Chapter 11 (3) The current enemy

On November 24, 1932, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang jointly issued "Emergency Instructions to Crush the Enemy's Four Encirclement and Suppression".This instruction pointed out that because the Red Army had been operating in the Northeast for a month, it occupied seven cities in a row, reddened Jianning, Taining, and Lichuan, expanded the Soviet territory by hundreds of miles, defeated Zhou Zhiqun, defeated the two southern enemies twice, and approached Hu Wan and Nancheng defeated the third and fourth divisions of the White Army.Jiang Jun will counterattack after receiving this threat.

In view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek had already set off for Jiangxi and adjusted his strategic deployment for encircling and suppressing the Red Front Army, the instruction required all units of the Red Front Army to gather their main forces and gradually shift their combat objectives to other areas after defeating the enemy's plan to attack Jinxi. Cooperate with the full-line attack of all combat units in the Soviet area, and wipe out the enemy's large-scale attacking backbone troops in appropriate areas, so as to defeat the enemy one by one and completely crush the enemy's fourth "encirclement and suppression".

According to Chiang Kai-shek's will, on December 30, He Yingqin, commander-in-chief of the "bandit suppression" in the Jiangxi, Guangdong and Fujian border regions of the Kuomintang, issued a plan for the fourth "encirclement and suppression" of the Central Soviet Area in Jiangxi.Jiang's army was divided into three groups: the left army Cai Tingkai commanded 6 divisions and 1 brigade in Fujian; the right army Yu Hanmou commanded 6 divisions and 1 brigade in Guangdong; the middle army Chen Cheng commanded 12 divisions.The Cai Department on the left and the rest on the right were all Cantonese troops, not directly related to Chiang Kai-shek. They were not active in the "encirclement and suppression" and almost did not take major military actions. The main force of the "encirclement and suppression campaign" was the Central Route Army led by Chen Cheng, with a strength of more than 160,000 troops, adopting the strategy of "separate advances and joint attacks" in an attempt to fight the Red Army in the Lichuan area.

The Red Front Army participated in the battle with the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Corps, the 11th, 12th, 21st, and 22nd Armies and two independent divisions, with more than 50,000 people.Due to the disparity in the strength of the two sides, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, who were in charge of the war, took the countermeasures to defeat the enemy: take advantage of the deployment of Jiang's army before it was completed, and preemptively strike. On December 31, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China, the Provisional Central Government and the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Shanghai. The enemy of Shidu, occupied Jinxi City, guerrilla Guixi, Dongxiang, Huwan, and Nancheng with effective troops, hoping to attract the enemies in the southwest of Jinxi, especially the 14th, 90th, and 11th divisions to fight against them to eliminate Fu The main force of the enemy in the river, destroying the enemy's large-scale arrangements.

As early as after the Ningdu meeting, Zhou Enlai decided to develop in the northeast direction where Jiang Jun's strength was relatively empty.He, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang led the Red Army to attack the northeast of Guangchang. Before the completion of the fourth "encirclement and suppression" deployment of the Jiang Army to the Central Soviet Area, he launched the Battle of Litai, quickly defeated the other side, and opened up the Red Army with Northeast Jiangxi. They occupied the three cities of Lichuan, Jianning, and Taining, and firstly transformed the area between Ninghua, Jianning, and Guangchang to solve the problem of supplying the Red Army.

He and Zhu De went to the front line to command operations in person, adopted the tactics of selecting the enemy's weaknesses, concentrating superior forces, and launching a fierce attack on the enemy's weak links, trying to open up the situation in Northeast Jiangxi at a relatively small cost, and mobilized Jiang's army in order to fight against the enemy during the movement. Look for fighters and wipe out Jiang's army as much as possible.According to their deployment, the 22nd Red Army attacked Taining with the right column, the 1st Red Army attacked Jianning with the central column, the 3rd Red Army attacked Lichuan with the left column, and the 5th Red Army was the reserve team.

On October 16, the Red Army began to march towards the Jianlitai area. From October 18 to 24, the five cities of Lichuan, Jianning, Taining, Shaowu, and Guangze on the border of Jiangxi and Fujian were defeated, and the masses were mobilized in newly opened areas to collect materials and strengthen preparations for war.After the Battle of Jianlitai, the connection between the Central Soviet Area and the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi Soviet Areas was opened, but this campaign failed to achieve the goal of mobilizing and annihilating Jiang's army in large numbers. In mid-November, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De were determined to launch the Jinxi and Zixi battles in order to continue to adjust the enemy and seek opportunities for combat.Under their command, the Red Army on the one hand launched an offensive to the north, captured the two counties of Zixi and Jinxi, opened up a large area of ​​​​the Soviet Area, and sent troops to Jinxi at Weishui Bridge, Huwan, Huangshidu Fengshanpu and other places. The Jiang army who attacked Xixi repelled.These few battles, on the one hand, expanded the Soviet area, and on the other hand, caused major damage to Jiang's army. However, due to the division of troops, the main force of Jiang's army could not be wiped out, and the expected goal was still not achieved.

In mid-December, the provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China called Zhou Enlai and proposed again that the Red Army should attack Nancheng. On the 16th, Zhou Enlai replied: "We are concentrating on mobilizing the enemy and seeking to solve it in mobile warfare. If we attack Nancheng directly, the enemy will gather heavy troops here. The terrain is more dangerous than Shaowu, and it is not good for us to attack." On the 20th, Zhou Enlai then called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China, the Provisional Central Government and the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: "Before the enemy's large-scale offensive is ready, the main thing is to blockade the central area and attack our front army. Now, when the enemy withdraws and sticks to the southwest, immediately Concentrate on Lichuan, and at the same time organize a special agent to take charge of fundraising and attacking the enemy's rear. After such training, we will dispatch to a decisive battle with the main forces of the Jiang faction, in order to destroy the center of their large-scale deployment."

In view of the imminent attack of Jiang's army, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De decided to take advantage of the opportunity of the enemy's solid defense of Nancheng and Nanfeng. The Red Army carried out pre-war reorganization, focusing on reducing the organization, reducing the level of command, enriching the company's combat soldiers, and conducting pre-war military training at the same time. On New Year's Day in 1933, the First Red Army held a Northward Swearing-in Meeting in Lichuan. The next day, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De led their troops northward and marched towards the Jinxi area. On January 4th, they commanded the Red 1st and 3rd Corps, the Red 22nd Army, and the 31st Division. With their absolute superiority, they suddenly surrounded a brigade of the Jiang Army stationed 20 kilometers south of Jinxi, and wiped out the enemy until the next day. And took advantage of the victory to occupy Jinxi County.

On the 6th, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China, the Provisional Central Government, and transferred it to the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: "Swift, agile, resolute, proactive and coordinated actions are the necessary conditions for the entire Red Army to win all four wars... Now our army has changed to a combat readiness posture and assembled In the areas of Jinxi, Zuofangying, Houche, and Huangshidu, we sent troops to approach Nancheng, Huwan, and Guixi guerrillas, and used the 31st Division to go out to Dongxiang to mobilize the enemy and seek a solution in mobile warfare. In the past few days, we have worked hard to prepare money and carry out redification."

In order to regain Jinxi, Jiang Jun commanded three divisions under the command of Wu Qiwei, starting from Huwan between Fuzhou and Jinxi, and attacking Huangshidu and Jinxi in two directions.When the warplane arrived unexpectedly, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De were determined to concentrate their superior forces to wipe out Wu Qiwei's troops. On the 8th, the main force of the Red Army encountered Wu Qiwei's troops at Fengshanpu. After a fierce battle, the Red Army defeated all the enemy troops advancing westward, followed and chased them along the east bank of the Fuhe River to Qianjinpo Airport on the opposite bank of Fuzhou City.A total of more than 4,000 enemies were captured in the two battles, and more than 4,000 guns were surrendered.The fourth campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was successful. After the first Red Army conquered Huangshidu and Huwan, and severely damaged Wu Qiwei's troops, Xiang Ying and other leaders of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area ignored the victory of the Red Army and insisted that the main force of the Red Army should capture Nancheng. On January 16, they called Zhou Enlai and Zhu De to put forward their opinions on future operational deployment: Under the current enemy deployment situation, all parties in the security rear we rely on feel the threat of the enemy, and they should quickly move the battlefield and mobilize the enemy to fight.It is proposed to "strike the enemies outside the southern city first". The next day, Zhou Enlai called Xiang Ying and Ren Bishi, claiming that the reason why the Red Army had assembled in Jinxi and Huwan for several days was to transport wounded soldiers and raise funds. ...It is good to move the area to fight, but it must be estimated that returning to Lichuan will become a wait, and attacking the enemy near Nancheng will have to fight against the water." Chiang Kai-shek's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Red Army initially placed the main battlefield in the Red Fourth Front Army in the Hubei, Henan, Anhui Soviet Areas, and the secondary battlefield in the Central Soviet Areas in Jiangxi and Fujian.Chiang Kai-shek personally went to Wuhan to command the "encirclement and suppression" of the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Soviet areas, and sent He Yingqin to Nanchang to command the campaign against the Central Red Army.Its strategic deployment is to take the offensive against the Fourth Red Army and the defensive against the Central Red Army. As early as June last year, Chiang Kai-shek organized a general headquarters in Wuhan, with Li Jishen as the deputy commander-in-chief, to attack Hubei, Henan and Anhui in three routes: Li Jishen, the commander of the right army, and Wang Jun, the deputy commander, under the jurisdiction of 7 divisions, 1 1 army and 1 independent brigade; Chiang Kai-shek, commander of the Central Route Army, and Liu Zhi, deputy commander, under the jurisdiction of 15 divisions, 3 cavalry brigades and 1 special service brigade; He Chengjun, commander of the Left Route Army, and Xu Yuanquan, deputy commander, Jurisdiction over 4 columns; another "bandit suppression" general headquarters in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, under the jurisdiction of 2 armies, 2 brigades and 1 detachment.At the same time, Chiang Kai-shek appointed He Yingqin as the "commander-in-chief of suppressing bandits in the Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian and Hunan border areas", and Chen Jitang as the deputy commander-in-chief, under the jurisdiction of Yu Hanmou, Chen Cheng, Li Yangjing, Cai Tingkai, Bai Chongxi, Zhu Shaoliang, Tan Daoyuan, Zhao Guantao, and Sun Lianzhong's 9th Route Army. The Red Fourth Front Army failed to smash Chiang Kai-shek's heavy "encirclement and suppression" in the Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Soviet areas, retreated to the east of Pinghan Road, and was forced to move westward.Later, under the pressure of Jiang Jun, they moved to the northern Sichuan and southern Shaanxi areas to establish a new Sichuan-Shanxi base. After Chiang Kai-shek relieved the threat of the Fourth Red Front Army to Wuhan, he mobilized troops from western Hunan, Hubei and Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and refocused the "encirclement and suppression" on the Central Soviet Area. At the end of that year, Chiang Kai-shek ordered to intensify the "encirclement and suppression" of the Hunan-Jiangxi, Hunan-Hubei and Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi Soviet areas on the two wings of the Central Soviet Area. He Yingqin was the commander-in-chief and He Guoguang was the chief of staff.The Central Route Army is dominated by Jiang's lineage troops. The 12th Division has about 160,000 people. The 18th Army Commander Chen Cheng is the commander in chief. The task is to seek a decisive battle with the main force of the Red Army.The Left Route Army consisted of 6 divisions and 1 brigade stationed in Fujian, under the command of Cai Tingkai, commander-in-chief of the 19th Route Army.The Right Route Army consisted of 6 divisions and 1 brigade of the Guangdong Army stationed in northern Guangdong and southern Jiangxi, with Yu Hanmou, commander of the 1st Army of the Guangdong Army, as the commander-in-chief. A total of 28 divisions, 4 brigades and 2 air brigades participated in the battle.According to the combat policy formulated by He Yingqin in Nanchang, it is to attack the Soviet area in three routes, concentrate the main force in the middle route, encircle the main force of the Red Army in the area near Lichuan, and annihilate it in one fell swoop. Accordingly, the left and right armies were respectively responsible for the "suppression office" in western Fujian and the border areas of Jiangxi and Guangdong, and the task of supporting the attack of the central army.With 4 divisions and 2 independent brigades, they served as defenses in Yongfeng, Le'an, Nanfeng, Nancheng, Fuzhou, Wan'an, Taihe and other places, preventing the Red Army from blocking and maintaining rear traffic.With the 22nd Division as the general reserve, 2 air teams support the ground forces in operations.In Fuzhou, Chen Cheng organized the 12 divisions of the Central Route Army into three columns for deployment: the first column consisted of three divisions, headed by Luo Zhuoying, concentrated in the southern area of ​​Yihuang, and attacked in the direction of Guangchang; the second column Composed of 4 divisions, with Wu Qiwei as the column leader, concentrated in the area south of Fuzhou, and cooperated with the 3rd column to attack Lichuan; the 3rd column was composed of 4 divisions, with Zhao Guantao as the column leader, concentrated in the Jinxi area , Cooperate with the second column to attack Lichuan frontally.Another division is used as a reserve team.All troops were ordered to assemble before January 6. However, the troops moved slowly and did not reach the assembly area according to the deadline stipulated in the order.Chiang Kai-shek was very annoyed by this. As early as the "September 18th Incident", the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang controlled by Chiang Kai-shek ignored the Japanese invaders and occupied the three eastern provinces and the people's demand for resistance to Japan in the "Telegram to Cantonese VIPs", and instead emphasized that "the red bandits who endanger the survival of the nation must fundamentally eradicate".Suppressing the Red Army in the Yangtze River Basin, especially the Central Soviet Area, was a decision he made after careful consideration.But the current situation is not worrying!Therefore, he had to make up his mind to go to Nanchang to direct the "encirclement and suppression" in person. After entering the Central Soviet Area to directly command the war for more than a year, Zhou Enlai had a deep understanding of the Red Army's combat capabilities and the enemy's situation.He believes that the main attack of the Red Army must be conditional and must conform to the actual combat capabilities of the Red Army, and must not carry out blind attacks that the Red Army's combat capabilities cannot match.In terms of combat direction, he advocated choosing the enemy's left wing to attack and destroying the enemy in the vast area between the east of Fuhe River and the south of Xinjiang River.If the enemy attacks the center of the Soviet area, the Red Army can attack its flanks; if the enemy seeks a decisive battle with the main force of the Red Army in the Jinxi, Zixi, and Guangze areas, the Red Army can rely on the central Soviet area in the south and rely on the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi Soviet areas in the north. The favorable terrain of the mountain, and the mass base that has been established, seek to annihilate the enemy in motion. On January 21, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De called the Provisional Central Committee and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area in response to the deployment of Jiang's "encirclement and suppression" and the Red Army's countermeasures. The telegram said, "The Guangdong and Guangxi Army is in southern Jiangxi. Western Fujian still adopts a gradual policy; the 19th Route Army is in Fujian, and the enemy's advance needs to be coordinated because the defense line is too wide; Troops will be deployed from eastern Hunan to prevent blockage; Wei Lihuang from Hubei, Henan and Anhui will still lead about eight divisions to "encircle and suppress" northeast Hubei, and Hubei, Henan and Anhui will not be able to draw out many troops; The heroic actions on the Sichuan-Shaanxi frontier have restrained five or six divisions of the Jiang army. Recently, one of the Second Army Corps seems to have reached Kaijiang and Daxian, where it can join the Fourth Front Army. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek decided to move the center of "suppressing red" to Jiangxi in October last year, and has been speeding up the deployment of a large-scale offensive for a long time. The Red Army's great victories in the past two or three months and the opening of northeastern Jiangxi have made the Jiangxi and Fu enemies completely passive. We have to wait for the increase of new troops and Chiang’s coming to Jiangxi, and the imperialists are stepping up to help and urge them.” In order to concentrate our forces to pre-empt strikes, quickly eliminate the main enemies in the Jiangxi and Fu River basins, and prepare for continuous battles to win the first victories in Fuzhou, Zhangshu, Ji'an, Nanchang and Jiangxi.They suggested to the Central Committee and the Central Bureau that effective cadres should be sent to the Soviet areas of Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, Dongjiang, Qiongya, and Guangxi to develop guerrilla warfare and expand the revolutionary base areas.It is proposed that "in order to strengthen the leadership of Hunan, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi and change their purely defensive line, it is proposed that one comrade from the Central Bureau after Wen Tianlai be selected to take charge of Hexi. In smashing the large-scale offensive, the role of the left wing of Hunan, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi It is very important. According to the current enemy situation, the Red Eighth Army and the Red Sixteenth Army urgently need to cooperate to open up the Yuanshui River Basin and develop in the direction of Zhangshu and Ji'an. For Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi, we are doing our best to help them form the Eleventh Army and make the Tenth Army , The Eleventh Army can develop towards Hexi and become a powerful right wing of the Central Army." Xiang Ying and other leaders of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area were afraid that the combat area would be far away from the base area, which would be disadvantageous to the Red Army.Under the repeated urging of Xiang Ying and others, the Red Army had no choice but to take the Red 10th Army from Northeast Jiangxi over the Xinjiang River and withdraw from the Huwan and Jinxi areas. On January 24, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area called Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang: "We absolutely want you to tell us immediately about future strategic issues, without delay, and we want you to stand on the same line to implement the above instructions ", "Concentrate all our main forces to occupy Nancheng and Nanfeng and consolidate and maintain them", "Specially emphatic instructions to occupy Nancheng and Nanfeng are an important part of the above new combat plan."It is required to "immediately inform us of you and the front and the decision clearly and directly", "and inform us of the results of the implementation". On January 26, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Recovery Zone and quickly transferred it to the Provisional Central Committee. He stated: "Under the current enemy situation, our army will go north to Jinxi this month, mobilize the enemy's main force for a decisive battle, and win a big victory. There is nothing wrong with coordinating crossing the river, and there is no Rightist concept of thinking that the enemy will retreat and not attack. Since March, we have always paid attention to this, and we have not been careless. We have always aimed at destroying the enemy's main force and breaking the siege of Fuhe River." The next day, he called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area again.The telegram said: "After the Battle of Jinxi, our army continued to take the posture of preparing for war, mobilizing the enemy and collecting materials, that is, the three armies marched to Guixi for the same purpose. The enemy was mobilized by us this time, and one side wanted to use the enemy of Xinjiang to attract our army. , the enemy from Fuzhou intercepted me in the north of Jinxi, and because the one side did not know our situation and was deeply afraid of the past, the enemy from Fuzhou advanced very slowly and leaned north. To this day, the Wu, Luo, and Zhou divisions are still there. Huwan, Liuligang, and Lixu lines. Our front army moved southward concentratedly, and reached the southeast of Jinxi in only one day, in order to attract the enemy in a preparedness posture. However, the enemy has detected today that our main force is not north of Jinxi, so they changed their plan , the Wu and Zhou divisions concentrated near Huwan, the Luo division retreated to Fuzhou, and the 23rd division still moved westward to Le'an, returning to its original offensive deployment." "Our army decided to take advantage of this two-day opportunity to mobilize combatants to transport all the seven or eight hundred sick and wounded in Jinxi South to the Lichuan area so that they can be transported later. When the enemy's 23rd Division moves west tomorrow (preferably Luo Shi also moved westward), our army then used the Eleventh Army to attack Huwan partly and the other part to attack Nancheng to confuse and contain the enemy. The Twelfth Army to contain the enemy of Shaowu, and the other to cross the river with all its strength and attack Nanfeng City directly. And prepare to destroy the enemy reinforcements west of Fuhe in order to break through the siege line of Fuhe." "Originally, according to the current enemy situation, that is, before the two strong "advancing and suppressing" armies of the enemy in the Fuhe River Basin are fully organized, our army can join the 11th Army on the east bank of the Fuhe River to obtain mobile warfare and destroy the enemy's main force. It is better for Feng to expose our army's intention to attack the enemy's reinforcements, and the area of ​​Fuhe River is not narrow, and the terrain is particularly good, especially for the collection of materials, but the rear connection is far from convenient for transportation, mainly because Nanfeng, Guangchang , Jianning, and Lichuan's redification work is poor. But our advantage is the enemy's disadvantage. The enemy tried to seek war on the east bank of the river with a strategy of absorbing us and intercepting us with one wing, but the three battles of Nanfeng, Nancheng, and Jinxi were all due to We concentrated our forces to quickly defeat or eliminate one of its wings and failed. Therefore, the enemy fought on the east bank of the Fuhe River, and did not dare to advance until the two powerful "advancing and suppressing" armies were fully organized. The last time Li Xizhao (Nancheng) After the victory, I waited in Lichuan in the posture of preparing for battle. After the victory in Jinxi this time, I waited in Jinxi. Because the enemy dared not venture into the defense of the city and could not continue to fight in mobile warfare, the area had to be transferred. Therefore, from the east of Nanfeng to the east of Nancheng As for the east of Huwan Bay, our army was extremely careful to understand the enemy's situation, mobilized the enemy with the strategy of delaying the advance, and won the victory in mobile warfare. We never ignored the concept of the enemy's attack and interception. The last time we went east to Shaowu to attract the enemy, because we Fearing that the enemy intercepted and returned to the division too early, causing the enemy's Wu and Zhou divisions to retreat halfway through saltpeter, this proves that all strategic decisions are related to the enemy's situation, terrain, and mission. If the enemy's two powerful Fuhe columns have been formed, Another example is that the Three Armies approaching Guixi is in an unfavorable position, so the strategy must be changed. Therefore, when the Tenth Army crossed the river, Zeng, Shao, Tang and others advocated that the Three Armies cross the river to attack Guixi, and we immediately opposed it." "Now that the enemy is carrying out its offensive deployment of organizing three 'advancing and suppressing' troops and the 'clearing and suppressing' army to defend the city defenses, we must seize the opportunity to immediately transfer the combat area and mobilize the enemy to disrupt its offensive deployment. Therefore, it must be explained that after the battles of Yihuang and Le'an, the enemy's city defenses have become more tenacious. Although some of them advocate abandoning the mechanical city defenses, it must be under the conditions of our attack and victory in mobilizing the enemy and destroying the enemy in the field. We are independent The division attacked Chongren twice because of our victory and attack on the east bank. Therefore, when we moved to the west of Fuhe River, we had to attack the city to mobilize the enemy immediately. Because Nanfeng, Nancheng, Yihuang, and Fuzhou are all on the west bank of the river, we can't do it like the east bank. We have been going deep into the vicinity of Fuzhou to threaten and mobilize the enemy. The siege and the elimination of reinforcements have the disadvantage of exposing the intention and being vulnerable to flanking attacks, so it is not as easy as on the east bank. Therefore, if mobile warfare cannot be obtained on the east bank at present, we should never take it lightly. Cross the river. Please pay attention to this." On the 30th, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and the Provisional Central Committee again. The telegram said: "On the 27th, it was confirmed that the three divisions of Luo, Zhou and Wu attempted to take advantage of our army to move southward, oppressing our army from a long distance, and decided to open the Jinxi, Zuofang, and Langju lines on the 28th. On the 29th, the lines of Powei, Huangshidu, and Langju were opened, and on the 30th, Luo Shi went back to the south city of Xizhao after the ceremony, and the Zhou and Wu divisions returned to Huwan. Therefore, our army is more concentrated, and we are going to go to other places. When the three divisions separated, Luo Division was eliminated first. But on the 28th, the enemy only reached the line of Xiaogongmiao, Hufang, and Langju. Reverse and retreat. Today the 11th Division has returned to Huwan and Hexi East Hall to stand by. The 14th and 90th Divisions are concentrated near Huwan. The Thirteenth Division came to Jiangxi in February and a half. Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Nanchang on the 29th, and his offensive arrangements should be more intensive and accelerated." "The enemy's reluctance to rush forward and divide troops before the deployment is completed is obvious. Zhou Zhirou's division is now trying to replenish, Wu Qiwei's division is in the process of finishing, and Wu himself has gone to see Jiang. Under the enemy's situation, the continuous brutal The battle is coming in no time. If I go to the west of Fuhe immediately, the only way to mobilize the enemy is to attack the city. In addition to the above mentioned in the previous telegram, the siege of the city will first expose the attempt, and second, be vulnerable to flanking attacks. Five time-consuming disadvantages. If you are disadvantaged before the war, and the fortified city cannot be attacked, and the three divisions of the reinforcement army advance in parallel and it is inconvenient to fight, it will not only not destroy the enemy's offensive deployment, but also facilitate the enemy's offensive. Therefore, in the Before the enemy's deployment is completed, if we can continuously obtain mobile warfare on the east bank of the Fu River to deal with the enemy, I do not advocate immediately crossing the river and attacking the city. 10,000), in order to benefit the funds for the war, and strengthen the Chihua Jinxi and Zixi of the 11th Army, so as to better contain the enemy's fifth and sixth divisions from being incorporated into the "advance and suppression" army. On the east bank of the river, we should immediately attack the Soviet area in depth, and our army should quickly move to the border of the Soviet area, with the Soviet area behind us for a decisive battle." "Comrades Zhu, Wang, and others agree with the above opinions. Only the central government urged us to break through the city defenses, which is actually different from our two strategies. But I finally realized that destroying the enemy, especially the main force, is a prerequisite for securing a strong city. The enemy If we are wiped out, even though the city is strong, there is no way to encircle me. I can go straight to the back of the fortified city, otherwise I will lose the main force, and the attack will hit the enemy's current requirements. Comrades from the Central Bureau agree with this opinion, and I hope to send a reply tomorrow. Since the timing cannot be delayed any longer, I shall be responsible for the decision, and at the same time, I still ask the central government to give me instructions in principle.” When Zhou Enlai was arguing endlessly with the leaders of the rear of the Soviet area on the combat policy, the Kuomintang's fourth "encirclement and suppression" storm came to the Central Soviet area. On January 29, Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Nanchang. In his speech on the same day, he declared that "suppressing bandits is the initial work of the revolution and the only basis for resisting insults" and that "to fight against the outside world, we must first settle down inside." On the 31st, Chiang Kai-shek presided over a military meeting to deploy an attack on the Central Soviet Area. On February 6, Chiang Kai-shek decided to act as the commander-in-chief of "bandit suppression" in Jiangxi Province and set up a camp in Nanchang.A battle of unprecedented scale is imminent. When the great war was imminent and imminent, the most troublesome thing for Zhou Enlai was not facing a powerful enemy that was several times his own in terms of equipment and strength, but the internal disagreement on the combat policy.At this time, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China could not gain a foothold in Shanghai and had moved to the Central Soviet Area. Bogu, the head of the Provisional Central Committee, held the party, government, and military power in the Central Soviet Area, and refused to accept the opinions of the front military leaders represented by Zhou Enlai. The rapid development of the situation has no longer allowed internal debates on the operational policy. On February 2, he called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area to report that after Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Nanchang, the Kuomintang would stick to the city defense and increase the deployment of troops.He pointed out that "it seems hopeless for our army to mobilize the enemy in Fuhe River, because if we don't go northward and attack the enemy's vital points, Jiang can focus on deployment and ignore it for the time being. If we go deep, Jiang can use a stronger guerrilla force to cut our way back. Forced me to return to the south. Therefore, it was decided to transfer the Red Army to the vicinity of Lichuan to wait." The next day, he, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang jointly called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area to state their opinions on the decision to re-demarcate the combat area, and proposed that "continuous and brutal battles will come soon, and the war and military deployment should be determined. Unified command, it is suggested that the Central Bureau often Give us instructions in principle and policy for the front, and the specific deployment should belong to the front." The Central Bureau of the Soviet Area immediately replied, ordering the Red Army to capture Nanfeng first, and take advantage of the victory to threaten Nancheng and Fuzhou, pointing out that "this new plan has been approved by all the Central Bureau, please discuss it immediately and telegraph the specific deployment for implementation." The Central Bureau of the Soviet Area did not give an inch in the operational policy of besieging Nanfeng, and its attitude was resolute and unquestionable.In this way, storming Nanfeng has become a rigid order that cannot be discussed but must be implemented. On February 7, Zhou Enlai had to call the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area to propose a military deployment to attack Nanfeng.The telegram said, "When the enemy's 8th Division had two regiments, one battalion was at Xinfeng Street and the other was at Litawei, I attacked Xinfeng with a force, and crossed the river from the lower reaches of Nanfeng with the main force to destroy the enemy of Xinfeng. Retreat to Nanfeng and go straight to Nanfeng City. There are only four regiments inside and outside the city, and there is a possibility of being attacked by us. In the case of a strong attack, we will also deploy a force on the east bank of Nanfeng." "The main force of the 11th Army is approaching Huwan, and one part is guerrilla to the opposite bank of Nancheng, threatening and containing the enemy. The working group is working hard to redify Jinxi and Zixi. The 21st Army is approaching Yongfeng. The 4th and 5th divisions are in Yi Move to the south of Huang and Le'an. If the assault fails and the enemies in the fortifications outside the city have been expelled, you can work in the tunnels while preparing to attack the reinforcements. We can only prepare to attack the reinforcements. If it doesn't work for me to contain the enemy's forces, the third and fourth divisions of the enemy's reinforcements will advance side by side from the road. If we attack, I will be flanked, and the side attack will make it easier for the enemies inside and outside the city to meet up. If this is the case, we must move the area and attack Yihuang , Le’an mobilizes the enemy, and solves them in mountainous mobile warfare. Because the mountainous area is easy to contain and destroy one part, but it is very difficult to contain them if they advance side by side by the road.” The telegram emphasized: "The above deployment is not rigid. If the enemy's terrain changes, it must be used flexibly. If the lower reaches of Nanfeng are inconvenient to ford because of the snow and water, and it is necessary to cross the river from the upper reaches of Nanfeng, then my intention will be exposed first. New Feng's two regiments cannot be cut off, and Nanfeng's city defense can be increased to six regiments, and the enemy can attack Nanfeng with 11 and 90 divisions first. Huang or Le'an to mobilize the enemy and seek to eliminate the enemy in mobile warfare." The telegram said: "This deployment is inconsistent with the original purpose of the Central Bureau's order. I think it is best to capture Nanfeng, but to capture Yihuang and Le'an and eliminate reinforcements in mobile warfare can still take advantage of the victory and directly threaten Fuzhou. It will be easier to operate. Do you agree? Or still insist that the only thing is to attack Nanfeng fiercely, even if the loss is heavy, even if the enemy's third and fourth divisions advance along the road, it is still necessary to fight with them? Please reply before 18 o'clock today. for action tomorrow." "Without attacking Nanfeng or Yihuang and Le'an, attacking Nancheng first is impossible given the current enemy situation and terrain. Please pay attention to the central government." At the same time, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang once again jointly called the Provisional Central Committee and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area. The telegram said: "The Central Committee and the Central Bureau instructed us to destroy the enemy's siege line and capture Fuzhou as the strategic center. It is completely correct. In the past few months, we have followed this purpose and strived to eliminate the enemy's main force, so that we can take advantage of the victory and go straight to the city. Deployment, especially many deployments related to tactical issues, requests the Central Committee, and the Central Bureau must give the frontline activities, room for decision-making and due authority. Otherwise, order us to attack a certain city instead of indicating the direction with instructions, then We are in a changing or unfavorable situation, which makes it very difficult for those responsible to deal with it. In terms of organization, especially in the military, we must absolutely obey the orders of the superiors, without the slightest delay, but in terms of responsibility and environment, we have to I would like to present my opinion to you. Regarding the deployment of operations, we will hold a meeting at the same place in the front, and I would rather pay attention to my instructions. If we discuss it by telegram, it will be a big mistake. Therefore, we earnestly ask you to solve this difficult problem, and please The Central Bureau sent Bang Xian. Wen Tian and his comrades came to the front to convey the spirit of the Central Committee’s instructions, and on the other hand, to understand the situation of the battle and the Red Army ahead. We also have many opinions to be expressed in person, because the telegram cannot explain them. I implore you to decide And call back." The Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and the Provisional Central Committee insisted on ignoring Zhou Enlai's opinions. On the evening of February 13, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and transferred to the Provisional Central Committee.The telegram said: "I continued to investigate the fortifications of Nanfeng Fortress yesterday. Only the fort outside the northwest gate took advantage of the night to approach and attack. After dusk, our army began to attack, fought fiercely with the enemy all night, and captured more than a dozen of the enemy's important fortresses. More than 20 forts are in the hands of the enemy, and they are extremely dangerous. There is an open space behind the fortress. The fortifications that have been captured are far from the edge of the city, and there are gun towers on the wall. The enemy's fortresses have more squads and rows. The most important thing is In one company, it took me a long time to attack the fort, and the dangerous ones had to besieged. As a result of the fierce battle all night, I captured less than one battalion, but lost more than 300. The three army regiments were the main attack, and the division commander Peng Ao and the two regiment commanders were all killed. Rain, great morale." "On the 10th, our 11th Army had pinned down one regiment of the enemy's 8th Division on Xinfeng Street. On the 11th, the 22nd Army extended out of Litawei to cut off its return route. Therefore, the enemy in Nanfeng was divided into five regiments. Today, Nanfeng's enemy regiment in Henan, because the Twelfth Army occupied the first fort in the east of the river at night, also withdrew into the city and broke the pontoon bridge, showing its determination to defend the city and wait for reinforcements. The deployment of hostile reinforcements was divided into three routes: two The division is from Nancheng, one division is from Yihuang, and two divisions are from Le'an. The enemy's 11th division has already moved to Yihuang." "According to this situation, we changed the attack on Nanfeng into a feint attack, and decided to eliminate the reinforcements first. The troops are currently gathering in the western area of ​​Nanfeng. After clarifying the enemy's marching route today and tomorrow, we should obtain it in the expected mobile battle." Destroy the enemy's wings and destroy them one by one." That night, according to Zhou Enlai and Zhu De's orders, the Red Army on the one hand left a small number of troops for feint missions, and the main force withdrew from Nanfeng and secretly moved to the area west of Nanfeng and Litawei. On February 15, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area. The telegram said: "It is indeed reported that when our army was in Lichuan, the enemy made a large-scale deployment. Chen Cheng led the Central Route Army and divided it into three columns: Luo Zhuoying, the first column, consisted of the 11th, 52nd, and 59th divisions. Yihuang, Tangyin; Wu Qiwei, the 10th, 14th, and 93rd divisions of the second column, concentrated in Fuzhou and Longgudu; Zhao Guantao, the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 70th divisions of the third column The ninety-four divisions will be concentrated in Huwan and Jinxi, and one part will be contributed to Zixi. The forty-three divisions will be concentrated in Yihuang and Le'anjian as the reserve team. The concentration must be completed 20 days before. The fourth and eighty-third divisions For the General Reserve". "Since our army besieged Nanfeng in a hurry, the enemy concentrated in advance. The 11th Division marched to Yihuang and Tangyin on the 14th, and the 52nd and 59th Divisions opened Le'an. Xinfeng City intercepted our army, and now they are all advancing towards Le'an. The second column is advancing towards Nanfeng. On the 14th, the 90th Division arrived at the East Pavilion. There is also news of the 14th Division starting, but the 10th Division has not yet moved. The third column is concentrated The time and place have not changed. The 43rd Division opened to Yihuang, and arrived at Gongpi on the 14th. Yihuang had its own regiment. The 27th Division has already concentrated in Yongfeng and Xingan." "We are now changing the storm to a feint attack and monitoring the enemy in Nanfeng, and we are going to destroy their reinforcements. The enemy may change the attack route. The enemy's army storms the fortified city, thinking that it can damage and fatigue our troops, and attract us to the fortified city. In order to facilitate the interception and continuous fighting of its reinforcements, the "suppression" has been scheduled to start on the 18th. Now our army is gathering troops in Nanfeng City and the area west of Litawei, with our backs to the Soviet area, and is actively feigning to attack Nanfeng, causing The enemy still "advances and suppresses" according to the original route, so that I can first meet and destroy his right wing." In the telegram, he specifically mentioned: "The casualties of our army in the violent attack on Nanfeng exceeded 400." He emphasized that the number of casualties was to warn the leaders of the rear of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area once again that Nanfeng's fortifications were dangerous, and a storm would inevitably cause heavy losses.At the same time, he emphasized his proposition for the current strategy and tactics. In the face of a strong enemy and a fortified city, he can only adapt to the situation and change the strong attack on Nanfeng into a feint attack in order to seize the opportunity in mobile warfare. One wing of the enemy, and then wipe out each one.