Chapter 18 Chapter 18 The War Is Over

What baffled President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and other American wartime leaders was that Chiang Kai-shek was less interested in exterminating the Japanese than they were. In a telegram, Goss mentioned that someone said that Chiang Kai-shek was the great leader who fought hard to lead China's resistance against Japan. Goss commented on this: "Looking at the cold facts in front of you, anyone will think this is nonsense." For a period of time, Roosevelt felt that his conversation with Chairman Chiang Kai-shek was like "playing the piano against a cow." Chiang Kai-shek said:

"As far as I'm concerned, the biggest problem is not Japan, but the unity of my country. I'm sure you Americans will fight Japan one day, maybe with the help of the troops I keep in the Northwest against the Communists, maybe not. In another On the one hand, if I let Mao Zedong spread his propaganda to the whole of Free China, we are taking a risk, we will get nothing, and neither will you Americans. The reason I say this is that Mao Zedong has a communist doctrine behind it, And behind it is Russia." These words can be said to be basically what the chairman said, but their reliability is still questionable.

This passage is quoted from the history of the Chinese Civil War written by General Lionel Max Caissan of the French Air Force. The author arranges this passage in the context of the discussion between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell. Although Stilwell does not seem to have quoted the exact same words, they are consistent with Chiang Kai-shek's views in private conversations.It embodies Chiang Kai-shek's attitude when the Second World War was in full swing, and it also provides the best explanation for why the United States is so angry with Chiang Kai-shek. To the bafflement of President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and other wartime leaders of the United States, Chiang Kai-shek was less interested in exterminating the Japanese than they were, and for five and a half years after the end of 1938, the Japanese did little to touch the Central Army , and no new major offensives were launched.Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, was quite content to wait and see how things unfolded.His elite troops, best trained and equipped, faced the Communist forces on the front in the northwest approaching Yan'an.

Indeed, in the early stages of Japan's invasion of China, China's Central Army suffered huge losses, while the United States was still comfortably and safely in a neutral state.However, China is now involved in a wider war. How will Roosevelt understand the passive approach of the Chinese government? Americans support such an unsatisfactory government and provide material assistance. right?Wouldn't it be better to use these aids to those simple and noble Chinese Communist Party called "communists"? There are many, many, contradictory information and information received by the White House as well as public reports by the American press.Among them, there was a scathing telegram sent back by General Stilwell, which was full of complaints about how incompetent and chaotic the bureaucrats in the Kuomintang army were, and how the Chairman was in the way.There is also a skeptical report from the American ambassador in Chongqing, Goss.Once, Goss mentioned in a telegram that someone said that Chiang Kai-shek was the great leader who fought hard to lead China's resistance against Japan. Goss commented on this: "Looking at the cold facts before us, anyone will think this is nonsense."

On October 1, 1942, the unsuccessful US presidential candidate Wendell Wilkie came to China.Wilkie was tall, sociable, and easily trusting. He was overwhelmed by what he saw.The wartime capital disguised itself to welcome him.The hospitality of the Chinese people, the seductive charm of Mrs. Chiang, and the scholar-like manner of the Chairman, dazzled Wilkie's mind. He visited the "combat front line" by the Yellow River, where the "handed over" Japanese weapons and equipment, including helmets (it is said that these things were moved from one place to another, were to impress the important people who came to visit. figure).Although Wilkie had a little doubt about this, he quickly dispelled it.

So he suggested to Mrs. Chiang that she could be the most ideal diplomatic envoy, because she "has brains, persuasion, high moral character, wit, charm, open-minded compassion, graceful manners and fiery firm belief. Later, Madam Chiang took these flattering words seriously, and actually adopted Wilkie's suggestion. In addition to this kind of delusion, there are many reports that confuse the public.Wilkie belongs to the kind of open-minded person, but there are more people with ulterior motives who are also secretly contributing to the flames.Others have relatively pure motives. They see that the Kuomintang is so corrupt, and they take it for granted that the Communist Party must be good.

In February 1941, the chairman told Laughlin Curry that he hoped that President Roosevelt would send him a political adviser who was personally trusted by Roosevelt.Currie, however, recommended to the president Irving Lattimore as the chairman's "political adviser." Lattimore was a well-known Sinologist, and he later served as the leader of the University of Leeds, but he had never met President Roosevelt before he was appointed. Nine years later, Louis F. Biedenz, the former chairman of the American Communist Party, who had renounced his communist beliefs, testified before the Tydings Commission that Lattimore was an agent of the American Communist Party.Later, he became the leader of the anti-Chiang faction in the Institute of Pacific Relations in the United States.

Details of the circumstances surrounding his appointment are recorded in the Senate Judiciary Committee report, filed in the Senate on July 2, 1952.In fact, after the leftist writers of the United Front period greatly praised Chiang Kai-shek, some people began to make distorted reports in the 1940s.This is not entirely a matter of belittling Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang government, even if those who made false reports did not accuse Chiang Kai-shek of various crimes one after another, those deplorable facts speak for themselves. The misinformation comes from an idyllic description of the Communist Party's state within a state.

The propaganda was pushed a huge step further by the romantic naiveté of Vice President Henry Wallace, another of Roosevelt's special envoys.From June 21 to 24, the Vice President held four lengthy meetings with the Chairman, who listened to Wallace expounding his elaborate theory that the Communists were nothing more than "agricultural reformers," As well as the commonplace talk about the "dangerousness" and "orthodoxy" of the CCP's Marxism-Leninism.Wallace insisted on visiting Yan'an. At first the chairman refused, but later changed his attitude.After returning from Yan'an, Wallace really said that the Communists were indeed "agricultural reformers."When Chiang Kai-shek again asked the United States to recall Stilwell, he did support it.

On the military front, Chiang Kai-shek was again forced to fight back against the Japanese in 1944 because of a new Japanese offensive.For China, it was the most terrible year in the long war of resistance, when the Japanese captured Changde in northern Hunan Province by means of poison gas after fifteen days of attack. The city was almost flattened by the Japanese army, only 30 of the 10,000 houses remained, and the entire city fled.The Chinese reinforcements arrived seven days later, at which point the Japanese were forced to retreat.It soon became apparent that this attack was of great significance to Japan.

In the Pacific, the Japanese fought poorly on the islands.What the top Japanese leadership feared most was that the American expeditionary force would land in the southern part of mainland China.Once this happened, the Americans were in the air with the full assistance of a series of bases established by General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force.Therefore, Japan must completely control the entire Beijing-Guangzhou Railway in order to achieve the goal of dividing China into two and isolating Chongqing.Because of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, and Russia was busy dealing with powerful enemies in Europe, Japan didn't have to worry about a Soviet attack.Therefore, they transferred ten divisions of "Manchuria" to Hunan in March 1944. In January, Mao Zedong and his colleagues accepted the invitation to send representatives to meet with the KMT to comprehensively resolve the differences between the two parties.Mao Zedong then put forward the idea of ​​a coalition government, demanding that the Communist Party be given equal status. A month later, the American Communist Party and those sympathetic to the Yan'an government launched a propaganda campaign calling for American pressure to force Chongqing to allow an American mission to visit Yan'an, breaking the Kuomintang blockade. In March, Russian planes bombed Xinjiang. On April 2, the Soviet government accused Xinjiang authorities of sending troops to Outer Mongolia and claimed that Kuomintang planes had bombed refugees.These baseless accusations were made to justify the bombing by Soviet aircraft.In mid-May, the Soviet ambassador stationed in Chongqing was recalled to Moscow, and all Soviet military advisers also returned home. At this time, the KMT and the Communist Party had held several talks in Xi'an, but when the Communist Party insisted that the government recognize the autonomy of the Communist-controlled areas and combat troops, the talks quickly reached a deadlock. At the time, Japan was on a massive offensive.They have an attacking force of 1.8 million men.These are not all their elite troops. Most of the best troops are on the front lines elsewhere, but they are well equipped, well commanded, and extremely rigorously trained. Chiang Kai-shek's six million troops are no match for them, because in this Many of the six million troops are underfed, poorly commanded, poorly equipped, and uninterested in fighting. From Henan Province north of the Yangtze River came news of another famine, this time catastrophic and tragic.The news was first revealed in February 1943 by the Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper that overcame various difficulties to maintain its independence. The newspaper comprehensively reported the tragic experience of the local people.Because this was the first report, the paper was withheld for three days, and censors later deleted the news from the paper.Theodore White has written a memorable account of what he saw firsthand.He believes that in 1942, when the harvest was very poor, the government collected most of the food in the form of taxes, and in the second year there was a long drought, which resulted in a famine.Relief for the victims was severely inadequate, and relief work was impossible due to competition from better-off neighboring provinces and sabotage by ruthless local grain hoarders.An estimated 2 to 3 million people were uprooted to the provinces, and about as many died of starvation and disease. In mid-April 1944, Japan's 60,000 troops launched an attack on the famine-stricken province of China.One of the Chinese commanders, Tang Enbo, was not in Henan when the Japanese attacked, nor did he return in time to fend off the Japanese raid.Tang Enbo had the worst reputation among the Kuomintang soldiers. According to Feng Yuxiang's records, every unit of the army under Tang Enbo's command was short-staffed, so that the officers could pocket the military pay paid to soldiers who did not exist.Feng Yuxiang's record must be believed. What's more, Tang Enbo and his army did a very prosperous business with the enemy. They bought Japanese goods from Jieshou on the Henan border, and then shipped them to the interior for sale.When they came back, they sold Chinese products to the Japanese.This exchange provides convenient conditions for Japanese intelligence agencies.Tang Enbo's absence from the front was just one example of the Kuomintang's serious failure to defend Henan, which had been seized by the Japanese while they were scrambling for internal conflicts. China's twelfth and thirteenth armies attacked each other, delaying the evacuation time.And local farmers disarmed 50,000 Chinese troops with a pitchfork.It took the Japanese three weeks to defeat 300,000 Chinese troops and control the railway to Hankou. At this disastrous moment, President Roosevelt dealt a heavy blow to China. He demanded that China deploy troops that were badly needed for domestic defense.He had been pestering the Generalissimo to send American-trained and equipped Y Corps to northwestern Burma, where the Japanese attack threatened Imphal, India, across the border. According to the Cairo agreement, Chiang Kai-shek rejected Roosevelt's request twice. The agreement stipulated that Stilwell would lead his Chinese and American army troops to attack the Japanese on the northern section of the Burma Road, and cooperate with the joint land, sea and air landing of 50,000 British troops in southern Burma. Take Rangoon. Although Churchill agreed with the plan, he was obviously not very enthusiastic.Because this plan has little to do with British strategy.Chiang Kai-shek supported this plan, and he had various reasons.He warned the president that he expected a major Japanese offensive in eastern China by that time.He reminded the president not to forget the promises made in Cairo.This undoubtedly makes sense.But in the end, Chiang Kai-shek inexplicably agreed to Roosevelt's entreaty, agreeing to send American-trained troops to Burma on April 14. Within a few days, developments proved that Chiang Kai-shek's fears were well-founded. In May, the Japanese launched a well-planned offensive in Hunan, and later in the month, Changsha fell.Prior to this, Xue Yue (little tiger) had retaken Changsha three times, but this time he was driven away by the Japanese. During the year, the Japanese scored a series of victories. At the end of November, they took control of Guangxi and captured the bases of the Fourteenth Air Force in Hengyang, Lingling, Guilin and Liuzhou.So far, the invading army was only 200 miles away from Chongqing in a straight line, and only the mountains of Guizhou remained in the middle to separate the Japanese army. The Kuomintang made only one resistance at Hengyang in southern Hunan, where General Xue Yue, despite receiving no reinforcements (perhaps because he was not a direct descendant of Chiang Kai-shek), held out for forty days with an enemy force vastly superior to his own. When describing these failures, Jiang Jingguo wrote: "Father was very saddened by the loss of Guilin. He wrote in his diary: 'Guilin's fortifications are strong, food and ammunition are sufficient, and various telecommunications equipment and weapons are used. It hurts me so much to be defeated in one day!" There was a reason for the fall of Guilin and Liuzhou. A military historian said: China's military authorities were completely unprepared for such a sudden attack.They had always thought that the Japanese would not push further inland because they feared that the United States would land on the east coast.The main force of the Guangxi army is outside the province. Guilin city government officials and local businessmen disapproved of the Weixu troops fighting around the city, fearing that the city would be destroyed. In addition, Hengyang's inevitable fall after a heroic resistance also dampened the strength of the Guilin and Liuzhou defenders. morale. During these disastrous months, Chiang Kai-shek mustered all the troops he could muster against the Japanese.Some of them traveled 2,000 miles on foot from the banks of the Yellow River, and some were airlifted from the Burmese front. By December 1944, this group of Nationalist troops finally stopped the Japanese attack in Guizhou Province and drove them back in Guangxi.This is the turning point in this long war. Focusing on the battlefield, Chiang Kai-shek failed to see the sad reality in China.Is it because these circumstances do not attract his attention?Or did his extreme self-confidence make him unconsciously ignore those news that should be taken seriously?It's hard to tell. He wasn't corrupt himself (if power wasn't counted), but everything else was: from his intolerance of dissent, his preference for grandiosity over the truth, and his reluctance to hear facts that contradicted his optimism.So he is surrounded by yes people.Before that, many people in Chongqing said that his assistants often forged newspaper editorials and news, telling him that everything was fine and reassuring him.No one told him about skyrocketing prices, food shortages, or the daily misery of ordinary people. Civil servants, professors, teachers and students at the bottom of society are all struggling with hunger.The educated Chinese middle class, like the lower class, was willing to suffer the sacrifices of war; but the blatant amassing of wealth in war by the powerful and those around them naturally aroused strong dissatisfied. KMT officials, those with backers and those who made war windfalls enjoy great privileges. Therefore, many intellectuals supported the Democratic League.They are not necessarily pro-Communist, but they hate the corrupt regime of the KMT. What the Kuomintang's secret agents have done is also disgusting. They catch political suspects at will.In fact, these spies don't pay much attention to the so-called "secrets" at all. They often reveal their identities in order to make the people around them afraid of them. The chairman of the general committee, who has no audiovisual ability, must have heard about the increasingly chaotic situation and the growing dissatisfaction of the people. Perhaps in order to please the Americans, at the end of 1944, he made some adjustments in order to improve efficiency.The corrupt and incompetent Kong Xiangxi was finally removed, and his brother-in-law, Song Ziwen, who despised him very much, served as the president of the Executive Yuan.Chiang Kai-shek filled the vacancy created by Song Ziwen's departure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the mild-mannered and hard-working Wang Shijie.Even the deep-rooted General He Yingqin, whose self-interest in the army has caused chaos comparable to that of Kong Xiangxi, was sidelined.He was succeeded by the energetic and capable General Chen Cheng as Minister of Military Affairs.However, General He has not completely lost all power to make the combat effectiveness of the army as low as possible. He is still the chief of the general staff. Once Song Ziwen is in an important position, the chairman can no longer ignore those things that are invisible to the eye, because his brother-in-law, who has studied at Harvard University, frankly said that he is one of the few in China who dares to state his thoughts in front of the highest boss. one of the people. But, that doesn't help either.Chiang Kai-shek once said to General Marshall that general economic laws could not have an effect on China's agricultural economy. Kong Xiangxi printed money because it was the easiest way to promote the operation of the country, at least for a period of time, it would work. Despite Song Ziwen's hard work and busy schedule, he was still unable to overcome the obstacles deliberately set up by the chairman. The government's appetite for the national budget increased, and by 1947 it took up as much as 80% of the national budget.In this way, Song Ziwen had no choice but to print money. In Burma, while the Guizhou campaign was ongoing, Stilwell scored a series of hard-fought but brilliant victories against the Japanese.Most of these victories are due to his Chinese troops. By the end of January 1945, the Lido Highway in northwestern Myanmar had been partially connected to the old Burma Highway leading to Kunming. In this way, the long-term Japanese blockade was finally opened. On January 28, the first batch of 500 trucks from the overland transport team arrived in China.In order to show the justice of history, Chiang Kai-shek renamed this highway as Stilwell Highway. However, General Stilwell did not enjoy this belated glory, and he had already left China. In the summer of 1944 his long-running quarrel with the Generalissimo turned into a crisis.From President Roosevelt's telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, we can see the process of intensification of contradictions. For a period of time, the president felt that his dialogue with Chairman Chiang Kai-shek was like playing the piano with each other.This was caused by Soong Tzu-wen, who, out of prudence and his own diplomatic tactics, kept Chiang Kai-shek from hearing the White House's blunt complaints, despite his outspokenness on domestic affairs at the time; in translating Roosevelt's telegram, he All passages that might have offended Chiang Kai-shek were deleted.Stilwell, through his protector, General Marshall, had mentioned his old rhetoric, suggesting that the only way to get China to go all out in the war was for him (Stilwell) to replace Chiang Kai-shek as supreme commander of China within China and the United States force. Marshall proposed this to Roosevelt in July 1944, and Roosevelt telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek on July 6, saying that he considered Stiechen to be "the one who has the authority to coordinate all Chinese-hired Allied forces, including Communist forces." In order to prevent Others changed the content of the telegram, and the telegram was sent to Chiang Kai-shek by General Ferris, a veteran American military officer in Chongqing, and Xie Wei'en, the ambassador's first secretary and a well-known anti-Chiang faction, served as an interpreter. The telegram was very straightforward, but Chiang Kai-shek was calm when he read the telegram, with a smile on his face as usual.Surprisingly, he wrote back two days later to comply.But he asked the United States to send a "plenipotentiary" mediator to adjust his relationship with Stilwell.Chiang Kai-shek only expressed his displeasure on one issue. He suggested that Dr. Kong Xiangxi should entrust all letters from the President to him in the future. President Roosevelt was delighted, but some of his advisers thought things were going too well to be true.Sure enough, they were right. On July 23, Chiang Kai-shek proposed three conditions that had not been mentioned before. He said: The Communist army could of course be commanded by Stilwell, but they had to accept the leadership of the central government in advance; his relationship with Stilwell should no longer be unclear; the Chinese government should have full control over the leased materials. To complicate matters further, he instructed Dr. Kong Xiangxi in Washington to declare that when he referred to Chinese troops, he was referring only to those Chinese troops already operating in Burma under Stilwell's command. The president was confused, but he thought he agreed with Chiang Kai-shek on at least one issue: the appointment of a powerful mediator.He selected Brigadier General Patrick Hurley, a burly, breezy Oklahoma native whose carefully trimmed mustache oozes confidence; President Buddha's men served as Secretary of the Army.On second thought, the President decided to send Donald Nelson to accompany Hurley.Nelson, a businessman, was for a time chairman of the War Production Committee.His special mission is to study the Chinese economy, and he is also a tall, confident man. On September 6, the two of them arrived in Chongqing via Moscow. By the time Hurley arrived, the rift between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell had been irreparable. Although the "stab head" was admired by the army and junior officers, Chinese generals hated his curt, arrogant style and wanted him to ignore various flaws in the military bureaucracy or keep his opinions in their stomachs inside.In order to protect themselves, even rivals like He Yingqin and Chen Cheng in the highest military organization can team up to speak ill of Stilwell in front of the chairman. Another source of misunderstanding is Chiang Kai-shek's Zhejiang dialect.Stilwell could speak Chinese and was unwilling to ask for an interpreter.However, apart from Chiang Kai-shek's fellow countrymen, even other Chinese people found Chiang's words difficult to understand.When he said "ok, ok" he meant "I got it, I got it".But in Mandarin, "good" means agreement. If Stilwell understood it in this sense, it would explain why Stilwell would accuse Chiang Kai-shek of always "breaking his promises." There are still some stories about Chiang Kai-shek's Zhejiang dialect causing misunderstandings. One of the most interesting things is this: There is a director named Hou in the Liaison Office of the Military Commission.Once, around 1943 or 1944, he was summoned to the chairman's office and ended up being reprimanded.He tried to defend himself, and when Chiang Kai-shek yelled: "Shoot!", his face turned blue with fright.He returned home tremblingly, bid farewell to relatives and friends.Days passed and he was still alive.When he regained his strength, he asked one of Chiang Kai-shek's personal guards to find out what was going on.He was relieved by the guard's words, but he became the target of people's ridicule. It turned out that the sentence Chiang Kai-shek often yelled with a heavy accent was "Strong argument!" Hou is from Hunan. He speaks with a strong local accent, and Chiang Kai-shek can hardly understand him.This joke was widely circulated in the upper class circles, and this Mr. Hou became the laughing stock of everyone. Besides his accent, Chiang Kai-shek had other habits that prevented others from getting him right: he liked to nod his head even when he disagreed with the speaker.This is Chiang Kai-shek's personal habit, not a Chinese custom. In his dealings with Stilwell, this habit may have caused some confusion of understanding.According to Hu Lin of the "Ta Kung Pao", the two of them finally broke up because Stilwell suggested using the Communist army to fight the Japanese on the condition that they were provided with American weapons and ammunition.Although Stilwell refused to meet with Zhou Enlai, Stilwell's American advisers had close contacts with Zhou Enlai's assistants. (The role of these American advisers in the US policy towards China will be mentioned later in this chapter). Since all of Stilwell's political advisers actively supported Yan'an, even if there were no other reasons, it would be difficult for Stilwell to win the trust of the Chairman. In September 1944, due to the strain on the military front, Chiang Kai-shek very politely asked Stilwell to transfer some of his Chinese troops to defend Longling in Yunnan Province. under pressure from the Japanese army. Stilwell declined the request and furiously telegraphed Marshall, demanding a tough letter to Chiang Kai-shek to force him to submit.In fact, since Chiang Kai-shek "requested" him instead of "ordering" him to mobilize troops according to the rules, Stilwell did not have to do so. Marshall personally dictated the letter to Chiang Kai-shek, and after signing Roosevelt's name, it was mailed on the 16th. The letter was delivered directly to Stilwell, who read the letter with relish.In strong terms, the letter demanded that Stilwell be appointed "unrestricted command of all ... troops" and threatened in plain sight that the United States might withdraw all aid to Chiang Kai-shek.In order to enjoy the joy of victory and see the embarrassment of his rival, Stilwell decided to deliver the letter himself.Before entering the conference room, he showed the letter to Hurley, who advised him to tone down.But that was exactly what Stilwell was unwilling to do.He walked into the conference room and handed the uncensored Chinese translation to Chiang Kai-shek.Chiang Kai-shek was very calm when he read the letter, and did not let Stilwell enjoy the joy of the winner. However, Stilwell knew that the blow was on point, and he wrote down his thoughts at the time in very rude language in his diary.He "stuffed this peanut with a handful of chili peppers." He added, "The knife went right through the heart of the bastard." After adjourning the meeting, the chairman, as his entourage often saw, I lost my temper. Chiang Kai-shek asked Song Ziwen to give him advice.The question now was how to get rid of Stilwell and at the same time keep the loan supplies. Chiang Kai-shek decided to show Roosevelt. On September 25, he telegraphed the President, asking him to recall Stilwell and send someone else.At this time, Roosevelt finally realized that it was no longer necessary for Stilwell to stay in Chongqing. His role there had been exhausted, but Roosevelt still wanted to continue to allow Stilwell to display his military talents in East Asia.Roosevelt therefore reacted in a compromising manner, promising Chiang Kai-shek to replace Stilwell as his chief of staff on October 5, but suggesting that Stilwell remain there during the Burma campaign. However, Chiang Kai-shek would not just take advantage of Roosevelt. In his reply to the President on the 9th, he analyzed the development of the war situation since the Cairo Conference at length, and pointed out correctly that due to the sending of his troops trained by the United States to the As a result, when Japan aggressively attacked East China, he was in a dangerous situation of insufficient troops and could not resist the Japanese army. He had already issued a clear warning about this. He went on to write that Stilwell "had no concern for the success or failure of the East China War" and refused to issue leased ammunition there. "In short, we captured Myitkyina, but lost the whole of East China." Since Chiang Kai-shek sent part of the Y Army to Burma only under the strong pressure of Roosevelt at that time, this letter not only criticized General Stilwell, And indirectly criticized the president. This time, the president "understood the other party's intentions." On the 18th, Stilwell was recalled. Before he left, the Chairman of the General Assembly awarded him the Blue Sky and White Sun Special Medal, which is the highest medal of honor awarded to foreigners by China.Conceivably, Stilwell declined the offer, but gritted his teeth and accepted the invitation to the farewell tea that followed.At the farewell meeting, Generalissimo Jiang was eloquent and eloquent, while Stilwell was sullen and silent. On the 27th, this "thorny head" flew out of China and never returned. With the departure of Ambassadors Stilwell and Goss in September and November 1944, the first stage of misunderstanding in Sino-US relations ended. , And the arrival of their successors opened the prelude to the second stage.The depth of misunderstandings in this period is no less than that of the previous period, but there are subtle differences in nature. Stilwell had seen through Chiang Kai-shek's military intentions, and Goss had seen through his government's "democratic" claims. Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to attack the Japanese made Stilwell thwarted everywhere, and one could not help but feel sympathy for Stilwell in this regard, but he was a narrow-minded man and lacked political acumen.When Chiang Kai-shek was still in power, he was dreaming of the commander-in-chief of all the Chinese and American armies in China. This is too unwise. General Stilwell and Ambassador Goss, heavily influenced by professional diplomatic advisers, accepted their misperceptions of Chinese communism uncritically. Stilwell himself had asked for the appointment of Peyton Davis Jr. as "[his] liaison officer for this term." Davis was born in China to Protestant missionary parents.John Stewart Shelves also had a similar family background. He came to China as a staff member of the embassy in July 1944. Other professional diplomats in China at that time had basically the same views. The reports they wrote to the State Department were written by them It was forwarded by Fan Xuande, the boss in charge of China issues. These were the men who made their name during the "McCarthy era" of the fifties, and they were all subject to lengthy investigations.Their case caused a sensation.Their respective diplomatic careers were thus ruined. Many years later, when Zhuang rereads the letters they sent back from Chongqing describing the situation at that time, anyone with a little brain can see that these letters do not prove that they are the secret agents of the Communist International.But it is undeniable that their reporting from China had a powerful and ultimately decisive influence on the US government, turning the US away from the Chiang Kai-shek government that its official policy was to support, and toward Mao Zedong's Communist Party. If they were not "communist men," the same was not necessarily true of the other American advisers who enjoyed the confidence of the president and secretary of state during those crucial years. An interesting example is that of Ms. Josephine Truslow Adams, who was often close to President Roosevelt despite her close working relationship with the chairman of the American Communist Party, Earl Browder. In fact, the main point made by the US embassy in Chongqing was both realistic and prescient.Their letters quite rightly point to the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union in the Far East, in their view: The Chinese Communist Party has always followed the Soviet Union, but now nationalism is changing their attitude; there may be a civil war in China, and in this war, the victory of the Communist Party is inevitable. In March 1945, Xie Weisi visited Yan'an. His report put forward convincing and powerful arguments for the United States to change its policy and turn to support the Communist Party. On November 1, 1944, Ambassador Goss resigned; his successor was General Hurley, who had been serving as the President's personal representative in China since August, and he became Ambassador on January 8, 1945.After Stilwell left, his command was split in two: General Daniel Surdan took over the Burma-India theater and General Albert Weydemeyer commanded the China theater.Hurley and Wedemeyer are a stark contrast to their predecessors.Hurley was an honest, outspoken man who lacked the diplomatic sensibility of the career diplomat Clarence Goss.Although Wedemeyer had undoubted intelligence and outstanding temperament, he was as lacking in strategy as Stilwell in diplomacy.Both newcomers were staunchly anti-communist, and both firmly supported Chiang Kai-shek for what they saw as the interests of the United States.However, both men were tasked with helping the KMT and the Communist Party to reconcile, a goal that was excluded from consideration due to Chiang Kai-shek's unrelenting commitment. Hurley soon got into a quarrel with his entire diplomatic staff, who he disagreed with and did not want them to report that favored Yan'an over Chungking. Wedemeyer also had a rift with his political adviser, Davis, whom he had retained from Stiechen.But Wedemeyer was less annoyed by the adviser's advice than Hurley was with his men.Yet Wedemeyer was no less frustrated than Hurley when, like others, he found it impossible to bring China's two parties together. The chairman is very pleased with the appointment of these two men.When General Hurley took office as ambassador, he articulated his mission to the State Department and everyone he met in Chongqing, which included five goals: 1. To prevent the collapse of the national government. 2. Support Chiang Kai-shek as the president of the Republic of China and the chairman of the army. 3. To mediate the relationship between the Chairman and the US commander. 4. To develop the production of war materials in China and to prevent economic collapse. 五、为击败日本，统一中国的一切军事力量。 赫尔利并没有马上认识到其中的第五个目标是与前面三个目标相互矛盾的。 他很快就尝到了苦头。他最初那种过分的自信，一部分是由于他乐观的天性造成的，而另一方面则是因为他在来华途中和斯大林及莫洛托夫在莫斯科进行了交谈，俄国人曾向他保证，他们对中国共产党已经失去了兴趣，并希望与重庆改善关系。 在赫尔利试图使国共两党合并军队的第一次努力失败以后，按照罗斯福总统的指示，他又作了一次更大的努力。那是在1944年11月，当时他飞抵延安与共产党的领导人进行了一次会谈。怀着马到成功的得意心情，他于11月10日带着一项五点建议飞回了重庆，这项建议主要的要求是建立一个有共产党参加的联合政府。当他得知蒋介石对这样一个要剥夺国民党独揽大权的资格的计划毫无兴趣时，他十分狼狈。 11月22日，蒋介石提出一项反建议，答应承认中共为合法党派，并将共军并入国民党军队。但这项建议没有同意联合，在共产党方面，周恩来起初接受了蒋介石的反建议，但是12月8日他离开重庆返回延安时，又改变了态度，认为这些建议无法接受。在28日从延安发来的电报中，他要求释放所有的政治犯，撤走包围共产党地区的国民党军队，废除一切压迫性的规定，停止秘密警察的一切活动。 这种突然的转变使赫尔利感到又着急又失望，尽管委员长并没有这种感觉。不久，赫尔利就发现，美国战略情报局（即中央情报局在战时的前身）已秘密提出向25000名共产党游击队提供全部装备，以便在华北日军的后方开展破坏活动，这样一来，共产党就没有那么高的热情与国民党谈判了。 当赫尔利和魏德迈发现了他们背后发生的这些情况之后，便明确地向共产党表示，美国政府不会牺牲重庆来和他们打交道。1945年1月24日，周恩来回到国民党的首都，准备参加另一轮会谈。 要使国共双方消除分歧，看来没有捷径可走。周恩来坚持在联合政府建立了以后，才能移交军队；而蒋介石则要求共产党先解散他们的军事组织，再来谈联合。 由于周恩来没有让步的表示，蒋介石便宣布他将在5月4日召集一次会议，开始按孙中山的遗嘱起草宪法，以废除一党专制，建立宪政。 由于担心共产党会被排除在这一重大行动之外，周恩来又作出了和解的姿态。2月3日，双方发表了一项联合建议，提出召开政治协商会议，取代国民大会，以便为建立宪政开辟道路，同时为统一军队制定一个共同的方案和计划，并决定国民党以外其他党派的参政方式。 就在此刻，在数千英里之外的苏联克里米亚，正在开一个意义更加重大的会议。这是二战期间的最后一次首脑会议，它将决定战后世界的格局。会议2月4日于雅尔塔召开，一周以后结束。 这时的罗斯福总统已精疲力尽，形容枯槁，的确到了行将就木的地步，就这样，他在协约上把中国的领土主权交给了斯大林，并把东欧也交给了他。而邱吉尔则无能为力地在一旁看着这一切，听着这一切。 在这些整整过了一年才公开的秘密条款中，斯大林同意“在德国投降两三个月、欧洲战争结束之后”参加对日作战。 作为回报，苏联将得到千岛群岛，霸占外蒙古、南萨哈林（库页）岛及附近岛屿，并控制东北的港口和铁路设施。 按道理，涉及到外蒙古和东北的条款应征求蒋介石的同意，但是，罗斯福总统却把这一切都包办了。 斯大林耍的一个主要手腕，就是他“准备与中华民国政府签定一项友好同盟条约……以其武装力量帮助中国，将中国从日本的奴役下解放出来”。就这样，这位苏联的领导人一下子就达到了沙俄帝国一直梦想实现的目标一在远东扩张领土，打垮日本，并削弱中国。 显然，雅尔塔会议的条款直接违背了罗斯福在开罗首脑会议上所作的庄严承诺，比起德黑兰会议上制定的条款，是有过之而无不及的。辛亥革命的一个重要目标，就是实现使中国不再在国际上遭受屈辱的强烈愿望。1937年，蒋介石抗日参战，其最高目标就是要恢复中国的领土完整。 可是，在雅尔塔，罗斯福总统这个曾对中国作出过保证的人，却背叛了自己的诺言，放弃了他说过要支持的一切。 需要指出的是，在雅尔塔会议期间，美国正在准备对日本开展大规模的空中进攻，原子弹也即将投入生产。美国的军事指挥官们明白，他们不需苏联的帮助，就能击败日本。 然而在这种情况下，罗斯福总统不但没有与委贝长商量就签订了“雅尔塔协议”，而且还背着他对斯大林作出了一个许诺，即其中的内容暂不告诉蒋介石。 至于什么时候再告诉他，斯大林回答说：“等我们从西线腾出一些部队，往远东调去二十五个师时……就可以同蒋介石元帅谈这些事情了，” 这个秘密保守得十分严密。美国国务卿詹姆斯·F·贝尔纳斯后来承认，他都是在事后七个月才知道雅尔塔会议的远东条款，虽然他当时也出席了这次会议。 1945年3月2日，罗斯福在向国会报告雅尔塔会议的情况时，若无其事他说：“很自然，这次会议只涉及欧洲的战争和欧洲的政治问题，与太平洋战争无关，” 尽管采取了种种保密措施，有关牺牲中国的传闻还是传到了蒋介石的耳里。极度不安的赫尔利大使在雅尔塔会议结束大约一周之后，于2月19日离开重庆回到了华盛顿。在白宫，总统把雅尔塔协议给赫尔利看了。 3月6日，当蒋介石的外交部长宋子文拍电报给赫尔利求见总统时，这位大使仍在华盛顿。宋子文得到的答复是，在既定的旧金山会议召开之前，来不及进行有益的会谈。旧金山会议定于4月25日召开，将讨论建立联合国的事。这时，蒋介石已经得到了有关雅尔塔会议相当准确的情报。于是，宋子文3月10日又给罗斯福的私人助手哈里·霍普金斯拍了一封电报。 在给赫尔利的电报中，没有提及雅尔塔会议。而给霍普金斯的电报则提到了此事。宋子文提出他将以代理总理而不是外交部长的身份访美。 宋子文的电报没有得到答复，他的访问被推迟到了旧金山会议之后。在这次会议之前，福兰克林·F·罗斯福就于4月12日死去了。 此时，蒋介石对于他所面临的形势和问题有了一个十分清楚的认识。他的心思已完全扑在了中国战后的权力斗争上。他感到未日就要到来了。在他看来，不管美国人会施加什么样的压力，接受共产党建立联合政府的要求都将会引起灾难性的后果，因为这样无异于不战而败。 他必须争取时间，必须在敌对状态结束之后争取足够的时间，以使自己处于必胜的位置。但是，同时他还必须稳住美国人，他们一直在抱怨他的政府不民主，并且正逐步倾向于支持他的对头共产党。在相当长的一段时间里，委员长一直没有采取什么行动，只是主持着他那个懒惰低效的政府。 现在，他要让人们看到，他并没有失去他的政治技巧和果断决策的权力。3月1日，他宣布“国民大会”将于11月12日召开，以推行“宪政”。一旦推行宪政之后，一切政党就是平等的了。即使在此之前，中国共产党和其他党派也可以参政，但是最终的决策权力和责任仍掌握在国民政府手中。 蒋介石是从领土和权力两方面去考虑的。一旦日本人撤走，中国的绝大部分土地，至少在名义上将由国民党控制。通过继续把持政府，他便可以得到组织地方行政机构的权力，进而控制“国民大会”的代表人选。 毛泽东和他的同事们自然看穿了这套把戏，并在3月9日指责整个方案是一个“欺骗性的分裂中国”的计划。专门处理麻烦事的周恩来退出了由赫尔利发起的会谈。 … 然而，共产党对于蒋介石建议的政治措施，还不能完全置之不理，但他们首先必须制定一个适用于今后这段关键时期的政策。 4月23日，中国共产党第七次代表大会在毛泽东的主持下在延安召开，会议一直开到6月11日。 这时，共产党宣布，他们已作好了重新与国民党谈判的准备，甚至可以按蒋介石的条件有保留地参加政治活动。毛泽东宣布，中国共产党现在控制的解放区已有9550万人口，在这些解放区里，“地方的联合政府已经或者正在由人民选出”。毛泽东还说他们的军队有91万兵力，另外还有220万民兵。对此，蒋介石和美国情报机关有不同的估计。蒋介石的估计是，共产党有30万武装军队。而美国情报机关估计共产党有47万5千兵力、20万7千条枪支。 当中共代表大会仍在进行时，国民党也召开了它的第六次代表大会，会议从5月5日一直开到21日。自然，蒋介石再次当选为党的总裁。“国民大会”的召开日期确定在11月12日。 会议向共产党作出了一个让步：即同意通过立法使一切政党获得合法地位。而有关“国民大会”参加成员的重要问题，则留待“人民政治协商会议”决定，“在这个会议上一切党派都将有代表参加。”7月1日，一个由国民党成员和民主同盟的代表组成的代表团飞抵延安。但是，他们从延安带回来的答复，却没有让蒋介石满意。 毛泽东建议，推迟国民大会的召开，中国的各大政党应该开会讨论建立一个临时的联合政府。这样一来，僵持仍在继续。 蒋介石面临的第二个问题是，如何从寄托于国际的已破碎的希望中，再捞回一些东西。 罗斯福的继任者杜鲁门总统，于5月26日把哈里·霍普金斯（又是一个不久于人世的人）派到了莫斯科。斯大林告诉他，苏联人已准备好于8月8日开始在中国作战。但是，在中苏定立条约之前，他们不会参战。 他声称支持蒋介石作为唯一有资格领导中国的人，至于领土，他对满洲和新疆都没有任何企图。他甚至准备让国民党的代表在由苏军占领的满洲地区组织地方政府。6月15日，赫尔利拜见蒋介石，向他正式通报了雅尔塔会议的协定。 美国决定牺牲中国、支持在满洲的俄国人的消息，显然震动了蒋介石。但他保持了平静，他建议，中苏签定任何协议都应有美国和英国参加，大连港的海军基地应由四国联合处置，而且英美应该参加中苏移交库页岛和千岛群岛的讨论。 如果赫尔利回答时的态度还不算冷淡的话，那么他的答复本身则是冷冰冰的——美国政府将遵守雅尔塔协议。蒋介石的建议没有一个是可以接受的。 于是，蒋介石召见宋子文，向他下达了几点简要的指示，并派他前往莫斯科。6月下旬，宋子文抵达莫斯科，这位外交部长此行的目的是反映委员长的立场。 尽管中国处于弱势，但宋子文仍不愿让步，这也是蒋介石的意思。宋子文与斯大林和莫洛托夫进行了一周的会谈，但是双方的分歧之大，一如当初。7月14日，斯大林去参加波茨坦会议，宋子文也回到了重庆。 由于杜鲁门不像罗斯福那样倾向于妥协，因此，他想使美国在满洲问题上也有一个发言权，于是他要求斯大林同意使大连成为一个“自由港”。当蒋介石听说这件事之后，他得到了一点安慰，因为杜鲁门毕竟有意要满足他的一些要求，而在赫尔利那里，这些要求都被断然拒绝了。 8月7日，宋子文率领一个新的代表团赴莫斯科，这一次，他是作为总理前往的，随行的还有新上任的外交部长王世杰博士。 这时的形势正在迅速地发展。就在一天之前的8月6日，美国向广岛投下了一颗原子弹。8日，苏联向日本宣战。两天之后，第二颗原子弹落在了长崎。由于相信有杜鲁门的支持，所以宋子文和王世杰开始时的态度都十分坚决。 这些事情过去了将近三十年之后，我在台北见到了王世杰。他告诉我，他当时曾要求斯大林作出一个具体的保证，但斯大林却反问道：“你们想让我干什么？去打毛泽东吗？”王世杰反驳说，他要求俄国人所做的一切就是他们必须保证，不向中国共产党提供政治上或物质上的援助，这种援助都应提供给中华民国的合法政府。斯大林答应了。但是，到了最后，宋子文却拒绝在由莫洛托夫起草的新协议上签字。王世杰博士看到这件事已别无选择，便在虚线上签了字。 对中国来说，这是一个很苛刻的协定:中国人允许苏联将大连港作为海军基地使用，同意宣布大连为自由港口，答应外蒙古的地位由公民投票决定（苏联人后来控制了这次投票），并且同意中国的长春铁路由中苏共同所有。反过来，斯大林只作了一些没有什么约束力的保证，即承认国民政府为中国的合法政府，不干涉中国的内部事务。 拖到这时，社鲁门才作出了一个已为时过晚的决定。他想采取军事行动，抢在苏联控制东北之前占领此地。8月11日，他向参谋长联席会议主席下达了命令，要求他们在日本投降之后马上准备占领大连和朝鲜的汉城，“如果那时这两个港口还没有被苏联军队夺走。”然而，一周之后，这项命令便被取消了，因为苏联军队已抢先到达了大连，并牢牢地控制了东北。 当中苏会谈仍在莫斯科进行时，日本内阁已提出投降。接受投降是在8月14日——中苏条约签订的当天。9月2日，在停靠于东京湾的美国密苏里战舰上，日本正式签署了投降书。 对中国而言，一场战争结束了，而另一场战争即将到来。