Chapter 30 Struggle (5)

This situation developed to a fever pitch in July. Two special envoys of the Communist Party of Hunan came to Jinggangshan with Li Lisan's instructions to put pressure on Mao, trying to subdue Mao and let him launch a large-scale attack. In order to seek support, Mao convened a meeting, and the result of the vote was against the Southern Expedition.But the special envoy showed two trump cards: first, Zhu De agreed with them, and in addition, many soldiers from southern Hunan were eager to be closer to their hometown.The expedition started against Mao's opposition. The result of the Southern Expedition can be said to be a catastrophe.The battle was lost and the troops suffered heavy losses.The villages and towns originally occupied by the Red Army fell into the hands of the enemy.Mao hurried to southern Hunan to persuade Zhu De to return to Jinggangshan to adhere to the strategy formulated at the Maoping Conference.He succeeded, however, most of Jinggang Mountains had been occupied by the enemy.

There has been no revolutionary upsurge in southern Hunan. What should be done now is to focus on construction and education, rather than taking risks in cities where the warlords and the Kuomintang are powerful. The two special envoys from Changsha sneered: "How can there be Marxism in the valley!" According to Marxism, it is impossible to have Marxism in the valley, but Mao firmly believed that China has its own particularity. .Moscow and Shanghai may or may not be helpful in the struggle for power, but the mountains will be key to establishing a new regime. By October 1928, Mao and Zhu had regained most of Jinggangshan's lost territory.Shared struggles have also brought their relationship closer.Zhu De regretted this Southern Expedition very much.At the same time, he admired Mao's mind more and more.

Maybe there is some truth in comparing the Jinggangshan base area to people's "buttocks"? Or maybe Mao's moderate land policy is wise? Shanghai is still dissatisfied with Mao.But he has won local moral victories.By the end of 1928, he was effectively the number one figure in the then disorganized CCP forces in Hunan. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party held its sixth congress in Moscow, because it was difficult to find a safe place for this meeting in China at the time.The grim facts were more convincing than any resolution of the congress, and it took five months for the report of the congress to reach Jinggangshan.This fact itself shows how important Jinggangshan is.

The Sixth Party Congress elected a far-left Politburo, with Li Lisan in power alone.No one suggested electing the absent Mao to the Politburo any more than anyone suggested thanking the Soviets for the poor food they provided for the Congress. The Congress (apparently at the urging of the Soviets) formalized the rural bases as a valid step toward revolutionary victory.This was the new policy, which quelled fundamental criticism of Mao's Jinggangshan campaign.At least Mao returned to the Central Committee. However, the Sixth Party Congress did not approve of Mao's policy at all.They only regard the rural base areas as the front station waiting for the climax of the revolution, and the urban workers are still regarded as the backbone of the revolution (but very few).They believed that absorbing homeless people into the Communist Party was worse than not expanding the party's power.

I wonder if Mao has considered his role in the previous party congresses? Six congresses have been held, two of which (the first and third) he played a certain role, and two of them (the fourth and third) five times) he was a bystander, and twice he didn't participate at all. Mao found himself once again stepping into a triangular formation.The triangle of the early twenties was Communist-Moscow-KMT.The current triangle is the Communist Party (Shanghai) - Moscow - Jinggangshan. The Chinese Communist Party was a political organization that was rare among its members.The meeting with the largest number of people was the Fifth Party Congress held in Wuhan, and there were only 80 people present.The party organizes and conducts struggles through correspondence.

Sometimes it takes several months for letters to be received. During this period, one policy is likely to be replaced by another, although the instructions are all from Shanghai.While Shanghai was drafting a letter reintroducing one policy, it was probable that a letter was en route from Moscow directing the implementation of another. In retrospect, it is astonishing that these academics wanted to seize power and rule a country of 450 million people. Yet Mao often benefited from this medieval form of communication. He didn't hear about the ultra-left line formulated in November 1927 until four months later, so he had a period of time to move freely.

Of course, sometimes due to the late arrival of the letter, the army will be lost. In 1928, the ultra-left line was already criticized in Moscow, but Mao did not receive the report until November.During this period, he was pressured by the extreme left to implement their land policy, which cost the Red Army many supporters. Mao's writing was often sharp, but, in inner-Party struggles, an eloquent pen was not always the answer.When someone was on Mao's side—such as Zhu De—they found Mao convincing.However, the tone of his writing has often offended some people.Mao always wrote articles as if declaring certain truths, which made it very unpleasant for those who disagreed with him.His skillful use of aphorisms is a double-edged sword, making the ideas expressed vivid and vivid. However, those colleagues who cannot use aphorisms do not like his style.