Chapter 33 2. The direct promoter of Deng Xiaoping's "comeback"

Premier Zhou Enlai, the host of the banquet at the Great Hall of the People who personally arranged Deng Xiaoping's reappearance, said that Deng's appearance at this banquet and everything that happened after the banquet were nothing more than expected.A month ago, that is, at the beginning of March of this year, it was he who personally wrote a report to Mao Zedong, reporting to the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee several discussions on the restoration of Deng Xiaoping's party organization and the position of Vice Premier of the State Council.Immediately, Mao Zedong approved the word "agree" on Zhou Enlai's report.Thus began the historic turning point of Deng Xiaoping's second comeback in his troubled career.

Of course, before Mao Zedong's decisive remarks, there is also the phrase "Comrade Deng Xiaoping's mistakes are serious".This seems to be an important reason why it took Mao to issue instructions for seven months before Deng Caishan "started out".In addition, it also cited the following passage from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's "Decision on Resuming Comrade Deng Xiaoping's Party Organizational Life and the Position of Vice-Premier of the State Council" (March 10, 1973): The Political Bureau of the Central Committee seriously discussed Chairman Mao's instructions and Comrade Deng Xiaoping's issues.Chairman Mao's instructions fully demonstrate that our party always strictly distinguishes between two types of contradictions of different natures when dealing with comrades who have made mistakes, evaluates their merits and demerits comprehensively and historically, and conscientiously implements the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, curing diseases and saving patients".In accordance with the spirit of Chairman Mao's instructions, the Central Committee decided to restore Deng Xiaoping's party organization and resume his position as vice premier of the State Council, and the State Council would assign him appropriate duties.Party organizations at all levels must conscientiously study Chairman Mao's series of instructions on correctly treating erroneous cadres, make realistic conclusions about erring comrades, and further implement the party's cadre policy. ...

It is not difficult to see that under the guidance of the "Left" ideology at the time, the "Decision" of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did not vindicate Deng Xiaoping's so-called "mistakes"; , continue to uphold the theory and practice of the "Cultural Revolution", which shows a kind of historical limitation in solving Deng Xiaoping's problem at that time.However, according to the "Decision" of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the fact that the "No. 2 person in power in the party who took the capitalist road" who was defeated in the "Cultural Revolution" was able to come back is itself a denunciation of the wrong theories and practices of the "Cultural Revolution". A kind of negation.It undoubtedly played a role in demonstrating and promoting the further "liberation" of the vast number of veteran cadres who were persecuted during the "Cultural Revolution".It should be said that this is the "essence" of Deng Xiaoping's comeback.

At this time, it was Zhou Enlai who had a close relationship with Deng Xiaoping who could truly understand and grasp this "essence". Since the beginning of the "Cultural Revolution", Zhou Enlai has repeatedly dissuaded the Red Guards from posting big-character posters to "defeat" Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, and stopped the rebels from attacking the residences of Liu, Deng and other leaders.In addition, he has always been cautious in his words and deeds on the issue of Deng Xiaoping's "mistakes", and he has hardly said anything, even the kind of "contradictory" words to cope with the situation.This shows that Zhou knew Deng well. In 1965, at a small meeting held before the "Cultural Revolution", when Zhou Enlai talked about Chairman Mao's "successor" with several other central leaders, he did not hesitate to mention Deng Xiaoping's name, thinking that Deng could succeed Mao Come "take the helm".This is not only because Mao Zedong always boasted about Deng Xiaoping's talents in front of everyone (including foreigners), but also based on Zhou's understanding and trust in Deng for half a century.

If it is said that Mao Zedong really knew and understood Deng Xiaoping because of the "Deng, Mao, Xie, and Gu" incident that occurred in the Central Soviet Area in 1931; then Zhou Enlai was about 10 years earlier than Mao Zedong. In August 1980, Deng Xiaoping fondly recalled his unusual relationship with Zhou Enlai in a conversation with the Italian female journalist Oleina Farage.He said: "We knew each other very early and lived together when we were working and studying in France (press: 1920-1924). For me, he has always been an elder brother. We embarked on the road of revolution at about the same time. He is A man whom comrades and the people respect."

Deng Xiaoping, who has experienced countless hardships in his life, rarely expressed his views on those he respected in such emotional language.Perhaps Zhou Enlai was the only exception. Deng Xiaoping's daughter Mao Mao (Deng Rong) also mentioned in her book "My Father Deng Xiaoping": "I asked my father, among the people studying in France, which person do you have the closest relationship with? My father thought about it for a while. Answer: It’s still Premier Zhou, I have always regarded him as my elder brother, and we have worked together the longest.” Maomao then wrote: "Yes, the two years in France, the years of underground work in Shanghai in the late 1920s and early 1930s, in the Central Soviet Area of ​​Jiangxi, on the Long March Road, during the Revolutionary War, after the founding of the People's Republic of China In the highest organs of the party and the state, until Premier Zhou devoted himself to the party, the country, and the people, and breathed out his last breath, my father has been Zhou Enlai's right-hand man and loyal comrade-in-arms for more than half a century..."

It is this kind of friendship and brotherhood that closely links these two proletarian revolutionaries, relying on each other in adversity and sharing life and death. However, in the view of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and others, the long history of revolutionary struggles of the older generation of revolutionaries can be the "reason" for these old revolutionaries to die. During the "Cultural Revolution", a large number of party, government, and military leaders from the central government to the local government were overthrown or suffered criticism, generally due to two reasons: one is "practical problems" and the other is "historical problems."The so-called "practical problems" mostly refer to someone who made "mistakes" after the founding of the People's Republic of China, especially during the "Cultural Revolution". die".The so-called "historical issues" mostly refer to someone who had "surrendered", "betrayed", "escaped", and "rebelled" before the founding of the People's Republic of China. Sentenced in prison, he will be "destroyed" and "unable to stand up forever".Just because they saw this, Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and others first used "historical issues" to completely overthrow Liu Shaoqi and persecuted him to death, and then tried to use the same means to overthrow and discredit Deng Xiaoping.

Before and after the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1969, Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng repeatedly instructed the "Deng Task Force" to investigate the issue of Deng Xiaoping's "rebellion and surrender" in history.For this reason, the "Second Office" of the Central Task Force dispatched personnel to supplement the manpower required for the investigation. The "Deng task force" stepped up their actions and went to various places to collect evidence.From June 1968 to the end of 1969, the "special task force" successively dispatched 93 batches of transfer teams, with 223 transfer personnel, to 15 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions, including more than 140 cities and counties, with a journey of more than 300,000 kilometers.Even so, investigations into Deng Xiaoping's "historical issues" have gone nowhere.Afterwards, the "special task force" had to admit in a report to Kang Sheng, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Li Zuopeng and others: "Regarding Deng Xiaoping's historical issues, after repeated checks and investigations, so far, except for joining the League, transferring The party issue has not yet found direct witnesses, and some issues of opportunism have not been found. There are no clues to major issues such as arrests, betrayal, and collusion with the enemy.” At the same time, the report also wrote: “The next step, we plan to focus on Investigate his intention to engage in a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat, conspiracy to usurp the party and government, and collusion with foreign countries. Correspondingly verify his three anti-crimes." After reading it, Kang Sheng gave his approval and sent this document to Zhou Enlai, Chen Boda, Jiang Qing, Xie Fuzhi, etc. read.After Zhou En came to see it, he personally wrote a note on Deng's joining the party: "Deng Xiaoping joined the Communist Youth League and transferred to the party when he was studying in France for a work-study program. Comrades Li Fuchun, Cai Chang, and I all knew about this."

Zhou Enlai's comment of less than 30 characters not only made the "Deng task force" busy for more than a year, but also made the conspirators behind the "special task force" unexpected and helpless.