Chapter 17 The Eastern Army entered Fujian twice

As early as June 20, 1932, the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area issued the "Resolution on Winning and Accomplishing the First Victory of the Revolution in Jiangxi and its Adjacent Provinces and Regions" in accordance with the military instruction issued by the Provisional Central Committee on June 5, demanding that "the Central Committee The Red Army in the Soviet Area should quickly seek consecutive victories in the Ganjiang River Basin, with the aim of capturing the cities of Ganzhou, Ji'an, Zhangshu, Nanchang, Jiujiang, etc.; , Open up with the Northeast Jiangxi Soviet Area, and become the eastern wing for the first victory in Jiangxi."Since the fourth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" had begun shortly after the resolution was passed, the main force of the Red Army failed to enter Fujian to fight for the victory of Jiangxi's "Eastern Wing". It was not until July 1933 that the "Eastern Army" was formed to enter Fujian.

Different from the leaders of "Left" adventurism, Comrade Mao Zedong actively proposed based on the new situation after the "September 18th" Incident in 1931 and the "January 28th" Incident in 1932 that set off an upsurge of anti-Japanese national salvation in the whole country. The main force of the Red Army on the one hand should go to the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area, organize anti-Japanese forces by aiding Shanghai in the Anti-Japanese War, launch political offensives, and expose Chiang Kai-shek’s treacherous plot, so as to promote the development of the national anti-countermeasures climax, and at the same time open up the Central Soviet Area and the Fujian-Zhejiang-Jiangxi border area To expand the Soviet area, expand the Red Army, and prepare conditions for the future counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression".However, the leaders of "Left" adventurism not only did not adopt Comrade Mao Zedong's opinion, but mistakenly labeled him as "opposing the Central Committee's offensive line", "guerrillaism", and "Right-leaning conservatism", and continued to exclude Mao Zedong comrade's correct leadership of the party and the Red Army.They asked Comrade Mao Zedong to work in the Soviet Central Government on the pretext of the need for government work. In early November 1931, they removed him from the position of Secretary of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area; In October 1932, Comrade Mao Zedong was removed from the post of General Political Commissar of the Red Front Army.

In January 1933, the provisional Party Central Committee headed by Bogu had difficulty gaining a foothold in the White Area and was forced to withdraw to the Central Soviet Area.On May 12, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission added Bogu and Xiang Ying as members of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and on the grounds that the Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, Comrade Zhu De, led the First Front Army to command operations in the front, Xiang Ying was appointed to act as the chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission for eight months. For a long time, he commanded the Red Army throughout the country, enabling the mistakes of "Left" adventurism to be more directly promoted in the Soviet area and the Red Army.

The leaders of "Left" adventurism were dazzled by the fourth victory against "encirclement and suppression", even though each victory was achieved when Zhou Enlai and Comrade Zhu De resolutely resisted the "Left" wrong command of the Central Committee , was the victory of Mao Zedong's military thought, but they blindly advocated that this victory was the result of implementing their "correct Bolshevik political line and practical work", thus further contributing to their subjectivism and dogmatism errors, This caused "Left" adventurism to flood the Red Army.Wang Ming, Bo Gu, Xiang Ying and others had no actual work experience, especially no experience in commanding operations, and they did not absorb the rich experience of smashing the enemy's first, second, and third "encirclement and suppression" campaigns, and they did not pay attention to the actual situation of battlefield commanders. Experience, without investigating and studying the specific conditions of the Central Soviet Area and the Central Red Army, blindly and subjectively put forward many "left" slogans, and determined many urgent tasks that could not be realized: such as "raising millions, reddening thousands of miles", "creating millions "Iron Red Army", "fight regular warfare", "attack from all fronts", "hit people with two fists", etc., all of which are rigidly copied from the Soviet Union's experience.Bogu and others also tried their best to rely on and elevate their military adviser Li De (German, formerly known as Otto Braun, graduated from the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow in 1932, worked in the Eastern Department of the Communist International, and Wang He had a good relationship with Ming Dynasty. Later, he was sent by the Soviet intelligence agency to Northeast China to do intelligence work. Because he couldn’t stay in Northeast China, he transferred to Shanghai and was hired by Xiang Ying as a military adviser), especially in October 1933. After coming to the Central Soviet Area from Shanghai, Bogu and Xiang Ying even let him take the actual command of the Red Army, making him the "commander-in-chief" who took over all the work of the Military Commission, thus actually depriving Comrades Zhou Enlai and Zhu De of their authority. military command.

The so-called "beating people with two fists" proposed by them is to separate the two main forces of the First Red Army and the Third Red Army of the Red Army in an attempt to win in two strategic directions at the same time.Originally, since the formation of the Red Front Army in August 1930, the First and Third Armies have never been separated under the leadership and command of Mao Zedong, Zhu De and other comrades.The two legions fought side by side, cooperated with each other, twisted into a rope, invincible, forming an invincible fist to hit the enemy.However, under the erroneous decision-making of "hitting people with two fists" by the "Left" adventurist leader, the two main forces were divided, and the forces to fight the enemy were dispersed.In the summer of 1933, they were afraid that the altars and pots in the base area would be smashed by the enemy, so they formed the Central Army with a regiment as the main body. They took the front lines of Yihuang, Le'an, and Nanfeng in Jiangxi to contain the enemies of Chongren and Jinxi, and guarded the Central Army. The northern gate of the Soviet area deprived it of the opportunity to maneuver and nimbly annihilate the enemy, and failed to play its due role (During the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" in December 1933, it was once again reorganized with the First Army as the main force into the " "Western Army", steadily blocking the "encirclement and suppression" of the enemy in the Central Soviet Area, also lost the opportunity for mobile operations).At the same time, an order was issued on July 1, 1933, to form the Eastern Army mainly from the Third Army Corps (temporarily lacking the Sixth Red Division), including the Nineteenth Red Division in Fujian. Peng Dehuai was appointed as the commander, and Teng Daiyuan was appointed as the political commissar.In order to cooperate with the operation, the Red Thirty-Fourth Division and the local armed forces in some divisions of the Fujian-Jiangxi Military Region were also ordered to be under the command of Peng and Teng nearby.After the formation of the Eastern Army, on July 2, the Third Red Army led the Red Fourth Division and the Fifth Division to set off from the Toupi area of ​​Guangchang, Jiangxi, and marched towards Fujian via Xin'an, Danxi, Yiqian, and Shicheng in two routes. Arrived at the area west of Ninghua on the 5th of the month and gathered to carry out the combat mission of recovering the Liancheng and Xinquan Soviet areas occupied by the 19th Route Army in western Fujian and opening up a new Soviet area in northern Fujian.In fact, at that time, because there was no coordination and cooperation of the Red First Army, although the Eastern Army fought hard, they struggled alone, exhausted, and failed to achieve the greatest possible victory. This is a profound historical lesson.

Although the Eastern Army was a product of "Left" adventurism, under the correct leadership of Commander-in-Chief Zhu De of the Red Front Army and General Political Commissar Zhou Enlai, the Eastern Army was led by Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan and Yang Shangkun (Teng Yu in December 1933) After being transferred due to illness, Yang took over as political commissar) and other comrades under the correct command, all commanders and fighters fought bravely and worked hard. Even in the situation where the enemy was outnumbered, they still won many battles, wiped out a large number of enemies, and opened up some towns. , Expanded political influence, expanded the Red Army, raised a large amount of materials, and partially solved the difficulties of dressing and eating salt in the Central Soviet Area and the Red Army.The historical achievements of the Eastern Army are indelible.

On July 2, 1933, after the Eastern Army marched into Fujian, almost every battle involved comrades Zhou, Zhu, Peng, and Teng Zhu and the "Left" erroneous central leaders, repeatedly arguing in the telegrams. Even a fierce struggle is won.The first battle in Fujian was to pull out the Quanshang Tubao in Ninghua County.Quanshang is located in the northeast of Ninghua County, adjacent to several counties of Ninghua, Qingliu, Guihua (now Mingxi), and Jianning. It is the traffic hub from Ninghua to Guihua, and its geographical location is very important.The wall of this earthen fortress is about two feet five feet high and more than two feet thick. It is quite strong; there is the 307th Regiment of the Lu Xingbang Division of the 52nd Division of the Kuomintang warlords stationed there, and there are four in Ninghua, Qingliu, Shicheng, and Changting. The remnant landlords in the county were armed with more than 400 people; they stored a large amount of food, salt and other materials. They were the reactionary bastion of the fled landlords in several surrounding counties, threatening the safety of the nearby Soviet area, and it was also a great opportunity for the Eastern Army to move eastward and expand the Soviet area. obstacle.So the Eastern Army decided to pull out this nail first.

However, the central leaders of the "Left" adventurism only had the central city in mind at that time, and even if they couldn't fight the big cities for a while, they would attack the county towns, and they didn't pay attention to the small spring fortress at all.Therefore, regardless of the actual situation, they ordered the Eastern Army to attack Qingliu County first. The controversy at that time caused great difficulties for the Eastern Army to fight.On July 4th, Peng and Teng Dian asked Commander-in-Chief Zhu De of the First Front Army and General Political Commissar Zhou Enlai to Xiang Ying, Acting Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and proposed: "Qingliu, Quanshang, and Songkou are still Lu Ni, and the four regiments remain unchanged. First eliminate the enemies at Quanshang, and then attack the enemies at Songkou and Qingliu at the same time. This will allow me to gather the main force to attack and reinforce the enemy at any time." At the same time, it is explained that Qingliu Castle is strong, and the enemy uses natural dangers to repair fortifications, in case of attack No, to delay the time, and then withdraw the enemy from the front line to fight for reinforcements, it will affect morale.These combat deployments based on the actual situation fully conformed to Comrade Mao Zedong's tactical principles, and they were quickly approved by Zhu and Zhou.On July 5th, Zhu and Zhou replied by telegram, stating: "If the enemy's situation remains unchanged, the three armies should attack Quanshang first, obtain naturalization quickly after the occupation, communicate with Yong'an with a broken Songkou, and intercept Yong'an or the enemy who comes to aid from Liancheng with a camera. However, on July 6, Xiang Ying replied with an extremely subjective opinion: "The current actions of the Eastern Army, as stated in the call, can in fact only eliminate the enemies of Quanshang and Naturalization, that is, move northward, and never It is impossible to attack Liancheng and aid the enemy." "Both Quanshang and Guihua belong to the siege of the city. Although the fortifications are relatively clear and easy to attack, I intend to still target Liuqing and resolutely eliminate the three regiments. The enemy of Liancheng may be reinforced. If Eliminating and aiding the enemy will have a great impact on the southeast and southwest fronts."

While Zhou, Zhu, Peng, Teng, and Xiang Ying were arguing, on July 8, Lu Xingbang sent the 156th brigade commander Zhang Xinglong to lead the 309th regiment to reinforce Quanshang from Qingliu.Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan, in accordance with the original tactical principle of "surrounding the city and fighting for aid", ordered the Fifth Red Division to continue to encircle Quanshang and work hard to prepare for the blasting of the tunnels, and ordered the Fourth Red Division to set up an ambush in Yanxiang, more than 30 miles away from Quanshang. , Prepare to annihilate and aid the enemy.On the trail leading from Quanshang to Yanxiang, there are high mountains on both sides, and a narrow and long depression in the middle, which is an ideal place for ambushes.

On July 9, Zhang Xinglong, commander of the enemy's 156th brigade, and Lu Shengbin (son of Lu Xingbang), head of the 309th regiment, led their troops to Shishiling in Yanxiang and entered our ambush circle.Commander Zhang Xilong of the Fourth Red Division and political commissar Peng Xuefeng immediately issued an attack order.The Red Army soldiers first killed and wounded the enemy with condescending firepower from the mountains on both sides, and then rushed into the enemy's formation with the momentum of a tiger descending the mountain, and started hand-to-hand combat. After only one hour of fierce fighting, the enemy's regiment was cleanly wiped out, and the enemy's brigade commander Zhang Xinglong was captured. None of the enemy regiment leader Lu Shengbin slipped through the net.Then, the Red Fourth Division took advantage of the victory to pursue and occupied Songxi, an important town in the northeast of Qingliu; the Ninghua Independent Seventh Division occupied Lingxia and Tianbei in the northwest of Qingliu; Cut off the connection between Qingliu and the enemy forces in Quanshang, form a siege situation on Qingliu County, and further isolate the enemy in Quanshang.At the same time, the 13th Regiment of the Fifth Red Division took advantage of the victory and marched eastward, annihilating the second battalion of the 307th Regiment of Guihua defending the enemy, and liberated Guihua County.

The victory of the Yanxiang ambush created favorable conditions for the capture of Quangami, and also proved the correctness of the tactics of "surrounding the points to fight for aid".However, the leaders of the "Left" adventurism were eager to attack Qingliu and Liancheng to defend the enemy. On July 10, they sent a telegram ordering the Eastern Army to "leave only one regiment to besiege Quanshang, and take out a company from the regiment as the backbone to lead the naturalization of the Northeast." Guerrillas, consolidate and naturalize"; at the same time, order most of the main force to immediately move to the south of Qingliu, prepare to destroy the retreating enemies of Qingliu, or cooperate with the 34th Division to strike against the enemies of Liancheng and reinforce Qingliu. Under such circumstances, on July 11, Commander-in-Chief Zhu and Political Commissar Zhou had to send two telegrams to Xiang Ying.One pointed out that it would be easier to attack the enemy's reinforcements by attacking Quanshang first and then forcing Qingliu, and that an active attack on Qingliu City could not be adopted; Yes, because it is rainy at present, the mountains and rivers rise from time to time, and the rivers in Fujian Province are rushing and deep, the movement of the large corps is inconvenient, and the weather is hot and sick. The three armies have left more than 500 sick people along the way. Please ask Xiang Ying to "decide on the action of the troops to take this into consideration. ".In another telegram, the opinions of Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan were conveyed, and they strongly stated that they would immediately move their troops to the south bank of Qingliu. Moving to the south, even if the enemy (city) does not move, the enemy can go north in the clear stream, and the upper siege of the spring will be solved. I will watch the fire from the other side, and it will take three days to cross the river. Act in this way”; and clearly stated that Peng and Teng have replied to the plan to fight for victory in a step-by-step manner, and asked Xiang Ying: “Don’t be in a hurry, especially don’t order Peng Teng directly, so that they don’t know what to do. Always ask for orders and restrain them. You can’t act on your own.” The next day, Peng and Teng telegraphed Xiang Ying’s opinion on besieging Quanshang, Qingliu, and Liancheng, emphasizing that: “Quanshang soil surrounded the enemy’s eight infantry companies, one company of machine guns and one company of artillery. There are more than a hundred people (note: it was later found that there were more than 400 people), and it is not enough to surround one group. Besides, the reactionary boy scouts and big swords will disturb outside, so they can no longer take care of naturalization." In Zhu, Zhou, and After Peng and Teng argued with reason, Xiang Ying and others calmed down, and called back Zhu and Zhou and forwarded Peng and Teng, explaining: "I am calling you not to order, but to propose a combat intention at a certain stage." But they are still soft. Hard in the middle, stubbornly stick to one's own opinion. Under the favorable situation where the main force of the Eastern Army besieged Quanshang Tubao and successively won the battles of Yanxiang and Naturalization, the Red Thirty-Fourth Division also actively carried out guerrilla warfare in the Anle and Wuge areas between Qingliu and Liancheng, cooperating with the main force to cut off The connection between Qingliu and the enemy in Liancheng, on July 10, defeated a regiment of the 78th Division of the enemy's 19th Route Army who reinforced Qingliu from Liancheng near Wuge and Mawu, and took advantage of the victory to occupy Shangbao.On July 14th, the enemy's three regiments of the main force of Lu Xingbang's Department entrenched in Qingliu, frightened by the might of our army, abandoned the city and fled to Yong'an.On the 15th, the 10th and 11th Regiments of the Fourth Red Division and the 7th Ninghua Independent Division took advantage of the victory to occupy Qingliu County; At this time, the enemy's 78th Division still had two regiments in Sibao near Wuge.Xiang Ying was informed of this situation and learned that the enemy in Liancheng might send three or four regiments to reinforce Sibao. Without considering the whole situation of the battle, he hastily sent a "100,000 urgency" telegram on July 16 to order the Eastern Army to abandon Quangami. , and immediately went south to cooperate with the Red Thirty-Fourth Division to wipe out the two regiments of the Sibao enemy, and prepared to wipe out the three or four regiments of Liancheng to aid the enemy. Potential." General Political Commissar Zhou Enlai was really embarrassed after receiving Xiang Ying's "urgent" telegram, and immediately replied with his opinion: "The enemy in Quanzhou should not be let go, and at least two regiments are required for the siege (the two regiments have no possibility of breaking out of the encirclement). Use the strength of the 4th regiment to cooperate with the 34th division to attack the 4th fort (the 4th fort has fortifications), and the reinforcement team will have insufficient firepower." After going to the Fourth Fort for three days, I fear that the enemy’s situation in the Fourth Fort will change.” However, while the General Political Commissar Zhou was putting forward his opinions, in order to implement the telegram of “one hundred thousand urgency” issued by the acting Chairman of the Military Commission Xiang Ying, he still tried his best to order the generals in Le The Red Nineteenth Division in the Bailian area of ​​the county immediately went south, and rushed to Quanshang two days later to take over the task of the three armies besieging Quanshang, so that the three armies could free up their hands and concentrate all their troops to go south; On Quanshang, wait for the 19th Division to come to take over the encirclement, and the rest of the main force immediately concentrates on Qingliu, passes through Anle and west of Wuge, secretly moves, and cooperates with the 34th Division to attack the Fourth Fort.Facts have proved that before our three army regiments went south, the enemies of the four forts and two regiments had already withdrawn to Liancheng. Xiang Ying's "one hundred thousand urgent" telegram was just a subjective conjecture. At dawn on July 19, the 15th Regiment of the Fifth Red Division, which besieged Quanshang Tubao, dug a tunnel directly to the wall of the Tubao last night, pushed three coffins filled with soil salt under the wall, and detonated the soil. Blow up a big gap in the wall, take advantage of the smoke, bravely rush into the bunker to fight the enemy alleyway, and with the cooperation of the brother troops, cleanly wipe out all the defending enemies.More than 300 people under the enemy regiment commander were killed, and more than 900 enemies were captured.Captured two old and new county magistrates in Ninghua, and more than 300 fugitive landlords, bullies and landlords' armed forces from counties around Quanshang, seized more than 700 rifles, two mortars, seven machine guns, 60 shell guns, and 10,000 yuan in cash Yuan and a large amount of food, salt and other materials won the first major victory in the People's Fujian War. The Eastern Army won the first battle, pulled out the earth fortress on Quanshang, and liberated a large area of ​​land in Qingliu and Guihua counties, which greatly shocked the army.In order to sum up the experience and lessons of the several battles since entering Fujian, General Political Commissar Gan of Zhou Enlai specially sent a telegram to Acting Chairman Xiang Ying on July 20 on the "controversy about the strategic deployment of fighting Quanshang", criticizing Xiang Ying and others for disregarding reality Circumstances and possibilities, calls have been made frequently in the past few days, nagging and urging the troops to attack Qingliu and go south to fight Liancheng, and solemnly pointed out: "Our argument is not that we have different intentions, and it is not that we do not know the main assault direction or that we should go north and east when we attack Quanshang." "We are different because we judge that the enemy's aid to Lian (City) is not as you expected. We don't advocate that the main force of the three armies cross the Qingliu River and go south immediately, but you advocate dividing the troops to go south. This is a matter of strategy implementation and tactics. It must be estimated At that time, the local enemy situation, the terrain, our military strength, and supply conditions, etc., I insisted on implementing the established steps (each step has a back and forth) to achieve victory."Comrade Zhou Enlai's concise and lively words are a powerful criticism of the subjectivist command method of the "Left" adventurist leaders.These facts are also enough to show that Comrade Zhou Enlai's military command is correct and wise, and it is enough to show that he is worthy of being a great proletarian military strategist. The military victory of the Eastern Army created good conditions for opening up a new Soviet area, but the leaders of the "Left" adventurism blindly demanded to expand the results of the war.As early as June 27, 1932, they proposed in the "Resolution of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area on Winning and Accomplishing the First Victory of the Revolution in Adjacent Jiangxi Provinces": "We must strive to eliminate the 'dispersion' of the main force of the Red Army." The tasks of “decentralizing” and “distributing” local work enable the Red Army to devote all its strength to the decisive battle, to carry out victorious offensives in the areas ruled by the whites, to continuously defeat the enemy, and to eliminate the enemy’s force.” The three major tasks of the Red Army determined at the Gutian Conference were narrowed down to There is only one item of war.Therefore, after the liberation of these places, although all the troops were very active in carrying out mass work, they did not wait for the troops to mobilize the masses deeply and consolidate the new area, so they hastily ordered the troops to attack Liancheng, arriving within a time limit, and specifying that they must attack from north to south .Sitting in Ruijin, Jiangxi, they didn't understand the actual situation in Liancheng, Fujian, and didn't accept the lesson of the controversy over the deployment of the attack on Quanshang, and they still directed blindly there. Liancheng and Xinquan were originally the Soviet Areas in western Fujian, and they were occupied by the 19th Route Army of the Kuomintang in April and May of 1933.Therefore, when our Eastern Army besieged Quanshang Tubao, part of the Red Thirty-Fourth Division and some of the Red Fourth Division had been ordered to enter the surrounding area of ​​Liancheng, ready to recover. At that time, the Shen Guanghan Division of the 60th Division of the 19th Route Army was stationed on the line from Longyan to Xinquan; the Shounian Division of the 78th Division was stationed around Liancheng and Sibao; The Yongchun area is used as a maneuver.The division of Ou Shounian was the vanguard and main division that invaded the Soviet area in western Fujian. It governed two brigades and six regiments.The division is equipped with German-style equipment, excellent weapons and well-trained. It is one of the first-class troops in the Kuomintang army.However, Xiang Ying completely ignored these actual conditions and ordered the Eastern Army to attack Liancheng immediately, and delineated the route for the Eastern Army to attack from north to south according to the location marked on the map. At that time, it was the weather in July and August, and the weather in western Fujian was scorching hot.In order to find out the enemy's situation, Peng Dehuai personally led the reconnaissance team to the front line for a day's reconnaissance, and found that according to Xiang Ying's regulations, Liancheng was attacked from north to south. It is impossible to complete the task.According to the actual situation at that time, Juxi, which was about 70 miles southeast of Liancheng, had the majority of the 467th Regiment of Ding Rongguang stationed in the district, and the second battalion (Huang Kangying) of the regiment was stationed in the northwest of Lijuxi. Pengkou, twenty Huali, guards the intersection of the two main roads from Longyan to Liancheng and Longyan to Changting, and serves as an outpost camp for Ding Rongguang's regiment.If our army chooses Pengkou as a breakthrough point, it will definitely be able to mobilize Juxi and the enemy of Liancheng to help and eliminate it during the movement.But the leaders of the "Left" adventurism at that time did not give the frontline commanders any maneuvering power, and no one allowed them to change their combat plans.Faced with this situation, Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan put the interests of the revolution first, and realistically reported the situation to Zhu and Zhou Zhuan to Xiang Ying, asking for a change in the combat plan. After repeated debates, they were approved. On July 28, the Red Fourth Division and the Red Nineteenth Division of our Eastern Army surrounded Pengkou and Juxi respectively to defend the enemy;On the 30th, our army launched continuous attacks on Pengkou.Although Pengkou defended the enemy's Huangkang Battalion with only four companies, it occupied a dangerous position and had strong fortifications. Our army attacked for a day and suffered a lot of casualties, so it was not captured.In the evening, the troops withdrew from the battle, and Peng Dehuai convened a military democratic meeting to mobilize officers and soldiers to come up with ideas.Our teaching camp also had a very heated discussion. Everyone offered their suggestions and suggestions. Most of them believed that our army's advantages in close combat and night combat should be used to carry out night attacks.Boss Peng adopted the opinions of the majority of comrades and adopted a night attack that night, and finally conquered Pengkou before dawn and wiped out the defending enemy. Shounian, in Liancheng defending the enemy area, heard that Pengkou and Juxi were in an emergency, and quickly sent the Zhong Jingrui Department of the 466th Regiment to go for reinforcements.The Thirteenth Regiment of the Fifth Red Division seized Guiren Mountain on the east side of Pengkou as early as the morning of the 29th.At dawn on the 31st, Liancheng aided the enemy and rushed to Guiren Mountain in an attempt to fight for this commanding height.The Red Thirteenth Regiment immediately used a battalion to detour behind the enemy, fiercely flanked and wiped out most of the reinforcements. Zhong Jingrui, the head of the enemy regiment, led the remnants to flee in the direction of Liancheng.At the same time, our Red Fourth Division and Nineteenth Division also set up ambushes and wiped out two battalions of the 467th Regiment of the Mingxi defenders who were trying to reinforce Pengkou, captured the enemy's commander Ding Rongguang, and took advantage of the victory to occupy Juxi. On August 1st, the Red Fourth Division, Fifth Division, Nineteenth Division, and Thirty-fourth Division of the Eastern Army joined forces in Xiabao, east of Liancheng, to celebrate the sixth anniversary of the founding of the army.At the celebration meeting, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic conferred military flags on all levels of the Red Army; Peng Dehuai, the head of the Army, and Yuan Guoping, director of the Political Department, spoke successively, encouraging the commanders and fighters of the entire army to continue to fight bravely and strive for greater victories. The majestic banner adds to the splendor.A celebration party was also held that night. The regiment and the propaganda teams of each division performed cultural and artistic programs. When Ou Shounian learned that all the 466th and 467th regiments had been wiped out, he sent an urgent call to the headquarters of the 19th Route Army in Zhangzhou.The Division of the 19th Route Army Headquarters was feared to be completely wiped out by me. On August 2, I ordered the division to abandon Liancheng and retreat to Yong'an, and ordered the Mao Weishou Department of the 61st Division stationed in Central Fujian to send a brigade to Datian and Yong'an to cover the area. The division retreated.On August 3, the four surviving regiments of the District Division and the troops directly under the division had just withdrawn from Liancheng County to Gutian Town. After rushing forward, the district division suddenly became chaotic, throwing away guns, luggage, and supplies one after another, and fled for the road. Our army took advantage of the victory to pursue.At noon, I fled the enemy to Xiaotao for dinner, and my pursuit troops arrived again. The enemy left his job and ran for his life in panic. Our army wiped out another regiment of the district division, and beat the enemy to panic. The next morning, he fled into Yong'an City, in a panic.Ou Shounian, the commander of the enemy division, said in frustration: "This defeat is the greatest shame of our army, especially the chaos during the retreat, which is even more heartbreaking." Shen Guanghan of the 60th Division of the enemy heard the news, fearing that they would be annihilated by me, they immediately withdrew from the Xinquan line to Longyan; the Mao Weishou Division of the 61st Division was stationed in Quanzhou and Yongchun, and did not dare to act rashly.In this battle, our Eastern Army wiped out one brigade and three regiments of the Shounian Department of the 78th Division of the enemy, and captured more than 2,000 enemy officers and soldiers, including one brigade commander and two regiment leaders, and handed over more than 2,000 guns and rations. 1,500 tons, greatly shocked the 19th Route Army of the Kuomintang.This was the biggest blow the Seventh and Ninth Route Army suffered in the history of participating in the anti-communist civil war.This made the army realize that anti-communism can only lead to its own demise, which is also an important factor in the political change of the army from "anti-Chiang, anti-communist and anti-Japanese" to "unity with the Communist Party, anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese" policy. As expected, after our Eastern Army captured Pengkou, it recovered the old Soviet areas such as Liancheng, Xinquan, Baisha, and Dayangba without firing a single shot, and took advantage of the victory to open up Quanshang, Qingliu, Guihua, and Taining. Waiting for the new Soviet area to redify the area for five or six hundred miles, the two Soviet areas in northern Fujian and western Fujian were united into one, and the first phase of combat missions in western Fujian was completed.The Eastern Army took advantage of this opportunity to carry out ten-day training in the Liancheng area to replenish troops, adjust and enrich cadres, and prepare for the second phase of the combat mission to march to northern Fujian.General Political Commissar Zhou Enlai praised the Dongfang Army for "adapting to changes in the situation and giving full play to its ability to act decisively without violating the overall intention" and "chased the 78th Division of the 19th Route Army to pieces. The new record of the Red Army, we should pay a warm salute to all the soldiers of the Eastern Army!" On August 8, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet, and Vice Chairman Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao jointly called the Eastern Army to warmly congratulate the Eastern Army on "bringing tenacious The enemy's 19th Route Army was defeated. This victory shows that our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army has become stronger and more invincible." I believe that the heroic Eastern Army will "strive for greater courage, move forward to destroy more enemies, and achieve greater success." Bigger and more glorious victories." Liancheng's ten-day training was originally a good time to carry out mass work, but because the leaders of the "Left" adventurism only allowed some local troops to carry out some propaganda activities, they still did not let the main force disperse to do mass work and consolidate the victory. On the 13th, the main force was sent to attack Yangkou and Yanping (now Nanping) immediately.Therefore, although the area occupied in western Fujian is not small, including eight or nine counties, they are all like monkeys picking corn, picking one and throwing the other away, without consolidating a single one. On August 16, except for the 34th Division of the Eastern Army stationed in Liancheng, the rest of the Eastern Army moved northward to start the second phase of operations.We set out from Liancheng, passed through Qingliu and Guihua to Sha County, liberated Xiamao, Gaoqiao and other large towns, and captured two major commercial ports in the upper reaches of the Minjiang River from August 25th to 26th—Shun Yangkou in Changxian County and Xiayang in Yanping County defeated three regiments of the Liu Heding Department of the 56th Division of the Jiang Army, captured four machine guns, three steamers, 150,000 catties of salt and a large amount of other military supplies, and raised 100,000 yuan. ten thousand yuan.Then, the Red Fourth Division, Fifth Division, and Nineteenth Division of the Eastern Army separated Shunchang and Yanping and besieged the two cities.The Red Sixth Division (formerly Xingguo Model Division) and the 61st Regiment of the Red 21st Division also went south from Lichuan, Jiangxi and Taining, Fujian, and surrounded Jiangle County.At this time, the headquarters of the First Front Army had moved eastward from Jiangxi, and arrived in Taining County via Jianning to organize command.At this point, Liu Heding's 56th Division was divided and surrounded by me, like a frightened bird, while desperately strengthening the fortifications in Yanping, while sending urgent calls to the 19th Route Army for help. In order to mobilize the masses in the new area to support the Red Army in combat, the Eastern Army disregarded the rules and regulations stipulated by the "Left" wrong leaders, and required all units to seize the opportunity to go deep into the masses to do political and ideological work. Freedom" and other slogans that were in line with the actual interests of the masses helped the masses to establish revolutionary committees, party and regiment anti-imperialist alliances, workers' unions and other organizations.The outstanding political work achievements of the Eastern Army have won the appreciation of leading comrades such as Zhu De and Zhou Enlai of the Front Army. On the one hand, the Eastern Army has written the most glorious page in political work, and is a glorious model for the Red Army in the Central Soviet Area", and called for the promotion of the Eastern Army's political work experience to the entire Red Army. On August 27, Peng Dehuai personally visited Shunchang City to observe the terrain. He learned that Shunchang City was surrounded by water on three sides, and only the north side could attack. There are very few houses in Thirty Li, and it is not convenient to carry out tunnel operations close to blasting.At the same time, according to scout reports, Jiangle County is also surrounded by water on three sides, and there are high mountains in the northwest, which can be guarded against danger; Yanping, a mountain city known as "Iron Yanping", has a tall and strong city wall, which is easy to defend and difficult to attack.According to the terrain of these three counties and the situation of the enemy and ourselves, Peng Dehuai, Teng Daiyuan and other leading comrades decided to still adhere to the policy of "siege the city and fight for aid", stepped up the feigned attack on Yanping, caught the big fish of Shuikou and the 19th Route Army in Shaxian County, and wiped out the reinforcements. enemy. However, at that time, the contradiction between Cai Tingkai and Chiang Kai-shek of the Nineteenth Route Army had become increasingly acute. In order to preserve his strength, Cai Tingkai was unwilling to actively reinforce the Yanping Liu and Ding troops.Our Eastern Army tried to lure the enemy deep in Yangkou, Xiayang and other places many times, but failed to annihilate its reinforcements; our troops who attacked Le and Shunchang were unable to attack for a long time, so the whole battle began in mid-August. It has been at a stalemate.At the end of August, under the pressure of Chiang Kai-shek, Cai Tingkai began to deploy reinforcements to Yanping: he ordered Shen Guanghan of the 60th Division to advance from Longyan to Yong'an, and Mao Weishou of the 61st Division to concentrate from Quanzhou to Sha County via Datian County. The supplementary division Tan Qixiu entered the area on both banks of Shuikou and Youxikou, and approached cautiously in the direction of Yanping.On September 3, a part of our Eastern Army went straight to Shuikou along the north bank of the Minjiang River, preparing to intercept and aid the enemy. When they reached the north bank of Xiadao Town, they captured the enemy's vanguard platoon. , dragged more than a dozen wooden boats to Xiadao Wharf, some went ashore to cook, and some were still on board.After Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan heard the report, they immediately ordered the 10th Regiment of the Fourth Red Division to cross the river from the upper reaches, and the part of the 13th Regiment of the Fifth Red Division crossed the river on the spot to attack the enemy together.The troops crossing the river quickly seized the hills on the opposite bank, and then the troops on both sides of the strait attacked fiercely with machine guns and mortars, annihilating one battalion of the enemy, and the rest fled to Shuikou.Our Red Fourth Division took advantage of the victory and pursued to Shuikou, 40 miles north of Fuzhou, and defeated two enemy battalions.In this battle, our army seized three heavy machine guns, more than a hundred rifles, two cars, eight steam ships, four ships with bullets, and 70,000 catties of salt. At this time, it was mid-September, and the Eastern Army moved to Xiqin in Yanping, waiting to annihilate the reinforcements from Sha County.At that time, the Mao Weishou Department of the 61st Division, the most elite of the 19th Route Army, had already entered Shaxian County in an attempt to occupy Xiqin with some of its troops and cover its main force to continue to reinforce Yanping. Upon hearing the news, our Eastern Army ordered the 13th Regiment of the Fifth Red Division to set off overnight. Intercept the enemy.On the morning of September 18, five battalions in total, Zheng Weiji, the 366th Regiment of the 61st Division, a battalion from the 78th Division, and a battalion from the 52nd Division, encountered each other at Muqin Mountain.Muqin Mountain is a great barren mountain overgrown with thatch. In order to seize the commanding heights, the Red Thirteenth Regiment bravely seized the main peak of Muqin Mountain despite the fatigue of the overnight march.The enemy is also desperately fighting for the main peak, and the battle is very fierce.Finally, a hand-to-hand fight on the top of the mountain.Under the brave charge of our red soldiers, the enemy was routed, and batch after batch surrendered their guns, and our army took advantage of the victory to pursue for dozens of miles.The 366th Regiment of the "Iron Army", known as the most combative and never defeated in the 19th Route Army, was wiped out.In this battle, the Red Thirteenth Regiment created a new record of annihilating one regiment of the enemy with one regiment in motion, and was awarded the honorable title of "Hero Model Regiment".The morale of all the commanders and fighters of the Eastern Army was very high, and they warmly celebrated the victory; the people in the Soviet area were all beaming when they heard the good news. In the autumn of 1933, when the Eastern Army was fighting frequently and winning consecutive victories, the "Left" erroneous central leaders not only continued to implement a set of "Left" adventurist strategies and tactics in the military, but also tried their best in the organization. Pursuing ultra-leftist policies.They put a lot of emphasis on the cadre line, and overemphasized that the leading cadres of the Red Army must be proletarian elements, and sent a large number of "imperial envoys" to various regions and troops to carry out the so-called "reform and enrich leading organs at all levels." , Messed up the cadre team.At that time, the vast majority of comrades in the army were of peasant origin, but they only promoted those of worker origin.Regardless of whether they have the qualifications for cadres, as long as they are proletarian elements, they will be promoted.除了长沙、安源的一些矿工外，手工业工人也照样提拔起来，而且一下子就提为团、师政委，担任高级领导职务，这样，就大大削弱了部队的作战指挥和政治工作。同时，他们还大搞“查田查阶级”运动，查到谁是地主阶级出身，不问是否属实，表现如何，斗争历史多久，就说谁是阶级异己分子，将他们开除出红军，摧残了许多有用之才。 他们刚刚进行过“肃反”运动，又以反“右倾机会主义”、“游击主义”、“富农路线”、“罗明路线”、“调和主义”、“两面派”等各种罪名，大搞宗派主义，惩办主义，对不坚决执行他们的错误主张，而拥护毛泽东同志正确领导的好干部则进行“残酷斗争，无情打击”，大批地进行惩罚和撤换，随意提拔同他们气味相投、只知随声附和的人，严重地破坏了党的民主集中制和批评与自我批评的好作风。家长制横行，一言堂成风。尤其是在福建、江西和红军中反对所谓“罗明路线”，打击面更宽，影响更坏，危害也更大。 事实真相是：一九三三年，罗明担任中共福建省委代理书记，并组织“中共前敌委员会”以指导前线的工作。他对闽西情况比较熟悉，根据前线实际情况大胆地向党中央提出了几点建议。其中谈到要积极坚持岩（龙岩）永（永定）杭（上杭）地区的游击战争，这个边沿地区条件比较困难，“赤化千里，筹款百万”应因地制宜，所有土地税款等收入不能完全集中到国库，应留一部分作为地方的机动费用，否则脱离生产的游击队等人员无法维持生活。还谈到“创造百万铁的红军”也应从闽西的实际情况出发，除动员一部分兵员补充主力红军外，还应动员一部分兵员补充地方武装，以锻炼提高地方武装的战斗力，更好地保卫和发展革命根据地。在“扩军”工作中，也要量力而行，因为苏区地方不大，人口不多，几年来动员再动员，扩大再扩大，究竟要动员、扩大到什么程度，需要有个限度，不能无止境地扩大。如上杭县才溪乡，共有二千余人口，在一次一次的扩军突击后，乡里只剩下壮丁七人，还要进行突击，这当然不现实。罗明虽然一再写信给省委转告临时中央，说明前线这些情况，但“左”倾错误的领导者根本不予考虑，仍坚持要边沿游击区上缴一切税款和扩大百万红军，并认为罗明是右倾机会主义者，是对革命悲观失望的、机会主义的、取消主义的逃跑退却路线，是反对党中央的“布尔塞维克的进攻路线”的。于是在组织上普遍开展反罗明线路的斗争，并错误地认为在红军党内开展反罗明路线的斗争尤为重要，只有肃清红军党内的右倾机会主义，才能保障最大限度地巩固与扩大铁的红军，坚决执行党的“进攻路线”。这样就把地方上反“罗明路线”的斗争扩大到红军中来，引起东方军内部的严重混乱。当时，不少同志不明真相，被“左”倾空喊的口号所蒙蔽，认为罗明路线是“反革命”，更有认为罗明就是“反革命者”的，议论纷纷，莫衷一是。甚至罗明同志从前线回来，连炊事员也不给他做饭吃。他去理发店理发，刚坐下，理发师傅听说他是罗明，马上把他撵走，不给理发。罗明同志被撤了职，还有很多好同志、中高级干部也受到诬害、牵连。如保卫黎川原是我们闽赣军区一个五百人的独立团，后因支援东方军围攻将乐、顺昌，调归前总直接指挥离开黎川，当一九三三年九月二十八日国民党周浑元军的三个师进攻黎川时，黎川城内只剩下一个七十人的教导队和一些地方游击队，在敌我力量如此悬殊的情况下，我们放弃黎川以保存有生力量是必然的。但“左”倾冒险主义领导者根本不体察实情，为了在军队中反“罗明路线”的需要，硬是给闽赣军区肖劲光司令员加上所谓“退却逃跑”、“违抗命令”、“右倾机会主义”等罪名，撤销职务，开除党籍、军籍，并拘捕交最高法庭组织的“最高临时军事裁判法庭”进行公审，判处五年徒刑（“遵义会议”上已澄清是非，彻底平反，恢复名誉）。“左”倾错误的领导者就是这样大搞惩办主义，以对罪犯和对敌斗争的方式来进行党内斗争。在福建开展反“罗明路线”斗争的同时，在江西也开展反邓（邓小平）、毛（毛泽覃）、谢（谢唯俊）、古（古柏）等同志的所谓“江西的罗明路线”，使许多地方干部和部队干部均受到打击，搞得人人自危，党内、军内恐惧心理和社会不安现象十分严重，大大削弱了东方军的战斗力。这场斗争的实质就是为了反对毛泽东同志的正确领导，进一步推行其“左顺冒险主义”因而造成了极为严重的恶果。 一九三三年九月二十五日，蒋介石调动了五十万大军，分四路开始对中央苏区进行第五次反革命“围剿”，其北路军第八纵队周浑元部已由南城、硝石向我黎川发动进攻，形势十分严峻。 恰在此时，国民党十九路军正准备发动福建事变，主动派人与我东方军进行谈判，联合反蒋抗日。闽北军阀刘和鼎、卢兴邦等部失去十九路军的支持，顿时陷于孤立，这个新的形势对革命十分有利。但王明“左”倾冒险主义的领导者却震惊于九月二十八日黎川一城之失守，不考虑东方军在闽北正值消灭孤立无援的刘和鼎敌军，向无敌人堡垒区大力发展苏区，粉碎敌人“围剿”计划的大好时机，急令东方军立即从将乐、顺昌北上就敌，企图收复黎川，与敌在抗河会战。 在“左”倾错误领导者的压力下，十月四日，作为东方军主力的红三军团只好从前线撤回泰宁集中，翌日向黎川北面的硝石前进。十月六日，当三军团行军到达洵口地区时，不期与敌遭遇，经过三天激战，消灭了敌军第六师赵观涛部第十八旅（三个团缺一个营），生俘敌旅长葛钟山，缴枪一千多支，迫击炮二门。当时，敌第十八旅残存的一个营据守在山顶土寨子，虽然山势很陡，不易爬上去，但山上无水，我们再围困它半天，即可迫使该营就歼。这算是第五次反“围剿”中的一个意外的序战胜利。但“左”倾错误的领导者不待困死之敌被歼灭，便命令立即向黎川以北敌人的巩固阵地硝石进攻。当时黎川驻敌三、四个师，南城、南丰各约三个师，硝石正在这三点之间，各隔三、四十里，处在敌军堡垒群中心。当我军进入硝石时，发现已钻入敌堡垒群纵深之中，完全失去机动余地；而且，泰宁以北之敌发现我主力在黎川方向，将向我泰宁进攻；黎川、南丰、南城之敌，亦向硝石增援企图夹击我军。我军连续攻击硝石五天不克，处境日益危急，彭德怀当机立断，连电陈词反对继续进攻硝石，十月十三日，敌军四个师已由南城东援，进抵硝石，中革军委鉴于东方军已处于敌人包围的威胁之下，才复电允许三军团撤出硝石返回洵口、莲塘一线，避免遭受严重损失。 十月中旬，敌人为打通黎川与硝石的交通，以北路军第三路军第七纵队薛岳部四个师由硝石附近进抵潭头市；第八纵队周浑元部两个师又一个旅，由黎川附近进到资溪桥。这样敌人在十公里距离内集中了近七个师的兵力，企图完成构筑黎川、硝石之间的碉堡封锁线，吸引红军前去进攻，以消耗和消灭红军。中革军委无视敌情这一重大变化，十月十八日，调集第一、三、五军团等部队，要求插到敌人堡垒地带间隙中去，在资溪桥附近与敌决战，以求牵动敌人到堡垒外战斗而消灭之。 彭德怀、滕代远奉命指挥这次决战。他们遵照中革军委十月二十一日的作战命令，以红五军团为主力，向资溪桥和潭头市发起攻击，力图牵动敌人；同时，将红三军团部署在石峡、洵口之线；一军团集结在湖坊地区，准备在敌人被牵动时对其猛烈突击，歼灭敌人。可是，薛、周两敌十分谨慎，步步为营，稳扎稳进，很少出击。我军对敌攻击了四天，既未能牵动敌人，也未能占领资溪桥和潭头市。而我军主力部队却摆在敌人堡垒周围，白天遭敌机轰炸，晚上露天宿营，疲惫不堪。二十六日，中革军委不得不放弃在资溪桥地区与敌人决战的计划。 当我军在资溪桥地区进行消耗战时，彭德怀、滕代远鉴于在中革军委错误的战略方针指导和错误的军事指挥下，部队反“围剿”战斗步步被动的局面，于十月二十三日至二十五日三天内连续三次向中革军委提出建议，其主要内容是：在敌人大举集中、并利用堡垒掩护谨慎稳进的情况下，我军能在敌运动中将敌各个击破的机会减少。因此，红军应充实和集中主力，离开敌人堡垒地带，在战略上向东北之金溪、贵溪、东乡、景德镇一带挺进，首先消灭浙赣边区警备司令赵观涛部，建立东北作战区，进而威胁江苏、浙江、安徽等敌人心脏地区，调动敌主力部队北进而离开中央苏区。当前，在敌人碉堡林立、工事相当坚固的情况下，我军切忌将主力部队摆在敌垒周围。彭、滕还提出，要使群众了解战争的意义，广泛动员起来配合红军，封锁扰敌，截敌捉敌，夜间袭敌，使所有男女、老少都为保卫苏区而战，为粉碎敌人第五次“围剿”而战。从而使红军能够集中兵力，机动秘密，出敌不意地打击消灭敌人，夺取反“围剿”战争的胜利。最后，他们恳切希望中革军委领导“以远大眼光过细考虑”这些意见。但是犯“左”倾错误的中革军委领导人认为彭、滕的意见肯定“目前是不能实行的”。十月二十七日，项英电告朱德、周恩来：“军委已决定了战役问题，望转告彭、滕，停止建议。”不久，滕代远被调出红三军团，彭德怀的中革军委副主席的职务，也在一九三四年一月中共六届五中全会上被免去。 自一九三三年十月初，三军团奉调返回江西之后，东方军在福建的部队没有主力的支撑，发挥不了作用，无法打击、歼灭陷于孤立的军阀刘和鼎、卢兴邦部队，而三军团在“左”倾错误领导者的指挥下，虽奋力苦战于黎川周围的硝石、资溪桥地区，并一度转战于浒湾、琅琚、琅玕一线，但打的大多是消耗战，不仅没有在根据地之外歼灭和阻止敌人，反而丢失了若干地方，消耗了自己的力量，使自己处于被动挨打的地位。 “左”倾错误的领导者在实行冒险进攻遭到失败后，从一个极端转向另一个极端，畏敌如虎，既不敢向敌人无堡垒的地区打出去，又不敢实行“诱敌深入”的方针，把敌人放进根据地内各个歼灭，而是实行处处设防、节节抵御的保守主义战法。从一九三三年十一月下旬起，在广昌至泰宁一百多公里的宽大正面上，构筑防御工事，进行阵地防御，结合“短促突击”，企图以此消耗敌人的力量，阻止敌人的进攻，粉碎敌人的第五次“围剿”。 恰在此时，国民党第十九路军因不满蒋介石对外卖国投降、对内排斥异己的政策，于十一月二十日发动了“福建事变”，宣布同蒋介石决裂，成立“福建人民革命政府”，这对于我们粉碎蒋介石的第五次“围剿”、发展抗日民族统一战线极为有利。可惜当时“左”倾错误的领导者在统一战线问题上同样犯了严重的“关门主义”错误，没有积极支援十九路军，坐失一个打击、消灭蒋介石反动军队、粉碎第五次“围剿”的大好时机。 这里要简单回顾一下，我们与十九路军通过斗争求得联合的一些历史情况： 一九三二年一月，日本侵略军进攻上海，发生了淞沪战争。驻上海的国民党十九路军官兵在共产党的影响和全国抗日救国浪潮的推动下，违抗蒋介石不准抗日的旨意，奋起应战。从一月二十八日至三月一日打了三十三天，取得了不小的胜利。但在战斗中，由于蒋介石驻苏浙嫡系部队六十个师的兵力皆按兵不动，坐视十九路军孤军苦斗，且克扣其军饷及海内外同胞捐赠的款项物资，使十九路军的抗战更陷于困境。三月三日，国际联盟决定要中日双方停止战争，蒋介石求之不得，马上逼迫十九路军撤离阵地，在英美帝国主义的策划下，与日本侵略军和谈，签订了丧权辱国的“淞沪停战协定”，将上海变为“自由市”，不设防，不驻军，不抵制日货等等，实际上出卖了上海，牺牲了国家主权。 停战后，蒋介石决心对“违令”抗日的非嫡系部队十九路军加以整肃。他本想把十九路军先调离宁沪，然后进行肢解，未达目的，乃改令十九路军到福建打红军，阴谋以十九路军消灭红军，或假红军之手消灭十九路军，或使两败俱伤，他好一箭双雕，坐收渔人之利。一九三二年五、六月间，十九路军调到福建之后，背靠大海无处可走，面向苏区进退两难。当时十九路军广大士兵要求抗日，不愿打内战。十九路军领导人蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴也知道“剿共”不能取胜，但从保存并发展自己的实力出发，还妄想排除共产党和红军势力出闽西，在福建搞个“模范省”，统一全国政权，联络广东、广西新军阀，在福建造成割据偏安之势。所以，他们在漳州、厦门登陆立足后，仍然服从蒋介石的调遣，利用我主力红军在江西进行第四次反“围剿”战斗、闽西武装力量薄弱的时机，以七十八师区寿年部为先头部队，六十师沈光汉部后续，并调动闽西、闽南的土著军阀杂牌部队和反动民团，采取步步为营的战略行动，不断进犯、蚕食我闽西苏区和闽南游击区，于一九三三年二、三月间侵占我龙岩，四、五月间又占我连城、新泉等大片苏区，并积极准备进攻我汀州城。 一九三三年七月，我东方军围攻泉上，威逼清流卢兴邦部时，驻连城的七十八师区寿年部派出一个团增援清流，被我击溃；八、九月间，我东方军围攻延平国民党五十六师刘和鼎部时，十九路军又令六十一师郑为辑团前往增援，蔡廷锴还亲率补充师谭启秀部进至水口、尤溪口一线待机增援，均被我击溃。由此可见，当时他们虽有反蒋抗日的愿望，但在实际行动上仍然是反共与屈从于蒋介石的。经过我东方军消灭其区、毛、谭师各一部后，铁的事实教育了十九路军领导人，使他们认识到继续反共就有全军覆灭的危险，而要反蒋抗日，只有联合共产党才有可能，遂决定把“反共反蒋抗日”的方针改变为“联共反蒋抗日”。事实说明，东方军对十九路军作战的胜利，是起了积极的促进作用的。 一九三三年七月，东方军进军福建后，连战皆捷，造成了威逼福州的形势，蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴害怕十九路军被消灭，于九月二十二日亲自写信并派过去曾是共产党员的陈公培为代表到前线找东方军联系，表示愿意和谈，共同抗日，双方先行停止战争行动。陈公培在延平附近的王台见到了东方军司令员彭德怀，表明他们要反蒋抗日，不反蒋就不能抗日。彭德怀接待了陈公培并向他指出：十九路军抗日是对的，来闽“剿共”是错误的。蒋介石执行“攘外必先安内”的卖国政策，抗日必须反蒋。我军愿意在我党提出的立即停止进攻苏区、保证民众民主权利、武装民众等三项条件下，与十九路军共同抗日。谈完话请他吃了饭，留宿一晚。翌日，彭德怀、滕代远给蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴写了回信，答复他们：“为了扩大民族革命战争，实践苏维埃中央政府之屡次宣言，红军愿与十九路军在抗日反蒋的谈判基础上，订立共同作战协定，以首先打倒蒋介石为恶魁的南京卖国政府，驱逐日本及一切帝国主义出中国。”彭、滕还请十九路军派代表到瑞金同我们中央正式谈判。九月二十三日下午，彭、滕致电项英、朱德、周恩来汇报双方谈判的情况。二十五日，苏区中央局电示朱、周、彭、滕，提出军事方面：“十九路军应撤退水口、尤溪口之线”，划延平、沙县为“缓冲区”，当我军在必要时对刘和鼎、卢兴邦、周志群等非十九路军部队“进行军事行动时，十九路军应取善意中立的态度。”在反日反蒋方面，我们可声明当蒋介石进扰福建时，红军准备实力援助十九路军之作战。 蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴、陈铭枢收到彭德怀、滕代远的回信后十分高兴，随即又派陈公培与十九路军秘书长徐名鸿到瑞金正式谈判。陈、徐到瑞金后，毛泽东、周恩来、朱德等中央领导同志接见他们，晓以抗日救国大义，进一步坚定了他们反蒋抗日的决心。由于毛泽东、周恩来、朱德、彭德怀、滕代远等同志对十九路军采取了联合、教育的正确方针，促使蒋、蔡、陈等人进一步酝酿抗日反蒋的实际行动部署。在十月二十六日与我中央政府及工农红军签订了《反日反蒋的初步协定》之后，他们更感到无西顾之忧，遂于十一月二十日揭起义旗，宣告成立“中华共和国人民政府”。 举事后不久，李济琛、陈铭枢、蒋光鼐、蔡廷锴等人聚会，感到放弃了国民党，没有个组织，处境不利，于是另行组织了“生产人民党”。原在十九路军中有活动、有发展的“第三党”随即声明解散，很多第三党人也参加了“生产人民党。” 无疑的，福建事变是国民党内部矛盾的表面化，是“一·二八”淞沪抗战后，抗日派和亲日派斗争的继续和发展。是上层小资产阶级和民族资产阶级反对官僚买办资产阶级和地主阶级的代表蒋介石的一场斗争。他们的反蒋抗日行动对我们十分有利，我们完全应该利用他们的矛盾，支援十九路军，一面发展抗日力量，一面牵制蒋介石的兵力，粉碎其对我中央苏区的第五次“围剿”。鉴于这种新的形势，为了不失时机，十一月二十日，彭德怀致电周恩来总政委转临时中央，建议留第五军团保卫中央苏区，集中第一、三、七、九军团出苏区，向闽浙赣地区进军，依方