Chapter 49 Section Five Truman refused to send troops to protect Chiang

U.S. President Truman sent ace Marshall to China to mediate the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, but he returned without success. After he returned to Washington, he believed that the Kuomintang was more responsible than the Communist Party for the failure of the peace talks (see May, The Truman Administration and China, P. 12), brooding.From Chiang Kai-shek's point of view, Marshall seemed to be helping the Communist Party. In fact, the Americans wanted to help Chiang Kai-shek, hoping to unify China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek without civil war.Helping Chiang Kai-shek is also helping the United States. A pro-American Chinese government is in line with the strategic interests of the United States in Asia, and a peaceful and stable China is in line with the commercial interests of the United States. China is not only a vast potential market, but also a major supplier of raw materials.However, Chiang Kai-shek was "recalcitrant" and bent on destroying the "communist bandits" by stealing chickens without losing money. This not only caused him to lose his great country, but also made the United States "lose of China" (loss of China).It is conceivable that Truman and Marshall felt contempt and hatred for Chiang Kai-shek who "harmed others and harmed himself".

After all, Marshall was an upright soldier, unsmiling, and would not speak rudely. However, Truman was a politician from a small town.After he retired, someone made an "oral history" for him. Although he was over seventy years old, he was still very angry when he mentioned Chiang Kai-shek, and his anger was palpable.He said that it took him a while to discover that the Kong and Song family, including the Jiangs, had stolen US$750 million out of the US$3.5 billion in aid to China and invested them in real estate in Sao Paulo, Brazil and New York. And for the so-called "China Lobby".Truman said mercilessly: Jiang, Song, Kong "They're all thieves, every damn one of them" (They're all thieves, every damn one of them, see Miller, Plain Speaking, P. 288, 289)

Although Truman and Marshall had long disliked Chiang Kai-shek, their problem was that they had no choice. From the perspective of the interests of the United States, they disliked Mao Zedong even more.Although the Americans did not see any Russian advisers or any Russian equipment in Yan'an, and knew that Stalin was far more self-serving than helping Mao, Mao was the Communist Party after all, and Mao's victory was still the victory of international communism. The United States is completely unacceptable at a time of climate change.What's more, Truman is not a dictator like Chiang Kai-shek, who has to bear the pressure of other political forces, and Chiang Kai-shek has many right-wing friends in the United States, such as Luce in the publishing industry, who is the most loyal supporter of Chiang Kai-shek.Through vigorous anti-communist beliefs and the organization of the "China Lobby", a powerful pro-Chiang force was formed in the United States.

Being pro-Chiang and being pro-China were originally two different things, but at that time, the general American public often regarded Chiang Kai-shek as China, just like Chiang Kai-shek.Roosevelt's confidant Harry Hopkins (Harry Hopkins) once said, "The Chairman may be the only Chinese who, like the American public, mistook Chiang Kai-shek for China." (Quoted from Kahn, The China Hands, p. 102) Especially right-wing politicians among the American public regard "supporting Chiang" and "anti-communism" as one, and use "criticizing Chiang" and "favoring the Communists" as synonymous terms. Two words.Therefore, it is not surprising that some American diplomats in Chongqing were put on red hats and liquidated in the "McCarthy era" for criticizing Chiang Kai-shek.

Under the general direction of anti-communism, apart from the public, American officials, especially the diplomatic and military departments, only advocated "helping Chiang to destroy the Communist Party", and almost unanimously believed that the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek and the victory of Mao Zedong would lead to Soviet Russia controlling China, Threats to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific.Admiral Charles M. Cooke, commander of the Seventh Fleet, advocated reducing the strength of the US Marine Corps in China during Marshall's mediation in China. Although Marshall did not accept it, he continued to emphasize the importance of US military bases in China. Sex, especially the Qingdao Naval Base, believed that once lost, there would be disastrous consequences, so they proposed various suggestions such as training the Chinese Marine Corps and using the US Navy to support the Kuomintang. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 7 (1947), P. 73-80, 864-865, 944-945, 953) Most of the U.S. State Department and its ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart, took the position of supporting and assisting Chiang. They all hope that the aid of the United States can help Chiang Kai-shek defeat the Communist Party.

Under such circumstances, no matter how much Truman and Marshall hated Chiang Kai-shek, they had no choice but to help him.Jiang Yi knew it well and had nothing to fear. In the end, he could not buy Marshall's account, close the door to peace talks, and start a full-scale civil war.However, according to Gu Weijun's memoirs, Jiang still underestimated Ma, so when he heard that Ma was announced as Secretary of State, he was "shocked".Chiang also wanted to ask Ma to stay in China as his military adviser.In short, whether it is Truman or Marshall, the question of whether to aid Chiang Kai-shek does not exist, but the question of how much aid, to what extent, and how to achieve the desired effect of aid.When Marshall first came to China, he brought a check for 500 million U.S. dollars as a "reward" for reaching a peace agreement.In the second half of 1946, Marshall used an arms embargo as pressure on Chiang for peace talks, but the embargo was lifted before Marshall left China.Chiang Kai-shek had always had U.S. military aid in his fight against the Communist Party, and in the fall of 1947, there was a new aid plan.In April 1948, the U.S. Congress passed another 463 million yuan aid bill to China. According to U.S. estimates, since the victory of the Anti-Japanese War five years ago, the assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek government has been no less than 2 billion U.S. dollars.However, Chiang Kai-shek always believed that the lack of US aid led to his failure. American right-wing politicians also used this to attack the Truman administration for "losing China."However, the U.S. troops observing in China agreed that the defeat of the Kuomintang army was not due to lack of arms, but due to lack of leadership and low morale.When they saw the American weapons and equipment brought by the People's Liberation Army when they entered Beijing, and the Cadillac convertible that Mao Zedong rode in the military parade, they were very uncomfortable.

In the autumn of 1947, the war situation became increasingly unfavorable to Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang's stronghold in the Northeast became more and more isolated. Ambassador Stuart even issued an early warning to the US government that North China might not defend it. (See Situ’s letter to the Secretary of State dated March 26, 1947, contained in Foreign Relations of the United States, V0l. The tragedy is that President Jiang and the people around him can't understand the people's desire for peace, but only trust their spies, so that they can't cater to the demands of the masses, and can only use cruel suppression methods, which really help the Communist Party. (Quoted from Rea & Brewer ed., the Forgotten Ambassador, p. 115) Fearing the total collapse of the Kuomintang regime, Marshall confessed to a group of American businessmen in June: "I have exhausted my brains to think of a way out." (I have troubled my brain and I can't now see the answer.) (See Lillienthal, Journals: the Atomic Energy Years, P. 201) Finally, he suggested that Wedemeyer lead a delegation to visit China.General Wedemeyer’s anti-communist views are well known, and he is familiar with Chiang Kai-shek, and his delegation includes experts in finance, economy, politics, engineering and technology. signs of a possible change in policy". (See volume six of "Gu Weijun's Memoirs", page 171) The so-called "changes" mean that the US government will increase aid to Chiang Kai-shek based on General Wei's field investigation report.The general public opinion in the United States at that time also held this view.Later Marshall said to Gu Weijun in person:

Wedemeyer's mission was suggested by (I) so that Wedemeyer could study the situation in China and report back to the United States.This report will enable (me) to examine the US policy of aid to China. (I) have been back from China for more than half a year. I am eager to help China, but I am not very sure how to help China best. ("Gu Weijun's Memoirs" Volume Six, page 203) So he sent this delegation, and the reason why he chose Wei was that Wei was anti-communist and co-produced with Chiang, and Wei had served as Jiang's military adviser, so he could fully discuss it.This proves that Marshall did have the intention of more actively assisting Chiang to save the crisis.

The White House announced on July 11 that it would send a delegation to visit China. Wedemeyer conducted field investigations for more than a month, visiting Nanjing, Taipei, Guangzhou, Shanghai, North China, and Northeast China.Although he is anti-communist and pro-Chiang, he is a soldier of the United States and has the heavy responsibility of investigating the truth. His own country's interests are at stake, so it is inevitable that he speaks truth and candor.He pointed out that the civil and military officials of the Kuomintang are generally corrupt and corrupt, and the conscription is extremely unfair. The children of the rich and powerful have gone abroad to study in order to evade military service. , and scolded Xiong who had never been to the military hospital for inspection, so he didn't know how many beds there were in the hospital.On the eve of leaving China on August 24, Wei Demei published an extremely frank talk in the newspaper.In a word, he criticized the "spiritually insolvent" of Chiang Kai-shek's regime.For Wedemeyer, this kind of frankness and bluntness is his duty, but for Chiang Kai-shek, it is naturally harsh and embarrassing.We know from Gu Weijun's memoirs that Foreign Minister Wang Shijie telegraphed Ambassador Gu, "The chairman and other responsible officials of the government expressed their indignation at Wedemeyer's speech", not only annoyed, but also "quite annoyed", not only disgusted, but also "very angry". Very disgusted", accusing Wedemeyer of being "arrogant".Because of these "disgusts" and "angers", Wei Demai held a banquet to entertain Chiang Kai-shek before leaving China. Chiang refused to go and was represented by Song Meiling. (See volume six of "Gu Weijun's Memoirs", pages 193 and 195) There is no doubt that Chiang Kai-shek felt humiliated.An American general came to China to "investigate" arbitrarily, and he was suspected of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, but Jiang welcomed it and was willing to hand over power to Wedemeyer. He lashed out, especially saying that China needs a leader who can inspire the masses. You feel embarrassed, and it is hard to tell yourself. Although Ambassador Zeng Yang Situ asked Wei Demei not to criticize him too much, but the ambassador intervened inconveniently. See Rea & Brewer ed., the Forgotten Ambassador, P. 133, 137), always seeking help from others is like eating someone else's food, the mouth is soft, and the waist is even more unable to stand up.Chiang Kai-shek kept saying that Mao Zedong was a vassal of Soviet Russia, but he didn't know the benefits of being a vassal to the United States.Hu Shizhi pointed out that Soviet Russia was the "superior government" of the CCP, and he did not realize that the United States was Chiang Kai-shek's "superior government".

After returning to the United States, Wedemeyer reported that the situation in China had worsened since Marshall left, but his anti-communist stance did not allow him to suggest that the United States quit. He still advocated aiding Chiang and large-scale economic aid, but all military aid and economic aid The aid, when planning and using it, must be supervised by the Americans so that it will not be in vain.He was convinced that the Northeast could no longer be done, and suggested that it be managed by the United Nations, so as not to be occupied by the CCP and become a "satellite country" of Soviet Russia.Chiang Kai-shek and his foreign minister Wang Shijie thought that the United States wanted China to give up the Northeast. In fact, Wedemeyer wanted to keep the Northeast from being taken by the Communist Party. fist, and then straightened his index finger and said: "The situation is like this, the Communist Party can cut off that finger at any time, thereby cutting off the supply line of the national army." (See volume six of "Gu Weijun's Memoirs", page 199). The general knew the situation at a glance in the northeast, but China's supreme commander Chiang Kai-shek couldn't see it, and finally let the People's Liberation Army completely cut off his supply line.In view of the sensitivity of Wedemeyer's report, Marshall did not publish it immediately, and made private reference.Later, after the publication of the white paper, the Wedemeyer Report was made public.

We can see from Wedemeyer's report that this general strongly advocated large-scale aid to Chiang because of the needs of anti-communism, but at the same time pointed out that without American intervention, no amount of aid would help.The so-called "intervention" will eventually take the financial and military burdens from Chiang Kai-shek's shoulders.Chiang once proposed to Leighton Stuart to sign the "Sino-U.S. Anti-Communist Agreement", but Situ did not encourage him, and he knew that Chiang had the intention of trapping Lao America. (See Rea & Brewer, cited above, p. 194.) On November 9, 1948, when Shenyang had abandoned its defense a week earlier and the Battle of Xubang began, Chiang Kai-shek made a "screaming shout" to Truman. help" (a frantic appeal for help).At the same time, General David Barr, head of the U.S. Advisory Group to China, reported to the White House: "I am convinced that the military situation has become so bad that only the active participation of the U.S. military can help. Since my arrival in China, there has not been a single defeat due to insufficient guns." .Their defeat, it seems to me, is entirely due to the worst art of domination in the world, and other morale-damaging factors, so that there is no fighting spirit." (See Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 411 ) So far, the Truman administration has come to a clear conclusion: unless the United States is willing to spend billions of dollars and send millions of U.S. troops to China to aid in the war, it would be a waste to reinforce Chiang. It seems impossible for the United States to send millions of troops to protect Chiang Kai-shek, but it was not. At that time, there were fanatical anti-communists in the United States who were willing to organize an anti-communist crusade to prevent the expansion of communism, at least to prevent the CCP from being located north of the Yangtze River.In the 1949 general election, the Republican Party launched the right-wing conservative Thomas E. Dewey, who strongly echoed the anti-Communist and support Chiang theory.He openly said: "If China falls, we have reason to believe that the whole of Asia will be doomed, but Western Europe and the United States will be isolated, isolated in a very hostile world." (See The New York Times 25 Nov. 1947, p. .18) It seems to be "The Domino Theory" before the Vietnam War? The China in Dewey's mind is Chiang Kai-shek's China, with the intention of giving Chiang greater assistance and a decisive battle with the CCP.Chiang Kai-shek knew that he had a close consensus with the United States on anti-communism, so he naturally hoped that Dewey would be elected.In fact, many Republicans under Dewey believed that helping Chiang Kai-shek defeat the CCP was a relatively cheap investment in the anti-communist war? Dewey's voice was quite high, and public opinion predicted that he would be elected. The result was beyond many people's expectations. Truman was re-elected, and the Senate and House of Representatives also received a majority of seats from the Democratic Party, which further strengthened Truman's political strength.Chiang Kai-shek could not expect major changes in the U.S. policy toward China. In fact, if Dewey was elected, whether he would really send troops to help Chiang suppress the Communist Party is a big question mark.However, for the re-elected Truman, all Jiang could hope for was to win more American aid and continue to make efforts that he knew could not be done.Chiang Kai-shek’s call for help on November 9 was sent to Truman shortly after the general election, calling for “accelerated and increased military assistance” and even asking for “American military advisers to participate in command operations” (see volume six of Gu Weijun’s Memoirs, p. 523), but Truman basically did not change the established policy toward China. When the situation in the Battle of Xu Bang was unfavorable, the US State Department's attitude towards the Chiang regime changed from contempt to indifference, believing that Chiang Kai-shek's downfall would be inevitable. The personal representative, the "Private Ambassador", was considered "inappropriate" by Marshall and refused to be interviewed by Truman, and finally died without a problem.On November 24, Gu Weijun paid a visit to Truman. The American president knew more about Xu Bang's battle situation than the Chinese ambassador, and said that the 32 divisions of the national army brought all the equipment to the Communist Party.Gu Jing didn't know it at all, and only confirmed it after asking Ye Gongchao. (Refer to the sixth volume of "Gu Weijun's Memoirs", pages 544 to 553). At the end of 1948, the Nanjing government was on the verge of paralysis. Chiang Kai-shek originally wanted to come to the United States to ask for help, but Truman did not approve of the invitation. (See the sixth volume of "Gu Weijun's Memoirs", page 560) Song Meiling was changed to represent Chiang Kai-shek, but the US side insisted on a private visit.Song Meiling arrived in Washington on the morning of December 1st.The circumstances of her trip were quite different from the last time. Although the Japanese invaders occupied a large area of ​​the country last time, the couple was saluted by the American government and the opposition as anti-Japanese heroes. The reception was unprecedented. However, this trip was not officially received at all. The embarrassment was hard to hide.The real purpose of her trip was not even clear to the ambassador, Gu Weijun. It still needs to be guessed whether it was the chairman's order, or the wife's own initiative, or even some weird reasons as rumors said.Such as quarreling with her husband and fear of being captured by the communist army.The three requests she made to Truman: a statement on aid to China, the dispatch of senior military officers, and increased military aid, have been repeatedly repeated, and the US government's attitude of not being interested has become very clear.It was already difficult for Du and Jiang to seek common ground despite differences. Du believed that Jiang refused to reform, and aid would be useless. Jiang said that without aid, there would be no reform at all, and bargaining was not speculative.If she had discussed with Ambassador Gu carefully before and after the trip, and learned about the situation in Washington, there would be no need to do anything extra, let Truman say no, and bring shame on herself.However, after she arrived in Washington, Ambassador Gu ignored her repeated requests to see her, and she had no chance to give her a detailed "background analysis". Finally, on the afternoon when she went to the White House to meet the President, she made an appointment to meet Ambassador Gu, but she kept a straight face. It turned out to be a Huang Renquan, who worked for the Confucian family and was named an attache at the embassy, ​​was dismissed from his post.After the conversation, she got up and said to Ambassador Gu in a "stern tone": "Is it true that Huang Renquan will be dismissed?" Then she repeatedly said that as long as she is in the United States, she needs Huang Renquan to work, and he will not be dismissed. dismissed.Ambassador Gu promised not to revoke Huang's post, and she walked out of the living room.Gu Da made this "adventure" and couldn't help but write the following paragraph in his diary: I have the impression that she (Song Meiling) was in no rush to see me because she was in a bad mood, annoyed by her mission and the cold reception she received, and maybe because her relatives and Huang Renquan were talking about me behind my back Her attitude towards me was not so friendly and natural, which was very different from when we met on various occasions before.Strangely, not once during our forty-five minutes of conversation did she tell me how she decided to accept the mission, the purpose of the visit, the hopes of the Generalissimo or the Administration, the attitude of General Marshall, the Prospects for aid and more.It was as if she had arranged this meeting only to avoid criticism that she did not want to know the intelligence or opinion I had to offer. ("Gu Weijun's Memoirs", Volume Six, page 574) Gu Weijun's revelations are likely to prove that this noble lady is capricious, ignorant, self-serving, and what Hu Shizhi once said was "a sense of vanity"? She was accompanied by Mrs. Marshall from the time she got off the plane, and many times Meeting Marshall, it can be seen that she really wanted to set up an old relationship. After all, the Marshalls had been in China for a year, and they had established some personal friendship. The Secretary of State attached great importance to the seriousness of the crisis of the Kuomintang and vigorously supported Chiang under the anti-communist consensus.But in Marshall's mind, Chiang Kai-shek's record is really bad, even if there is an affair, he will not harm the public with selfishness. Soong Meiling and Marshall did not agree with each other, and she has already shown it.After she met Marshall again, the reporter asked her if she had gained anything, and she cleverly asked: "Who has met General Marshall and not felt rewarded?" Inadvertently admitting that her gain was limited to meeting General Ma, Gu Weijun confirmed Her meeting with Ma was "extremely disappointing".Her only meeting with Truman, on December 10, was even more disappointing.She had tea at the White House at 5:00 p.m., talked in Truman's study at 5:30 p.m., and ended before 6:00 p.m. without even dinner.She came out, in full view of the crowd, "with a stern look and a sneering smile, giving the impression that the talks were fruitless." (Gu Weijun’s words, see the sixth volume of his "Memoirs", page 574) Truman dictated after retirement, referring to this meeting: When I was President in 1948, she came to America asking for more "handouts."I don't live in the White House like Roosevelt did, and I think she's pretty upset, but I don't give a damn if she's happy or not. (Miller, Plain Speaking, p. 288) Gu Weijun said that Jiang Soong Meiling's trip "had no achievements", more than no achievements, it was a catastrophic failure.The situation has shown that, as far as Chiang Kai-shek's relationship with the United States is concerned, the Soong brothers and sisters are no longer a "wealth" but a "burden".After Truman refused to meet again, Song Meiling quietly left Washington and lived in seclusion in the Kong family's mansion on Long Island, New York. It was not until 1950 when the mainland was lost that she returned to Taipei to reunite with her husband. The Truman administration was unwilling to provide more aid, because it knew that it was of no avail, and the only way to save Chiang was to get involved in the Chinese civil war.During the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek did not allow Stilwell to command the Chinese army, but now he actively asked the United States to send a senior general to command the national army to suppress the Communists. The United States also considered sending General Douglas MacArthur to China.Chiang Kai-shek's intention to ask the U.S. military to intervene in order to "save lives" is already very clear (see Leighton Stuart's letter to the State Council on June 10, 1948, stating that Chiang was willing to hand over all power to the U.S. side for planning, supervision and execution, the letter contains Rea & Brewer ed., the Forgotten Ambassador, P. 242), the US initially felt hesitant, thank you for being insensitive, and the opportunity was fleeting.In the 1960s, the United States sent half a million US troops to Vietnam in order to stop the Communist Party.Truman did not send troops to China to protect Chiang Kai-shek in the 1940s. In addition to many different factors such as time, place, and people, Marshall played a certain role.He has been to China, had contact with the CCP, and is relatively familiar with the situation in China.Although he was anti-communist, he knew that Chiang Kai-shek's failure was not a conspiracy of Soviet Russia, but a force within China.If the United States intervenes, it will be tantamount to shouldering all of China's problems. As Marshall himself said, "in fact, it is bound to be ready to accept the Chinese government and invest a large amount of military power and economic resources indefinitely." Therefore, he believes that "such a large-scale The costs and costs are clearly out of proportion to the results that may be obtained." (See May, The Truman Administration and China, P.30, 81-82) Americans regard the Vietnam War as a disaster, and they should thank Marshall for preventing an even bigger disaster.If it really happens, it is conceivable that it will not only be a catastrophe for the United States, but also a catastrophe for the Chinese nation.In this regard, the "failure" of Chiang Kai-shek's rescue and rescue is not the "success" of the Chinese nation? When the dust settled, the State Department of the Truman administration, whose Secretary of State had been replaced by Dean Acheson, published a sensational white paper on Sino-US relations on August 5, 1949.The intention of this white paper is obviously to answer the growing criticism from the rightists in the United States. It uses a large number of archives to illustrate that the Truman administration has tried its best to help Chiang Kai-shek defeat the Communist Party, but the adverse results of the Chinese civil war are definitely beyond the control and change of Therefore, the responsibility for "losing China" should mainly be borne by the corruption and incompetence of the Chiang regime, and many excellent American military units easily surrendered to the Communist army.This was confirmed by Mao Zedong: "Most of the powerful materials and equipment of the Chinese People's Liberation Army came from American imperialism." ("Mao Zedong Selected Works" Volume Four, page 1372) In other words, Truman tried his best to provide military aid And economic aid, but Chiang Kai-shek was helpless, so he failed. By the end of 1948, he was unwilling to even issue a statement supporting the Chiang government. (See the first series of "Compilation of Materials on Sino-US Relations", page 902) But Truman's intentions obviously did not achieve the expected results, and he let go of his responsibility.Chiang Kai-shek dared not to speak out, but the historian Chen Yinke said: "The poor man seeks immortality, and wins the ashes of the monk Hu." He compared Truman to the monk Hu who talked ashamed.The rightists in the United States ridiculed the "White Paper" as "The Whitewash Paper" (The Whitewash Paper). Mao Zedong even used this to make a big fuss, pointing out that the White Paper was "a confession of helplessness" by the U.S. emperor. People" fight proxy wars for US imperialism.Chiang Kai-shek has always said that Mao Zedong was Stalin's agent, and the white paper just confirmed for Mao Zedong that Chiang Kai-shek was an agent of the US imperialists? In the end, Chiang Kai-shek couldn't help him, and even wanted to be an agent again.However, Mao Zedong issued an order to "march across the country" and "pay special attention to arresting the bandit leader Chiang Kai-shek".