Chapter 156 Chapter 25 "The Hell of the Underworld Follows Him" ​​(7)

At Stalingrad, Hitler faced yet another defeat.For weeks, Paulus' Sixth Army made little progress.The distance traveled is only measured in yards, and every yard comes at a high price.Both Paulus and Eastern intelligence chief Reinhard Grün warned of the danger that the enemy was massing its forces north. "We cannot yet make a full estimate of the enemy's situation because the situation is still in flux," Glenn reported on November 12. The Stalingrad railway, putting our eastern troops at risk, forced our troops to withdraw from Stalingrad." At the time, Hitler was in the Berghof and had not read the ominous report.But he is also very concerned about the Romanian army, and he specifically asked if there was any situation in this area.Zenkammer, who had been at the military meeting that week, recalled that the answer was no, and he said no repeatedly.The Führer was unaware of the seriousness of the situation because of the slow delivery of bad news.There was still some doubt about the strength of the Soviet Army, and the Army General Command, stung by Hitler's recent criticism ("again and again, of overestimating the strength of the enemy"), was unwilling to repeat their efforts in Poland. and French miscalculation.

At dawn on November 19, the Soviet army attacked the Romanian army with 40 divisions.Although the defenders fought well and valiantly, they were eventually overwhelmed by an overwhelming enemy force. The commander of Army Group B responded quickly.First, he ordered Paulus to halt the attack on Stalingrad and prepare the troops to meet the threat on the left; then, seeing that the collapse of the Romanian Army was a foregone conclusion, he advised the Sixth Army to withdraw immediately. Hitler arbitrarily rejected this.Earlier reports had convinced him that the Soviet Union was bleeding to death and that the counteroffensive was nothing more than a death throes.He then ordered the troops in Stalingrad to stand firm, and reinforcements were already on the way.These words, however, do not reflect how disorganized Hitler's headquarters itself was.Major Engel recorded in his diary, "There was chaos there. The Führer himself was completely at a loss as to what to do. During these painful hours he walked up and down the halls of the Berghof, berating him The generals are repeating their old mistakes."

His tank units, which he had reluctantly brought into battle, had been driven back. On November 21, the Romanian army (more than half of its tanks broke down because rats gnawed through the wires) was divided. "Absolutely frightened," a Romanian officer scribbled in his diary. "What crime have we or our ancestors committed? Why do we suffer like this?" It was only that day that Paulus and his chief of staff, Arthur Schmidt, woke up to their own danger.Soviet tanks appeared only a few miles from the headquarters.This proves that the communication arteries of the Sixth Army have been occupied by the Soviet army.After hastily shifting his headquarters, he requested a retreat.His superiors approved the proposal and asked the Supreme Command for instructions.At the meeting that night at the Berghof, Jodl suggested that the Sixth Army be fully withdrawn.The head of state said no again, "No matter what happens, we must hold the area around Stalingrad."

On the morning of the next day, that is, on the 22nd, the double pincers of the Soviet army's huge pincer-shaped offensive joined forces and surrounded the Sixth Army. 200,000 of the most elite troops of the German army, together with 100 tanks, 1,800 cannons and more than 10,000 various vehicles, were trapped in a large basin.At the Sixth Army meeting that morning, it was suggested to break out to the southwest. "No," said Chief of Staff Schmidt, "we don't have enough fuel. If we forcefully break through, the result will be the catastrophe that Napoleon encountered." He said, we have to fight the "hedgehog" defensive battle.In the afternoon, Schmidt began to have doubts about his arguments as the situation deteriorated significantly.At this time, Paulus received a new order: hold on to the spot and stand by. "Oh," Pauls said, turning to the chief of staff, "now we have time to think about what to do. Let's think about it separately and come to see me in an hour and see if the two come to the same conclusion." The conclusion is exactly the same: Breakout to the southwest.

At this time, Hitler was on his way back to the "Wolf's Lair".Retreat, this is beyond his consideration.That night, he called Paulos on a personal celebrity. "The Sixth Corps must understand," he said, "that I am doing my best to assist you and await relief. I will issue orders quickly." Paulus accepted the decision, but one of his corps commanders went his own way and sent troops to the rear. Withdrew to force Paulus to order a general retreat.Paulos had the power to fire him or arrest him, but he didn't because of the urgency of the situation.The irony is that when Hitler learned of the retreat, he put the blame on the innocent Paulus and rewarded the responsible sinner—whom Hitler trusted so much—with independent command as a reward.

On the evening of November 23, the commander of the Sixth Army personally requested permission to break out of the encirclement.Hitler ignored it; for one reason, he was suspicious of Paulus.Göring assured him that the Luftwaffe could drop supplies to the besieged Sixth Army.Despite the field marshal's poor record in the past, Hitler listened to him.The next morning, Hitler ordered Paulus to hold on "at all costs" and supplies would be airdropped by the Air Force. Hitler couldn't wait to seize on Goering's flippant promise to declare Stalingrad a fortress based only on his imagination.In this way, he canceled the fate of 250,000 officers and soldiers of Germany and its allies.

Having lost confidence in Paulus' superiors, Hitler handed over much of that commander's command to Field Marshal von Manstein (whose ingenious plans to invade the West were very close to his own).Manstein was about to command a new force, the Don Army, whose mission was to stop the Soviet advance westward and relieve the pressure on the defenders of Stalingrad.At noon that day, Manstein sent a reassuring telegram to Paulus: "We will do our best to get you out of your plight." He added that Paulus's immediate task was to: "Hold the Volga and the northern front as ordered by the Führer. , and prepare to use heavy troops to break through to the rear." Paulus thought that Manstein would open a corridor while calling the Sixth Army to hold on.In this way, Paulus and Schmidt abandoned their own plan: to break out without Hitler's permission.

Before dark that day, 22 planes carrying supplies to Stalingrad were shot down. On the 25th, another 9 were destroyed.Paulus only got 75 tons of food and ammunition. On the 26th, Zeitzler, Chief of the Army General Staff, returned to the "Wolf's Lair". Regardless of Hitler's anger, he outrageously suggested that Paulus be given "freedom of action";Hitler rejected the suggestion outright, agreeing only to ask Manstein to take action.To every objection, Hitler responded with Goering's repeated empty assurances that sufficient supplies would be airlifted. "I was terrified by such intense optimism," Engel wrote in his diary, "so optimistic that even the Air Force General Staff dared not have it!"

On that day, Pauls wrote a letter of thanks in hand, thanking Manstein for his latest pledge to assist the Sixth Army.He told Manstein that he had asked Hitler for freedom of movement - if necessary. "The reason I want this power," he explained, "is that I want to avoid a situation where it's too late to issue the only possible order. Issue such an order. I can only ask you to accept my word on the matter." Paulus received the Führer's reply five minutes before midnight.Hitler sent a telegram to all officers and soldiers of the Sixth Army in his own name, ordering them to stick to their posts and promise to try their best to rescue them.

The relief operation, "Winter Storm," was relatively inadequate.It only consisted of one-time one-way penetrations, with only two armored divisions.The operation was originally planned to be carried out in the first ten days of December. Due to many delays and setbacks encountered in gathering the necessary minimum force, it did not start until the morning of December 12. 230 tanks rumbled northeast toward Stalingrad, nearly a hundred kilometers away.Along the way, there was little resistance; in some places there was no resistance, which puzzled the Germans.Even so, the tanks only covered 19 kilometers—the ice on the road began to melt under the sun, turning the slope into a slippery trap.

At the regular meeting held at noon, the first question Hitler asked was "Has there been a disaster?" More sleepless nights. We don't know what's going on there yet." For six days, officers and soldiers of the Sixth Army watched eagerly for friendly tanks to come, but what they saw was groups of Soviet troops struggling to the west—blocking the "Winter Storm".Equally frustrated, Manstein made a plea on the 18th to allow Paulus to break out in order to save the lives of most of the soldiers.Zeitzler approved the measure "with great urgency," but Hitler refused.For the Italian Eighth Army collapsed that day, leaving a huge gap to the north of the relief force. The next afternoon, Manstein again telegraphed Hitler to allow the Sixth Army to break out.At first, Hitler refused; later, under Zeitzler's constant urging, it began to show signs of loosening.His indecision left some officers with a glimmer of hope that Paulus would take the initiative to try to break out.If able, Paulus will do so.He was ready to disobey the original order of the head of state; however, by this time, he had less than 100 tanks, and the fuel was only enough to travel 32 kilometers at most.Also, the stored ammunition is not enough for defense, so let's talk about offense.Both he and Schmidt pinned their hopes on the reinforcements who came to relieve the siege. However, the tanks that came to their rescue could no longer go east. On December 23, Manstein ordered the relief force to halt the attack because one of the armored divisions had to rush to close the gap left by the fleeing Italians.At 5:40 p.m., he contacted Paulos by telex.He asked: "If the situation is extremely bad", can he break through?Does that mean he now has the authority to take the initiative, Paulos asked? "Once you do it," he said, "there's no turning back. "I can't give you all the authority today," Manstein replied, "but I hope to make a decision tomorrow." Within his headquarters, Hitler was still reluctant to make this decision.So, on Christmas Eve, Manstein gave the Sixth Army only gloomy language and holiday greetings. That night, Manstein telegraphed the "Wolf's Lair" that the stamina of the Stalingrad officers and soldiers had dropped significantly, and the decline would accelerate. "It seems that although they can still support for a short time, they are unable to fight a way out. I think the end of this month is the latest day." Although this telegram was signed by Manstein himself, he knew that Hitler will not listen.The Sixth Army is dead.Although Paulus wanted to break out of the siege, he knew that breaking out would mean suicide.He agreed with Manstein: the end had come.However, should the situation be explained to the officers and soldiers?A soldier without hope does not want to fight. Goebbels tried to give them hope in his New Year's address.In a speech dedicated to soldiers at the front, he pledged that 1943 would bring the Reich closer to "final victory" and "final victory."He was much more candid with his own personnel. He said publicity in the coming months must avoid creating a largely defensive impression among the masses. "Since the beginning of the war, our propaganda has taken a wrong course. Year one: We won. Year two: We will win; Year three: We must win; Year four: We are invincible." This, he said, would be a disaster. "Instead, we have to make the German public understand that we are capable of winning. Because, once all the work and effort of the country is directed to the service of the war, the prerequisites for winning exist." This is a gloomy picture. This picture is the harbinger of the announcement issued by the head of state two weeks later, ordering the whole country to mobilize for war.