Chapter 9 (1) Telegram quarrel

After the Battle of Shuikou, what will the Red Army do next?According to the policy of winning the first victory in one province and several provinces formulated by the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Central Bureau of the Communist Party of China required the Red Front Army to fight the Jiang Army in a decisive battle, quickly seize all the central cities in the Ganjiang River Basin, and achieve the first victory in Jiangxi. The troops pretended to attack Ganzhou and mobilized the enemy. After seeking the main force to take the opportunity to cross the upper reaches of the Ganjiang River, march northward along the west bank of the Ganjiang River, and fight a decisive battle with the 4 divisions of Chiang Kai-shek's direct line Chen Cheng.Zhou Enlai, who went to the front to supervise the battle with the opinions of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, after repeated studies and discussions with Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang and others, believed that the plan of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area was difficult to realize.

As early as July 25, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang jointly sent a call to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area about the situation that Jiang Jun had assembled 40 regiments to prevent the Red Army from crossing the Ganjiang River westward: "We think twice and think that the enemy forces in the upper reaches of Ganzhou Close contact, crossing the river to attack the Jiangxi enemy at any point, there is a danger of being cut off by the enemy, such as attacking Xincheng and Nankang, will cause the Ning and Jiangxi enemies to separate into a joint attack, or confront each other across the river, creating even more unfavorable conditions." "Therefore, it is decided to Go to the lower reaches of the Ganjiang River and take Wan'an first, so as to cross the river, eliminate the main force of the four divisions including Chen and Luo, and take Ji'an and other cities." At the same time, it is believed that if Jiang Junting can be led to the Hedong area, it will be more conducive to the Red Army's operations.

On the 29th, Zhou Enlai wrote another letter to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China, emphasizing that: "It is impossible to cross the river in the upper reaches of Ganzhou. If we prepare to fight the enemy before crossing the river, the enemy may rely on the river to defend and delay our army's actions... You say that the decisive battle in Hedong may be very small, but it is not always true, as long as you move quickly, you will be able to defeat the enemy one by one." In order to plan the next move of the Red Army, under the chairmanship of Zhou Enlai, the headquarters of the Red Army and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area of ​​the Communist Party of China held military meetings in Zhuba, Xingguo in early August to re-discuss the direction of action.At this time, after Jiang Jun discovered the Red Army's northward movement, he transferred the 14th and 52nd Divisions supporting the Cantonese Army back to Ji'an and Taihe, and moved closer to the 11th and 90th Divisions, gathering the main force in the Hexi area to prevent the Red Army from crossing west and advancing northward. .If the Red Army attacked Wan'an and crossed Hebei, Jiang's army could rely on the Ganjiang River to block the attack.Even if the Red Army crosses the Gan River, in the current situation where the enemies in Guangdong, Jiangxi and Hunan are close and surrounded, the enemy can attack immediately before the Red Army can gather and organize its troops, putting the Red Army at a disadvantage.

After analyzing the above-mentioned enemy situation, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang believed that the Jiang army in eastern Jiangxi was relatively small, and the three divisions were distributed in Nanfeng, Nancheng, Le'an and Yihuang areas. The Red Army could concentrate its efforts to eliminate Le'an, Yihuang, and Yongfeng. Then seek to annihilate the enemy who came to aid from the west of the Ganjiang River and Nanfeng Nancheng, and then mobilize the enemy forces in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi and northeastern Jiangxi, creating favorable conditions for crossing the lower reaches of the Ganjiang River to seize Ji'an; , then capture Fuzhou.The meeting decided that in order to adapt to the new combat missions, the Red Front Army was reorganized.

On August 8, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order for the Red Front Army to launch the Le'an and Yihuang campaigns, requiring the Red Front Army to concentrate their efforts and, through resolute, rapid, and secret actions, first eliminate the Le'an and Yihuang fronts. The 27th Division, and the camera to destroy the enemy's reinforcements.According to the order of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the Red Army on the one hand pretended to move westward, but the main force hurried northward in concealment.After a week of continuous marching, when the Red Army arrived at the front line of Dongshao and Dongshao, which was stalemate with Jiang Jun on August 15, Jiang Jun didn't notice it at all.At this time, the 27th Division of Jiang Jun Sun Lianzhong's Department was stationed in Le'an and Yihuang. The division commander Gao Shuxun led 6 regiments of the whole division at the door of the Soviet area; Le'an City had 2 regiments of the 27th Division and 87th Brigade stationed. On the 16th, Lin Biao commanded the Red 1st Army to attack Le'an.On the one hand, the Red Army organized powerful firepower to cover the city, and on the other hand, it took a ladder to storm the city.Although the troops suffered heavy casualties, the city gate was quickly breached, and more than 3,000 people in the city, from brigade commanders and regimental commanders to cooks and grooms, all became prisoners of the Red Army.

On the 18th, the 1st Red Army cooperated with the 3rd Red Army to besiege Yihuang. Except for the 10th Division of the Red Army to clean up the battlefield in Le'an, the rest of the 1st Army quickly rushed to the northwest area of ​​Yihuang. At dawn on the 20th, the Red 3rd Army took the lead in attacking the city.But after a day of hard work, they still failed to break through the city, so they changed the daytime siege to the night siege.That night, the 3rd Army of the 1st Red Army entered the city from the northwest gate, and the 3rd Red Army also entered the southwest gate and southeast gate one after another.Except for the division commander who escaped with a few entourages, all the 27th divisions were wiped out.Jiang Jun Mao Bingwen, who was stationed in Nanfeng, saw the situation and felt that he was in danger, so he hurriedly approached the direction of Nancheng.The 12th Red Army took the opportunity to occupy Nanfeng on the 23rd.

The Red Army on the one hand conquered three cities in a row in one week, wiped out most of the 27th Division of the Jiang Army, captured more than 5,000 people, and seized a large number of weapons, ammunition and other materials including mountain artillery, mortars, and machine guns. supplies.Nanchang and Fuzhou were affected by the earthquake. After the battles of Le'an and Yihuang, the Red Army prepared to take advantage of the victory to capture Nancheng. On August 24, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De and others led their troops to the outskirts of Nancheng, and found that the Jiang army in Nancheng had assembled 17 regiments of troops, and the city defenses were strong. A strong attack would inevitably lead to a stalemate.However, Jiang's army was greatly shaken after the Battle of Le and Yi. He was worried that the Red Army would take advantage of the victory and take Fuzhou from the north, threatening Nanchang.He Yingqin, Commander-in-Chief of the "Bandit Suppression" in the Jiangxi-Guangdong-Fujian border area, ordered the 8th and 24th Divisions to withdraw from Nanfeng to the north and gather with the 23rd Division in Nancheng in order to prevent the Red Army from going deep into the north; Chen Cheng, the commander of the Second Route Army, led the 11th and 14th Divisions The 90th Division concentrated in Zhangshu, and Xingan Yirong's troops assembled in Linchuan to lure the Red Army into the annihilation; the 5th Division advanced to the vicinity of Zhaogongdu in the northeast of Linchuan; ; The 43rd Division quickly assembled in Ji'an after handing over the defense; the 1st Division and Tang Yunshan Brigade rushed to Nanchang to consolidate the provincial defense.

In response to Jiang's new deployment, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and others decided to change the original plan of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area again, and sent troops eastward to attack Nancheng in order to open up the situation in eastern Jiangxi.For this reason, Zhou Enlai called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area on August 22: "We judged that Leyi had captured, approached Fuzhou and Zhangshu, threatened Nanchang, and the enemy was shaken. Zhou Hunyuan and Li Baobing's two divisions in the northeast of Jiangxi quickly moved to Fuzhou and Chongren. , Shi Lin, Yue Sen, Zhu Yaohua and other divisions in northwest Jiangxi will move to the banks of the Feng River, and the enemy's main force, Wu, Luo, and Zhu's three divisions, and Li Ming and Liu Shaoxian's two divisions will go east to find our main force to fight." "Our army will immediately go eastward to wipe out the three divisions of Mao [Bingwen], Li [Yunjie], and Xu [Kexiang], occupy Nanfeng, and even Nancheng and Lichuan, and then meet the enemy from the west."

On August 24, when the main force of the Red Army arrived in the suburbs of Nancheng, it was discovered that 17 regiments of 3 divisions of Jiang Jun had been deployed in Nancheng.The situation changed suddenly, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and others immediately changed the planned plan, and took the initiative to retreat to Dongshao and Luokou to rest and recuperate, looking for fighter opportunities.Zhou Enlai immediately called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and transferred it to the Temporary Central Committee, explaining the reason for changing the plan: "The interior and exterior of the southern city are dangerous, and the fortifications are strong, so it is not easy to succeed. The next action plan is to reinforce the Wu (Qiwei) and Chen (Cheng) ministries in the west. When you get to a certain place, give a head-on blow to wipe out the main force of the enemy."

However, the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area repeatedly urged the Red Army to continue to attack northward and threaten Nanchang. They believed that this would relieve the pressure on the Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi Soviet areas and provide direct support to these Soviet areas. In mid-June, Chiang Kai-shek, who once resigned from the field and made a comeback, had already signed the Songhu Armistice Agreement with the Japanese invading army at this time, concentrating the troops that should have been used to resist the Japanese aggression to attack the Red Army.This was Chiang Kai-shek's fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Soviet area and the Red Army. A total of about 500,000 troops were mobilized. In the second half of the year, he temporarily took a defensive position against the Central Soviet Area in Jiangxi, and used the main force to "encircle and suppress" the two Soviet areas of Hubei, Henan, Anhui and Hunan.

Therefore, at this time, the Provisional Central Committee and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area accused the Red Army of "not staying in Nanfeng, Nancheng, and Yihuang for a long time.He also pointed out that although the front army marched north this time, although it indicated its rapid and secret progress, it was a shortcoming that it did not quickly seek to fight Chen Cheng and Wu Qiwei west of Yihuang.This caused the enemy to advance more actively towards the center of the Soviet area, causing it to be destroyed by the enemy, and this had a very bad influence on the masses. As a result, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang, etc. in the front were on the one side, and the Provisional Central Committee in Shanghai and the rear members of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area in Ruijin were on the other side. Serious differences occurred in combat policies and formed a confrontational situation. After much deliberation, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang jointly sent a telegram to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and transferred it to the Provisional Central Committee on September 23. The telegram further stated their opinions on the Red Army's marching policy: "At present, it is best for the Red Army to attack the enemy immediately, expand northern Fujian, develop the situation, boost morale, and provide direct assistance to Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and western Hunan and Hubei. However, the attack must be sure to win and destroy part of the enemy, so that all Defeating the enemy is the correct strategy; otherwise, rushing for success will lead to more serious mistakes." "Because the enemy is firmly holding on to the strongholds in the cities of the White Area, there are still vast areas around the first-tier cities of Jishui, Yongfeng, Le'an, Yihuang, Nancheng, Nanfeng, and Lichuan that have not been reddened, and the difficult conditions caused by our past strategic mistakes. The siege reinforcements must always take into account the enemy's divisional advances so that they can attack together, and the Red Army's sickness leaves too many troops to replenish, and it is not easy to attack and eliminate the enemy's three stronger divisions in the white areas. "Therefore, we believe that the current conditions are not conducive to immediate combat. We should seize Nanfeng and redify both sides of the Nanfeng River, especially the Le'an area in Nanfeng, so as to promote changes in the enemy's situation and prepare to attack and eliminate the current main enemy in mobile warfare. This is the current policy of action. To be specific, place a large force in the west of Nanfeng to the vicinity of Le'an, and place a small force in the southeast of Nanfeng to expand the Soviet area. After the first phase of work, use a small force Frequent guerrilla attacks to Nanfeng, causing the enemy to reinforce Nanfeng and preparing to attack the reinforcements, and taking advantage of the situation with Fujian and the Soviet area. Although this arrangement is not an immediate attack on the enemy, it is still an active offensive strategy, because this area The redification and approach of these cities will definitely change the enemy's situation and give the Red Army favorable conditions for the masses to destroy the enemy and capture the central cities. "In this operation, it is necessary to estimate that the enemy's situation will change. When it is beneficial to us, it is natural to concentrate our forces on a mobile basis." "We decided to go out in the next day. If the Central Bureau has any new opinions, please send a telegram as soon as possible." The next day, Zhou Enlai wrote to the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area from Ningdu again, emphasizing: "The action plan has been telegraphed. According to our opinion, this is the best way under the current situation. Of course, the enemy's situation is not constant. If the enemy's situation changes, we will still continue." We should quickly grasp the enemy's weakness, and break down one side so that we can defeat each other." The letter pointed out that there were unresolved problems in the front combat command, and proposed that the current combat command method should be changed. "The front organization is not centralized Individual responsibility system, everyone's ability has strengths and weaknesses", and "Military operations must be decisive, and there must be no doubts. Everyone is worried that things will not be done well. Even if there are mistakes, they must be criticized when they are checked. Otherwise, if something happens, you can interfere, and if something happens, you can’t rest assured, even if you are right, you will make a mistake.” He also suggested in the letter that the members of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area go to the front to hold a plenary meeting of the Central Bureau to resolve the differences between the leaders in the rear and the leaders in the front. At the same time, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang called the central sub-bureaus of western Hunan, Hubei and Hubei, Henan and Anhui respectively: concentrate their forces to flexibly select the enemy's weaknesses, strike and eliminate one side, and defeat the enemy one by one.Scattered and persistent hard attack is the best chance for the enemy to defeat us individually and attack together. After receiving a telegram from Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang on the 23rd and a letter from Zhou Enlai on the 24th, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area replied on the 25th: "In the current active and arduous operations of the Red Army in the Soviet Areas across the country, we do not agree with you to disperse your troops. Chihua Nanfeng and Le'an approached several cities to exchange the enemy's situation and obtain favorable conditions to eliminate the enemy, and explained this as the specific arrangement and spirit of the active offensive strategy, which will actually delay the combat time for more than one month. Will The active and arduous actions of the Sixteenth and Eighth Armies in Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Hunan and Hubei, and the more direct Hexi 16th and Eighth Armies did not coordinate with each other. What's more, they gave the enemy time not to deploy. Scattering also risked being attacked by the enemy. Unfavorable, it can turn into a serious mistake." Faced with severe accusations from the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area, Zhou Enlai immediately chaired the highest front-line military meeting for discussion.At the meeting, he, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang agreed that the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area accused the military leaders in the front of not being able to actively support the fourth anti-"encirclement and suppression" struggle in Western Hunan, Hubei, Hubei, Henan, Anhui, Hunan, and Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi Soviet areas. , and at the same time mistakenly gave the enemy time to prepare for the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Soviet Area, which is unacceptable. They then called the Central Bureau again, arguing: "If we can win the war immediately, it will indeed be a direct aid to Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and western Hunan and Hubei, and we will start to develop northward. We have considered this over and over again. But in Given the current situation of the enemy and the current strength of the front army, it is uncertain to attack the city and reinforce the troops. If you are eager to fight and act recklessly, the result will be time-consuming and futile, and the force will be wasted. "To open up the current difficult situation, we must especially realize that the enemy is planning a larger-scale attack on the central area. The cruel war is coming soon. We must not lose the opportunity to redify the northern area, approach Yi, Le, and Nanfeng, and change the enemy's situation. Strive for conditions that are conducive to a decisive battle to destroy the enemy. Based on this arrangement, we also advocate that in the first phase, we should redify the areas in the west, Yi, Le, and south of Nanfeng, and make preparations for war, and attack east and west at any time. Le and Feng's assault troops. Only in this way can we successfully cooperate with the national Red Army's offensive, which is naturally an active offensive." Then, the day after the highest military meeting on the front line, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area again, emphasizing: "Le'an's enemy Wu Qiwei's division is not comparable to Gao Shuxun's brigade. The previous attack on Le'an took two days. Attack Le'an for three days, reinforcements are bound to come from the west, and internal and external flanking attacks will become more disadvantageous... Therefore, attacking Le'an is not sure, and with the greatest force, even if Wu Qiwei's division can be wiped out, with the current strength of the Red Army, it will not be able to fight a strong reinforcement team. Please pay special attention to the Central Committee. After the plenary meeting of the Central Bureau, comrades Xiang and Deng returned, it is still appropriate to go to the front, because there are many problems that must be discussed and resolved as mentioned in the previous telegram." The original plan of the Supreme Military Council on the front line was to "arrange the battlefield in the middle of Yi and Le, and win over the masses to mobilize the enemy." The contradictions between the front military leaders and the rear leaders of the Provisional Central Committee and the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area further intensified.In order to resolve these contradictions, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and others repeatedly requested to convene a plenary meeting of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area to discuss the differences in internal combat policies. On September 26, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area called Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang, adhering to the opinion of "attacking Yongfeng westward". The danger of each breaking.And on the grounds that "Xiang Ying and Deng Fa have gone to western Fujian to attend the meeting, and you must also march with the army", he said that it is impossible to hold a meeting of the Central Bureau. At the same time, Zhu De and Mao Zedong issued an order for the Red Front Army to work northward for a period of time.Order the troops to do preparatory work to win over the masses for a period of time, develop the Soviet area, and strengthen their own training in the Yihuang, Le'an, and Nanfeng areas. Conditions for decisive battle and destruction of the enemy.The leaders of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area were very annoyed by this. On the 29th, they called Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Wang Jiaxiang, and criticized them in very strong terms: "We think this is completely out of principle and a very dangerous arrangement. The Central Bureau decided to temporarily Stop the action and hold a plenary meeting of the Central Bureau immediately ahead." He emphasized that "a merciless blow" should be given to all decentralized views that depart from the principle of completing the current task. Zhou Enlai read the telegrams of Ren Bishi and Xiang Ying several times in a row, frowned tightly, and muttered to himself: "...completely deviated from principles...an extremely dangerous arrangement...a merciless blow... ...Could it be that there is still an intra-party struggle at this time? Just because of differences in strategy and tactics! Could it be..." Mao Zedong on the side was smoking a cigarette, looking at Zhou Enlai: "Enlai, you guessed it right. They are full of anger now, and they are going to vent to us." Zhou Enlai smiled coldly and said, "We are the ones who are angry, not them. We suggested a meeting a long time ago, but they just didn't hold it. If the meeting had been held earlier, why would the problem have dragged on until today?" Mao Zedong said: "They didn't expect that we would be so 'stubborn' and dare to fight them to the end." Zhou Enlai: "They finally agreed to hold a meeting, which is a good thing. Any differences of opinion can be brought out at the meeting, and the obvious things can't be separated into black and white?" Mao Zedong let out a long breath and said, "Enlai, I dare not be optimistic about this meeting!" Zhou Enlai: "Unless our strategy and tactics are wrong, otherwise, we have no reason to be pessimistic." Mao Zedong shook his head and said, "I always feel that the rain is about to come." Zhou Enlai smiled and said, "Comrade Chairman Mao, you are worrying too much. It's just that the people in front of us had a rough fight with the people behind them, and it's just to see who can convince the other!"