Chapter 15 Great feat, glorious journey

I am an ordinary soldier who participated in the Long March of the Central Red Army.The Long March is a grand epic. I have only written a few main issues in this article for reference by comrades. Please correct me. This question is a long story, but in a nutshell: At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in January 1931, the Party Central Committee headed by Wang Ming promoted "Left" adventurism, making the Fifth Party from 1933 to 1934 The first counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" failed. Originally, the situation in the Central Soviet Area was very good.

From the end of 1930 to September 1931, with the support of imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek carried out three "encirclement and suppression" campaigns against the Central Soviet Area centered on Jiangxi.Under the correct leadership of Mao Zedong and Zhu De, according to the actual situation that the enemy is strong and we are weak, the strategic policy of active defense was implemented, the enemy was lured deep, concentrated superior forces, defeated and eliminated the enemy one by one, achieved great victories, consolidated and developed the revolutionary base. In November 1931, the first National Congress of Soviets was held in Ruijin, and the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet was established, with Mao Zedong elected as its chairman.

After Xiang Zhongfa, the general secretary of the Party Central Committee, was arrested and rebelled in June 1931, the Comintern appointed Wang Ming as acting general secretary.Wang Ming implemented his so-called "Left" adventurist program of "struggling for the CCP to become more Bolshevik" throughout the party.They are "Left" leaning dogmatism and closed-doorism in politics. On September 18, 1931, after the Japanese imperialists launched an incident to occupy the three eastern provinces, although the Party Central Committee issued a declaration on September 20, opposing the Japanese imperialist invasion of China, it also said that Japan "at the same time more actively and directly attacked the Soviet Union." He called on "the toiling masses of Chinese workers and peasants to act in unison under the fundamental task of supporting the Soviet Union", and said that "all factions of the Kuomintang and warlords in China are fundamentally lackeys of imperialism", and proposed "overthrowing all imperialism" slogan. On January 9, 1932, the Party Central Committee made the "Resolution on the First Victory of the Revolution in One or Several Provinces".They denied that there were divisions within the Kuomintang on the issue of resistance to Japan, and they also denied the anti-Japanese demands of the national bourgeoisie and other intermediate forces. Ruled an area with a population of tens of millions, the development of the Red Army has created a situation of encircling important and minor cities such as Nanchang, Ji'an, and Wuhan"; the Red Army is required to "occupy one or two important central cities to start the revolution in one The first victory in several provinces".The Central Red Army was ordered to attack Ganzhou, which was firmly defended by the enemy. After fighting for more than 40 days, the Red Army suffered great losses.In terms of organization, Wang Ming and others implemented a sectarian policy, sending representatives to various Soviet areas to "anti-rightist" and "reform" the party's leading organs; struggle and strike relentlessly".

In October 1931, Wang Ming went to Moscow to serve as the head of the CCP delegation to the Comintern. Shanghai established a provisional Central Political Bureau, with Bogu, Zhang Wentian, and Lu Futan (later arrested and rebellious) as the Central Party Committee and Bogu in charge.Bogu was a member of the so-called "Bolshevik" dogmatist clique organized by Wang Ming in Moscow, and he completely carried out Wang Ming's erroneous line. In November, the delegation sent by the Provisional Central Committee to the Central Soviet Area held the first Soviet Party Congress in Ruijin, slandering Mao Zedong's correct views as "narrow empiricism", "rich peasant line" and "extremely serious consistent Right opportunism". ", crowding out Mao Zedong's correct leadership of the party and the Red Army.

In September 1932, the Provisional Central Committee instructed the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area to hold a meeting in Ningdu, Jiangxi Province, to implement the policy of seizing the central city.At the meeting, the "Left" adventurists accused Mao Zedong's disapproval of the invasion of Ganzhou and the correct opinion of advocating the development of the Red Army in northeastern Jiangxi where conditions are favorable, as "passive slowdown in the seizure of central cities", and all previous counter-campaigns against "encirclement and suppression" The effective strategic policy of "luting the enemy into the deep" is accused of "waiting for the enemy to attack the danger of rightism".The meeting ignored the different opinions of Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhu De, and pushed Mao Zedong out of the leadership of the Red Army. He was dismissed from the post of General Political Commissar of the Front Army, and asked him to go to Ruijin to work exclusively for the Soviet government.

In January 1933, due to the implementation of "Left" adventurism in the White Areas, the Shanghai Provisional Central Committee suffered great damage to the party organizations in the White Areas.Bogu came to Ruijin on January 19, and immediately seized all the party, government, and military power in the Central Soviet Area in order to implement their "Left" policy.He was only 26 years old at the time. He neither knew the situation in China nor had he ever fought in a war. He could only recite the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism and the Communist International, but he had to command everything.

In February 1933, Chiang Kai-shek gathered 500,000 troops to carry out the fourth "encirclement and suppression" campaign against the Central Soviet Area.At this time, Mao Zedong had been removed from command of the Red Army, and Zhu De, chairman of the Military Commission, and Zhou Enlai, vice chairman, were commanding operations at the front.Bogu neither studied the actual situation of the enemy nor us, nor respected the opinions of the front-line headquarters. In the name of the central government, he forced the main Red Army to attack the enemy's heavily guarded Nanfeng City.Because Zhu De and Zhou Enlai fought hard on the basis of reason, resisted the wrong instructions, used Mao Zedong's experience of concentrating superior forces to destroy the enemy in mobile warfare, and adopted the tactics of a large-scale large-scale army ambushing the enemy in motion, on February 27 in Yihuang, Jiangxi In the Dongpo and Huangpi areas, two main enemy divisions were wiped out in one fell swoop, and Li Ming, commander of the 52nd Division, and Chen Shiji, commander of the 59th Division, were captured. On March 21, another division of the enemy army was wiped out in Caotaigang, more than 10,000 enemies were captured, more than 20,000 guns and many new weapons were handed over, and the fourth great victory against "encirclement and suppression" was achieved. The Central Red Army developed to 80,000 people, greatly enhanced the combat effectiveness, expanded the base area, and connected the Central Soviet Area with the Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi Soviet Areas led by Fang Zhimin.

After Bogu arrived in Ruijin, he further implemented the sectarian cadre policy, and casually criticized cadres who did not implement their erroneous policies. In February 1933, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area unreasonably accused the Fujian Provincial Party Committee of "forming an opportunistic line headed by Comrade Luo Ming", announced the revocation of Luo Ming's position as the acting secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, and launched an anti-"Luo Ming line" in the Central Soviet Area struggle. In March, Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zetan, Xie Weijun, and Gu Bai, who were working in counties in southern Jiangxi, were launched a struggle against the "Jiangxi Luo Ming Line" as a "pure defensive line" and their posts were dismissed.

After the failure of the fourth "encirclement and suppression campaign", Chiang Kai-shek felt very distressed. He said in the "hand letter" to Chen Cheng, the commander-in-chief of the Central Road: "This setback is extremely tragic, and it is the only hidden pain in my life." He was unwilling to fail, and in 1933 Since June, we have concentrated our efforts to prepare for the fifth "encirclement and suppression".On the one hand, he stepped up the deployment of troops and generals, and Chen Cheng and other generals went to Nanchang to sum up the lessons of failure, set up an officer training group in Lushan, trained officers above the platoon in rotation, and invited military advisers from the United States, Italy, Germany and other countries to participate in the planning.He summed up the past failure lessons of "driving straight into" the Soviet area and being defeated by the Red Army one by one. He accepted the suggestion of the German adviser Seekert and adopted the tactics of "fortressism" and "step by step", that is, all armies marched together and stopped shortly after advancing. Build fortresses, build roads at the same time, connect the main positions, strengthen the supply of arms and food; and adopt the so-called "three-point military, seven-point political" strategy to strengthen anti-communist propaganda.On the other hand, he sent Song Ziwen to the United States to ask for help, and the U.S. imperialists shipped a large amount of cotton and wheat backlogged by the farmers to China, worth 200 million U.S. dollars, called "cotton and wheat loans"; they also received 100 million pounds from the British imperialists Arms loans.

On July 24, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the "Resolution on the Five Encirclement and Suppression" of the Imperialist Kuomintang and the Tasks of Our Party, emphasizing that the five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns were "a more intense and brutal decisive battle between classes" and "a struggle for independence and freedom". The struggle for Soviet China"; and put forward slogans such as "Keep the enemy out of the country" and "Don't let the enemy invade an inch of the Soviet area".At the same time, the unrealistic request of "creating a million Iron Red Army" was put forward.

In the process of Chiang Kai-shek's deployment of troops and generals, if the Red Army finds a favorable opportunity to destroy some of the enemy in mobile warfare, it can disrupt the enemy's deployment.However, the temporary central government did not listen to the opinions of Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai and others, and forced the main force of the Red Army to divide into two parts to fight, which is the so-called "two fists to beat people": the Eastern Army composed mainly of the three armies, went to Fujian to attack the enemy 19 Shaowu and Jiangle, who were firmly defended by the Route Army, failed to capture the city, which wasted time and strength; with the First and Fifth Army Corps as the central army, they stayed in the Jiangxi Soviet Area, but had no combat missions.In this way, the opportunity to actively prepare for battle was lost, but it gave Chiang Kai-shek time to deploy his troops. On September 25 of that year, Chiang Kai-shek personally commanded an army of 500,000, and under the cover of aircraft, he attacked the Central Soviet Area in four directions. On the 28th, the enemy occupied Lichuan City in eastern Jiangxi.Under the attack of the enemy's superior force, it is permissible to retreat as necessary to preserve military strength.However, Bo Gu and others believed that they allowed the enemy to enter the "national gate" and blamed Xiao Jinguang, the commander of the Fujian-Jiangxi Military Region who was in charge of defending Lichuan, as "the Luo Ming line in the army" and carried out "cruel struggles and merciless blows" against him. All positions were revoked, military and party memberships were expelled, and he was handed over to military court for trial.It has had a very bad influence both in the army and in the party. At the tense moment of the fifth campaign against "encirclement and suppression", Li De, a military adviser sent by the Communist International, came to the Central Soviet Area from Shanghai.Originally, consultants were "Gu" and "Qian". They only had the right to advise, but not to command.However, because Bogu himself did not understand military affairs, he canceled Mao Zedong’s command power, and did not reuse Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and others. Li De, who had no experience in revolutionary war and did not understand China's situation, was regarded as a "treasure" and handed over the command of the Red Army to him. Li De is German, formerly known as Otto?Braun, a member of the German Communist Party. In 1928, he escaped from prison and fled to the Soviet Union. In 1932, he studied at the Moscow Military Academy with good academic performance. After graduation, he was sent to China by the Communist International.His style is arbitrary and arrogant, and he replaced the collective leadership of the Central Military Commission by himself.He sat in the house, commanding the war on the map only according to the dogma of positional warfare in the textbook.Due to his blind command, many battles were lost.He refused to listen to the opinions of the front-line commanders. Instead, he reprimanded others and shirked responsibility.But Bo Gu praised him as "the Supreme Emperor".Such a person is the commander-in-chief, how can there be no reason not to lose the battle? In the face of Chiang Kai-shek's "fortress policy", although Mao Zedong had no commanding power, he suggested to the central government several times in the spirit of being highly responsible to the party and the Red Army that the Red Army should jump out of the enemy's fortress encirclement and attack the enemy's rear. Activities in the vast area between the four provinces of Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu prompted the enemy to deploy troops and generals in order to find opportunities to destroy the enemy in mobile warfare.It can not only crush the enemy's "encirclement and suppression", but also expand the Soviet area.But Bo Gu and Li De didn't listen at all, and instead slandered this as "abandoning the base area." Bo Gu, Li De and others began to implement the policy of adventurism in the offensive. Under the slogan of "defending the enemy outside the country's gate", they commanded the main force of the Red Army to the border area between the enemy and us near Fuzhou, and fought between the enemy's main force and the fortress.From September to November, several wars of attrition were fought, but the enemy's advance was not stopped. The Red Army suffered a lot of losses and was in a passive position. Then, Bo Gu, Li De, etc. practiced conservatism in defense, adopted a passive defense policy, "fortress against fortress", "short assaults", and fought for consumption with superior enemies.The enemy's forts are relatively strong, with strong firepower and sufficient ammunition, making it difficult to break through; there are road connections between the forts and the rear, and transportation is also convenient.However, the Red Army's defensive strength was very weak. Before the fortress was repaired, it was bombarded by enemy planes and cannons. With less artillery and ammunition, it was difficult to hold on to the enemy's strong attack, and suffered great losses as a result. Just as Chiang Kai-shek was aggressively attacking the Soviet area, something very beneficial to the Red Army happened. On January 28, 1932, the 19th Route Army, which fought bravely against the Japanese invaders in Shanghai, was transferred to Fujian by Chiang Kai-shek to participate in the "encirclement and suppression".Jiang Guangding, Cai Tingcuo and the majority of officers and soldiers demanded resistance to Japan and did not want to fight a civil war.Under the influence of the Communist Party of China’s declaration that it would cooperate with any armed forces in the country to resist Japan under three conditions, Jiang Guangding and Cai Tingcuo secretly sent representatives Wu Ming (Chen Gongpei, who had worked with Zhou Enlai in France) in August 1933. ) to contact the Red Army near Yanping.Zhou Enlai attached great importance to this matter. He called Xiang Ying (Vice Chairman of the Military Commission), Peng Dehuai, and Teng Daiyuan, and suggested sending Yuan Guoping (director of the Political Department of the Three Armies) to interview Wu Ming to learn more about their true intentions.After the talks, Peng Dehuai wrote a letter for Wu Ming to take back, welcoming the cooperation request put forward by the 19th Route Army.Both sides stopped fighting on the front line. In early October, Wu Ming accompanied Xu Minghong, secretary-general of the 19th Route Army, to Ruijin in secret. On the 26th, the two sides signed a preliminary agreement on anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang: immediately stop hostilities, demarcate borders and rule, resume trade, and lift the economic blockade of the Soviet area. On November 20, 1933, Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, Jiang Guangnai, Cai Tingkai and others launched the "Fujian Incident" in Fuzhou, established the "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China", and publicly declared their opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and Japan.This reflects the internal contradictions of the Kuomintang and the development of anti-Japanese forces, and it is a very good thing that they are willing to cooperate with the CCP to resist Japan and Chiang Kai-shek.If the Red Army cooperates closely with them, it is entirely possible to break Chiang Kai-shek's fifth "encirclement and suppression".But "left" opportunists like Bogu and Li De do not believe that they can be our friends, and regard the middle forces as "the most dangerous enemy".At this time, Chiang Kai-shek transferred 9 divisions from the Jiangxi front line to Fujian to fight the 19th Route Army, which gave the Red Army a good opportunity to destroy the enemy in mobile warfare.Zhou Enlai, who was at the front at the time, called Bogu and Xiang Ying on November 24, pointing out that Chiang Kai-shek was delaying the attack on the Central Soviet Area and drawing troops into Fujian.Peng Dehuai also made a suggestion: concentrate the main force of the Red Army to attack the border areas of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, and threaten Hangzhou, Shanghai, and Nanjing. This can not only assist the 19th Route Army, but also disrupt Chiang Kai-shek's "encirclement and suppression" plan.Zhang Wentian also advocated actively cooperating with the 19th Route Army.Mao Zedong had long advocated that the Red Army should go to Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu to turn strategic defense into strategic offense.But these correct propositions were all rejected by Bogu et al.Instead, they transferred the main force of the Red Army to the west.Go to attack the enemy's fortress in Yongfeng area. The "People's Revolutionary Government of the Republic of China" failed in January 1934 under the attack of Chiang Kai-shek's army and political polarization.Chiang Kai-shek organized the troops into Fujian into the East Route Army, further completing the encirclement of the Central Soviet Area.The Nineteenth Route Army was forced to participate in the "encirclement and suppression". In January 1934, the Provisional Central Committee held the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in Ruijin, which was the culmination of the third "Left" error in the history of the CCP.The plenary session disregarded the heavy losses suffered in the White Areas due to the implementation of Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism after the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, and did not summarize the experience and lessons of the failure of the implementation of military adventurism in the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign in the past few months. It is concluded that there is a "direct revolutionary situation" in China, and the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" is "a question of who will win between the Chinese Soviet road and the colonial road" and "is a struggle for the complete victory of Soviet China"; The lower-level united front" (that is, no upper-level united front) strategy continued to carry out the "anti-rich peasant line" struggle in the countryside.In the areas ruled by the Kuomintang, the party is required to "use its greatest strength to prepare and organize the strike struggle of the working class" in order to cooperate with the Red Army's attack on big cities.They even mistakenly confuse the tasks of the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, claiming that "when we have extended the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants to important parts of China, carrying out the socialist revolution will become the fundamental task of the Communist Party..." and so on.Under the slogan of "Right Opportunism" "against the main danger", the policy of sectarianism continued. This is the root cause of the further failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression". After the failure of military adventurism, Bo Gu and Li De turned to military conservatism.In the face of an enemy with strong troops, sophisticated weapons and the implementation of the "fortress policy", instead of adopting flexible strategies and tactics, we still continue to defend frontally, fortify everywhere, resist steadily, fight the enemy for consumption, and fail. The most typical is the Guangchang defense battle in April 1934.Guangchang is a small city in the north of the Soviet area. Chiang Kai-shek concentrated 11 main divisions. Under the cover of aircraft and artillery, he began a massive attack on Guangchang on April 10, trying to break through Guangchang and advance to the center of the Soviet area.Bo Gu, Li De, etc. regarded Guangchang as the "Northern Gate", and under the slogan "Don't let the enemy occupy an inch of land", they mobilized 9 divisions of the main force of the Red Army to defend it.It was the first time that Bo Gu and Li De went to the front to directly command. They organized a field command on the front (the commander was Zhu De in name, but Li De was actually Li De, and Bo Gu served as a political commissar) to "decisive battle" with the enemy.Zhou Enlai was left behind in Ruijin (actually the Minister of Logistics) far away from the front line. The battle lasted from the 10th to the 27th. This was the largest and most intense battle since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression".Although the enemy suffered a lot of damage, the Red Army also suffered great losses, with more than 5,500 casualties, accounting for one-fifth of the troops participating in the battle.But Guangchang was still occupied by the enemy, and Jianning in Fujian also fell at the same time.This is the serious consequence of the purely defensive line of the "Left" opportunists, which will have an extremely adverse effect on the Red Army's future operations. At this time, the Red Army still had considerable strength, and the Soviet area still had room for maneuver.If Mao Zedong’s suggestion is accepted, the main force of the Red Army will be rested and replenished, and if it reaches the central part of Hunan (the enemy forces were empty at the time), the enemy can be mobilized to attack the Soviet area, and the enemy can be wiped out in mobile warfare in the unfortified area behind the enemy, and the Soviet area can also be restored and expanded. The "encirclement and suppression" can be crushed.But Bogu and others rejected this suggestion, thus losing the opportunity to turn the tables. The fall of Guangchang was a blow to the "Left" opportunists, who felt that the problem was serious, but they did not wake up from their mistakes, and continued to implement a purely defensive policy, building fortress defenses everywhere, and their losses increased day by day.The Secretariat of the Central Committee, which Bogu was in charge of, secretly decided in May to withdraw the main force of the Red Army from the Central Soviet Area, and asked the Communist International for instructions, which was approved by the Communist International in June.However, neither political nor organizational preparations were adequate. In early July, Chiang Kai-shek commanded the army to launch a full-scale attack on the Central Soviet Area at the same time from the North Road, East Road, and South Road.At this time, the Soviet area was shrinking day by day, manpower and material resources were scarce, and our army had lost the possibility of breaking the enemy's "encirclement and suppression" on the inner line. If we decisively rushed the main force of the Red Army to the outer line to fight, we still had the possibility of victory.However, Bogu, Li De and others still carried out "comprehensive defense" of the Red Army's main force "six-way division".As a result, our army lost a lot, and the enemy continued to advance.By the end of September, only narrow areas such as Ruijin, Huichang, Yudu, Xingguo, and Changting remained in the Central Soviet Area.At this time, preparations were hastily begun for the main Red Army to move to the west of Hunan and Hubei to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps and establish a new base. In order to mobilize the enemies attacking the Central Soviet Area, the Central Committee decided to send the Seventh Army Corps, under the banner of "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army Northward Anti-Japanese Advance Team", to enter Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi borders through Fujian; The Soviet area was transferred to central Hunan for activities, in order to cooperate with the central Soviet area's anti-"encirclement and suppression" and strategic shift. Xun Huaizhou, head of the Seventh Army Corps, Le Shaohua, political commissar, Su Yu, chief of staff, and Liu Ying, director of the Political Department.There are more than 6,000 people in the whole army, most of them are new fighters, and less than half of them have guns.The troops set off from Ruijin on July 6, passing through Changting and Liancheng, and then arrived at the Kuomintang ruled area; after going north along Shaxi, they crossed the Minjiang River north on July 30. They attempted to attack Fuzhou on August 8, so they went north Occupy Luoyuan County; fought hard for several months on the borders of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi, and suffered great losses. On October 19, he was ordered by the Central Committee to join the Red Cross Army led by Fang Zhimin in the Northeast Soviet Area of ​​Jiangxi Province.The Central Military Commission decided that the Seventh Army and the Tenth Army would be combined into a new Tenth Army, with Liu Chouxi, the head of the army, Le Shaohua, the political commissar, and Fang Zhimin as the commanders of the military region. The Seventh Army went north. Although they fought hard and achieved some victories, they suffered heavy losses. They did not achieve the goal of mobilizing and encircling the enemy in the Central Soviet Area, nor did they establish new bases.Now it seems that the main reason is that there are too few troops, which did not pose a threat to the enemy's rear. In mid-November, the Central Military Commission decided to form a military and political committee with Fang Zhimin as the chairman, and moved northward with the Tenth Army.The troops entered Huangshan, Xiuning, Shexian and other places in Anhui.Chiang Kai-shek immediately mobilized 5 regular divisions and local armed forces to stop it.Unable to advance, the leaders of the Tenth Army decided to return to the base areas of Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi. On the way, they were intercepted by the enemy. The main force was surrounded by powerful enemies in the Huaiyu Mountain area of ​​Jiangxi Province. After fierce fighting, most of them died heroically.Seeking Huaizhou sacrifice, Fang Zhimin was arrested in January 1935 for being betrayed by a traitor while fighting the enemy in Longshou Village, Dexing County, Jiangxi Province.Fang Zhimin was righteous and unyielding in the enemy's court.In prison, he wrote immortal works such as "Records in Prison".On August 6 of the same year, he died heroically in Nanchang. This is also the evil result of the temporary central command error. A part of the Tenth Army Corps broke out from the encirclement. Under the leadership of Chief of Staff Su Yu and Director of the Political Department Liu Ying, they moved to the border areas of Fujian and Zhejiang, persisted in guerrilla warfare, and joined the New Fourth Army during the War of Resistance. On July 23, 1934, the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided that the Sixth Red Army Corps would leave the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area. The first step was to move to central Hunan to develop and expand guerrilla warfare and create a new Soviet area; the second step was to develop to western Hunan; Three steps to the north to contact the Second Red Army.The independent troops and guerrilla units in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area should insist on carrying out guerrilla warfare in and around the present Soviet Area to defend the Soviet Area. Ren Bishi was a representative sent by the Central Committee to the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area. The Central Committee decided that Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke (head of the Sixth Army Corps), and Wang Zhen (political commissar of the Sixth Army Corps) should form the military and political committee of the Sixth Army Corps, with Ren Bishi as the chairman.There are more than 9,000 people in the whole army. On August 7, they marched towards Hunan from the Bixi area of ​​Suichuan County, Jiangxi Province, broke through the enemy's blockade, and occupied Xintian County in the west of Chenzhou on the 20th.After hard work and breaking through the enemy's siege many times, they crossed the Xiangjiang River at Jieshou, south of Quanzhou, Guangxi on September 4, and captured Yanxian County on September 5.Later, it broke through the siege of the enemy forces in Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou provinces, and captured Huangping County, Guizhou on October 1.After another arduous struggle, on October 24, in Muhuang, Yinjiang County, eastern Guizhou, the Red Army led by He Long, Guan Xiangying and Xia Xi successfully joined forces.After the two armies joined forces, they entered the Nanyao border of Youyang, Sichuan on the 26th, and held a meeting to celebrate the meeting. With the approval of the Party Central Committee, the Third Red Army resumed the designation of the Second Red Army. He Long was the commander of the army, Ren Bishi was the political commissar, Guan Xiangying was the deputy political commissar, Li Da was the chief of staff, and Zhang Ziyi was the director of the political department. The entire army has more than 4,400 people.The Sixth Red Army was headed by Xiao Ke, political commissar Wang Zhen, chief of staff Tan Jiashu, and director of the political department Gan Siqi.The Second Red Army Regiment Headquarters and the General Headquarters command the actions of the two legions in a unified manner.The Red Sixth Army thus successfully completed the strategic transfer task of more than 80 days and a journey of more than 5,000 miles, which played a role in exploring and propagating for the Central Red Army to pass through western Hunan and eastern Guizhou. The First Front Army of the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area (that is, the Central Red Army), Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, Chief Political Commissar Zhou Enlai, Chief of the General Staff Liu Bocheng, Director of the General Political Department Wang Jiaxiang (replaced by Li Fuchun due to injury), under the jurisdiction of the first, third, fifth, and eighth , Nine Legion.In addition to breaking through the enemy's blockade and carrying out strategic transfers, a very important task is to cover the transfer of the huge Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and the organs directly under the Soviet Central Government. Since Bo Gu, Li De, etc. practiced escapeism during the strategic retreat, the combat troops had just withdrawn from the front line, there was no necessary rest and political mobilization, and there was no necessary streamlining of the huge central organization. Move all the pots and pans away."Therefore, the central authority formed two columns.The first column of the Military Commission has 4,600 people, with Ye Jianying as the commander; the second column has more than 9,800 people, and Luo Mai is the commander; the total is 86,000 people. , and many silver dollars). In order to persevere in the revolutionary struggle in the Central Soviet Area, the Central Committee decided to set up a Central Sub-bureau headed by Xiang Ying and the Central Government Office of the Chinese Soviet Republic with Chen Yi as the director and Liang Baitai as the deputy director; and a Central Military Region with Xiang Ying as the commander He is also a political commissar, commanding more than 16,000 people in the 24th Red Division and more than 10 independent regiments and local troops.Many responsible persons remained: Qu Qiubai, He Shuheng, He Chang, Mao Zetan, Gu Bai, Deng Zihui, Tan Zhenlin, Zhang Dingcheng, Sun Pixian, etc.Qu Qiubai was captured in the battle and died heroically in Changting.He Shuheng, He Chang, Mao Zetan, Gu Bai and others died in the battle.Those who remained fought arduously in the Soviet area for three years, cooperated with the Long March of the Central Red Army, and defended many revolutionary fruits.During the Anti-Japanese War, he joined the New Fourth Army. On October 16, 1934, the vanguard of the First Red Army set off from the Duanwu area of ​​Yudu (known as Yudu at the time), and started the long march in Yudu River (Haishui).Mao Zedong and the central government set off from Yudu County on the 18th.The rest of the parts set off from Ruijin and Yudu in Jiangxi, Changting and Ninghua in Fujian, and embarked on the long road of the Long March. Since there were relatively few enemies in the southwest of the Central Soviet Area, the Central Committee sent representatives to conduct secret negotiations with Guangdong Chen Jitang beforehand and signed an agreement. Therefore, the junction of Jiangxi and Guangdong borders was determined to be the breakthrough point to break through. More than 80,000 troops broke out to the west in mighty force, which is rare in the history of war.In order to protect the safety of the central column, the Red First and Ninth Corps took the left, the Red Third and Eighth Corps took the right, the first and second columns of the Military Commission were in the middle, and the Fifth Army was in the rear. On the road of the Red Army's westward march, the enemy army successively arranged four blockade lines. On October 21, the Central Red Army crossed the Xinfeng River between Xinfeng and Anyuan in Jiangxi Province. Without a major battle, they all broke through the enemy's first blockade line on the 25th and began to enter Guangdong.Chen Jitang carried out the original agreement without blocking it.The First Red Army occupied the entrance of Renhua County, Guangdong Province on November 2. From the 5th to the 8th, the Central Red Army successfully passed the enemy's second blockade line between Chengkou and Hunan Rucheng. On November 14, the main Red Army passed the enemy's third blockade between Liangtian and Yizhang in Hunan.Then turn to the north of Guangxi.This area is all mountainous, and there are many Red Army operations, which are very crowded.In particular, the column of the Military Commission moved very slowly due to its weight and too many machines.Because you have to avoid the bombing of enemy planes and take more night and mountain roads, it will be even slower.The columns of the Military Commission light more torches at night, and the soldiers nicknamed it the "torch team". After Chiang Kai-shek discovered the intention of the Red Army to cross the Xiangjiang River to the west of Hunan and Hubei to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps of the Red Army, he urgently dispatched a large army to blockade the Xiangjiang River, forming a fourth blockade line, and attempted to encircle the Red Army and destroy it east of the Xiangjiang River.There are 15 divisions of the Hunan enemy, 6 divisions of the Guangdong enemy, and 5 divisions of the Guangxi enemy, a total of 26 divisions. In addition, Xue Yue, who is from Jiang's lineage on the North Road, led Zhou Hunyuan and Wu Qiwei, two columns, four armies, and 100,000 troops. 400,000 people were divided into five groups to intercept, pursue, and encircle the Red Army. On November 27, the Red Army's vanguard troops, the Red Second Division and the Fourth Division, each occupied Jieshou and nearby ferry crossings in Quanzhou and Xing'an in Guangxi, crossed the Xiangjiang River, and broke through the enemy's fourth blockade.Because the Military Commission's column moved too slowly and arrived at Jieshou on the 29th, the enemy troops from Hunan and Guangxi stepped up their attack on Jieshou.The Central Red Army bravely resisted the enemy's attack on both sides of the Xiangjiang River to cover the army's crossing of the river. The battle was very fierce. Chiang Kai-shek believed that his plot to destroy the Red Army on the Xiangjiang River could be realized, so he wrote a letter to encourage his frontline troops.He believed that the Red Army was "traveling thousands of miles, being restrained on all sides, going down the mountain like a tiger, and it is not difficult to capture", and ordered them to pursue it, "don't allow the Red Army to take root again" and so on.But Chiang Kai-shek was too happy.After 6 days and 6 nights of bloody fighting, by the afternoon of December 1, except for the Red Thirty-Fourth Division (mainly from Western Fujian) and a regiment of the Sixth Division who were surrounded by the enemy and most of them died, the rest had all crossed the river. However, due to the fierce fighting and heavy casualties when crossing the river, and the need to climb mountains after crossing the river, some bulky items of the Military Commission's column, including a few mountain cannons without shells, had to be thrown into the Xiangjiang River.The Battle of Xiangjiang was an unprecedented battle of the Central Red Army during the Long March and suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 80,000-strong Central Red Army, only 30,000 remained.This campaign further proved that Bo Gu, Li De and others were completely wrong in stubbornly implementing Wang Ming's "Left" adventurist military policy. After crossing the Xiangjiang River and breaking through the enemy's fourth blockade line, in order to avoid the enemy blocking the front, the Central Red Army entered the Yuechengling Mountain on the border of Hunan and Guizhou, which is an ethnic minority residential area.After fighting on the Xiangjiang River, the troops were very tired, and they entered the mountains again, marching day and night, and supplies were difficult. Chiang Kai-shek's interception and pursuit were still intensified, and the Red Army was still in a very dangerous situation.Therefore, there were many complaints in the army, and they believed that the Red Army had never fought such a defeat in history, and they questioned the leadership policy of the Central Committee and the Military Commission.The commanders and political commissars of each legion have more and more opinions on the Central Military Commission, and the disputes among the central leaders have become more and more intense and open.Since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression", there has been a struggle in the central leadership group between the correct ideas represented by Mao Zedong and the wrong ideas represented by Bo Gu.Due to the long-distance march, and because Bo Gu and Li De acted arbitrarily, they could not listen to different opinions, and they were unwilling to hold a meeting of the Politburo and the Military Commission for discussion, so the dispute could not be resolved. In order to prevent the Central Red Army from joining the Second and Sixth Red Army Corps in western Hunan, Chiang Kai-shek stepped up the arrangement of encirclement circles in an attempt to gather and annihilate the Red Army when the Red Army marched northward.At this critical juncture, whether the Central Red Army should continue northward at the risk of being wiped out by the enemy or turn to Guizhou, where the enemy is weaker, is an urgent problem that must be resolved immediately. Bogu and Li De felt dejected and helpless because of the huge loss of troops and the serious enemy situation, but they refused to review and correct their mistakes, so they stubbornly insisted on marching northward to join the second and sixth armies.At this time, the command of the troops was actually taken up by Zhou Enlai.Although Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang shared many views with Bogu in the past, they also began to criticize Bogu and Li De in the face of this cruel fact.Mao Zedong exchanged views with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang out of his high responsibility to the party and the Red Army (sitting on the stretcher of the cadre recuperation company without interruption).He firmly advocated abandoning the original plan to go to Xiangxi, and moved to Guizhou, where the enemy is weak, and got their consent.The military thinking of Zhou Enlai and Zhu De was basically the same as that of Mao Zedong. On December 10, the First Red Army Corps occupied Tongdao County in Hunan. On the 12th, the person in charge of the central government in the channel held an emergency meeting, attended by Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, and Li De.At the meeting, a debate was launched on the whereabouts of the Red Army.Bo Gu and Li De still insisted on joining the Second and Sixth Army Corps, but they were opposed by most people.The meeting decided to agree with Mao Zedong's opinion, advance to Guizhou, and take the camera to occupy Liping. On the 15th, the Red Army occupied Liping.Although the channel meeting was not a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, it created a precedent for openly discussing the course of action in the form of a meeting since the Long March. On the 17th and 18th, Zhou Enlai presided over a Politburo meeting in Liping.This was an important meeting to discuss the future strategic direction of the Red Army.There was a heated debate at the meeting.Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhu De, etc. agreed with Mao Zedong's opinion, decided to abandon the plan to join the Second and Sixth Army Corps and establish a base area in western Hunan, and passed the "Decision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on Strategic Guidelines". The "Decision" pointed out that "in view of the current situation, the Politburo believes that the decision to establish a new Soviet base area in western Hunan is now impossible and inappropriate"; "The Politburo believes that the new base area It should be the Sichuan-Guizhou area, which should be centered on Zunyi at the beginning. Under unfavorable conditions, it should be transferred to the northwest area of ​​Zunyi." The Liping Conference decided that the Red Army would cross the Wujiang River and advance to Zunyi.In this way, hundreds of thousands of enemy troops were left in western Hunan at once, and the Red Army won the first initiative since the Long March.This is the victory of the correct ideas represented by Mao Zedong, and the failure of the wrong policies of Bo Gu and Li De.It is the beginning of the transformation of the Red Army's strategic policy, and it is also the beginning of the transition from failure to victory.The Liping meeting laid the ideological foundation for the convening of the Zunyi meeting.During the Liping Conference, reorganization was carried out in order to enrich the combat troops and reduce the personnel of the agencies.The Central Military Commission decided to cancel the establishment of the Eighth Army and merge it into the Fifth Army.The first and second columns of the Military Commission were jointly organized into the Military Commission Column, with Liu Bocheng, chief of the general staff, concurrently as the commander, Chen Yun as the political commissar, and Ye Jianying as the deputy commander. On January 1, 1935, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting in Houchang, Weng'an County, Guizhou, and criticized Bogu and Li De's wrong idea of ​​still insisting on going to Xiangxi.决定过乌江，进遵义，作出了《关于渡江后新的行动方针的决定》，提出“创造川黔边新苏区根据地”的口号，规定“军委要向政治局报告作战方针、计划”。猴场会议后，实际上停止了李德的军事指挥权，周恩来担当了指挥部队的责任。 1日，一军团二师四团奉命强渡乌江未成；2日，组织60多个竹筏抢渡，已于1日过去躲在石崖下一天的毛振华连长等5位勇士出来接应，军团炮兵连长赵章成以3发迫击炮弹打掉了对岸敌据点。我军抢渡成功后，即加紧架设浮桥。至6日，全军从几座浮桥通过乌江。 1月7日，红二师化装成敌溃兵突然进入黔北重要城市遵义城，消灭了王家烈的“双枪兵”（一枝步枪、一枝鸦片枪）。 中央和军委1月9日进入遵义。 红军突然进遵义，把几十万追敌远远抛在乌江东南。蒋介石嫡系薛岳、吴奇伟、周浑元等，是从江西追赶红军到贵州的，被我军拖得很苦，逃亡、死伤减员一半，军官们在通信中说，“肥的拖瘦，瘦的拖死”了。红军取得了长征以来第一次休整机会，为召开遵义会议创造了有利条件。 遵义会议是毛泽东为代表的正确路线和以博古为代表的“左”倾错误路线决定胜负的一次会议，是中国共产党第一次自己选举中央领导人（过去都由共产国际指定）的会议。 由于广昌战役，特别是湘江战役的重大损失和毛泽东的耐心争取工作，首先使过去同博古等站在一起的王稼祥反对博古、李德的瞎指挥，要求毛泽东出来指挥，进而张闻天也表示支持毛泽东的正确主张，这就为召开遵义会议准备了主要条件。 会议是王稼祥先同毛泽东商议并得到张闻天、周恩来、朱德同意后，由王稼祥出面向博古提议召开的。并商定由博古主持会议和作关于第五次反“围剿”的总结报告，周恩来作副报告。 遵义政治局扩大会议从1935年1月15日开到17日。到会的政治局委员有：毛泽东、张闻天、周恩来、朱德、陈云、博古；候补委员4个：王稼祥、刘少奇、邓发、何克全（凯丰）；将领7人：刘伯承（总参谋长）、李富春（总政代主任）、林彪（一军团军团长）、聂荣臻（一军团政委）、彭德怀（三军团军团长）、杨尚昆（三军团政委）、李卓然（五军团政委）。还有邓小平（中央秘书长）、李德（顾问）、伍修权（翻译）列席。 敌情紧急，蒋介石又在加紧对红军包围，要求先决定红军下一步行动方针。15日会议开始后，刘伯承、聂荣臻提出红军北渡长江，到川西北建立新根据地的建议。会议同意他们的建议，并“一致决定改变黎平会议以黔北为中心来创造苏区根据地的建议，一致决定红军渡过长江在成都之西南或西北建立苏区根据地”。 会议主要议题是检查在苏区第五次反“围剿”和西征中军事指挥的经验与教训。博古作了报告，他强调红军不能粉碎第五次“围剿”的原因，是由于帝国主义、国民党力量的强大，苏区和白区工作配合不够等，为他和李德在军事指挥上的严重错误辩解。周恩来作副报告，他指出第五次反“围剿”失利的主要原因是军事领导的战略战术的错误，并主动承担责任（他是军委副主席，长征中的“三人团”之一），做了自我批评，又批评了博古和李德。张闻天根据他和毛泽东、王稼祥共同草拟的提纲作了反对“左”倾军事路线的报告。毛泽东作了长篇发言，他对错误的军事路线进行了深刻的分析和批判，尖锐地批评了李德只知道在地图上指挥作战，但不懂得路是要用脚走的，红军是要吃饭睡觉的，敌人的子弹是会打死人的。阐述了中国革命战争的战略问题，指出了今后的方向。王稼祥、朱德、李富春、聂荣臻等的发言，都支持毛泽东的正确主张，不同意博古的报告。周恩来表示完全同意毛泽东、张闻天、王稼祥三人的提纲和意见，并全力推举毛泽东来领导红军今后的行动。他的倡议得到多数人的支持。只有凯丰发言为博古、李德的错误辩护，李德则坚持不承认自己的错误。 会议开了三天，作出了如下决定：（一）补选毛泽东为政治局常委；（二）指定张闻天起草决议，委托常委审查后，发到支部去讨论（决议在2月8日的政治局会议通过）；（三）常委中再进行适当的分工；（四）取消“三人团”（即博古、李德、周恩来），仍由最高军事首长朱德、周恩来为军事指挥者，而周恩来是党内委托的对于指挥军事下最后决心的负责者。 1月18日政治局会议，决定“以毛泽东同志为恩来同志的军事指挥上的帮助者”。2月5日左右，在四川、贵州、云南三省交界“鸡鸣三省”的地方，中央常委会“决定以洛甫同志代替博古同志负总的责任”。3月14日，中央军委决定：设前敌司令部，朱德为前敌司令员，毛泽东为政治委员。 3月11日左右，为便于指挥，毛泽东提议，由毛泽东、周恩来、王稼祥成立三人军事领导小组，全权指挥军事，组长是周恩来。 遵义会议明确了红军战略战术的是非问题，批判了博古、李德军事指挥上的错误，取消了他的指挥权，改组了军事领导，并在组织上结束了“左”倾教条主义在中央四年的统治。这标志着王明“左”倾冒险主义的失败，标志着以毛泽东为首的正确方针的胜利，实际上确立了毛泽东在中央和红军的领导地位。遵义会议在极端危急的关头，挽救了党和红军，挽救了中国革命，在政治上、军事上、组织上为党中央和中央红军胜利地完成二万五千里长征提供了保证。 遵义会议是中国共产党同共产国际中断联系的情况下，独立自主地根据马列主义的原则，按照中国的实际情况，实事求是地解决自己的路线、方针、政策和组织领导问题，说明中国共产党已经完全成熟了。（会后，在长征途中，中央派陈云、潘汉年秘密到上海恢复白区党的组织，又去苏联向共产国际报告遵义会议情况，得到共产国际的批准。） 遵义会议为我党树立了一个正确解决党内矛盾和纠正错误的范例，是伟大的马克思主义者毛泽东高贵品质和杰出的领导艺术才能的表现。他在中央苏区受教条主义者打击、排挤，被撤销对红军的指挥权，仍服从组织决定，但他坚持自己正确的意见，耐心争取王稼祥、张闻天，在关键时刻仍以对革命负责的态度提出自己的建议。遵义会议，只抓主要矛盾，即解决最紧迫的军事路线和组织领导问题；对犯错误的博古、李德，采取治病救人方针，杜绝了他们过去那种“残酷斗争，无情打击”的做法。 博古经过延安的整风学习，认识和改正了错误。1937年夏同周恩来一道参加国共谈判，在武汉长江局、重庆南方局任委员兼组织部长，做了很多工作。1946年1月时是我党政协会议代表。当年4月8日乘飞机回延安途中遇难。 凯丰也认识、改正错误，以后做了很多工作。 只有李德受批评后，很不满，发脾气。1938年在延安抗大教书，1939年同周恩来一道去莫斯科，搞翻译、出版工作。他受到共产国际监委批评，结论：有错误，不予处分。1949年回东德，1970年出版《中国记事》，对中国共产党进行攻击和诽谤。1974年病死，可谓死不悔改。 王明是在1931年1月六届四中全会上由国际代表米夫捧上台的。6月，因向忠发被捕叛变，王明任代总书记。9月，赴莫斯科，为中共驻共产国际代表。上海成立临时中央，博古为总书记，贯彻王明的“左”倾冒险主义。1937年底，王明回到延安，下车伊始，便批评当年8月中央政治局扩大会议在统一战线中坚持无产阶级领导权，在敌后放手发动独立自主的游击战争等方针，提出“一切经过统一战线，一切服从统一战线”的右倾投降主义口号。1937年12月到武汉，参加中共代表团，任长江局书记，吹捧蒋介石为“民族英雄”，大谈依靠国民党抗战，宣扬“速胜论”，与毛泽东的“持久战”观点相对立，拒绝在《新华日报》登载《论持久战》，实行抗战中的右倾投降主义。1938年9月，在六届六中全会上受批判，没有诚恳承认错误。党的“七大”、“八大”均选为中央委员。新中国成立后，任政务院法律委员会副主任。1956年，去苏联治病；赫鲁晓夫反华后，参加“反华大合唱”，化名马马维奇，写了一本骂中共的书。1974年3月，病死于莫斯科，成为死不悔改的叛徒。 朱德的诗：“群龙得首自腾翔，路线精通走一行。左右高低能纠正，天空无限任飞扬。”描绘了遵义会议以后的大好形势。部队听了遵义会议传达后，全军官兵都很兴奋，战斗情绪特别高涨。 遵义会议后，在毛、周、王三人军事小组的指挥下，采取的战略思想和战术原则是：根据敌情变化，采取高度的运动战术，经常转移作战地区，目的是在有利的条件下，消灭敌人有生力量，建立新的根据地。四渡赤水的战斗，是中央红军在川、黔、滇边地区进行的出色的运动战，把蒋介石的“中央军”和贵州、四川、云南的地方军共几十万人搞得昏头转向，拖得疲惫不堪。红军完全处于主动地位，消灭了大量敌人，达到了北上与四方面军会合的战略目的。 遵义会议后，红军又进行了整编，扔掉笨重东西，精简机关，充实连队，行动更迅速了。 1935年1月19日，中央红军离开遵义，向四川的土城前进，准备北上过长江。1月28日，因川敌阻拦，在土城打了一仗，因敌增援，撤出战斗。1月29日，一渡赤水，向四川和古蔺、叙永前进，准备在宜宾、泸州之间北渡长江，与四方面军会合。蒋介石发现红军企图，调川敌12个旅封锁长江，又组织大军包围红军。军委决定放弃渡江计划，又突然东进，2月18日，二渡赤水。26日奇袭娄山关后，于28日再次占领遵义，消灭了王家烈的8个团。蒋嫡系吴奇伟北渡乌江想夺回遵义，被红军打垮两个师，一直追到乌江边。吴奇伟跑过乌江，把浮桥斩断，丢下1800多人当了俘虏。红军这次在5天之内歼灭和打垮了敌人两个师8个团，俘虏3000多人，是长征以来第一次大胜利。红军欢呼“毛主席正确领导的胜利”。 蒋介石恼羞成怒，自己飞到重庆指挥。他对部下说：“这是国军追击以来的奇耻大辱！”他除调大军增援外，还加调空军到贵阳机场，加紧对红军的侦察、轰炸，企图包围红军在遵义地区加以消灭。 在第二次占遵义后，我遭敌机轰炸几乎送命。当时为了乘胜消灭敌周浑元纵队，红一军团奉军委令于3月5日晨从遵义城出发，向鸭溪方向前进。我当时是红一军团政治保卫局秘书，局长罗瑞卿行军时为及时了解情况常常跟军团司令部走，把保卫局（20多人）和保卫队（百把人）交给我带上，跟在军团政治部后面前进。离遵义十几里时遇到3架敌机轰炸，炸死8人，炸伤52人，惨不忍睹。这是长征以来最悲痛的一天，是我当红军5年多来第三次挨敌机轰炸（第一次1930年在湖南株洲，第二次1932年在福建建宁），我都幸免于难。写到这里时，我有感作了一首打油诗： 为摆脱敌人，3月16日，红军又在茅台等地三渡赤水，再次进入川南叙永地区。蒋介石以为红军又要渡长江，又调兵阻击。红军又突然掉头回贵州，于3月21日四渡赤水。接着红军又南渡乌江，佯攻贵阳，吓得在贵阳的蒋介石急忙从云南调兵增援，自己准备坐飞机逃跑。红军又乘昆明空虚之机，直插云南，威胁昆明。在公路上，缴获龙云送给“中央军”的云南军用地图和白药（治伤口特效药）各一汽车。红军对押车的云南兵风趣地说：“你们要送给'中央军'，对了，我们是'中央红军'，我们收下，谢谢了！”给他们每人发了3块银元让他们回昆明报账去。地图和白药都起了很大作用。当龙云又调兵回昆明时，红军又急行军走向金沙江。5月3日，先头部队占领了皎平渡口，集中了6只木船，得到几十名船工的积极支援，在总参谋长刘伯承的亲自指挥下，5月9日，红军全部渡过了天险金沙江。同时，红九军团也在另外的渡口过了金沙江。 就这样，红军把几十万敌人追兵又远远甩在金沙江以南，蒋介石想把红军消灭的计划又落了空。等他的追兵追到江边时，只捡到了几双红军丢弃的破草鞋。 过了金沙江，甩掉强大追敌，到四川会理附近，得到了5天休息（攻会理未克）。1935年5月12日，在会理附近的铁厂召开了政治局扩大会议，会议决定红军继续北上，经过大小凉山彝族地区，越过大渡河，北上同四方面军会合，在川康北部建立根据地。此时四方面军已经到达理番（今理县）地区，中央已电四方面军向南前进。会上，毛泽东、周恩来严厉批评了林彪反对毛泽东“走弓背路”机动作战，甚至背后活动，反对毛泽东领导的错误，维护了党和红军的统一领导。 5月15日，红军继续北上，攻占德昌城。晚上过安宁河的铁索桥，风大，桥摇摆得很厉害，挑担子的同志很难走，大家就扶着他走；个别同志不敢站起来走，就在桥板上爬过去。经过冕宁、越西后，就进人彝族地区。这里基本上是奴隶社会，生产处于刀耕火种年代，由于长期受封建王朝和国民党统治压迫，仇恨汉人，抓到汉人当“娃子”( “白骨头”、奴隶）。为了争取彝族人民让红军通过，及时到达大渡河边安顺场，朱德总司令发布了《中国工农红军布告》，宣传红军宗旨，宣布红军纪律，并号召彝族人民团结起来同红军一起打倒欺压他们的军阀。军委决定由刘伯承为先遣司令员，聂荣臻为政委。他们是四川人，深知彝族情况。经过争取工作，刘伯承同对红军深表同情的沽鸡部落首领小叶丹献血为盟，结拜兄弟，送了枪支子弹给他，成立了“中国红军彝族沽鸡支队”。并通过他向彝族兄弟宣传，使红军顺利通过彝族区。刘伯承、聂荣臻直接指挥红一军团第一团（团长杨得志）为先遣队，于5月25日晨出其不意地消灭了安顺场守敌1个营，占领了渡口，缴到木船1只，立即组织了17个勇士，在船工帮助和炮火的掩护下冲向北岸，消灭了守敌，占领了北岸敌据点。 鉴于大渡河水深流急，不能架桥，全军无法渡过，军委决定由刘伯承、聂荣臻率领一军团第一师和军委干部团为右纵队，在安顺场用4只木船渡河后沿大渡河东岸前进，占领泸定城；林彪率领一军团二师和五军团为左纵队，沿大渡河西岸前进，抢夺泸定桥。军委纵队和三军团、九军团随后跟进。安顺场到泸定桥320华里，沿途都是山路，还有敌人阻拦。军委要求先头部队用两天半时间赶到。一军团即以第二师第四团（团长王开湘、政委杨成武）为先头团，指战员以大无畏的精神接受了任务。27日晨，他们由安顺场出发，边走边打，28日一天一夜走了240华里，于29日晨6时到达沪定桥西岸，消灭了守敌，占领了西桥头。这时，东岸的红一师也日夜兼程前进，在距泸定县城100里的龙八步将守敌歼灭，使固守泸定县城的敌人（1个团）孤立无援，有力地支援了西岸的战斗。 泸定桥是大渡河上一座用13条铁链连成的悬桥（俗称铁索桥），清康熙四十四年（公元1705年）始建，第二年建成。铁环大拇指粗，一环扣一环相连而成；以9条铁链上铺木板为桥面，桥面2米多宽，每边各有两条铁链为扶手；长约100米，每隔一段，都用铁条横连起来，除摇摆外，人马走起来都很安全。该桥是当年四川通西康、西藏的主要交通要道，地势异常险峻。桥东岸是依山建成的沪定县城，往东就是海拔3000多米的二郎山，桥的西岸连着海拔7000多米的贡嘎大雪山。敌人为阻止红军过桥，在红军未到西岸时，就把桥上的木板全部拆走了，只剩13条铁链在河上悬空摇荡。桥东区还有1个团的炮火守护，敌人以为红军不是天兵天将，是无法飞渡的。