Chapter 135 navy concern

Shen Zui was eager to portray Dai Li as submissive to the United States, but his description of the relationship between his former boss, military commander, and U.S. Navy officer “Mary” Mellas was inaccurate.From the beginning, Melles expressed strong support for Dai Li as the undisputed leader of Sino-US cooperative intelligence operations.This support was intended not only to recognize Chinese interests in wartime cooperation, but also to affirm his own key role as a naval officer in the Chinese arena.The U.S. military, especially the Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army have indeed tried their best to show that the conspiracy between Dai Li’s military command and the United States is, first of all, naval affairs:

Prior to Pearl Harbor, Major Shaw suggested to the US Signal Corps for help with signal communications.This suggestion was shelved.The Army G-2 was approached shortly after Pearl Harbor, but negotiations were fruitless.This was followed by contacts with the Office of Strategic Intelligence (OSS) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).But the result is nothing, because both OSS and ONI have their own plans.Major Shaw, who has been with Commodore Mellas for eight years, talked with Commodore Mellas at a cocktail party about organizing naval attacks off the coast of China.Commodore Mellas reported these proposals to Admiral Leahy, who immediately approved them.The commander-in-chief also approved.

Second, according to the conditions accepted by Brigadier General Melles and approved by the US government, SACO, including the intelligence agency, is almost completely subordinate to the leadership of the chief of the Chinese secret service.As General Donovan told President Roosevelt: "According to SACO regulations, we were in China in April 1942, but only as partners in General Dai Li's Chinese intelligence services...to General Dai Said that SACO is an opportunity to receive material assistance, and at the same time, it can be guaranteed that if the intelligence agency must be recognized by China, then at least all activities must be under his control and continuous monitoring.”

The initial steps to establish the Sino-US Cooperation Institute began in Washington after the United States declared war on Japan.A top priority for the U.S. Navy was to map the western and central Pacific: a task that required weather data from weather stations on the Asian continent.When Shaw and Melles first discussed the establishment of SACO at a cocktail party in a hotel in Washington, the two considered exchanging communications information with the Kuomintang in exchange for cooperation in establishing a weather station in China. Including northern and western China, where the weather patterns of Siberia and Gobi Desert are best observed.After that initial meeting, Mellors consulted with his superiors and gained their approval for what started out as a relatively simple plan.But Xiao Bo foresaw a greater opportunity in it, so he notified the military commander in Chongqing.In Chongqing, after Chiang Kai-shek had approved Dai Li's relationship with the Americans, a series of more formal and high-level talks took place between the military attaches of the American embassy and a group of Chinese officials from the Bureau of Military Statistics.