Chapter 41 Wartime Political Work

In December 1946, I was ordered to be transferred to the second column of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region as a political commissar.When I reported to the military region, I learned that Comrade Yang Dezhi, the commander of the first column, was also transferred to the second column as the commander of the second column at the same time as me.After the head of the military region explained the mission, he sent a jeep to take the two of us to the post.At that time, we all knew in our hearts that this trip was not a light one, so all the discussions along the way were how to lead this army well, kill more enemies, win more battles, and live up to the trust of the leaders.Before this, although I did not work with Yang Dezhi, I have heard about him for a long time, and know that he is brave in battle, decisive in command, and well-leading troops. The commando team (later known as the "Seventeen Warriors Crossing the River") forcibly crossed the Dadu River, opened the way for our follow-up troops, and became famous throughout the army.In the car, he also said a lot of good opinions on rectifying the discipline of the troops and improving the military quality of the troops, which made me feel that he is indeed a military commander with rich experience. confidence.After arriving in the second column, we went deep into the army to investigate and study together to understand and analyze the situation of the army. Then he focused on administrative management and military training, and I focused on party building and ideological work. We divided labor and cooperated with each other to support each other, and soon achieved results.In a battle not long after, our column captured more than 2,000 enemies with minimal casualties, captured a lot of weapons, and boosted morale.On April 8, 1947, we led our troops to participate in the Battle of Zhengtai, conquered Ding County, and won the victory of annihilating one regiment of the enemy.In this battle, together with our brother troops, we wiped out two enemy divisions and a large number of reactionary local armed forces totaling more than 35,000 people, controlled more than 360 miles of Zhengda Road, and cut off the connection between Taiyuan and Shijiazhuang enemies.Since then, Shijiazhuang has become an isolated city, opening up the connection between our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei and the Shanxi-Hebei-Luyu Liberated Areas, making our army even stronger.Then, my column was active on the Pinghan Road, launched mobile warfare, and won many battles, especially the "three strikes against Xushui". In one fight, one regiment of the enemy was wiped out, and in three fights, a total of three regiments of the enemy were wiped out, which made me even stronger. Deeply understand Chairman Mao's strategic thinking on fighting mobile warfare.

In May 1947, the National War of Liberation had gradually entered the stage of strategic counter-offensive.According to the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region formally formed the leading body of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army in order to conduct mobile operations. Yang Dezhi was appointed as the commander, Luo Ruiqing was also the first political commissar, and Yang Chengwu was the second political commissar. The third and fourth columns, a total of nine brigades.After Yang Dezhi was transferred from our second column, Chen Zhengxiang succeeded as the commander of the column.

After the reorganization of the troops, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army, in order to cooperate with the Northeast summer offensive and contain the enemies in the Pingjin area, led our second column and brother columns to attack the northern section of Jinpu Road on June 12 and launched the Battle of Qingcang, which lasted until the 15th. That is to say, Qingxian and Cangxian counties were liberated, more than 9,500 enemies were wiped out, and 150 miles of railways were controlled.From June 25th to July 6th, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army took advantage of the enemy's 53rd Army and 43rd Division to reinforce the Northeast, and when the 16th Army was transferred to the east and the northern section of Pinghan Road was empty, they launched a After the Battle of Baobei, I led my second column and my brother's column to attack on Pinghan Road north of Baoding, and wiped out one part each of the 16th and 94th armies, totaling more than 8,000 people.

In early October 1947, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched four divisions from North China to reinforce the Northeast.In order to prevent our army from taking advantage of false attacks, the enemy army in North China concentrated its main force to strengthen the defense along the railway.On October 11th, the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army led our second column and brother column to launch the Battle of Qingfengdian when the enemy's forces were empty, and wiped out more than 17,000 enemies during the campaign.Then, taking advantage of the opportunity when the main force of the third army defending Shijiazhuang was wiped out by me when we reinforced Qingfengdian, the enemy's morale was shaken and the defense was weak, Shijiazhuang was captured on November 12, and more than 24,000 enemies were wiped out.The liberation of Shijiazhuang created a precedent for our army to capture a large enemy city.The two liberated areas of Shanxi, Chahar and Hebei and Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan are connected together, so that the rear of our army is more consolidated and broad, and the situation in North China is one of the new ones.Our second column has also grown rapidly after this year's combat training.

In the winter of 1947, according to the instructions of the Central Committee, the military region, and the field army, our column used the intervals between battles to carry out complaints (complaints about the sufferings of the working people caused by the old society and the reactionaries) and three investigations (inspection of class, investigation of work, and investigation of fighting spirit). A new type of whole-army movement (organization, thought, and work style).According to the actual situation of our column, most of the commanders and fighters at that time came from the children of the anti-Japanese base areas such as Jinchaji, and many young soldiers suffered less from the class oppression and exploitation of landlords and bullies; The number of soldiers liberated from the Kuomintang army in the army is increasing day by day, and most of these "liberation fighters" were born in poor peasants. They were oppressed by landlord bullies, Kuomintang reactionaries and old military officers. In our complaint education, we focused on "liberation fighters", recalled suffering, held large and small meetings to complain, so that all commanders and fighters received class education, and realized the evils of the old society and the two societies (the liberated areas and the Jiang-administered areas). , The essential difference between the two armies (the People's Liberation Army and the Kuomintang Army), so I made up my mind to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek, liberate the whole of China, and never suffer twice or suffer twice.At the same time, we have also carried forward political democracy, economic democracy and military democracy through "three investigations and three rectifications", and we have checked out individual impure elements who have mixed into our army, purified the team, strengthened organizational discipline education, and rectified ideological and military discipline. In order to improve the style of work, a mass troop training campaign was carried out, which made the troops united and took on a new look.This new type of whole-army movement is an important development of our military’s political work and the promotion of the “Three Great Democracies” under the new situation.It has greatly improved the political awareness, organizational discipline, and combat effectiveness of the vast number of commanders and fighters. At the same time, it has also extremely effectively accelerated the process of transforming a large number of "liberation fighters" into soldiers of our army, and accumulated experience in transforming "liberation fighters". The consolidation and expansion of the army and the victory of the battle played a major role.

During the "Three Checks and Three Rectifications" campaign, I often went deep into the troops to understand the situation, and reviewed and summarized the experience and lessons of several battles and battles with cadres at all levels in the past year; Experience in wartime political work in new situations.Every time I summarize and discuss, I listen carefully, memorize carefully, and think carefully when I come back. I contact the experience and lessons of political work in previous battles and battles since the Liberation War, and even wrote a "wartime Several Issues in Political Work" report outline.In early February 1948, Commander Chen Zhengxiang and I presided over a meeting of cadres above the battalion of the entire column.At the meeting, I made this political work report.At this time, although Commander Yang Dezhi had been transferred from the second column, as the commander of the field army, he was still very concerned about the construction and development of the second column. He personally participated in this meeting and gave instructions.Because my political work report comes from the experience and lessons summed up by the masses in actual combat, and now I return to the masses for discussion, which arouses everyone's interest, and they all express their opinions, make supplements and amendments, and make the report more mature. .After the meeting, I carefully thought about it, revised it, and deleted some battles and battles that everyone is familiar with. After discussion and approval by the party committee, a document was formed and issued to the troops for implementation.This has played a good role in improving the leadership style of our column and strengthening wartime political work in the future.Today, when I was reviewing the experience of the Second Column, I opened this report outline again, added some battle cases that were deleted that year, and recorded it below.I think this may help me clarify some of my experience in wartime political work for many years!

As early as the early days of our army's founding, Chairman Mao clearly pointed out: "China's Red Army is an armed group that carries out revolutionary political tasks." ("Mao Zedong Selected Works" Vol. The great and glorious political task of "overthrowing Chiang Kai-shek and liberating the whole of China" was put forward in the "Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" in October 1947.Our political work must ensure that the commanders and fighters of the entire army advance bravely in battles that must be won, resolutely and thoroughly wipe out all enemies, and successfully complete this political task.In order to accomplish this political task, it should adapt to the characteristics of wartime to carry out its work in order to fully play its role and achieve the expected results.Now, I would like to make some suggestions on how to strengthen political work during wartime.

First, several issues that leaders of wartime political work must master: 1. Implement tactical thinking and adapt to tactical requirements. What is our tactical thinking?Our tactical thinking is the tactical thinking of Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu, the thinking of fighting a war of annihilation; it is a positive, active, and offensive tactical thinking, no matter what the situation is.Therefore, political workers must first understand this idea, and political work must ensure that all commanders and fighters understand this idea. Chairman Mao told us in the "Ten Military Principles": "In each battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (twice, three times, four times, and some even five or six times the enemy's force), surround the enemy on all sides, Strive for total annihilation, and not let anyone slip through the net." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Vol. 4, p. 1143) Those who have mastered this idea have won victory; those who have not seriously grasped this idea have only won partial victories or achieved victory. less than victory.Chairman Mao also told us: "Fight the scattered and isolated enemies first, and then the concentrated and powerful ones." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong", Vol. 4, p. 1143) "Fight the weak first, then the strong. What's yours, I'll hit mine (everyone hits his own)". ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong's Military Works" p. 299) In this way, the strong enemy becomes weak.From April 8th to May 4th last year, our second column and our brother column launched the Zhengtai Campaign, attacking the Kuomintang army on Zheng (Ding) Tai (Original) Road, and successively conquered the two counties of Zhengding and Luancheng And more than 90 outlying strongholds in Shijiazhuang, annihilating more than 10,000 enemies.At that time, the enemy army north of Baoding was attacking the Jizhong Liberated Area.The heads of our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region and the Field Army were not restrained by the enemy's actions, and continued to command us to march westward, quickly captured the strongholds east of Yangquan on Zhengda Road, besieged the Yangquan industrial and mining area, and lured two enemy divisions from Taiyuan to come to help, and surrounded the whole area. Annihilated in the Shishiyi area.In this campaign, more than 35,000 enemies were wiped out, the Yangquan industrial and mining area and counties such as Dingping, Shouyang, Huolu, Jingxing, Yuxian, and Dingxiang were conquered, Zhengtai Road was controlled for more than 360 miles, and Taiyuan was cut off. The connection with the enemy of Shijiazhuang made Shijiazhuang an isolated city.Then, from June 12th to 15th, the Battle of Qingcang was launched again, attacking the enemy in the northern section of Jinpu Road, liberating Qingxian and Cangxian counties, annihilating more than 9,500 enemies, and controlling 150 railway lines. ten miles.From June 25th to July 6th, our army took advantage of the enemy's 53rd Army and 34th Division to reinforce the Northeast, and when part of the 16th Army was transferred eastward, when the northern section of Pinghan Road was empty, we moved to the Northeast. Attacking on Pinghan Road north of Baoding, they wiped out one part each of the 16th Army and one part of the 94th Army, totaling more than 8,000 troops.After several consecutive battles, Shijiazhuang became an isolated city, and the Third Army of Chiang Kai-shek's lineage guarding Shijiazhuang also became weak, creating conditions for us to eliminate it and liberate Shijiazhuang.

In early October last year, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched four divisions from North China to reinforce the Northeast battlefield. The enemy forces in North China feared that we would take advantage of false attacks, so they concentrated their main force to strengthen the defense along the railway.In order to cooperate with the operations of the Northeast Field Army, the head of our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region and the Field Army decided to take advantage of the emptiness of the enemy's troops, concentrate the main force to besiege Xushui, attract the enemy to teach, and destroy the enemy during the movement.Therefore, on October 11, we began to attack the Xushui and Gucheng sections of the railway, and then besieged Xushui, preparing to besiege the city and fight for aid.Later, because the aid of the enemy went hand in hand, it was not easy to separate and annihilate, and became a confrontation with the enemy.At this time, it was learned that the enemy's Third Army in Shijiazhuang had left a part of the guards in the city, and the army headquarters led the Seventh Division and commanded a regiment of the Sixteenth Army in an attempt to move northward to Baoding, and cooperated with the enemy's No. The Ninety-Fourth Army and a part of the enemy's Sixteenth Army in the Rongcheng area northeast of Xushui attacked our army from north to south.Due to changes in the enemy's situation, the enemy changed and we changed, the heads of the military region and the field army changed their determination to fight on October 17, except for the fifth brigade of the second column, the seventh and eighth brigades of the third column, and the independent seventh brigade. In the area north of Baoding to contain the enemy and prepare to block aid, on the 19th, I ordered the fourth and sixth brigades of the second column, the ninth brigade of the third column, and the entire fourth column to march southward in preparation for annihilating the enemy. The area south of Fangshun Bridge.Our 4th and 6th brigades marched 125 kilometers day and night. At 2 o'clock on the 21st, we surrounded the enemy in Qingfengdian and the Southwest Hebei area together with our brother troops. On the 22nd, we completely wiped out the enemy There were more than 17,000 people, and Luo Lirong, the commander of the enemy's third army, was captured alive.The victory in the battle of Qingfengdian greatly shook the morale of the rest of the third army defending Shijiazhuang.Our army immediately took advantage of the victory to attack Shijiazhuang on November 6. After six days of fierce fighting, it broke through the enemy's very solid and complete three-line defense and successfully liberated Shijiazhuang.Chairman Mao also told us in the "Ten Military Principles": "Strive to annihilate the enemy in motion." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong" Vol. 4, page 1144) The thinking of fighting mobile warfare is also the consistent tactical thinking of Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu.The characteristic of mobile warfare is to stride forward and retreat in great strides, without a fixed line of battle, sometimes west and sometimes east, sometimes south and sometimes north, you fight yours, I fight mine, each fights its own, lures the enemy into deep, mobilizes the enemy, in the movement annihilate it.The battle at Qingfengdian was a mobile warfare, and the Ping-Han Northern Front Campaign launched from last winter to January this year was also a mobile warfare.After our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Field Army liberated Shijiazhuang, the enemy tried their best to consolidate the defenses in the triangular areas of (Bei) Ping, (Tianjin) and Bao (Ding) and along the railway lines, and hurriedly dispatched troops from Beiping to Laishui, Zhuoxian, and Ding in the south. Xing, Xushui, Baoding and other areas.In order to disperse and mobilize the enemy, our army, in addition to the sixth column pretending to besiege Baoding to attract the enemy, the main force went north from Ding County, smashed the enemy's railway line, and looked for opportunities to wipe out the enemy.The enemy is a mechanized force, moving back and forth on the Ping-Han and Ping-Sui roads by trains and cars; we rely on two legs to run back and forth in the mountains between the Ping-Han line and the Ping-Sui line, looking for fighters near the two lines.After twisting and turning in this way, more than 5,000 troops from the new 32nd Division of the enemy's new division were wiped out in Zhuangding near Laishui, and Li Mingding, the commander of the enemy division, was killed; In the headquarters of the 15th Army, more than 600 enemies were killed and injured, and the enemy commander Lu Yinglin was killed; in the battles of Wucun and Gaoluo, the 101st Division of the 35th Army, the "ace" of the enemy, was defeated. Killed and wounded six or seven hundred enemies.

We review the victories achieved in implementing the tactical thinking of Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu in the past ten months. The purpose is to enable cadres at all levels to learn from them, to understand this tactical thinking more deeply, and to use successful battle examples to fight against the vast number of soldiers. Propaganda and explanation, so that every soldier understands this tactical thinking.Otherwise, in such a situation where combat operations are frequent, turned around, or even lost, we are always busy explaining the work, and political work sometimes appears passive and powerless.At the same time, when we publicize and explain our tactical thinking, we must also clarify that our combat principle is "to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy"; the tactical requirement is "to obtain a large victory with a small sacrifice", and only fight battles that are prepared and sure , It's not the desperateism of slapping Hu Yu.Therefore, if the superior decides to fight, everyone must work together to wipe out the enemy bravely.Advocate fighting with wisdom, and advocate bravery plus technology; if you don't fight, you will be done, and if you fight, you will wipe out the enemy, so as to achieve the goal of small casualties and great victory.

Now many soldiers and even ordinary people understand our tactics, such as saying: "Turn around and we are about to win the battle." Tell the whole army and people that this is very beneficial.This is not a secret, and there is nothing the enemy can do if they know it. Since our tactical thinking is to concentrate superior forces to fight a war of annihilation and mobile warfare, it is very important to coordinate operations in corps operations in order to win the war of annihilation.In our political work, we must ensure unity in combat, coordination of actions, and resolute execution of orders. Everything must be based on the overall situation, and everything is for the purpose of annihilating the enemy.However, there are still three kinds of erroneous ideas in our army: The first kind of erroneous thinking is willing to attack and unwilling to block.Because offensive wars generally have many prisoners and captures, and the results are remarkable; while blocking wars sometimes have to withstand the impact of several times the enemy's strength, resulting in heavy casualties and few captures. The second kind of erroneous thinking is that they cannot correctly handle the relationship between local interests and overall interests, lack the spirit of active cooperation in battle, and wait and see each other.In January of this year, the third column attacked Laishui County and defended the enemy. Our second column gathered in Yaocun and Tanghu, west of the Juma River, to cover the third column's attack on the city and wait for reinforcements.In order to break the siege of Laishui, the enemy urgently dispatched the 101st Division (with two infantry regiments led by the division headquarters) and the newly formed 32nd Division to help them by car on January 11.That night, the enemy's new 32nd Division encountered the 3rd Column at Zhuangding near Laishui; .At this time, the head of the field army quickly changed his determination to fight, and decided that our second and third columns should first annihilate the reinforcements, and then annihilate Laishui to defend the enemy.A brigade of our column first encountered the enemy's 101st Division and organized a counterattack. After half a day's fighting, we launched two attacks and compressed the enemy into Wu Village (a small village with only about 200 households), and carried out four more attacks that night. Attack, to kill the enemy.However, due to poor coordination, we failed to hold the bank of the Juma River. Before our main force arrived, the enemy had already crossed the river and fled across the river. We only fought a defeat battle, but failed to wipe out the enemy. This lesson should be learned. The third kind of erroneous thinking is to only focus on the number of captures, not on the completion of the task of annihilating the enemy; sometimes, after completing a difficult task, the casualties are large, but the capture is very few, which leads to unhappiness or complaints.Comrades with such erroneous ideas should learn from the Fourth Brigade.In the battle of Qingfengdian, the enemy's third army, under the attack of our army, attempted to break through to the east, but was intercepted by our fourth and twelfth brigades in the Southwest Hebei area.The commanders and fighters of the fourth brigade only ate one meal a day and night, traveled a long distance of 125 kilometers, and arrived at the predetermined area four to six hours ahead of schedule at a speed four times that of the enemy, and immediately went into battle. They were brave and tenacious, and suffered heavy casualties until the brother troops rushed to encircle and wiped out the enemy, but they themselves did not take many prisoners. They did not complain about this and showed a noble style. praise.They have done great service to the people for the benefit of the whole, for the victory of the whole, and not for their own capture. With regard to the above-mentioned three kinds of erroneous ideas existing in our troops, none of them must be prevented, and some of them must be overcome quickly and firmly. If we want to implement the tactical thinking and fight the war of annihilation well, leading cadres at all levels must plan carefully and be resolute and courageous.Regardless of military, political, and logistical work, it should be carefully planned according to objective conditions such as the enemy's situation, our own situation, terrain, and climate.It is not enough to have a careful plan. To make the plan come true, we must develop a resolute and courageous fighting spirit, that is to say, we must have the determination and ambition to destroy the enemy.To be resolute and courageous is to be reckless, not only soldiers should be like this, but cadres should lead by example.In the past battles, we have found that individual cadres who fled the battle, or even individual battalion cadres who charged and retreated, were not resolute and courageous, but shameful deserters, and should be punished by discipline and even military law. One more point should be explained: the head of the field army once told us not to fight if the situation is unclear (of course not absolute); not to fight if not prepared; not to fight if not sure.But this is only the basis for the high-level command to make up their minds, not everyone below can use this excuse not to fight because they are not sure.We must tell the soldiers and cadres widely so that everyone can trust the wise command of the superiors, strengthen their confidence in victory, and resolutely implement the orders of the superiors. Second, master the characteristics of mobile warfare to carry out political work. The battles we are fighting now are mainly mobile warfare. Therefore, we must grasp the characteristics of mobile warfare to carry out political work, so as to adapt to the war.What are the characteristics of mobile warfare? One is that the situation is changing rapidly.The situation between ourselves and the enemy, the nature of the battle, the battlefield, terrain, fortifications, and people's conditions are constantly changing, sometimes rapidly.Because the enemy can still use railways and roads to transport troops at present, they can move quickly.For example, in the battle between Wucun and Gaoluo, the enemy's 101st Division rushed from Baoding to Wucun and Gaoluo by car in just one day and one night, preparing to reinforce Laishui to defend the enemy, and the speed was quite fast.When we found the enemy, we hadn't found out the enemy's number and strength, so we rushed into battle.This is also an objective reason for the failure to wipe out the enemy. Second, tasks change rapidly.Due to the rapid change of the situation, tasks such as offense, defense, field, village, assault, reinforcement, and pursuit must change quickly with the change of the situation. The third is that there are many marches and many transfers.If we want to mobilize the enemy and make great strides to advance and retreat in order to seize opportunities to annihilate the enemy, we must march more and move frequently.Therefore, it is necessary to tell all commanders and fighters to do a few things not to be afraid: one is not afraid to walk more, and they must learn to walk.We must learn from the indomitable spirit of the Fourth Brigade who marched 125 kilometers a day and a night.They usually practiced "scud legs", walking and running; a few who couldn't walk just rolled and crawled, and they rushed to Qingfengdian on time via Renqiu and Gaoyang from the Baxian area in the northeast of Xushui, and immediately went into battle .Some comrades said: "Victory is at our feet", which is absolutely true. If we did not do this, we would not be able to win the Qingfengdian battle.Two, don't be afraid of going the wrong way, and don't be afraid of missing the mark.Because we want to capture fighters, sometimes we may not be able to catch the enemy. Sometimes we find the enemy, but the enemy's situation, terrain and other conditions are not good for us, so we can't fight.Three are not afraid of walking at night.In order to keep secrets and prevent reconnaissance and bombing by enemies in the air and on the ground, it is also necessary to travel at night.Four is not afraid of fatigue, not afraid of difficulties.We must overcome fatigue and all difficulties to win the victory. Fourth, time is tight and there is a lot of work.We marched and fought continuously in the first half of last year, and only had two rests. The total was only more than 20 days, and the work was very urgent.If we don't seize the time to carry out political work in flexible and diverse ways such as marching talks, meetings, individual talks, group talks, and political briefings, then the more we need political work, the less political work we will have. Fifth, there is a large turnover of troops.Due to continuous operations and the development of wars, the casualties, promotions, transfers, and replenishments of cadres and soldiers are very frequent. Sometimes, after a company has fought several battles, almost most of its personnel are renewed.This requires continuous strengthening of ideological and political work and organizational work to ensure the soundness of various organizations in the army and the inheritance and development of fine traditional styles. 3. The tasks and requirements of wartime political work. According to the above characteristics of mobile warfare, what are the specific tasks and requirements of wartime political work? First, we must carry out repeated and uninterrupted political work, strengthen our resolve, and increase our confidence.When mobilizing, under the condition of keeping secrets, we must announce the mission and put forward the requirements, so that all commanders and fighters can clearly understand the mission and know it well.After mobilization, we must check our determination step by step, solve some of the problems raised below, and carry out political work throughout the entire campaign.At present, some units have work in the front, but not in the rear; soldiers have it, but cadres do not; Second, there must be predictability.What battles might we fight, where might we go, and what enemies might we fight?What kind of fighters do we have and what might happen?It is necessary to investigate and study in advance, prepare plans, and arrange work.With investigation and research, there is predictability, and work can be carried out proactively.For example, before we went to fight in some mountainous areas last year, we learned in advance that the mountainous areas are sparsely populated and the roads are rugged;Therefore, when mobilizing, tell the troops in advance that they may encounter difficulties in marching, drinking water, lodging, and eating when fighting in mountainous areas. When encountering difficulties, everyone does not speak strange words.Later, due to the active support of the masses and the hard work of the logistics work, the difficulties were reduced, and everyone was very satisfied.However, the political work in some of our troops is rarely investigated and studied, and the work is often arranged in a subjective "one, two, three, four" manner, and even "one, two, three, four" is no longer there.Often when the situation changes, it is impossible to cope.Here, I want to emphasize one point in particular, that is, the reconnaissance, judgment, and estimation of the enemy's situation in investigation and research are very important, and there is no room for sloppy or subjectivist guesses and assumptions.Because the overestimation of the enemy's situation will easily lead to fear of the enemy; underestimation will lead to underestimation of the enemy and paralysis.In the Wucun and Gaoluo battles in January this year, due to poor reconnaissance work, we fought with the enemy for several hours, and the enemy's designation and strength were still unknown.I began to think that this enemy was the new second army unit (that is, the miscellaneous army adapted from the puppet army Liu Huanan's army), with only one regiment in strength, and the combat effectiveness was not strong, so I underestimated the enemy.After capturing several prisoners for interrogation twice and checking the symbols worn by the prisoners, it was confirmed that they were troops of the enemy's 101st Division, but they still refused to believe it, thinking that it was a trick played by the enemy, and still belittled the enemy.On the afternoon of the 12th, the enemy had been compressed to Wu Village, and we launched another attack without adequate preparation and careful deployment.Later, when I saw that the enemy had a large number of troops and strong firepower, and failed to overcome four consecutive attacks, I knew that I had indeed encountered the enemy's "ace" 101st Division, but I overestimated the enemy, hesitated, and waited for the main force to reinforce; On the morning of the 3rd, it was discovered that the enemy was building a bridge over the Juma River to transfer the wounded, but they failed to decisively block the enemy's retreat across the river and hold the enemy back. As a result, the enemy escaped. The third is to seek truth from facts, be proactive, grasp the situation in a timely manner, and deal with it effectively.The spirit of seeking truth from facts in political work is very important. There have been such lessons in history: In the autumn of 1945, shortly after the Japanese imperialists announced their surrender, our field column of the Jizhong Military Region was ordered to drive from Jizhong to Zhangjiakou to carry out the battle to defend Zhangjiakou Task.During the march, it was found that a small number of Jizhong soldiers were unwilling to stay away from their hometowns, afraid of crossing the Pinghan Road, and afraid of going to Zhangjiakou.Faced with this situation, some camp instructors are not actively doing ideological and political work, but resorting to deception.The troops clearly wanted to cross Pinghan Road, but the instructor insisted: "We promise not to cross the railway." After crossing the road, he insisted: "We promise that we will never reach Zhangjiakou." In the end, they still arrived in Zhangjiakou, and the soldiers were very dissatisfied and damaged. The prestige of political work.Therefore, our political work must not deceive cadres, soldiers, or ordinary people. Our tactics are offensive, active and active, so our political agitation slogans should also be offensive, active and active.When our army was mobilized before the war, we held a swearing-in meeting, launched a competition for killing the enemy and making meritorious deeds, and proposed: "Whoever is a hero, who is a hero, compare the battlefield", "Kill more enemies and pay more guns, and send good news to your hometown for meritorious service" and other slogans. It is a good slogan to motivate fighting spirit.In battle, it is also very useful to raise agitation slogans at the right time according to the combat mission.For example, during the Gaoyan battle last year, when a company of the 11th Regiment crossed the river to pursue the enemy, the enemy tried to counterattack. Fight the enemy bravely.During the battles of Wucun and Gaoluo, the 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment confronted the enemy. Both sides wanted to charge. The enemy's attack plan.These are positive, proactive, offensive slogans. Political agitation slogans must be clear, affirmative, brief and forceful.Some slogans are too long to memorize; even when they are shouted in sections, they have opposite meanings and have a counterproductive effect. This is not good.When we put forward a slogan, we must also combine the slogan, order and action so that the slogan can be truly carried out.During the battles of Wucun and Gaoluo, the 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment issued an order for the company to charge and put forward the slogans of "strike first to be the strongest" and "charge to kill the enemy and make meritorious service". The deputy battalion commander and instructor led the company to charge again. It's good to go up and take back the house that the enemy has taken.Conversely, after a company commander gave the order to charge and put forward the slogan of "charge, kill the enemy and make meritorious service", he himself flinched, and the influence was very bad, so he had to be given disciplinary action. If we want to do a good job in political work, we must also be good at mobilizing the masses and giving play to the slogans of creativity and action that come from the masses.That is to say, not only political workers must do political work, but military commanders and fighters should also actively do political work.During the Wucun and Gaoluo battles, when some people discovered that the defending enemy was Fu Zuoyi's "ace" 101st Division, they panicked. At this time, a soldier suggested: "Whether it belongs to Fu Zuoyi or Liu Huanan Yes, we must destroy it!" What a resolute and heroic battle cry!However, the instructor of this company not only did not use and promote this slogan to motivate the soldiers to destroy the enemy, but instead said "the situation is changing", such hesitation and discouragement of the enemy, which further fueled the panic of some soldiers.This instructor is really not as good as that soldier. Another example is that when the Sixth Brigade was studying the three major disciplines and eight precautions recently, the soldiers automatically wrote letters of determination and challenges to implement the three major disciplines and eight precautions, and posted them on the wall newspaper, forming a Everyone consciously observes discipline and supervises each other's good atmosphere.These are the conscious creations of soldiers, and we should quickly carry them forward and spread them to the entire army. Fourth, we must be flexible and maneuver without losing the opportunity.The situation in wartime changes rapidly, and we must have a certain degree of flexibility in our slogans and questions.For example, when issuing combat missions and carrying out political mobilization, according to the situation at the time, it may be proposed that a certain unit be the main attack and a certain unit be a feint.However, after the battle is launched, the main attack direction is blocked, and the feint attack direction is the enemy's weakness. At this time, military commanders and political leading cadres should act accordingly, change the deployment, change the feint attack direction to the main attack direction, and issue new tasks in time. Put forward a new battle cry to motivate the troops to seize the enemy's weakness to attack the enemy and strive for victory in the battle.If the troops are in a hurry to act due to a temporary change of task, and have no time to work, we can mobilize while acting, without losing the opportunity. Fifth, be firm and tenacious.Political work is most needed in emergencies, especially setbacks, because at that time the mind is the most confused, and if political work is not carried out in time, problems are most likely to occur, and delays will lead to missed opportunities and losses.Therefore, political work must be carried out in a timely manner to find problems and solve them quickly.In the case of setbacks, we should do the following things well: First of all, we must grasp ideological trends in a timely manner, conduct propaganda and explanations, quickly restore and improve the organization, reorganize forces, replenish cadres, and quickly stabilize the mood of the troops. Then, we must quickly review the lessons learned, find out the main reasons for the setbacks, praise heroes and heroes, deal with wavering elements, educate the troops to learn lessons, prepare to fight again, avenge the martyrs who died, and recover losses.At this time, news of the victory of the brotherly troops should also be spread to boost morale.But the good news must be true. In the past, some troops falsely reported the situation in order to cheer up their neighbors, which was a violation of discipline. At the same time, it is necessary to organize special personnel to quickly and properly deal with the aftermath, rescue and transfer the wounded, and bury the remains of the martyrs.However, it is not allowed to gather the remains of the wounded and martyrs together, let alone place them on the side of the marching road or at the crossing, so as not to affect the mood of the troops. When the troops suffer setbacks, it is very useful for the superiors to explain, encourage and condolence in person.At this time, the superior leader can also mobilize the neighboring troops to write condolences and encouragement to the frustrated troops, or mobilize the two troops to write letters of encouragement or compete with each other.In short, under such circumstances, cadres at all levels should not be depressed. Any military commander or political worker who is downcast is showing his infirmity, and this infirmity is enough to affect the troops. 第二，战时政治工作的领导作风与工作方法问题。 由于战时情况、任务变化得快，政治工作的领导作风就必须发扬高度的战斗性，以战斗的姿态，抓紧时间，利用空隙，雷厉风行地去开展政治工作。要习惯于边行军边做工作，边打仗边做工作。情况不允许时，可以写条子；敌人火力密集通不过去，还可以用石头绑着条子扔过去；不能大声说话，可用接耳宣传。说比不说好，做比不做强，反对拖拉等待，反对打“哑巴仗”。工作中“宁可准备过早，不可失之过迟”。 我们提倡战斗作风，并不能因此而工作简单化。在工作中，仍应深入、细致、扎实。当我们领受任务之后，就要在党委的统一领导之下，集中计划，然后分配干部下去，就地传达，就地教育，就地检查，就地解决，就地总结，一抓到底。一般说来，战时要上面的同志多下去，不要下面的同志多上来。作为上级干部，要尽可能实行面对面的领导，重点检查与帮助下级。要分别一个团、一个营、一个连或一个问题去检查，才能抓深抓细。在实行集中计划、分散领导的情况下，上级领导还应掌握一定的机动力量。因为在战斗紧张时，常常电话不通，写信派通讯员也不行，这时派出得力干部当“通讯员”是非常需要、非常重要的。过去有些同志认为把他当作机动干部是轻视他，这种想法不对。如沧县战斗时，我们的一科科长王又新就当了“通讯员”，马上下去第五旅传达任务和首长指示，起了很好的作用。我们的工作要发挥创造性，不要固守老一套，要适应情况与任务，创造新的工作方式方法。创造性那里来呢？上面我已经讲过，主要来自群众。只有走群众路线，向群众学习，新的东西就出来了。我们一方面固然要反对老一套，但另一方面对“老一套”要有辩证的看法。有些老一套的东西对一些没有这老一套的部队和人来说还是新的；老一套的东西里面也有新的内容。如三大纪律八项注意二十年前就有了，但今天还如同新的，这是由于人员变了，或者没有很好地教育，或很久以前教育过，现在已经淡忘了，仍然需要反复教育。 要培养战斗作风，必须坚决做到“五到、五快”。 所谓“五到”： 一是口到。要随时讲到问到工作怎样做法，工作有何困难，有何成绩和经验？ 二是脚到。工作布置以后，脚就要走出指挥部，到下面去。 三是眼到。要随时看看下边的工作情况，但不是走马观花，而是要看出问题来。 四是耳到。要听听下面的汇报，听听大家的呼声。 五是脑筋到。要开动脑筋，时时考虑连队的工作，发现新情况，解决新问题。如果不开动脑筋，那末口到、脚到、眼到、耳到都是形式的，即使发现了问题，也不可能很好地解决。 所谓“五快”，就是： 一要布置、动员、解释快。今天要做的工作，不要拖延到明天；现在应做的工作，不要拖延等一会；更不要纵队今天传达，旅明天传达，团后天传达，营大后天传达，一个挨一个，不知什么时候才传达到战士那里去。以后可多开“一揽子”会议（但党的会议与行政会议要分清，要分开），或由上级派人下去传达。 二是整理组织快。特别是战时，组织一有变化，应立即整理，健全起来。在条件许可时，可用民主选举；不可能时，即指定临时代理人。 三是总结经验教训快。一边进行工作，一边搜集材料，工作一结束就应总结。 四是上下级联系、反映情况快。上级首长和领导机关应该深入基层，反对官僚主义作风；但下面也要及时把情况反映上来。现在一些部队执行报告制度很差，有时来的报告繁杂冗长，抓不住中心，甚至“克里空”。今后把主要的收获和经验教训报告上来就行了。写报告来不及，电话报告或派人来口头汇报都行，目的就是要快。 五是解决问题快。我们的政治工作，不仅要了解情况，提出问题，更重要的是要解决问题。如果不能解决问题，或解决问题慢，在今天部队频繁地运动和作战的情况下，政治工作将成为“马后炮”，失掉应起的作用。 要做到“五到、五快”，必须树立两个观念： 一是责任观念。要有对战争高度负责的观念，不怕一切疲劳、困难和牺牲，以不屈不挠、坚忍不拔、积极进攻的精神去完成任务，争取战斗的胜利。 二是时间观念。现在我们不是有没有时间的问题，而是能不能争取和利用时间的问题。我们不要浪费一分钟、一秒钟的时间，行军和作战的环境中，也要紧张地去进行工作。同时，我们要善于科学支配时间，使一分钟、一秒钟都发挥作用。在这里，我们要求每个同志在时间上要照顾别人，照顾上级，照顾下级，坚决反对工作中的本位主义。反对罗嗦，反对清谈，反对净是和别人争时间的消极态度。 要做到“五到、五快”，还必须实现下面的几点要求： 一是上下一致。因为我们是一个战斗的整体，各项工作都是相互联系的，要快，上下都要快。团以上机关的拖拉作风必须迅速纠正，如下达命令、指示，就要讨论快，起草快，审查快，写得快，校对快，印得快，发得快；下边的同志接到命令、指示后，也要研究快，布置快，检查快，总结快。就象一部机器，马达一发动，各部机件都运转起来，工作效率就提高了。 二是军政一致。军政干部要在党委统一领导下，互相配合协调，不要各干各的。要多开些联席会议，进行讨论研究。党委决定后，军事、政治、后勤工作，各负其责，齐头并进。 三是善于组织与使用力量。工作要有重点，不要平均使用力量。同时，各级领导应掌握一定的机动力量，随时使用到突击方向上去。 四是工作任务要明确具体。要抓住每个时期的中心任务，再辅以其他第二位、第三位的工作。但每个时期的工作任务不可过重，以免影响中心任务。机关各部门都要围绕中心任务开展工作，不可各搞一套。 五是在战时，司政机关与领导干部，应尽量靠拢，住在一处，以便及时商量工作。过去有的因喜欢住得舒服，怕集中一起住宿拥挤，这种现象要立即纠正。 第三，对战时政治工作人员的要求。 战时政治工作的好坏，政治工作人员负有主要责任。因此，要求政治工作人员： 一要开动机器，动脑筋、想办法，经常调查研究部队的情况，集中精力搞好本职工作。现在有些政治工作人员，把自己的工作重点放在军事指挥上面，放弃了本职的工作，这是错误的。产生这种情况，一方面固然是这些同志出于对争取战斗胜利的责任感；但另一方面，有的同志对政治工作不熟悉，又不很好钻研；个别同志还夹杂着一些个人英雄主义的成分。我们应该明确，政治工作人员在军事指挥上只是协助军事指挥员，不能越沮代庖，放弃本职工作去代替军事指挥员指挥。 要做好本职工作，必须细心研究上级指示，及时主动地了解上级意图。 现在有些同志不认真研究、学习上级的命令、指示，这是政治责任心不强的表现。我们不仅要很好地研究上级的命令、指示，而且应该及时主动地去了解、领会上级的意图，遇到不明确的间题，还要主动地请教同级或请示上级，切勿敷衍了事。 二是军政干部最好同时受领任务，如情况不允许，受领任务回来的同志，应及时向没有去的同志传达，共同商量布置工作。 三是政治工作人员的位置，原则上是哪里需要就到哪里去。但一个指导员带一个班去冲锋，放弃了对全连的领导是不对的。营长和教导员有时可以分散，一般以在一起为好。团长、政委、政治处主任也应在一起好，但不是机械的。这样便于商量工作，及时处理问题。 四要充分发挥连队党支部的战斗堡垒作用。连队党支部是战斗的堡垒；党员、小组长、支委和功臣、模范是连队的战斗骨干。要在党支部的领导下，更好地团结教育骨干，发挥他们的模范带头作用，形成一个坚强的战斗集体，带动群众去完成各项战斗任务。 五要严格掌握战场纪律。政治工作人员要有高度的组织纪律性，一切行动听指挥，做到令行禁止。特别是要严格掌握战场纪律，提高警惕性，防止发生逃亡、投降、投敌和制造、传播谣言等政治事故，对战场投敌分子应该采取紧急处置，任何人部可以用强硬的手段制止投敌行为，直至开枪把他打死。对临阵畏缩分子，要加强思想教育，并组织骨干帮助、监督他，防止发生事故。 第四，战场爱兵问题。 战场爱兵最重要的是爱惜战士的生命，也就是说，要避免一切可能避免的伤亡，特别是避免大量的伤亡。现在之所以要这样着重提倡它，是因为我们的精心计划、战术素养、军事技术和战场纪律还不够好的缘故。 怎样实行战场爱兵呢？我看过一本苏联小说，叫《恐惧与无畏》。这本书里有一段对话对我很有启发。指挥官潘菲洛夫说：“打仗前不要可怜士兵，但打仗时要好好爱护士兵。”他要求军官要用智谋、用战术、用智慧战胜敌人。他说：“你用刺刀只能杀一个敌人，但你用智谋可以杀敌人一千个。”潘菲洛夫在一次战斗发起之前对他的营长莫梅什乌雷说：“你指挥一营人作战，是不容易的事情。”营长表示决心说：“但是我若牺牲，我会光荣牺牲的！”他就问道：“是同一营人一块牺牲吗？”营长回答说：“是的，同全营一块！”潘菲洛夫听了营长这样的回答，便风趣而又意味深长地说：“谢谢你这样的指挥员！噢，你说得这样容易，一营中有七百个人。你能统率一营人，打十次、二十次、三十次仗并能保持这一营人，这样，士兵们才会感谢你的。” 毛主席告诉我们：“战争的基本原则是保存自己消灭敌人。”（《毛泽东选集》第一卷第147页）因为只有保存自己的有生力量，才能消灭敌人；只有消灭敌人的有生力量，才能更有效地保存自己，这是辩证的统一。上面引用苏联指挥官潘菲洛夫的那番话，说的也是怎样在战场上爱兵，保存自己，消灭敌人的道理。 怎样更好地保存自己、消灭敌人，达到爱兵的目的呢？俗话说：“平时多流汗，战时少流血”，“苦练出精兵”，“艺高人胆大”，就是说平时要苦练，不要可怜士兵，不要单纯的、无原则的怕士兵疲劳（当然也要避免不必要的疲劳）；而要通过教育训练，提高部队的军政紊养，把兵练精。战斗前要做好深入细致的调查研究，精心计划，火力组织、力量配备、队形运用、地形选择、通信联络、侦察警戒、救护伤员、指定代理人等等，都要周密地考虑到。在战斗中要坚定、沉着、果敢，灵活机动地指挥，搞好协同配合，尽可能避免无谓的伤亡。那种不调查不研究，凭主观臆断，按个人情绪去乱碰乱撞的“鲁莽家”，在今天是不会成为英雄的。再者，军政干部战前制定计划时，在时间、条件允许的情况下，应走群众路线，召开“诸葛亮会议”，充分发扬军事民主，使战斗计划更趋完善，保证战斗任务胜利完成。只有这样，才能达到爱兵的目的，才是对党、对革命、对战士高度负责的表现。 战时政治工作的好坏，是检验平时政治工作好坏的标志，决不能“平时不烧香，急时抱佛脚”。平时政治工作的好坏，也可以检验政治工作人员的政治责任心、军政素养和实际工作水平。要提高军政素养和工作水平只有好好学习。因此，我们政治工作人员要反对故步自封、骄傲自满、自以为是的坏作风，树立好学上进的好风气。 这次营以上干部会议后，无论政工干部或军事、后勤干部，对战时政治工作的地位和作用都有了较明确的认识，进一步加强了全纵队的政治工作，使二纵领导机关和领导干部改进了作风，更自觉地深入连队进行调查研究和指导，使政治工作更有针对性和战斗性，把政治工作与提高部队的战斗力紧密结合起来。在此后参加察南、保北等战役的过程中，政治工作发挥了更大的作用，保证了战役战斗的胜利。 一九五零年十二月，杨得志和我率志愿军第十九兵团入朝参战前，兵团政治部曾将我的上述报告提纲翻印下发到连队，供干部学习参考。此后，解放军高等军事学院、政治学院也曾将这个报告提纲编入战时政治工作经验参考教材，发给学员学习参考。This is something. 一九四八年五月，解放战争逐步转入战略决战阶段，晋冀鲁豫、晋察冀解放区合并为华北解放区，成立了中共华北局和华北军区，聂荣臻为司令员，薄一波为政治委员，徐向前、膝代远、肖克为副司令员，赵尔陆为参谋长，罗瑞卿为政治部主任，下辖第一、第二、第三兵团。我第二纵队隶属第三兵团。杨成武任兵团司令员，李井泉任政治委员。我二纵队在军区和兵团首长指挥下，又一次向绥远进军。