Chapter 16 (1) "Foreign consultants" are here

On January 17, 1933, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to move from Shanghai to the Jiangxi Central Soviet Area.Subsequently, Bo Gu, Luo Fu and other temporary central leaders arrived in Ruijin.Soon, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China merged with the Provisional Central Committee and was called the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China.Zhou Enlai's position as Secretary of the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China's Soviet Area disappeared by itself. During this period, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De have been commanding the Red Army to fight in front.

According to the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic held the 11th executive meeting of the People's Committee on May 8, and decided to move the Central Revolutionary Military Commission from the front to Ruijin, adding Xiang Ying and Bo Gu as members, and Xiang Ying acting chairman.At the same time, a separate headquarters of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was organized in the front. Zhu De was the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the commander-in-chief of the Red Front Army, and Zhou Enlai was the general political commissar of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Red Front Army.Since then, Bogu and Xiang Ying have the direct control over the decision-making power for military operations ahead.

According to the intention of the Communist International military advisers in Shanghai, Bo Gu, Xiang Ying and others believed that Chiang Kai-shek had internal strife with the Fujian and Guangdong armies, and that he was on the defensive in the northern part of the Central Soviet Area, so he was not easy to attack. The main force of the army is divided into two parts to fight.Call such a deployment "two fists." The Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China called Zhu De and Zhou Enlai on June 13 to convey the summer military combat plan drawn up by Fred Stern, the general military adviser of the Comintern in the Communist Party of China.The telegram criticized the shortcomings of the Red Front Army's previous military operations in that "the main force is concentrated in a single combat unit, that is, the Front Army, which cannot cooperate with all aspects of operations", "so that there is little chance to deal a strong blow to the enemy in the north." ".In order to win the two strategic aspects of Fujian and Jiangxi at the same time, it was proposed to transfer some troops from the Red Army to form the Eastern Army to conduct separate operations.Emphasizing "effectively implementing this combat plan", it is proposed to use the Red 3rd Army as the eastern backbone to fight in Fujian; the Red 1st and 5th Army will fight between Fuhe and Ganjiang according to the plan.

Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China on June 14 regarding the issue of military operations in the summer: "After the Battle of East Huangpi, except for attacking Leyi, the front army fought the enemy twelve times, and each time the enemy lost about one regiment of troops, we must not Said that there is no plan to weaken the enemy's main force on the northern front." In response to the battle in Fujian, the telegram said: "It must be estimated that the attack in Qingliu, Guihua, Jiangle, Shaowu and other places will take time, and June and July are the best days for supplies. In difficult times, the area around Qingliuquan is barren, and the front army is in danger of running out of food, I wonder if you have figured it out?" But Bo Gu, Xiang Ying and others ignored his questions.

In the two days from the 16th to the 18th, he and Zhu De called Bogu and Xiang Ying four times in a row, disagreeing with the separation of the 1st and 3rd Red Army, the main force of the Red Front Army.Army commanders such as Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao also disagreed with the summer combat plan issued by foreign advisers in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.However, Bo Gu, Xiang Ying and other leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Military Commission in the rear did not accept the opinions of the military leaders in the front.

After being urged and reprimanded by Bo Gu and Xiang Ying in turn, Zhou Enlai had no choice but to order the Red Army to divide into two groups: the Red 1st and 5th Army remained in place and renamed the Central Army. There is no place to use it; the Eastern Army is formed with the Red 3rd Army as the backbone, and it goes out of Fujian in the east. It is planned to go north to Jiangle and Shaowu through Qingliu and Guihua areas, enter the northeast of Jiangxi, and then join the headquarters of the Front Army. After the arrangement was completed, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China on June 23: "I absolutely obey your orders and implement them immediately. I request that during the transfer of troops, I will return to Rui and his party to present disagreements face-to-face or open a military committee or a Central Bureau in Bosheng County. Yes. Because there are many problems that cannot be covered in the telegram, and many criticisms are not what we want.” At the same time, he pointed out that the terrain of Qingliu, Jiangle, and Shaowu City is easy to defend and difficult to attack, and the enemy’s 19th Army moved to Fujian. The ability is strong, so the Eastern Army should not spend too much time on the siege.

On the one hand, the red army dispersed the main force, and it hit Chiang Kai-shek's arms. As early as June 8, he held a military conference on "communist suppression" in the five provinces of Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan, and Hubei in Nanchang camp. The operational policy of "complete blockade" is the so-called strategy of "strategic offensive, tactical defensive" and "step by step, advance step by step, bunker roads, continuous, economic blockade, watertight" strategy and the strategy of "three points military, seven points political", That is, the Baojia system and the security force system continued to be implemented.

On July 8, Chiang Kai-shek set up an officer training regiment in Lushan, with Chen Cheng serving as the deputy head of the regiment and calling for officers from the Chiang family to receive training in turn.The training group was entirely aimed at anti-communism, and the central idea of ​​the education was "to fight against the outside world, we must first secure the inside." "The most important key to everything at present is to suppress the bandits." The troops recuperated around the Central Soviet Area, supplemented supplies, built blockade blockades, and prepared to launch a new "encirclement and suppression".After this period of successive increases, Chiang Kai-shek has assembled more than 500,000 troops around the Central Soviet Area.

After Peng Dehuai led the Eastern Army to fight in Fujian, he successively captured Guihua, Qingliu, Quanshang, Liancheng, Baisha and other places. On August 12, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De sent a telegram to the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, proposing that the purpose of the Eastern Army's entry into the second phase was to seek to continue to eliminate one or two divisions of the Fujian enemy, and to destroy the eastern flank of Jiangxi in mobile warfare so as to disperse the enemy's forces. Gather a powerful superior force and appear between Shaowu, Guangze, and Zixi, looking for the enemy's 5th and 6th divisions to attack them suddenly.In order to force the Jiangxi enemy to move and re-concentrate, it will create favorable conditions for the Central Route Army to move north.

Bogu, Xiang Ying, etc. did not accept this opinion, and ordered the next day: The Eastern Army will use the naturalization and Xiamao areas to capture Yangkou, Xiayang and other places with the main force at the end of August, and eliminate Yangkou, Shunchang, and Jiangle. The enemy in the area; the Central Army composed of the Red 1st Army and others is responsible for clamping down on the Jiang army in the front, destroying the blockade blockade line of the Jiang army in the north, and attacking the blockhouse building troops; the Red 5th Army formed the Fudong detachment. When the Red Army was deploying according to the instructions of Bogu and Xiang Ying, the 4th and 21st Divisions of the Jiang Army stationed in Xinjiang went south and invaded the Central Soviet Area.However, Shunchang and Jiangle City were fortified, and the Eastern Army could not conquer them for a while.

On September 3, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De called the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China, reporting that the Eastern Army had ended the battle, "assembled near Yancheng, and prepared to return to the division", and made arrangements to delay Jiang's army going south. On the 7th, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission replied, insisting that the Eastern Army destroy the backbone corps of Jiang's 19th Route Army and return to the north after completing the second phase of combat tasks. On September 12, the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China sent an instruction telegram from the Comintern, proposing to extend the combat time of the Eastern Army in Fujian and create a vast guerrilla area in Chong'an, Pucheng, and Songxi on the Fujian-Zhejiang border.Zhou Enlai replied by telegram on the same day, pointing out that in this way, "the northward period will be delayed even more", "the 5th Army will transfer a division, and it is really unnecessary to only fight the generals, Shun, and Shao enemies at present."The next day, Zhou Enlai called Bogu and Xiang Ying again, emphasizing that the key to the first step in implementing the Comintern's instructions was "to end the war in the East victoriously and move north quickly."And put forward the route and combat plan of the Eastern Army's return to the division. On September 14, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission sent a telegram to Zhu De and Zhou Enlai: "Shunchang and Jiangle have not been captured, which will restrict our army from gathering superior forces in the direction of the decisive battle, and it will be difficult to ensure our rear communication lines. Before the decisive battle, open Shunchang or Jiangle." The Eastern Army was required to advance northward some time later than the 20th. The siege of Jiangle and Shunchang was not as smooth as Bo Gu, Xiang Ying and others imagined.The battle went on for a month, but it still failed to "open Shunchang or Jiangle" as desired, and the enemy's situation on the northern front became increasingly tense. On September 24, Zhou Enlai called Xiang Ying and transferred it to the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China, proposing that "the battle in the east must be ended quickly, otherwise the good opportunity to cut off the Jiangxi enemy will be lost, and we will sit back and watch them preemptively concentrate on Fuhe."The next day, Zai telegram proposed that the Eastern Army must gather its forces to the maximum and use maximum maneuverability to achieve victory in the Eastern Battle. go north. On the 27th, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission ordered the main force of the Red Army to end the Eastern Front, concentrate in the Taining area, join the Fuxi Red Army, and fight Jiang's army at Fuhe with all its strength.Two days before this, Jiang Jun took advantage of the fact that the Red Army on the one hand was fighting separately and could not go north in time, and attacked Lichuan, an important town in the northern Soviet area with four divisions, which cut off the connection between the Central Soviet Area and the Northeast Jiangxi Soviet Area. The fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war fell into an unfavorable combat situation from the very beginning. After Zhou Enlai learned that the Jiang army had seized Lichuan, he called Xiang Ying continuously on September 28 and transferred it to the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, the Red Army must deal with the current battle with great mobility.It would be disadvantageous to meet Jiang's army head-on or storm Lichuan.He suggested that "the Eastern Army and the Central Army join forces" and concentrate superior forces to defeat the enemy.However, the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China did not accept his opinion. At this time, Li De, the military adviser of the Comintern to the CCP, arrived in the Central Soviet Area from Shanghai.This news brought a little relief to Zhou Enlai, who was caught in the distress of the dispute between the rear and the front.He said to Zhu De: "The advisers from the Communist International have come, and the situation should have changed!" Zhu De said: "At least there will be some changes! Otherwise, why do you need foreign consultants?" "The advisers sent by the Communist International are Germans, and the advisers Chiang Kai-shek invited are also Germans. There is such a coincidence in the world!" "Our enemy Chiang Kai-shek is the principal of the Whampoa Military Academy, and Zhou Enlai, Chiang Kai-shek's enemy, is also the director of the Political Department of the Whampoa Military Academy!" "So, our brothers turned against each other, and the Germans also turned against each other!" The two smiled.Zhou Enlai pondered for a moment, and then said with a heavy heart: "I hope that Li De will come, and the debate between our front and rear will be over."