Chapter 3 Chapter 3 The battlefield is full of wolf nature

Huawei faces hundreds of competitors in the communications field, such as Julong, Datang, ZTE, and Changhong Communications in China.ZTE and Huawei have been in the communication industry for 20 years, and they have become Huawei's "senior" competitors in China.At the same time, Huawei faced foreign competitors of the "seven countries and eight systems", and slowly took the lead in the next 20 years of racing. In the end, only Cisco, the United States, became Huawei's strongest competitor in the world today. International "senior" competitors.However, whether it is ZTE or Cisco, Huawei is sparing no effort to catch up and try to surpass.

"The great river goes east, the waves wash away, and the heroes of the ages...The country is picturesque, and there are so many heroes at one time." The shopping mall is a process of washing the sand with big waves, and the real gold is washed out and the dregs are eliminated.Shopping is like a game of chess, if you make a careless move, you will lose everything.Cruel competition in shopping malls, survival of the fittest, how many "heroes compete for the waist", the "city head" is constantly changing "the king's banner". Just like what Mr. Jin Yong said, how many love and hatred are intertwined, how many life-and-death battles are staged scene after scene, thrilling and exciting.Shopping malls are like battlefields, fighting and killing are endless.However, the shopping mall is a battlefield without gunpowder, relying on wisdom, courage and courage.

Huawei was born out of nowhere and determined to be a world-class enterprise. It was born to face countless "martial arts masters" and walk a "path of love and hatred".Ren Zhengfei strategized, relying on extraordinary foresight, courage to break through the routine, and indomitable courage, he used superb tactics, and was cautious to lead Huawei to break through. He staged a scene of Huawei's "Book, Sword, Enmity and Enmity Record" and blazed a bloody road for survival. . After the successful development of the C&C08 switch, how to achieve a market breakthrough has become the next thorny issue before Ren Zhengfei.

The first is competition from local Chinese counterparts.The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and Belgian Bell jointly established Shanghai Bell Company in Shanghai. This enterprise is in line with international standards in management and process equipment, and has reached a world-class level; the market share of 04 machines has grown rapidly; Datang Telecom has many years of national-level scientific research It has laid a strong technical reserve; ZTE, which is also located in Shenzhen, is directly on par with Huawei, with solid market development and high work efficiency. Secondly, most of the international telecommunications giants have already entered the Chinese market, and Huawei is simply throwing an egg at a stone if it wants to confront these giants with strong financial resources and advanced technology.As the domestic market quickly enters the stage of price-cutting competition, international telecom giants rely on their strong financial resources and have also begun to cut prices sharply, in an attempt to kill domestic emerging companies such as Huawei in their cradles.

Ren Zhengfei said frankly: Huawei "encountered international competition at our own doorstep, and knew what is the world's advanced. We learned the rules of competition and how to win the competition through competition."The hardships of life and career setbacks have made Ren Zhengfei particularly alert to the crisis facing the company. He described Huawei's fundamental goal in three words - "survive".Huawei must first survive, and the necessary condition for survival is to have market share, otherwise there will be nothing. In the 1990s, China entered a period of rapid growth in the communications industry. The original China Telecom was decomposed into four competing operators: China Mobile, China Telecom, China Netcom, and China Unicom. Zero initial installation fee, the number of fixed telephone users has grown rapidly from 10 million users nationwide in the early 1990s to hundreds of millions in 2005, and the overall communication equipment in the 1990s is facing a rapid transition from the original air separation and longitudinal model technology to digital technology convert.

Over the same period, the telephone penetration rate in foreign developed countries and regions has reached over 90%, while the Chinese market, where the telephone penetration rate was less than 0.5% at that time, attracted switch manufacturers from all over the world who were one step ahead in program-controlled switching technology to enclose their territories in China, forming a The famous "seven countries and eight systems" in China's communication history: Japan's NEC and Fujitsu, America's Lucent, Canada's Nortel, Sweden's Ericsson, Germany's Siemens, Belgium's BTM and France's Alcatel.Seven countries and eight standards are painted in various "colors" on China's telecommunications "map", and the national switch territory has been divided up by foreign switch manufacturers.And these switches from different countries and standards, relying on their own technical barriers, not only make single-user prices high, software upgrades and after-sales maintenance service fees high, but also the technology is not interoperable with each other, which once caused confusion in the Chinese communication market. And for this reason, Chinese telecom operators have paid a high cost.

After entering the 1990s, investment in the post and telecommunications industry developed rapidly. In 1993 alone, the investment in the entire post and telecommunications industry was more than 40 billion yuan.The more than 40 billion yuan has factories and pipelines. In addition, a large amount of investment is communication equipment. 50% of the equipment is 20 billion.Due to the temptation of this huge market, a group of Chinese engineers and capital who were at the forefront of technology and market at that time also entered this field. In the mid-to-late 1980s, a large number of program-controlled switchboard companies were born. Most of them gathered in the Pearl River Delta region with preferential policies at that time.These enterprises are small in scale and basically operate in the style of private workshops.However, in the end, from analog to digital, there are only four companies in the country that can launch digital program-controlled switches in time, known as "Huge China"-Julong, Datang, ZTE, and Huawei.

Huawei faced hundreds of competitors in the stage of unit user switches, and after entering the field of telecommunications equipment, it faced only a handful of domestic competitors, such as Julong, Datang, ZTE, and Changhong Communications.ZTE and Huawei have been in the communication industry for 20 years, and they have become Huawei's "senior" competitors in China. ZTE was called ZTE WXT before 1993 and was established in early 1985 (3 years earlier than Huawei).At that time, the state-owned enterprise in the mainland, the 691 factory of Aerospace Systems, decided to look for partners in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, "introducing externally and internally" in order to develop, and sent Hou Weigui, the technical section chief at that time, to Shenzhen for liaison and preparation work. In February 1985, Shenzhen Zhongxing Semiconductor Co., Ltd. was officially established with a registered capital of 2.8 million yuan, and Factory 691 accounted for 66% of the total share capital. In June 1986, while ZTE was expanding its processing business with supplied materials, in order to seek its own products and markets and get rid of the passive position of processing supplied materials, the company decided to set up an eight-person research and development team to develop 68 simulated air separation user units. switch. In January 1992, ZTE's ZX500A rural telephone end office switchboard was successfully opened. By 1993, the installed capacity of ZTE's 2,000 branch office digital switches had accounted for 18% of the country's annual new rural telephone capacity.

Huawei's main competitor in the field of data communications is Cisco. In December 1984, two Stanford University computer scientists, Len Bosack and Sandy Lerner, created Cisco Systems.The company's name comes from San Francisco, from the last few letters of its English name San Francisco, and its logo comes from the famous Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco. Bosack and Lerner attempted to connect disparate networks by laying cables between two different buildings on the Stanford campus and connecting them together with bridges (and later routers). In 1992, the total number of Cisco employees reached 875, and offices were opened in Toronto, Canada and Tokyo, Japan. In 1992, Cisco independently developed products including communication server series, Cisco 3000 low-end router platform, and router management software.

Since the 1980s, in just 20 years, my country's communication market has entered a stage of great development, and has established the world's second largest communication network that runs through the whole country and connects the world, and the speed of development is "fast by leaps and bounds". However, from the rural dialect to the national backbone telephone network, all the equipment used in the country is imported from abroad. They are 8 different models from 7 countries. That's where the saying comes from.It is said that in Beijing, almost all models of 8 standards can be found.

Multi-standards have caused the complexity of interconnection and low call quality.In addition, one of the biggest features of these products is the high price: the price of European and American manufacturers is generally 300-400 US dollars per line, and the price of Japanese manufacturers is more than 180 US dollars even though it is cheap. Foreign brands are flooding the Chinese communications market, and the Chinese do not have independent core technologies.This is not only related to the honor of the country, but also to the economic security of the country.In order to reverse this passive situation, the government began to pay attention to the development of its own brands and encourage the rise of national industries.Taking the opportunity of developing Wanmenji, Julong Information Technology Co., Ltd. was established in 1995.Subsequently, Datang, ZTE, and Huawei were established one after another, and for a while, the "Great China" galloped north and south. It is said that the term "Huge China" was called out by Wu Jichuan, Minister of Information Industry.Coincidentally, the first words of the best companies in the field of communication manufacturing at that time - Julong, Datang, ZTE, and Huawei happened to be "Huge China".Later, this name spread, and leaders and media often called it "Great China" to represent the rise of the national communication industry. After the rise of the "Great China", they seized the development opportunity of "agricultural dialect" and took the road of "encircling the cities from the countryside".At that time, foreign manufacturers underestimated the situation in rural China, thinking that the rural economy in China was backward, profits were too small, and there was little room for profit in expanding the rural market, so they only focused on big orders in cities.Under the leadership of "Great China", domestic enterprises seized this gap and quickly regained "lost ground". Due to the rise of domestic manufacturers and increasingly fierce competition, the price of domestic program-controlled switches has dropped sharply, from $300-500 per line to $50.Under the leadership of "Great China", China's communications industry has sprung up and regained "half of the country" in one fell swoop. With the successful development of Wanmenji, "Huge China" began to have its own independent technology and brand. They broke through the siege of foreign manufacturers and began to "resist".Since then, the pattern of "a huge China with four pillars supporting the sky" has been formed, and the "seven countries and eight systems" have completely become history.The era of our admiration for international giants is over, and now we can finally feel proud. Judging from the time of establishment, ZTE and Huawei are much earlier than Julong and Datang, but in fact, in terms of policy resources and technical strength, for a long time, Julong and Datang located in Beijing have been superior to Julong and Datang. ZTE and Huawei in Shenzhen.Founded in 1995, Julong was initiated by several state-owned enterprises with the aim of promoting the industrialization of China's first Wanmen program-controlled exchange HJD04-ISDN (hereinafter referred to as "04 machine"). The 04 machine was successfully developed as early as 1991 by Wu Jiangxing, a researcher at the PLA Information Engineering Institute, and basically brought together the highest achievements in the field of early Chinese switches. Although Datang was officially established in 1998, its predecessor was the Institute of Telecommunications Science and Technology, which was spun off from the Academy of Posts and Telecommunications in 1993. This institute has a history of more than 40 years, strong technical strength, and the country has given it the greatest support. In October of the year it was established, it was successfully listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.Although ZTE has the background of a state-owned enterprise, the state has no actual capital investment, and Huawei is the only private enterprise in the "Great China". Therefore, ZTE and Huawei are basically self-made.In addition, the founders of the two companies, Hou Weigui and Ren Zhengfei, have no experience in the communications industry, let alone any ready-made resources in terms of technology. The first to leave the battlefield is the dragon. In 1998, Huawei's sales were 8.9 billion yuan, ZTE exceeded 4 billion yuan, Julong exceeded 3 billion yuan, the smallest Datang was 900 million yuan, and the profits of the four companies were all over 100 million yuan. Among them, Julong's 04 Exchanges have accounted for 14% of the total online operations in the country.It can be seen from these figures that although there is a certain gap between them, they can still be regarded as the same camp considering the issue of establishment time and potential resource advantages.However, three years later, in 2001, Huawei's sales had grown to 25.5 billion yuan, with a profit of more than 2 billion yuan; ZTE's sales reached more than 14 billion yuan, with a profit of 570 million yuan; 10,000 yuan, while Julong's sales were only between 300 and 400 million yuan, and its profit was -90 million yuan.At this point, the gap is already very obvious. After 2002, it was hard to find Julong in the domestic communication market. According to relevant sources, Julong only survived by overseas orders in previous years.Although China Putian Group (formerly known as China Posts and Telecommunications Industry Corporation, which is also one of the major shareholders of Julong) reorganized Julong four times in 1996, 1999 (twice), and 2000, people also It was once hoped that China Putian could bring Julong back to its former glory, but in the end, China Putian itself also performed poorly, and its operating conditions became increasingly severe. Another reason for the dragon's downfall is the lack of a long-term development plan.After Julong developed the 04 machine, he was too eager for quick success and made short-term mistakes in the production layout.At that time, there were more than 20 enterprises producing 04 machines in the country, and every time they produced one machine, they had to pay Julong a technical royalty.For the technology owner, it seems that there is nothing wrong with charging an extra fee for producing one more unit.However, such a layout makes technology, research and development, and production out of line, and sales are independent, and the disadvantages are highlighted.Not only can the technical support fail to keep up with the opponents, but the manufacturers are also "killing each other".At that time, among the eight shareholders of Julong, each had its own "trump market". Factory 537 occupied the Gansu market, Factory 513 occupied the Northeast market, Factory 738 occupied the Inner Mongolia market, and Factory 522 had a deep foundation in the southern market.Later, the birthplace of the 04 machine technology further "released" the technology, and the production and sales manufacturers added 5 companies including Zhenjiang Post Power Plant and Hunan Post and Telecommunications Equipment Factory. Before its establishment in 1994, Julong’s problem was that manufacturers fought price wars with each other. After its establishment, although it adopted the “five unifications” of documentation, technology, sales, management, and after-sales service, its competitiveness also began to shrink, allowing Huawei to take advantage of it. , Directly entering the "trump market" that was originally impenetrable by needles and impenetrable by water. Datang’s situation is slightly better than that of Julong, even relying on TD-SCDMA (one of the three major standards of the Telecom Union on 3G, the intellectual property rights are owned by Datang, but it has not yet been industrialized. The other two standards are WCDMA and CDMA2000). It has shown its talents in the 3G field, but because it started more than 10 years later than ZTE and Huawei, it is not comparable in scale, and it is unquestionable that its current growth is weak and its stamina is insufficient, and the gap with ZTE and Huawei has widened. bigger and bigger. In 1998, Datang's sales were about 10% of Huawei's and ZTE's was about 25%. In 2001, it was about 8% of Huawei's and ZTE's was about 20%.By 2003, although Datang's sales had reached about 1.8 billion yuan, it was only 6% of Huawei's and 8% of ZTE's.Moreover, in areas where ZTE and Huawei have advantages such as mobile, data, and optical communications, Datang has done little. It only relies on microelectronics and TD-SCDMA to obtain some incremental income, and its future depends entirely on the progress of the industrialization of TD-SCDMA. Certainly, too much uncertainty makes the prospect worrying. In terms of system and business model, Datang's situation is somewhat similar to that of Julong.Compared with ZTE and Huawei, its advantages and disadvantages are equally obvious. The advantages lie in talents and technology, and the disadvantages are due to long-term consumption of national scientific research funds and lack of market awareness. Secondly, because it is a scientific research institute, there is almost no production capacity and sales system. On the contrary, there are tens of thousands of staff.Now, Datang is betting almost all of its wealth and life on TD-SCDMA, a technology standard promoted by the state, while ZTE and Huawei are going all out in the three major 3G standards, and the risk is greatly reduced. Specifically, the "huge" lagging behind, or the "China" winning, begins with the access device.The breakthrough of domestic manufacturers is switches in products, and in the market, it is expressed as entering the urban communication market from the rural market below the county level. Before 1994, China's local telephone field was mainly controlled by foreign communication equipment. Direct competition cost too much, and it may not be successful. ZTE and Huawei chose access equipment as a breakthrough point. This equipment can solve the interconnection between different standards. The problem.ZTE and Huawei began to invest in the development of access equipment when the switch market was booming, while Datang and Julong, especially Julong, were not optimistic about access equipment at all, thinking that this "setter" technology was not good enough. There will be a future.ZTE and Huawei have successfully developed access equipment successively, cultivated and started the market, and became the first ministers of domestic manufacturers to break through in the field of local calls.When Julong and Datang realized the importance of access equipment, the market had already been divided.In the later major emerging markets, such as mobile, optical communication, and data fields, "huge" failed to intervene in time. As a result, when the traditional switch market began to saturate and mobile and other industries emerged, they would naturally only shrink further. Once upon a time, "Great China" was synonymous with China's communications manufacturing industry. With their collective breakthroughs in Wanmen switches, four companies defeated the "seven countries and eight systems" that had been "unimpeded" in China for a long time.A few years later, due to technological innovation, mobile and data communications replaced switches and became the mainstream products in the communications industry. During this industry transformation process, there was also a gap between domestic manufacturers, and the gap was getting bigger and bigger mainly because of system problems. ."Huge", which once was ahead of "Zhonghua" in switch technology, has gradually declined, while "Zhonghua", which is completely a layman's intervention and has no professional background, has come from behind and has begun to shape the leading image of China's communication industry in the global communication forest.At present, their influence has gone far beyond the traditional fixed network field, and they all have their own outstanding performance in current or future mainstream fields such as mobile, data, optical communication, 3G, and NGN.And with their acceleration on the road of internationalization, they have attracted more and more attention from the global communication industry and the vigilance of industry giants. The vicissitudes of life, looking back suddenly, the "Great China" has changed.Due to system, technology, product, planning and other reasons, the fate of Huge China is completely different.Julong withdrew from the communication market sadly due to management mistakes, and Datang could only linger on its last legs. Only Huawei and ZTE took up the banner and went to the distance. In the early stage of China’s reform and opening up, the domestic communication situation was very backward. The total number of fixed telephones in the country was only more than 4 million, which was not as high as that in Hong Kong. The total number of telephone sets per million people was less than half, only 3 of the global average. %-4%.This situation has become the bottleneck of economic development and attracting foreign investment.At this time, the Party Central Committee, the State Council, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications made timely decisions to introduce all-digital program-controlled switching system technology and related large-scale integrated circuit production technology through the principle of "combining technology and trade, and exchanging technology with the market". In 1984, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and Belgian Bell Company jointly established a joint venture company, referred to as Shanghai Bell, which belongs to the first batch of Sino-foreign joint ventures in China. Shanghai Bell is the first joint venture established in my country's communications field.After the establishment of the company, it actively implemented the spirit of "combining introduction, digestion, absorption and innovation" of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and gradually mastered the most advanced program-controlled switching technology in the world at that time through the three-level communication technology development strategy of "focusing on innovation". Shanghai Bell has laid a solid foundation for its future development. In 1984, Hefei City, Anhui Province started the feasibility study on the project of introducing Wanmen program-controlled local telephone exchange and 500-way long-distance exchange.After half a year of program comparison and feasibility study demonstration, the S1240 digital program-controlled switching system produced by Shanghai Bell was finally selected.At that time, Shanghai Bell overcame delivery and other difficulties, and the two sides mobilized elite troops to fight day and night. In December 1986, the first local office of the program-controlled exchange produced by Shanghai Bell was opened in Hefei, Anhui. As the first supplier of domestic program-controlled switches in the 1980s and 1990s, Shanghai Bell helped operators build international long-distance, domestic long-distance, important private networks, and local calls in large and medium-sized cities at a speed far faster than the domestic economic development level. The network has truly achieved economic development and communication first, and has laid a good foundation for my country's introduction of foreign capital. In 1995, Huawei began to enter the program-controlled switch market.At that time, it did not have its own core technology and had little competitiveness, while Shanghai Bell was already a leader in this field, occupying a large share in the Chinese market.After Huawei developed the Wanmen machine, it has a veritable "lethal power", so it naturally pointed the finger at Shanghai Bell. At the beginning, Huawei's Wanmen phone was not perfect, far inferior to Bell's S1240. Huawei's image at this time was also far inferior to Shanghai Bell, and it could not compete with it head-on.Therefore, it adopted a roundabout and outflanking tactic-first capture the rural market, as well as the backward provinces and cities in the northeast, northwest, and southwest.In these "poor" markets, Huawei made a big publicity campaign of the V5 interface, using the HONET access network to counter Shanghai Bell's remote access module.At the same time, use profit as a subsidy and use low prices as a strategy to provoke price reduction competition.Adopt the low-price strategy, occupy the rural market with the absolute low price that Bell can't reach, and then compete for the market share in the city, and gradually reduce the profit margin of Shanghai Bell. In 1999, when Huawei entered Sichuan, Shanghai Bell's market share in Sichuan was 90%.At first, Huawei didn't mention sales, and took the initiative to give its own access network to customers for free, so as to spread points on the Internet in various parts of Sichuan, and opponents ignored Huawei's small actions.Immediately afterwards, Huawei grabbed the newly added access network and gradually connected the dots into a plane. After making breakthroughs, Huawei took the opportunity to extend the advantages of the access network to switches.In the end, the two systems of Huawei and Shanghai Bell were neck and neck, and Huawei seized more than 70% of the newly added market in Sichuan. In 1998, Huawei's sales surpassed Shanghai Bell for the first time, ranking tenth in the top 100 electronics companies with 7.18 billion yuan. In 1999, it ranked tenth again with sales of 10.2 billion yuan, further consolidating its leading position relative to Shanghai Bell. Subsequently, with the launch of the "Broadband Metropolitan Area Network", Huawei continued to expand the strategy of "encircling the cities from the countryside" and began to aggressively enter the data communication market.Huawei positions itself as an advocate of "Broadband Metropolitan Area Network" and has successfully established a taller image in the minds of operators. In this field, Shanghai Bell has no ability to compete with it. In 2002, Alcatel acquired Shanghai Bell’s foreign capital Fang Bell, but the name was still called Shanghai Bell, until later Alcatel (50% + 1 share) acquired Shanghai Bell, the famous gold 1 share gave Shanghai Bell a more westernized The name of Shanghai Bell - Alcatel Shanghai Bell. The development of global communications went through several years of explosive development, and then began to encounter a downturn in 2005. In 2006, Alcatel merged with Lucent, and the new company Alcatel-Lucent also integrated its business in China into Alcatel Shanghai Bell. In 2009, the company officially changed its name to Shanghai Bell after being reviewed and approved by the company's shareholders' meeting and approved by relevant government departments. However, no matter how the name changes, Huawei has left it far behind. On June 7, 2006, a transcript of the conversation appeared on Huawei's electronic bulletin board.This 2,200-word transcript of the conversation is more like an open letter, an open letter to Harbor Network employees. "This is the second time I shake hands with you on behalf of Huawei. First of all, this time I am entrusted by the chairman (Sun Yafang), and I sincerely welcome you back..." The author of the open letter is Ren Zhengfei, who rarely appears in front of the media President of Huawei.This is the second day after Huawei officially announced the acquisition of Harbor Network.When the outside world is still figuring out Huawei's true intention to acquire Harbor, Ren Zhengfei explained his views in this way. This is a merger and acquisition that some market participants call a "record of grievances and enmities".The protagonists of the story are Ren Zhengfei and Li Yinan, the latter is the president of Harbor Network, a former favorite of Ren Zhengfei, and later Ren Zhengfei's most stubborn opponent in the business world. Speaking of Li Yinan, Ren Zhengfei admires him from the bottom of his heart, and the relationship between the two is as close as father and son.But someone has to ask, why did it cause today's embarrassing situation?Their grievances have to start with Li Yinan's entry into Huawei. Li Yinan, born in Hunan in 1970, was admitted to the junior class of Huazhong University of Science and Technology at the age of 15. In 1992, Li Yinan went to Huawei for an internship. At that time, he was only a second-year master student at Huazhong University of Science and Technology.During the internship, Li Yinan's technical talent left a deep impression on Ren Zhengfei. Li Yinan, who has just arrived, is very novel about Ren Zhengfei's management ideas and insights such as "Huawei encourages everyone to be Lei Feng, but never let Lei Feng suffer".On the other hand, Ren Zhengfei also has a discerning eye and has noticed the potential of this young man.Li Yinan, who was still an intern, was appointed to lead the research and development of a technical project.Ren Zhengfei also decided to shell out money for a set of foreign equipment worth $200,000 for the project.At that time, Huawei, which was still in the entrepreneurial stage, did not have strong financial resources, and $200,000 was not a small sum for Ren Zhengfei.But Ren Zhengfei rejected the objection and still approved Li Yinan's project.However, due to the sudden downturn in the market, the project hosted by Li Yinan was accidentally stranded, and the equipment he just bought suddenly became a waste product, and 200,000 US dollars was wasted.Surprisingly, Ren Zhengfei was very generous and did not blame Li Yinan who was still worried.In Li's view: It is common for young people to hit a wall in technology development, and the most important thing is to be able to learn from it and start over. A scholar dies for his confidant.Li Yinan was grateful for Ren Zhengfei's generosity. In June 1993, Li Yinan, who graduated from a master's degree, walked into Huawei without hesitation. Ren Zhengfei insisted on eclectic promotion of talents based on business capabilities, and 23-year-old Li Yinan quickly became the apple of his eye: within two days, he was promoted to an engineer; two weeks later, he solved a technical problem and was hired as a senior engineer; Excellent, he was promoted to the deputy general manager of Huawei's Central Research Department; two years later, he made outstanding contributions to the development of C&C08 million digital program-controlled switches, and was promoted to the president and chief engineer of Huawei's Central Research Department. Four years later, at the age of 27, he jumped Become Huawei's youngest vice president. The period from 1996 to 1998 was Li Yinan's most vigorous years. Under his leadership, Huawei's research and development efficiency has been greatly improved, and a series of advanced technical equipment have been successfully developed.His outstanding technical talents brought Huawei into an unprecedented "golden age", and Huawei finally "captured the city". Li Yinan gave full play to his technical talents and led the R&D personnel to develop dozens of technological achievements with world advanced level and high commercial value.At the same time, Li Yinan revealed an amazing insight into future technological trends, and Huawei's internal employees couldn't help but marvel: "Li Yinan's every move will affect Huawei's development direction." Li Yinan recruited Liu Ping and Yu Houlin at the beginning of the C&C08 Wanmenji project. Liu Ping was in charge of the software of the Wanmenji, and Yu Houlin was in charge of the hardware.Yu Houlin is about the same age as Liu Ping. He is a very experienced hardware engineer from a research institute in Wuhan.After more than ten years, Liu Ping can still clearly remember the scene when Li Yinan called everyone to a meeting for the first time: Li Yinan just joined social work that year, and was 10 years younger than Liu Ping and Yu Houlin.It was probably the first time he called a meeting as a leader, and he was a little nervous when speaking with two people.At that time, Li Yinan spoke in a very low voice, weak, and he had to pay attention to hear clearly; when he spoke, his hands were still shaking a little. It is such a person who has created an improvement record in Huawei that no one can break through so far. After Li Yinan became the vice president of Huawei, he often spoke on behalf of Huawei in international and domestic media.Li Yinan was also the youngest vice president among China's top 100 electronic companies in the 1990s. After being reported by the media, he became a celebrity in China's IT industry.Li Yinan led more and more people, and his eloquence became better and better.Although Li Yinan's voice is not loud, his eyes are powerful, and the enthusiasm and dedication to his career revealed in his eyes attract everyone's attention. There is a private saying in Huawei that Li Yinan's actual status and power at that time were second only to "left non-right Fang", and many people speculated that he would become Ren Zhengfei's successor.The relationship between Ren and Li is more similar to the relationship between a teacher and a student or a father and son. According to people familiar with the matter, until now, Ren Zhengfei is still full of emotion when he mentions Li.However, some people from Huawei also revealed that Huawei has a lot of talents, and there are four or five masters who are on the same level as Li Yinan. In 1998, the smug Li Yinan was preparing to show his ambitions again, but was suddenly transferred from the Central Research Department to be in charge of the product department of the marketing department.In Ren Zhengfei's view, this is just a normal transfer. He hopes that Li Yinan can step out of research and development and go to the market. He also hopes that this training will make him more mature and take on more important positions in the future.And Li Yinan is a technical genius, this transfer is not suitable for him at all, and he is not willing to accept it, so he feels very uncomfortable. Li Yinan began to fade out of the eye-catching sight and was left out.The huge gap made him unable to balance his mind. He began to feel that Huawei had come to an end. He felt extremely disappointed and frustrated, so he had the idea of ​​going out to start a business. Regarding Li Yinan's psychological imbalance, Ren Zhengfei did not have a good psychological communication with him, and Li Yinan did not understand Ren Zhengfei's good intentions, which planted the seeds for Li Yinan's departure later. At the beginning of 2000, Li Yinan formally submitted his resignation to Ren Zhengfei after successively serving as the president of Huawei Electric and the director of Huawei's US Research Institute.Surprised, Ren Zhengfei tried every means to retain him but used the wrong method, which further strengthened Li Yinan's determination to leave. People's self-worth cannot be realized, and leaving may be the best choice.Li Yinan finally chose to leave, and his efforts won Ren Zhengfei's consent. In December 2000, Ren Zhengfei led all the director-level and above leaders of the company to hold a grand farewell party for him at Shenzhen Wuzhou Hotel. Li Yinan left Huawei, took more than 10 million yuan and some equipment from Huawei's equity settlement and dividends, and went north to Beijing. At the end of 2000, he founded Gangwan Network Company.Li Yinan said in Huawei's "Internal Entrepreneurship Personal Statement", "Huawei is a relatively weak point in the field of data communication, but also a potential opportunity." Li Yinan's original intention was to act as an agent of Huawei's routers and data communication products. It is a training base for Huawei data communication products, and integrates some other products that do not conflict with Huawei products.Therefore, his entrepreneurship was the only one that held a farewell party inside Huawei, and was encouraged by Ren Zhengfei, "When you start your business, as long as you don't harm Huawei, we support and understand you." However, the year when Li Yinan started his business was the "winter" of my country's telecommunications industry, and the harbor was frozen so hard that he couldn't breathe for a while.At this time, Huawei was also in a difficult stage. Ren Zhengfei published the famous "Huawei Winter". As the saying goes, "A strong general has no weak soldiers." During his time at Huawei, with the influence of a "wolf" like Ren Zhengfei from time to time, Li Yinan would not be far behind.He successfully applied Huawei's strategy, tactics, and business philosophy, rapidly shrinking the front line and concentrating on the data communication business.The rapid development of China's Internet business and the exponential growth of Internet users have brought huge business opportunities for the data communication business. At the same time, Cisco is the only company in the data communication field, and it is relatively easy for latecomers to enter. Under Li Yinan's careful management, Gangwan became famous.Harbor's annual R&D investment accounts for 12%-15% of the overall sales, and R&D personnel account for more than half of the total number of employees. The high investment has yielded fruitful results. From 2001 to 2003, Li Yinan launched a number of top technological achievements in the industry by virtue of his technical talent.Harbor claims: "The most widely used and most mainstream products in broadband network construction are 12-18 months ahead of major domestic competitors." Because Li Yinan is a technical genius, he led the pioneering technology research and development of the harbor to achieve success in succession. In the three years from 2001 to 2003, it developed rapidly, with 147 million yuan in 2001, 410 million yuan in 2002, and 1 billion yuan in 2003. growing at a double rate. The rapid development of Gangwan is exactly the same as that of Huawei back then, so Gangwan is also dubbed "Little Huawei".Li Yinan is eager to start a business successfully, and is not satisfied with just being a distributor of Huawei. He has greater ambitions and is eager to create his own world. However, Li Yinan is, after all, a technical talent rather than a management talent. Harbor has also experienced many problems while developing rapidly. The communication industry is an industry that spends money, and financial pressure is the bottleneck of the harbor.Li Yinan's "Huawei background" and the title of "Genius CEO" who led Harbor's extraordinary development are deeply favored by venture capital. From 2001 to 2003, Harbor received a total of US$116 million in funds from Warburg Pincus and Longke Venture Capital, a subsidiary of Shanghai Industrial Corporation. Ren Zhengfei is a little worried about Li Yinan's huge investment. He believes that these Western funds have "bad intentions": "After the IT bubble burst in the United States, these funds turned to China to hollow out Huawei and steal the intangible wealth accumulated by Huawei. , to get out of their plight." 让任正非气愤的是，“华为那时弥漫着一片歪风邪气，都高喊资本的早期是肮脏的口号，成群结队地在风险投机的推动下，合手偷走公司的技术机密与商业机密，像很光荣的一样，真是风起云涌，使华为摇摇欲坠”。 此时的华为真的算是“摇摇欲坠”。华为重金投入的3G研发只能苦苦等待，甚至在联通CDMA招标中意外失手，忽略小灵通，让老对手中兴缩短了差距，还惹上思科的“世纪诉讼”。 得到美国风险投资的李一男开始不满足于港湾只是一家分销商，他怀着更大的雄心，渴望能推出自己的产品。港湾成立-年内就迅速推出自己研发的路由器和交换机等数通产品，这意味着港湾从华为的代理商变为华为的对手。 2003年，港湾年销售收入达10亿元，港湾的锋芒甚至一度盖过了华为-李一男曾自负地宣称港湾在多个产品领域先后创造多项国内、业内第一……华为员工一直不服气，认为港湾之所以能迅速推出路由器等网络设备，是由于李一男带走了华为的技术机密、挖走了华为的顶尖研发人才…… 但不管怎样，港湾已经对华为形成了威胁，华为与港湾的冲突终于爆发。对于老东家而言，绝不会容忍昔日的伙计威胁自己的地位，打压是必然的。 2003年和美国3COM公司合资，2004年结束与思科的官司，华为终于能够腾出手来了，它要教训一下港湾这位新崛起的“叛将”。 在任正非的带领下，华为内部成立了“打港办”，对于华为的市场人员来说，只要是有港湾参与的竞标，无论多低的价格都一定要成功，否则就自动走人，双方竞争的惨烈程度已经完全公开化。 事实上，双方这种你死我活的竞争也埋下了可能两败俱伤的隐忧。任正非也承认：“华为逐鹿中原，惨胜如败。” 进入2004年后，港湾开始出现“成长中的阵痛”：竞争日趋激烈、对手不断挤压、员工离弃。港湾收入增长速度明显放缓，2004年合同销售为10亿元，增长率为零；此外，假账风波和匿名邮件事件也不时袭击港湾，虽然最终被证明都是谣言，却延缓了港湾的上市进程。 2004年对港湾公司来说似乎注定是糟糕的一年。风险投资商最不愿意见到的是，由于面临对手残酷的低价格战，港湾业绩开始放缓甚至停滞，一位投行人士称：“华尔街最喜欢编造高速成长的美妙故事，港湾似乎开始与这个故事失之交臂。” 进入2005年，华为仍然穷追猛打。对华为“杀敌八百，自损一千”的竞争策略，李一男找不到好的对策，毕竟华为有雄厚财力来实行这种“焦土政策”。港湾依靠10亿的营销仅能勉强度日，经营依旧没有起色。 2005年3月，港湾出现了转机的迹象，李一男成功说服风险投资人追加投资，由TVG投资携带马锡控股及港湾原股东华平投资、龙科投资再次向港湾注资3700万美元。 但对于一家高科技高成长的公司来说，港湾仍然缺钱。港湾逼迫自己必须连续几年的销售保持成倍增长：一方面是为了公司迅速成长，有实力和竞争对手相抗衡；另一方面则是为了完成投资方的销售指标。因为只有实现这个销售指标才能够尽快满足海外上市的要求，投资方才能够尽快地套现。据一位前港湾员工透露，在当初接受注资时港湾曾签下严格的协议，一旦港湾不能够实现持续增长的销售额，那么投资方就会得到更多的股权。 虽然港湾获得了一些投资，但前景依旧暗淡。上市无望、士气低落、遭受着资金吃紧等流言的困扰。 李一男甚至打算把港湾卖给西门子，这是华为不能容忍的。此项收购若能达成，华为将多出西门子这样强有力的对手。西门子利用在中国采购低廉OEM设备，在全球电信项目竞标中不断对华为造成威胁。在2005年尼泊尔电信招标中，西门子的报价就低于华为；在另一次电信项目竞标中，西门子同样以低报价战胜华为。 更令任正非担忧的是，诺基亚也打算收购西门子旗下的通信业务。如果诺基亚借此机会吞并港湾，那么诺基亚无异于如虎添翼，将极大威胁到华为的全球战略。 不得不说，姜还是老的辣。得知西门子欲收购港湾之后，华为先下手为强，瞄准了最赚钱的语音IP(VoIP)业务。在2005年10月有传闻称，华为以1000万元代价挖走港湾深圳研究所一语音研发小组，以致李一男不得不急忙南下安抚军心。 华为还敲山震虎，打算起诉港湾在知识产权方面对华为侵权。2005年9月2日，一封信件由华为发出，最终送抵港湾法律部。信件很简单，主体内容不到1000个字，但措辞相当强硬，要求港湾公司尽快解释对华为多项产品的知识产权侵权问题，如若不然，不排除诉诸法律。 华为向港湾发出律师函，港湾上市陡添变数，两家公司数年来的竞争公开化。一位业内人士说，不管结局怎样，从商业运行的一般规律看，华为与港湾的发展史、经营、竞争方略等都将在MBA教案上留下浓重的一笔。 任正非的策略再一次奏效。知识产权诉讼让西门子放弃收购港湾，西门子此时正在与诺基亚洽谈合并业务，不想因为华为与港湾的官司而让自己节外生枝。 到了此时，港湾的路已经走到了尽头。 任正非以胜利者的姿态向李一男伸出橄榄枝——华为收购港湾。港湾仍有员工对此次收购不满，在北京上地软件园，港湾大楼一片沉闷散伙的气氛，一位员工告诉记者，他对“男哥”缴械投降表示失望，“他丢失了自己一生中最后翻盘的资本”。 2006年6月6日，华为与港湾网络联合宣布，港湾网络已决定向华为转让部分资产、业务及部分人员，而转让的资产和业务包括路由器、光网络、综合接入的资产、人员、业务及与业务有关的所有知识产权。这也意味着，华为与港湾在历经多年“恩怨”后，如今又“重归于好”。 2006年5月10日，任正非与李一男在华为3COM的总部杭州见面。这次见面促成了华为和港湾的合作备忘录。 2006年6月6日，港湾网络与华为联合宣布，就港湾网络转让部分资产、业务及部分人员给华为达成意向协议书并签署谅解备忘录。业内估计，随后的整合中，华为支付了近5000万美元的现金，及调拨了大量资产。 之后，任正非在杭州会见了李一男等港湾管理层：我是受孙董事长委托而来的，是真诚欢迎你们回来的，如果我们都是真诚地对待这次握手，未来是能合作起来做大一点的事情的。不要看眼前，不要背负太多沉重的过去，要看未来、看发展。 任正非甚至于表示了歉意：这两年我们对你们的竞争力度是大了一些，对你们打击重了一些，这几年在这种情况下，为了我们自己活下去，不竞争也无路可走，这就对不起你们了，为此表达歉意，希望你们谅解。任正非同时强调，“如果华为容不下你们，何以容天下，何以容得下其他小公司。” 2006年9月，李一男重新回到深圳坂田华为公司总部，出任“华为副总裁兼首席电信科学家”，工号：59056。12月末，华为公司发出内部公告，任命李一男为华为终端公司副总裁。 2007年年末华为传出传闻，李一男将再度离开华为。 2008年10月6日，李一男加盟百度，被任命为首席技术官(CTO)。有接近华为与李一男的人士认为，作为技术天才的李一男，对通讯和IT行业有着非常敏锐的技术前瞻性。李一男离职华为加入百度，是华为收购港湾的一个很理想的结局。加盟与华为没有直接竞争关系的百度，对李一男本人及其恩师任正非来说都无异于一种解脱。 2010年1月18日，百度公司正式在内部宣布，李一男将辞任百度CTO一职。离职后出任中国移动旗下12580业务的运营商北京无限讯奇CEO职务。值得一提的“巧合”是，半个月前，12580总裁兼COO龚宇跳槽百度，出任百度投资的视频公司的CEO职务，这让业界对这次双方高管“互换”的背后充满遐想。 据知情人透露，李一男投奔12580的背后，其实折射了华为公司的资本意志。中移动旗下12580业务运营商北京无限讯奇很早之前就完成了前期的市场化资本运作，并吸纳了华为在内的多家巨头的投资。“很少有人知道华为在12580占据一定股权，有不小的话语权。”该知情人士透露说，李一男加盟12580出任CEO一事，事先很可能得到了华为创始人任正非的认可和推荐。 这也意味着，李一男在两度出走华为之后，将再次回到华为的势力范围。 北电网络是加拿大有名的通信设备制造商。它生产的大型排队机（寻呼台所用的大型呼叫设备）的市场占有率世界第一，它的产品技术成熟，性能稳定，多年来盘踞在中国市场上，“稳如泰山”。 1997年，华为与北电开始正面交锋。华为的产品性能没有明显的优势，但是华为善于明察秋毫，经过仔细研究发现，北电的技术研发全部设在国外，所有的设备都是从国外进口的，设备一旦出现问题需要技术支持时，技术专家很难及时赶到。华为很快抓住了北电的弱点：反应速度慢，不能提供优质服务。 华为抓住北电的这一劣势，针锋相对，建立为客户服务的灵活快捷的反应机制，部署客户战略优势。客户有什么紧急需求，华为的技术人员马上在最短的时间内赶到现场，第一时间给客户解决问题。这样，华为通过为客户提供高效的售后服务，使自己的产品竞争力上了一个台阶。 但是，北电不会善罢甘休，它正在积极准备新一轮的战斗。2006年，北电CEO迈克·扎菲尔洛夫斯基（Mike Zafirovski）走马上任之后，重新部署了全球布局，在北京、广州增加了研发中心。2007年4月，又在上海建立亚洲第一个全球运营卓越中心，将供应链中心也搬到了中国。2006年9月，北电将UMTS部门出售给阿尔卡特朗讯，并扬言将备战4G。 然而，北电的壮志雄心被市场无情地抛弃，华为则趁势追击。2008年12月份华为与爱立信等竞购北电的以太网业务，虽然因为各种原因的干预不了了之，但北电在大约一个月后宣布进入破产保护程序，并开始将旗下业务陆续出售。 2009年6月19日，北电与诺西（Nokia-Siemens Network）达成协议，出售旗下的LTE和CDMA业务给后者。此时距北电网络（Nortel Network）于2009年1月14日宣布进入破产保护程序整半年。自此，北电基本退出电信设备行业，剩下爱立信（Ericsson）、阿朗（Alcatel-Lucent）、诺西和华为、中兴等巨头。 北电扎根北美，CDMA是其盈利最好的业务，同时北电在第四代无线通信技术LTE上有较多积累，是其质量最好的资产之一。作为北电重组计划的一部分，其LTE和CDMA业务被出售，诺西接手。至此，北电基本退出电信设备行业。 提起那个以一个不规则的红色圆圈作标识的朗讯公司，电信业外的人并不熟悉，但它下面的科研机构——贝尔实验室却是大名鼎鼎，那里曾培养出11位诺贝尔奖得主。晶体管、UNIX系统、C++语言、移动电话等至关重要的技术都出自贝尔实验室。 朗讯科技公司的前身是1885年2月成立的美国电话电报公司（AT&T）。AT&T公司经过近百年的发展，不断兼并收购，到1983年时已经拥有1600亿美元资产，雇员达到了100万，占有美国电话市场80%的份额，成为电信业无与伦比的巨无霸。 AT&T的这种垄断引起了美国政府的担忧。此时，恰逢美国新自由主义经济思潮抬头。在这种思潮影响下，加上当时美国1000多家小公司一直对AT&T不满，最终，美国司法部和联邦政府实施反垄断法，AT&T被迫于1984年正式解体。 1984年1月1日，AT&T分解完毕。新AT&T公司保留了西方电气公司、长线部和国际公司。原来的22个地区性运营公司与AT&T完全脱离关系，重新组成7个地区公司。分解后，AT&T继续热衷于收购企业。在首席执行官罗伯特·艾伦指挥下，AT&T在1991年收购了制造计算机的国民现金出纳机（NCR）公司，1994年收购了制造蜂窝式电话的McCaw蜂窝通信公司。 但大规模技术资产的兼并没有给AT&T带来盈利，相反因要照顾各种互相矛盾的业务而经常顾此失彼。在这种状态下，1995年9月20日，AT&T再次宣布解体。改组后的AT&T公司包括原公司的核心部分，即资产为530亿美元的长途电话和蜂窝电话业务。原公司的网络部门，即过去的制造交换设备的西方电气公司，出售给股东，这就是1995年10月1日成立的朗讯科技公司，贝尔实验室从此也划归朗讯公司。 作为老牌的通信公司，朗讯在全球呼叫中心业务方面的市场占有率最高，在中国的非通信市场上也是第一位。在非通信领域，华为还处于起步阶段。2000年，华为在国内市场上已经占有相当的分量，正面对决不可避免了。 朗讯在技术领域和一些顶级的世界公司保持着密切的合作关系，大多数客户也一直在使用它的产品，华为要想介入是非常不容易的。 2000年，中国银行总行建立全国性的呼叫中心，承包商是IBM，朗讯与IBM、中国银行系统有多年的合作关系。在外人看来，中标者当然非朗讯莫属了，IBM怎么会随便接受华为呢？ 为了赢得合同，在进行了周密的策划后，华为决定从客户关系方面重点打击对手，以客户关系战略来打击朗讯。华为派出公司的骨干力量在各地进行公关活动。经过艰辛曲折的谈判，华为最终搞定最关键的环节——客户。一名曾经参与此次行动的华为人说：“我们找了中国银行总行的行长，做了一些工作，但是这些工作都是可以拿到'桌面上'的。尽管难度很大，但是我们最终还是把总行攻下来了。” 采用这种战术，华为处处紧逼，每一个项目都不放过，结果朗讯在中国市场上节节败退。朗讯在中国的市场被华为大范围地抢占，在上百次的交锋中，几乎都以失败告终。 2006年4月3日，上海贝尔阿尔卡特公司对国内媒体发布消息，称其母公司阿尔卡特和美国朗讯公司已经达成最终合并协议，阿尔卡特公司将以111亿欧元（约合134亿美元）收购朗讯科技公司，双方随后将成立一家新公司。这意味着脱胎于美国老牌电信公司AT&T的朗讯公司从此在世界舞台上消失。 1995年，国家出台了一系列扶持民族通信产业发展的政策。国内企业尤其是“巨大中华”四兄弟并肩做战，夺回了被外国巨头垄断的“半壁江山”。然而，危机解除，四个兄弟开始相残。随着发展，在市场上真正有竞争力的“巨大中华”，在很多合同招标中，最后只剩下中兴与华为两个“冤家”，为了扩大各自的市场份额，双方的“战斗”开始多了起来。 中兴与华为在深圳华侨城安营扎寨，一个在东头，一个在西头。中兴是华为的死对头，两家同处深圳华侨城，彼此虎视眈眈，心怀叵测。 两家有着相同的抱负、目标定位和接近的能力，这决定了它们相互竞争的基调。同行是冤家，他们早期的竞争主要在产品层面，最初很长一段时间，中兴处于领跑地位，但到了1995年，华为凭借在万门机上比中兴早半年，开始了领跑的阶段。随后中兴奋力追赶，1998年，在接入网市场上中兴又一度遥遥领先，华为望尘莫及。但是，不到一年时间，华为就占了上风。1999年上半年，华为的HONET以2.2亿元的销售额远远超过了中兴ZXA10的1.2亿元，取得了决定性胜利。 后来，两家又都实施了多元化，向多个领域发展。到现在，它们已经只有很少的一部分领域存在直接的竞争，而在多数领域，两“兄弟”已基本不存在竞争关系。它们的竞争已由具体的某一项产品或某一个市场上升到公司整体规模的竞争。 不过，平时的交锋只是小打小闹，两家真正“交火”是在1998年，华为率先向中兴叫战。 1998年，为了争夺市场，华为搞了一纸“有利于华为却有损中兴”的交换机产品比较书，大量送给目标客户。中兴人得知后，非常气愤，“以牙还牙”，也搞了一纸电源产品比较书。矛盾就这样被激化了。明明是华为“比较”在先，然而，华为却先发制人，抢先一步把中兴告上法庭。中兴也不是好惹的，双方在异地摆下公堂。 1998年7月1日，华为在河南高院与长沙中院率先起诉中兴，状告中兴公司将“中兴电源”与“华为电源”进行引人误解的对比，其中许多重要的事实、关键数据和技术指标失实，侵犯了华为的合法权益，要求分别赔偿损失1200万元与600万元。 中兴也不甘示弱，做出了针锋相对的举动。1998年7月27日、8月19日，中兴以同样的理由在河南与长沙两地提起民事诉讼，状告华为公司及其郑州办事处、长沙办事处为了削弱中兴公司的竞争能力，制作、散发“C&C08与ZXJ10技术对比”材料和“HONET与ZXA10的主要技术性能比较”的材料，有意以对比的形式，对双方不同型号的交换机及接入网产品进行引人误解的对比，贬低了中兴的商业信誉与产品声誉，违反了《反不正当竞争法》，要求分别赔偿1500万元、750万元。 此外，在庭审时，中兴追加诉讼请求500万元，华为提起反诉，反诉标的额2200万元（在河南高院反诉标的为2000万元、在长沙中院反诉标的为200万元）。 对这四起官司，河南省高级人民法院和长沙市中级人民法院相继做出了判决。在河南的官司，华为诉中兴案，中兴败诉，赔偿华为经济损失53万元；中兴诉华为案，华为败诉，赔偿中兴经济损失130万元；在长沙的官司，华为诉中兴案，中兴败诉，赔偿华为经济损失36万元；中兴诉华为案，华为败诉，赔偿中兴经济损失50.5万元。 至今，中兴人一提到这场官司还有隐隐的气愤：“原本是华为最先挑起的嘛，到最后他还恶人先告状。我们只好进行反诉。”结果还算公平，华为被罚得更多，中兴人多少找到了点心理平衡。 有趣的是，有媒体评价此事，还拿掌门人的名字做文章：“侯为贵以和为贵，任正非是非不分。”侯为贵一直想不通，怎么任正非就把他给告了呢？任正非就是想要借打击对手的机会，提高知名度。“借势”，任正非理解得很深刻，但搞得侯为贵很痛苦。 针对这几起官司，有媒体做了这样的评论：“中兴与华为之间的是非恩怨绝不是几起诉讼就能一了百了的，诉讼只能加剧双方的对立。降价竞争是中兴与华为矛盾的关键所在，而诉讼大战只不过是双方在市场、宣传、人才等各条战线积怨已久的矛盾总爆发。” 那么，华为为什么要挑起这场战争呢？这源于两家掌门人的性格差别。华为老总任正非和中兴老总侯为贵不同的性格，造就了不同的企业文化，不同的文化又造就了不同的企业性格。由于文化差异，两者的摩擦也就不断了。 侯为贵是典型的东方企业家，不过他在积极向西方学习；任正非更接近于西方企业家，只不过他更了解东方人的智慧。 侯为贵一向为人比较谦和，做事求稳。1984年，他和几个技术员来到荒芜一片的深圳创业，吃尽了苦头，才闯出一片天地来。所以，侯为贵一直是想把这个企业做得稳当一些，靠自己过硬的技术来打天下。 任正非看似大老粗