, and successful? A: Well, our understanding of investors is not the same as other financial managers.We are a foundation that pays more for more work, in other words, we benefit mainly according to the size of the profit ratio, not according to the amount of funds we operate.Most fund managers aim to absorb as much money as possible, and then manage these funds decently so that investors will not be disappointed and walk away.That is to say, they try to inflate their capital to the maximum, because they are trying to make a living from the total amount of capital at their disposal.We try to expand the foundation's profits to the maximum, because we can get a certain share of the profits.Moreover, this profit is measured in absolute terms, not relative to some index. Here's another major difference: at the foundation, we own our own money, and I'm a significant shareholder in the foundation.Since we can reinvest the funds earned from rewards for meritorious deeds into the foundation, the longer the foundation exists, the more successful its performance is, and the greater the share of funds owned by the management will be.This means that we have to share weal and woe, and help each other, so it goes without saying that the understanding of our investors should be that they are passengers in the car we drive, and our destination is the same. The essence of the contractual relationship should be a partnership, but it is a kind of entrusted responsibility.Of course, we still have to fulfill our fiduciary obligations. Q: What are the defining characteristics that make the Quantum Foundation stand out from the crowd?Now there are a lot of foundations following suit and imitating, but you are still a great trailblazer. A: It's really interesting. In fact, there is no foundation similar to ours. There are no two identical leaves in the world.However, there is now a group of so-called "hedge trading funds" (Hedge Flind's foundation group). As far as the name "hedge funds" is concerned, it does cover a variety of operational activities. I think that combining all It is always a mistake to put all the hedge funds in the same basket, let's not talk about anything else, many hedge funds don't bother to adopt macro investment strategies, or when adopting these techniques, their methods are very different from ours, but just Take macro measures. However, there are quite a few hedging funds who are unwilling to face a specific stock. In contrast, using three-dimensional methods, we can show our skills at the level of names and species, and use We can make decisions calmly in the face of ever-changing business opportunities. Of course, this is a kind of macro decision-making, which is a certain posture adopted by the fund. In that kind of macro measures, there is the ultimate judgment of buying or selling stocks , as well as the strategic deployment of what method should be adopted. Generally speaking, if we can use a macro means to implement a certain macro decision, we will choose to do so, rather than through more specific investment measures to achieve Purpose. Q: What are you referring to? Answer: I can give you an example. If the securities market of a certain stock foundation is bullish, it may be involved in public welfare stocks at that time.We don't do that.Of course, we may also buy public welfare stocks, but this will only be if we are keen on a specific public welfare stock, otherwise we buy stocks just because it can bring us more direct market exposure . Q: You mentioned that there is a group of macro hedge funds, so what are the characteristics that make the Quantum Fund different from other macro fund groups? A: Ahhhh, these are some of the more insidious traits, and it's where certain attitudes and approaches come to the fore. Q: How would you describe your particular investment style? A: My hobby is that I don't have a specific, unchanging investment style. More precisely, he said, I have to try to adapt my investment style to suit myself.If you look up the history of the Foundation, its character has changed many times.In the first 10 years of its establishment, the foundation actually did not use macro measures.Later, macro investment became the overwhelming main theme.More recently, we've started pouring capital into industrial assets again.Perhaps I should say that I do not fight according to a given set of rules, but rather seek some dynamic variation in the rules of the game. Q: Now let’s discuss that intuition, which you have said has been central to your stellar investment performance. What do you mean when you say you use intuition as an investing tool? What is it? Answer: I have to have some kind of assumptions in everything I do. I form my own set of theories about the expected results of events, and then I compare the actual process of events with my theory in all aspects. In this way, I can Get some sort of standard against which I can evaluate our assumptions. This naturally contains a certain amount of intuition. However, it is not certain that intuition can play a very large role.Because I also have a theoretical framework in my mind.In my investing career, I tend to pick and choose situations that are compatible with this framework.I look for imbalances.They are able to send some kind of signal that activates my motivation.In fact, my decisions are a mixture of theory and intuition, call it intuition if you like. Question: Usually, people think that financial managers have both imagination and analysis. If all investment skills can be classified into these two categories, which one are you particularly good at? imagination or analysis? Answer, hahaha, my party is relatively lacking in my own analytical ability, but I do have a lot of ability to drill down into horns and find fault.Alas, I'm not a professional-level securities analyst.I would rather call myself a restless analyst. Q: This is a provocative statement, what do you mean? A: I realize that maybe I'll be out germanium, and that makes me a little uncomfortable.My insecurities fueled me to be on the alert, ready to correct my mistakes.I can do this on two levels.On the level of abstraction, I have transformed my prone ideas into the foundation stone of a whole thoughtful philosophy: on the level of personal subtlety, I have become a harsh, unruly A merciful animal likes to make trouble for itself, just like the head of the family who picks on others.Smell, as much as I am keen to get to the bottom of it, I am also quite forgiving, forgiving and forgiving.If I can't forgive myself, I'm afraid I won't be able to realize the series of mistakes I made.For others, being wrong is a source of shame: for me, being wrong is a source of pride.As long as I realize that a flawed understanding of things is the innate companion of human beings, I won't feel sad and ashamed because of my mistakes. Stumbling, this may be a bit confusing. Q: You once said of yourself that you are more acutely aware of mistakes than others.This sounds like an indispensable quality in the investment career.So what do you count on if you make a mistake? A: As I told you earlier, I work with some investment assumptions, and I have to care whether the actual course of events coincides with my expectations.If it wasn't the case at all, I have to admit that I must have encountered a ghost. Q: However, sometimes things just go a little bit out of order for a while and then get back on track.How do you know what is actually going on?I'm afraid it depends on genius. A: (makes a grimace) Just because my assumptions don't work out the way events actually work doesn't mean I have to sell out of stock all at once.I'd retest my theories, trying to figure out what was wrong.I'll revise my opinion, or I'll rummage through the boxes and find some foreign factor that has intruded.I'm going to actually roll back and do it again, I'm going to strengthen my position instead of walking away and running away.I'm sure I'm not going to sit around and ignore the damned ins and outs.I'll do a hysterical cross-examination.Usually, I have a lot of misgivings about following the trend and following others' opinions, although I can't completely refuse. Q: You mentioned "the fun of going against the tide", so what kind of signals do you have to encounter to know that the time is ripe to go against the trend? A: Cough—, since I'm a bit of a horny person, I usually have to label each other as social rebels.But, in fact, I'm always very cautious when I'm fighting against the tide of society. You know, I can be easily trampled to the ground by everyone.According to my view on the initial self-cultivation and self-defeating ending, in fact, in most cases, the social tide can be your good teacher and helpful friend.Those who ride the tide get hurt only at the turning point, and it is at this turning point that the tide turns.As for me, I'm a trend follower most of the time, but all the time, I'm aware of being in the crowd, and I'm always on the lookout for turning points. Now there is a widely circulated and well-known proverb that the market is always right.I take the opposite view, I can assume that the market is always wrong.Even my assumptions occasionally go astray.I still use it as a valid premise.This does not mean that one is always against the prevailing trend. On the contrary, in the vast majority of cases, the big move in the market will dominate, and the mistakes in it can be corrected only occasionally.It is only in those specific circumstances that one should go against the tide.This way of reasoning has given me the habit of finding fault with various investment theories.When I plan out these disadvantages one by one, the feeling of insecurity will subside a little.This doesn't make me abandon the theories, on the contrary, I use them with confidence because I know what's wrong with the theories and the market doesn't.In this way, I can stay ahead of market changes.I will vigilantly search for clues that some kind of market situation is about to die down, and then try to escape the moss and ginger, and look for a different investment strategy again.Or, if I think the market is getting pushed too far, I will fight it.If we choose the path of fighting the market, in most cases, we will be punished only at the turning point.We will be lucky enough to reap the rewards. Q: In addition to swimming against the tide, you have mentioned that one of the tricks that you often play with is to remove yourself from the specific process.What exactly are you referring to?How can you keep yourself out of the loop? A: I'm on the outside.I'm still a brainy participant.My mind is occupied all day with means of escaping from the subject you are contemplating.Compared with other people, it may be easier for me because I am good at abstract thinking and really enjoy seeing all kinds of things imported from the outside world, including myself. Q: You are known for your self-control and detachment, do you think these are necessary? A: Self-detachment, smelling, is indeed a condition; self-control is not.It made me weep when I lost and repaired on the money field;There is nothing in this world more self-destructive than ignoring your emotions.Once you feel your emotions exist, you may feel that you don't need to make them public.Sometimes, however, especially if you are in a very stressful situation, deliberately hiding these emotions can make the stress you are facing intolerable.I also remember early in my operating career, when my personal account was literally wiped out, and I kept going as if nothing had happened.The pressure became unbearable any longer.After lunch, I could barely bring myself to struggle back to the office.That's why I encourage my colleagues to share their troubles; I'd be more than happy to help if the group were willing to admit that they were in all sorts of troubles themselves. QUESTION: George, in the way you're operating now, it's important to identify people who can be helpful, both within the circle and when you're picking financial executives.Can you identify people who are likely to be very successful in investing—both as administrators of a foundation you'll put your money into, and as part of your team— Any comments on a certain type of feature you'd like to look forward to? A: The amazing thing is that the most important aspect turns out to be a person's character traits.I might trust a certain type of person, and they should be the type of person I want to be a partner with.Some people are geniuses when it comes to making money, however, they are so incredible that I can't believe it; I wouldn't want them to be my partners!When Mitchell Milken washed his hands and quit business, a vacuum was created in vain in the junk stock business.This was another piece of good news that almost fell from the sky, and it made me ecstatic.I can't wait to fill that vacuum immediately, where I can make a lot of money!I had face-to-face conversations with several people who had worked in Milken Group, and they should all be potential peripheral managers or partners.However, I found that they invariably held a certain immoral attitude-of course, this is the obvious birthmark of the Milken Group trading organization (which is obviously different from the investment banking organization).Obviously, they are hard-working, intelligent, talented, and different people.However, it is this unethical work attitude that reminds borrowers to be more careful. I am not willing to be a borrower for this group of people, I just feel uneasy. Q: Once, J. p.Morgan's son was asked to describe the characteristics he expected from someone before lending money to him, and in his view, character traits were the most important. "If I don't trust a man, I won't lend him a penny, even if he can get out all the security in Christendom." Answer: Well, I am not so pious and pure as he is, and on the other hand, I am not in the business of lending money. Q: Obviously, investing requires taking a lot of risk.Let's talk about the difference between an unethical approach and a responsible, aggressive, and very high-stakes approach. Answer: (wry smile all over the face) What can I say?Taking risks is naturally distressing.Either you are willing to suffer the pain yourself, or you try to pass it on to someone else.Anyone who ventures into financial activities and then cannot face the consequences is somewhat unjustifiable. Q: What do you think makes a good investor?What about the intelligence factor?What role does it play in making a good investor? Answer: People with the same intelligence may have very different personalities.Some people come to a precipice, but never get over it; others, when faced with a precipice, only occasionally overcome the obstacle.This is very difficult to confirm.However, I don't want anyone who works for me to cross that cliff. Q: Do you want to drive people towards a cliff? A: I'm someone who used to visit the cliffs occasionally.But I'm putting all the wealth I've accumulated over the years on the edge of the volcano.I don't want other people to live and die because of my pile of money.Once upon a time, I had a genius financial trader who took on a huge financial and currency adventure without telling me.Although the deal was lucrative, I immediately parted ways with him because God warned me that if things were different, I would have no one to blame but myself. Q: Some people think that people in finance are too smart, and that the smartest people are rarely the most successful investors. A: (laughs) I hope you are wrong. Q: This reminds me of something that came up in your early writings, and it might as well be applied here in a far-fetched way; namely, your idea of ​​yourself.Once upon a time, you said that you harbored a messianic hatred. Could this be the reason for your big victory?Is it a mix of character, intelligence, and something we haven't touched on yet, plus a certain kind of fearlessness that you mentioned earlier that is directly related to the cliff edge concept? Answer: (Hahaha! In terms of investment, I definitely don't have messianic ideas. I just indulge my messianic fantasies in giving away the money I have earned, but I dare not make money I'm going to try to control my inexplicable whims. There's not going to be any kindness in making money. However, resorting to fringe strategies is a different story - it's still quite It works. There is nothing like a crisis situation that challenges one's calling. I do need that adrenaline rush associated with risk taking to keep my thinking clear and logical. This is my thinking A vital part of competence. For me, risk taking is an integral part of mental acuity. Q: Do you get the thrill you need because you have a soft spot for this kind of game, or because it is thrilling? Answer: It is because of its unique danger, which is what makes my heart itch.Gun, please don't misunderstand what I just said: I don't like any dangers, I hope to stay away from them and never touch them. Q: How did you rise to prominence in this game? A. As I have stated, I am in the habit of looking for any slight error in every investment theory. On the positive side of things, I will be distracted and anxious.Again, don't get me wrong.I am not the kind of person who likes to make great achievements. I am used to being prepared for danger in times of peace. I will not reject a certain investment strategy. Just because I have not found its negative side, I will still maintain a high degree of vigilance.On the other hand, I pay special attention to those investment theories that are not accepted by the market. If nothing else, they are usually the most convincing. There is such a proverb: "No market is not good" (The marketc limbsona wall of worry) Q: OK, thinking about excellence is an important factor, what other things do you think are very important? Answer: There are many ways to do something about investing, and there are all kinds of surprises.People like us could be called mo-mentum investors, but there are also value in-vestors who are exceptional.In our line of business, value investors don't do very well because they don't have people to talk to.One of my investment advisors, P. c.Chatyo had a very interesting experience.His basic philosophy is to think of technology companies as solid assets, where customers are considered an asset.If a company has a solid base among customers, it can be worth a lot even if it is poorly managed and unproductive.Chatyo feels that these values ​​can be unlocked with a little effort.It proved to be a tenable idea, for example, when he landed a big deal in Paradair.I went with him to inspect the company, and when I learned that they were having so many problems and were struggling, I stumbled out disappointed, wondering why on earth we were getting this stock and how we would get there then. get away.However, in a matter of weeks, AT&T bought the business for double our price, and he was right about the value of building a solid base of customers, but he didn't see the business in the same way that I did. s difference. I could give another example: the market has its ups and downs, periods of turmoil are commonplace, and my investment methods have been as bad as they could be.Before entering the market, I insist on forming some kind of presupposition.But finding an argument for an obvious move in the market is time consuming.有时，就在我们努力规划出某种看好市场行情的理论时，市场却突然逆转，如果反反复复地捣腾几阵，其结果将是毁灭性的。我所善长的是拨弄市场浪潮，而不是游泳池中的涟畸。 20世纪80年代之初，曾经一度，市场上风平浪静，只有少许涟清浮过。我发现了一名商品基金会的管理人员，维克多·李那得赫夫（Victor Niedethoffer），他就有一套追赶涟崎的手段，以随机步行理论的观点来看，他的方法有根有据，他把市场看成一个大赌场，市场上的人都是赌棍，他们的行为可通过研究赌徒来加以诠释。例如，赌徒们在星期一的行为方式就有别于他们在星期五的行为方式，在上午的行为方式就有别于下午的行为方式，如此等等。依靠这种理论，他能有规律地赚上一小笔钱。于是，我将一部分资金交由他去运作，他则回敬以良好的回报率。尽管如此，他的方法始终存在着一个缺陷，只有在莫衷一是、风平浪静的市场中，他的方法才会奏效，如果出现了某种实实在在的涌动，某种动向，那么这些纯粹由投机行为所导致的小波小浪转瞬之间就会无形元踪，他将遭受可怕的重创，因为他根本就没有一套合适的自我拯救的机制，我之所以提及他，是因为他的方法与我的大相径庭，相去甚远。当然，也还有他的方法大行其道的时机，对待正确的方法，我已经学会了心胸开阔，坦荡无私。只要我还能依赖于他们的正直与诚实，我就心甘情愿地使用不同类型的人，采纳不同类型的手段，这就叫博百家之长，攻一家之短嘛。 问：维克多·李那得赫夫怎样了？ 答：在整个市场像一只元头苍蝇囚处乱擅的时期，他大发板财，可谓春风得意，风光无限。但是，后来他却不断地开始流血。我们站在市场上引人注目，几乎没有几个商品交易商能做到这一点。 问：最近一段时间他又进展如何？ 答：他干得还不赖。 问：你现在还拨付资金给他吗？ 答：不了。 问：当你与某个人交谈时，你还期盼有其他的特征吗？ 答：我对人的性格特征一向捉摸不准。我在股票方面是一个狐吼叫的行家里手，对于历史的见地也非同一般，但是，在判断一个人的性格方面却一直在心里发毛。要知道，我已经犯下了许多错误，搜拢这帮管理队伍耗费了我5年的时间，其中的风风雨雨真是一言难尽。令人兴慰的是，最终还是找到了他们，无论如何，我现在不能夸口说，我在选拔我们工作班子方面与我实际处理金融事物一样大获全胜。 我在想，作为一个高级合作伙伴，或者说作为一个老板，我是十分称职的，因为我对那帮基金管理人员所面对的毫无头绪的重重困难深有所悟，过去我就是这样干出来的，毕竟是同病相伶吧。当他们遇到麻烦时，我就会跳将出来，拔刀相助。我就觉得，这会有助于在公司上下创造一种良好的工作氛围。但是，唉，我却并不那么扛长于扰选他们。 问：在你的诸多能力中，有多大的份额来源于选准市场而不是投资活动？ 答：这可说不准，其中既有我全身心地投入到某一特定股票中的经历。也有我瞄准市场或市场板块的经历。上面我就说过，我不依赖于一成不变的规则来玩这种游戏，我要在游戏的规则中寻找蛛丝马达的变化。 问：如果你要在游戏的规则当中寻找任何一类的细微变化，那么，在你职业生涯的漫漫长河中肯定就会冷不防地出现生死存亡的关头。若是你专心致志地埋头于某一持续的基础，恐怕你就不会意识到这些至关重要的时刻。你与我的一个重要差别之一就在于你似乎能够明察秋毫，及时辨认出这些特殊的时机。 答：在我职业生涯之初，当我还是在与位于伦敦的股票交易所对面的交易房中的办事员的时候，我有一个老板，柯乐尔·波葛茨基，他就是一个连鸡毛蒜皮的事都要躬身亲问的人。他每天一大早就会像一只小鸟一样早早地抛头露面，然后，坐在办公室里用小刀将他的铅笔削得尖尖的。他曾训导过我，如果元事可做，那么，当你离开时，铅笔尖就应当与刚进来时一样尖尖的。我不会忘记他给我的这一善意的指教。 从更一般的意义上来说，运作一份有价证券一览表并不是那种普普通通的文字活。它是另有所指的，它不要承担风险，你所需要完成的工作量是与你的成功保持一种反比关系的。这就是说。如果你干的是一份寻常恬，你是一位推销员或手艺人，那么，你的成功就与投入的工作总量保持正比关系。你越是工作勤奋，你的付出也就越多；你造访的顾答赵多，你所收到的订单可能也就越多；其中存在着比较直接的联系。在你承担风险时，如果你判断准确，深思远虑，明察秋毫，你倒无需役日没夜地加班加点地干活，若是你出了差错，在你的假设与事件的实际过程之间有了出入，你就需要真正地劳神费心一番，刨根究底地查出究竟是出了什么问题，你越是干得不成功，你就越得有必要扭转局势。如果一览表的活干得不差，你就可以轻松一些了，这其间存在着反比关系哩！ 问：嗅，事情果真如此吗？难道你会自我取笑吗？·有时，当一切都看起来风调雨顺的时候，实际上，事情却在无可挽回地走向灾难的边缘。当看起来万事大吉时，难道你不会时不时地干些前期性的工作，以防止发生可能出现的意外？ 答：当然啦，应该怎样就怎样，但是我却不屑于拼死拼活的傻干。要做出一项决策，我只做必需的绝对意义上的最少的活。许多人对于活可谓一往情深，他们惯于汇集一大堆杂乱元章的信息，远远超过了为做出某项决策所必需的量。他们对于某些投资牵肠挂肚，念念不忘，因为他们对这些项目太了解了。我就不同，我会专心于至关重要的事情，当非得由我亲自出马时，我也会发疯似地大干一场，因为我害怕我还会揽上更多的事：当我役必要工作时。我就不去于，悠哉游哉，好不快活。这就是我们工作方式中一个本质性的因素，如果我弄明白了会出什么样的差错，我就会拿出两手来，阻止它！但是，事情的发展可就不是这样，我们得面对它；在单个的股票管理者的业绩中，既有走大运的记录，也有倒霉运的结局，他们将事情弄得条理顺畅，他们就会干得相当不坏，随后他们或许就会变得目中无人，自以为天下老子第一，结果该他们倾家荡产的时候就到了。这些事情我也并不例外，真可谓习以为常，司空见惯。生意一切顺畅无阻时，我就感到恰然自得，但随后就开始出乱子。生意场上的事情转瞬即变，千变万化，不可捉摸。要么我去控制局势，要么就让局势控制我。这恐怕就是一个人永远也不要丧失不安全感的缘由了。经验教导我，通常我能将损失控制在20%的限度内。回过头去看看我的兴衰成败史，在一年里，有关某一特定运作我能损失到20,随后我能亡羊补牢，奋起直追，结果，一年到头结果依旧菲然，这种情况倒是屡见不鲜。 问：你是否采纳了一套正式的程序去减少各种损失呢？ 答：并非完全如此，如果某件事出了差错，我又能弄清楚究竟是怎么一回事，事实上，我会认为起初的看法仍然是站得住脚的，损失则是由外界不可知的缘由造成的，我会宁愿选择买进而不是抛空的方式，我需要弄明白为什么我被放了一次血。 问：当事情出了差错时，你又是如何找到罪魁祸首的呢？ 答：我会感觉到痛（哈哈哈)。我太依赖于动物的直觉了。当我窜上窜下地运作量子基金会时，我的背会让我痛不堪言，我会将这种钻心似的疼痛的最初发作看成一种信号，暗示我的股票行当中又出现了什么乱子，当然，背痛不会告诉你究竟是什么出了差错——你知道的。后背是短期股，左肩是货币，哈哈哈！ ——然而，当我舍此就元他法之时，它却在极力怂恿我打着灯笼就寻找那些走迷的乱子，这可不是运作股票证券最为科学的方法，对吧？Hahaha! 问：然而，你已不再接手量子基金会的管理工作了。 答：如果我还弄那事，恐怕我已元暇与你在此谈天说地。长期以来，我单枪匹马卓有成效地管理着基金会，我是这艘大船的头儿，同时又是铲着煤往火里扔的司炉。当我爬上舰桥，摇响了铃，大喊："左满舵"，随后我就立即钻进机房，实际执行命令。在此期间，我会稍作停顿，气喘嘘嘘，我算一下要买进何种股票，等等，这些日子终于一去不复返了。现在我有了一个组织，甚至我已将船长一职托付给了别人，我只是扮作董事会的主席，处理些战略性的大问题。 问：你能告诉我，你只是船上的一名乘客吗？ 答：啊，我得说我还不仅仅于此吧，我像是这条船的主人。 问：你会闯进驾驶室，然后接管控制权吗？ 答：我会去拜访船长，但我却不会去夺权。因为这是一项事关重大的工作，如果我妨碍了那种责任，那就将是十分有害的。 问：你是在什么时候开始从实际的金融管理事务中退出来的？ 答：1989年我已经深深地卷人到东欧正在发生的那场翻天覆地的革命中了。你知道，东欧正是我期盼早日恢复其昔时之光彩的第一故乡，我无法继续料理我的日常事务，不可能再继续守候在电话机旁，我已有点心猿意马。于是，我将金融控制权交给了由斯但菜·德鲁肯米勒牵头的一组年轻有力的金融家。 问：然而，你仍然在1992年对英镑挣下了10亿美元的战役中担当了重要角色，——这还是在你将金融控制权移交给了斯但莱之后。他应当由此而名声显赫吗？ 答：是的，我从未为此而过功请赏，我参与了那一事件的过程，作为一名督查者，我对他说，这将是一次千载难逢的绝好机会，承担风险就会财源滚滚，无限风光在险境嘛，我们应当比平常的规模还要大一点，来一次真格的。他接受了我的建议。 问：你对量子基金集团杠杆作用的程度负有全责。然而，在英镑上走短期的最初想法却是他的，对不对？ 答：是的，他专门槽询过我，但是，最终是由他作出的决定。 问：如果没有你的谆谆教诲，他恐怕将永元出头之日，不知道这样说是否公正？你难道没有驱使他将自己的潜能全部发挥出来吗？ 答：我曾建议他打蛇就要打七寸，如果没有我，他倒也或许做到了这一点。事实上，我们所采用的手段并非总是那样神奇，不可战胜，因为我们只有一些证券在担当风险，或者稍稍多出一些什么吧。 问：这就是你所获得的一个重大成就。在过去的岁月里，量子基金会也对货币的走势做出过某些判断，只是效果不尽如人意。你在其中扮演了何种角色呢？ 答：与我在英镑大战中的角色并无出入。1994年我们在日元问题上碰了一同大钉子，当时我们所遭受损失的程度被极大暄染了一番，外界纷纷扬扬地散播谣言，说我们损失了10亿美元，但是，事实却并非如此。1994年2月，我们损失了6亿美元，但是到年末岁初，我们也将本捞了回来。毫无疑问，这一年的绝大部分时间我们都在走霉运，我是整个决策程序的一部分，因此，我得承担起责任，就如同我在英镑大战中那样。在确定我们在何处弄糟了事情方面，我也占有一席之地，我们关注于美国两国在贸易问题上的徐徐拉开的序幕。当时，支持日元强劲的还有更为深层次的原因，而这一点当时我们并未意识到。 问：你现在在纽约花的时间也不像从前那样多了，你主要潜形于东欧，从事你的基金活动。 答：再也不那样了，我现在耗在东欧的时间就比过去的5年要少。 问：当你浪迹天涯，你又如何频繁地就商务上的事情与在纽约的办公机构进行沟通的呢？ 答：只要电话联系畅通无阻，我就每天与办公室聊聊天。 问：你会与斯但莱说几句吗？ 答：是的，还有其他的一些人。 问：斯但莱还向你征询意见吗？你与他进行沟通是具有一定的方向性，还是你们之间的交谈只是就事论事？ 答：他负责全盘运作基金会，我不会将任何东西强加到他的头上。在许多方面，斯但莱在40岁时比起我在那个年纪要强一此 问：这是不是量子基金会继续取得成功的原因呢？ 答：这只是部分原因，斯但菜是一个十分出色并且心胸开阔的人，因此，就凭他也能使得公司尽纳天下之贤士。基金会因此更加名声大振，在英镑危机过后更是如此。我们可以让最棒的年轻一代加入到我们的公司队伍里来，现在我们的金融管理蒸蒸日上，这一点我们过去从未做到过。 第二节索罗斯的全融谋略 ——成功之道（二） 向人们展示最不为人所体会的投资思维。 人们对于世界的理解总是不完善的。o在其后来才畅销一时的《点石成金》（The Alchemy Of Finance)一书中，索罗斯第一次就其在投资活动中所凭借的基本构架大发宏论，他暗示，在其只靠大脑挣钱吃饭的生涯中，这本着实令人晦涩难懂的书是一个了不起的突破。索罗斯一再声称，《点石成金》一书是他毕生心血的结晶，当所有一切看起来都无可救药的时候，思想就成了其生命中最重要的部分了。 索罗斯耗尽心血所构思的那些想法使得每一个人都大感困惑不解，实际上，他的主题思想就在于，我们对于生活其中的这个世界的理解从根深蒂固的层面上看，是相当不全面的。为了做出决策而需要了解的局势，实际上又是受到这些决策潜移默化的影响的，在参与某些事件的人的期望值与这些事件的实际结果之间，存在着不可改变的差异。有时，这类差异过于微不足道，人们几乎可以视而不见；然而，在其他情况下，这种差异却又是如此之大，以致于能够成为确定事件过程的关键因素。在索罗斯看来，他的这种想法可不是那样能轻易地加以表述的。 索罗斯宣称，要总结他那些貌似深奥的想法，用几个词——确切他说，就两个词——就已绰绰有余，即：不完全理解（英文：Imperfec tUnderstanding）。后来，索罗斯在其传记中曾说过，其实，即使是这两个单词也还不足以真正表白他的全部想法，因为，非完全性不仅涉及到人们的理解能力，也还事关人们身处其中的事件的动态以及所努力寻求弄个水落石出的现实世界。索罗斯似乎有点故弄玄虚，他扬言，现实可是一个让人捉摸不定的靶子，人们的理解过程本身也会对它产生影响。 一方面，现实可以在人们的思维领域得到某种反映一一一这是人类认识事物的机能；另一方面，人们还会做出可能会对现实产生影响的决策。这些决策倒也并非基于现实，而是建立在人们对于现实的理解基础之上一一一这一点索罗斯将其称之为人的参与机能。这两种机能相互对立，在某些情况下，它们又能相互影响，两者之间的交互作用采取了双向反馈的机制形式。 索罗斯显然是借用了法国语言的文法特色。他采取了反身动词的结构，这种动词的主语和宾语都是同一个词，其中"反射"这种说法和"反映"一语也有点关联，但却不能与生理意义上的反射混为一谈。 《点石成金》一书涵盖了索罗斯那些让人百恩不得其解的思想的全部，他有理由认为，该书是其思想领域中一项最了不起的成就，因为"我试图表达了反映的想法，这对于我进行市场行为分析来说是极其重要的。"然而，索罗斯也承认，他这种反映理论的陈述也是不完全的。 《点石成金》一书最初几乎没有销路，令出版公司一筹莫展，索罗斯将这种状况的原因归结为"没有几个人弄得懂我正在试图说些什么"。当然，索罗斯也获得了某些意料不到的收获，"多少能够让我心满意足了一番。"例如，他与斯但莱·德鲁肯米勒的邂逅，就是后者在拜读完这本书之后找到他的；还有保罗·根德·琼斯，此翁就曾三令五申，谁要替他做事，就得首先阅读完此书，并且还得弄明白索罗斯说了一些什么东西。 然而，索罗斯终究给他的那部宏论带来了好运气。当他在美国家喻户晓之时，《点石成金》一书还真被当成一回事了。居然成为当时美国的畅销书之一，各大传媒纷纷炒作，一些学术团体还专门举办各种研讨会。在出版公司的仓库里，原来堆积如山，几乎形同废纸的《点石成金》一夜之间价值连城，各书店之订购单雪片般飞来，令公司头头们大喜过望，眉开眼笑。 索罗斯从知识界获得了某种反馈，暴露了一些存在于他的那套理论中的不足之处。"眼下，我终于意识到了在使用某些字词，甚至于反映这一术语过程中，很不严谨的举措比比皆是。我既用它去描述存在有深思熟虑的参与者的事件的架构，也用它去描述某些特别事例。其中，双向反馈机制是一种导致失衡的方式，既中断了事件的程序，又破坏了参与者的观点。" 索罗斯认为，其理论的第一要义就在于观察事物的方式，一种普通理论总有其放之四海而皆准的有效性。第二要义则是一种仅仅只是偶尔间歇才会发生的现象，然而，当它出现时，却能创造历史。 就索罗斯普通意义上的反映论而言，本质上，它与有头脑，明察秋毫的参与者的角色相关联，当然，也涉及到他的思考与他所参与事件的关系。索罗斯相信，一个深思熟虑的参与者实际上处于十分困难的境地，因为他需要去理解局势，不幸的是，他本人就是其中的一个角色。从传统角度来看，人们把理解这一行为看成是本质上十分被动的一个角色，而具体参与则是一个积极角色。事实上，这两个角色相互作用，相互影响，这就使得参与者不太可能在纯粹或完全理解的基础上进行任何决策。 古典的经济学理论假设，市场参与者是依照充分完全理解事物的基础而从事活动的。这个假设在索罗斯那里是站不住脚的。参与者的思考影响着他们参与的市场，而市场行为也反过来影响着参与者的思考。这些人不可能得到对于市场全部的知识，因为他们的思维永远影响着市场，市场反馈也会永远波及他们的思维。这就会使得对于市场行为的分析比起如果能够全盘了解的假设站得住脚的那种情况，要难得多。 索罗斯惯于向美国的经济学界发出各种挑战，他扬言，"经济学理论需要进行根本性的再思考，"因为在经济运作过程中，始终存在着一种在很大程度上仍元人间津的不确定成分，没有任何门类的社会科学能够指望获得与自然科学相提并论的无可非议的结果，经济学也不例外。所以，索罗斯宣称，对于思维在影响事件过程中所起到的作用，人们必须采取一种截然不同的观点。 索罗斯的理论认为，人们习惯于将事件看成是一连串的事实；一个系列伴随着一个系列，永无止境，没完没了。当有头脑会思考的参与者进入局势之中，事物的环节并不会将事实直接联系上事实，而是将事实与参与者的思索连为一体，然后又将参与者的思索引向下一系列的事实。 要了解参与者扮演的角色，索罗斯宣称，必须首先弄清楚，参与者的思路不能深陷于具体事物当中而不能自拔，参与者也还得考虑其他人和他自己的思考。这样一来，就会出现一些捉摸不定的因素。换言之，此时参与者的思考就不再与事实保持一致，但却可以在影响和塑造事实方面起到某种作用。思考和事实不仅有所出入，而且参与者的认知力和实际情况之间也会存在差距，更不用说参与者的盘算和实际结果之间的误差了。索罗斯认为，这种误差正是了解历史过程以及金融市场动力的关键所在，他宣称，错误观念和举止失误在人间万事方面所起的作用，一如变异在生物学领域所起的作用。 索罗斯十分着重他的那套反映理论，并极力加以宣扬，上述想法就是他自我标榜的核心概念。他承认，这种概念所产生的影响非同寻常，而这些影响对于旁人未必重要，对他却意味深长，他的一切都来源于此。 索罗斯觉察到他自己对这个世界的观点，与芸芸众生所持的流行看法，在许多方面都大相径庭。 其中一个的广为流传的看法是，金融市场始终处于均衡状态之中，只是其中存在有各种差异，事物的结症就在于市场并非天衣元缝，其性质有如随机扩散一样，到头来还会受到其他随机事件的影响。索罗斯曾对这种看法口诛笔伐，认为看法错误的来源就在于错误地套用了牛顿物理学中的原理。 索罗斯认为，出现差异本源自不完整的理论，金融市场的实质之一就是市场参与者的认知力与实际情况存在多重隔阂，有时这种差异尚可视而不见，但有时人们却必须考虑到这种差异，只有这样，人们才会弄明白事情到底是怎样发生的。 在金融市场中，这种状况可谓司空见惯，见怪不怪，它们通常都以大起大落的顺序呈现在人们眼前，虽然，并非永远都是这样。索罗斯所提及的这种大起大落不是均衡对称。加速的过程是渐迸式的，随后才以灾难性的逆转到达事物的高潮。在《点石成金》一书中，索罗斯提及过一些事例，其中包括20世纪60年代的企业集团化浪潮；堪称经典案例的房地产投资信托基金问题；源自70年代，后终触发1982年墨西哥危机的国际借贷浪潮，等等。索罗斯不甘寂寞，一夜之间就炮制了一套关于外汇汇率自由波动的理论，外汇汇率易于狂升狂跌，但总算还能相互抵销。索罗斯在书中也还讨论过一些并不单纯的情况，例如在20世纪80年代席卷全球的收购企业大风暴。在这些例子中，风行一时的偏见和盛极一时的趋势之间，存在着相互作用、相互反馈的作用机制。当然，这些事例在某种意义上都是经过特殊挑选过的，在任何连续的事件中，都有很长一段时期，相互之间的交互作用相对而言是微不足道的。 这一点，索罗斯在其《点石成金》一书中并没有十分明确的表述。他用"反射"这种表述方式来说明双面性的交互作用，以及存在着这种交互作用的事件的结构。索罗斯虽然意识到了他所借用的"反映"一词给他所带来的诸多不便，但是他却不敢抛弃这种说法，因为那有可能会导致其整个引以为豪的理论解体与崩溃。 在所谓的通常情形下，思想与现实之间的差别并不是一个在天上，一个在地下。其间也有别的力量在起作用，能够缩小两者之间的差距。其中部分原因是人们能够从经验当中获益菲浅，另一原因则是人们可以按照自己的意志改变或塑造社会。这就是索罗斯惯称的准平衡状况。 然而有时人们的想法和现实距离很近，只是不会最终完全合二为一，索罗斯将此称为极不平衡状况。这种状况又可以分成两类，其一是所谓动态失衡。当动态失衡的状况发生时，广为流传的偏见和占据主导地位的潮流相互强化，直到两者之间的差异扩大到足以导致一场灾难性大崩溃的地步；其二是所谓的静态失衡，其特点在于极端僵化、极端教条化的思考方式，加上极其僵化的社会局势，但双方都不会出现变化，因此各种陈规教条与现实之间的距离一直都很大。假如社会出现了变革的迹像，而各种教条却不相应地进行调整，那么，即使这些变革的速度十分缓慢，思维与现实之间的鸿沟也会愈来愈大。这种局面可以延续很长时间，为人们所耳熟能详的事例就是前苏联。相形之下，前苏联解体则可视为一个动态不平衡的实例。 索罗斯把动态失衡和静态失衡视为两个极端，而准平衡则是介乎两者之间的一种状况，索罗斯喜欢把三种状态比拟为物质的三种物理状态：气态、固态和液态。这三态性质相差泅异。以水为例，水在这三种状态中都有不同的特点。相同的原则在市场参与者的思考方面也可适用，在正常状态下，索罗斯认为，他所称谓"反射"的双向反馈机制并非必不可少，相反，倒是可以置之不理的。然而，当这些人趋近或达到所谓极度失衡状态时，反射就变得重要了，大起大落的场面就会接匠而至。 索罗斯认为，区别准平衡和极度失衡两种状况，对于投资者来说极其重要。然而，索罗斯又说，两者之间的分野十分模糊，常常有一些力量和势力，将人们投入到极端失衡的状态中。尽管存在有某种抗衙力量与之对抗，而且抗衡力量一般都能如愿以偿，然而，在某些情况下，这种抗衡力量也会抵挡不住，于是就会发生改朝换代或革命流血之类的变化。生性好斗的索罗斯对这类情况自然深感兴趣盎然，但是，他又承认这并不能说明他已经掌握足以清晰地解释或预测这种情形的成熟理论，他还只是处于摸索阶段。