Chapter 26 2. The normalization of relations between China and the United States

In opening up a new pattern of diplomacy, the most important change is that Sino-US relations have begun to normalize. The dramatic turning point in Sino-US relations, which has been in a state of confrontation for a long time, is something that many people did not expect.In fact, it is the inevitable result of the development and changes of the entire international situation.At this time, the Soviet Union was aggressively expanding its power outward.China, facing various threats, has actually become an important international player that cannot be ignored.From the perspective of the United States, improving Sino-US relations can strengthen its power to contend with the Soviet Union.In China's view, improving Sino-US relations can meet the needs of resisting the threat of the Soviet Union, help to gradually resolve the Taiwan issue, and facilitate the expansion of China's international exchanges.However, it is not easy to achieve this, especially politicians need to be good at capturing those fleeting "diplomatic opportunities".

On December 3, 1969, at the Yugoslav fashion show held at the Palace of Culture in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, Stossel, the US ambassador to Poland with a "mission", saw the "Charge d'Affaires of China" (actually the second secretary of the embassy) leave the meeting, so he Followed out, trying to talk to the Chinese side.Unexpectedly, the "Charge d'Affaires of China" walked out of the venue, got into a car, and was about to leave.In desperation, the American ambassador ignored the diplomatic etiquette, grabbed the Chinese interpreter, and said in Polish: He has received instructions from Washington to resume contact with the Chinese embassy.After the Chinese interpreter politely agreed to convey it on his behalf, he left in a hurry.

It is no accident that things happened in Warsaw.Warsaw has long been the site of official contacts between China and the United States. The first Sino-US ambassadorial meeting in 1955 was held here. In March 1967, the Warsaw talks between China and the United States, which had been held more than 130 times, were temporarily suspended, and the official contact channels between China and the United States were also cut off. Since Nixon became president of the United States in January 1969, the United States has begun to adjust its policy toward China, sending a series of "messages" to China, expressing its willingness to have dialogue with China, and has repeatedly stated that improving US-China relations will be one of the diplomatic goals of the US government. one.In this regard, the Chinese side responded with "silence" in order to wait and see what the US side is doing.In September of the same year, the Beijing airport meeting between the prime ministers of China and the Soviet Union and the subsequent negotiations on the Sino-Soviet border issue prompted the United States to resolve to speed up the pace of contact between the United States and China. Nixon himself, who was "woke up", was even more eager to have a direct dialogue with Chinese high-level officials.It was in this situation that the scene of the US ambassador chasing the Chinese diplomat happened.

That night, Zhou Enlai saw the telegram sent from the Chinese embassy in Poland.He immediately reported to Mao Zedong: "I have found the door, I can knock on the door, and I have got the stepping stone." Before this, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had been keenly aware of a series of noteworthy signals sent by Nixon, including the US government's announcement to relax restrictions on China's trade restrictions, opposition to the Soviet Union's proposal aimed at isolating China, and ordered to stop US destroyers from patrolling the Taiwan Strait.Half a month before the Polish incident, Zhou Enlai wrote to Mao Zedong: "You can pay attention to the movements of Nixon and Kissinger."

On December 4, Zhou Enlai approved the Foreign Ministry's report on the release of two Americans who entered Chinese waters on a yacht, and notified the US ambassador to Poland, Stossel.This is also a response signal from China to the United States.A few days later, Stossel was invited to the Chinese embassy in Poland to meet with the Chinese charge d'affaires, Lei Yang, and became the first American ambassador abroad to enter the "Red China" embassy. On the 12th, Zhou Enlai forwarded three telegrams about the China-US meeting in Warsaw to Mao Zedong, proposing: "We plan to put aside the matter of the Sino-US contact to see the reactions of all parties, and then decide how to answer it."On the same day, when Zhou Enlai met with Pakistani Ambassador to China Kayser, he asked him to tell President Yahya that if Nixon wanted to contact China, he could use official channels as much as possible. At the end of December, after repeated consideration by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, they finally approved the resumption of the China-US Warsaw Talks, which had been interrupted for nearly three years.

The resumed Sino-US ambassadorial talks are scheduled to be held in Warsaw on January 20, 1970.Before the talks, Zhou Enlai reviewed and revised the Chinese speech word by word, and made a note: After our speech, if the United States reiterated that the United States has a treaty relationship with Taiwan, I should answer that the "U.S.-Chiang Treaty" is not recognized by the entire Chinese people. If the U.S. side asks what is meant by higher-level talks or other means, it can answer that if the U.S. government is interested in this, it can propose a plan, or the two sides can agree on a plan during the ambassadorial level talks.

The Taiwan issue has always been the crux of the Sino-US talks.Properly handling this issue is a prerequisite for the normalization of Sino-US relations, and it is also an unavoidable substantive issue.Zhou Enlai believed that it was necessary to express China's position to the United States, especially Nixon himself.When he was still considering resuming the China-US talks in Warsaw, he told the Pakistani ambassador who helped realize the Sino-US contact: the current international affairs are complicated, and the relationship between China and the United States is also changing.Regarding US relations, China's position is firstly the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and secondly the withdrawal of all US armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area.Thank you President Yahya for making China's position very clear. In mid-February, the Chinese party’s speech at the Warsaw Talks, which was discussed and revised at the Politburo meeting chaired by Zhou Enlai, proposed: “If the U.S. government is willing to send ministerial-level representatives or special envoys of the U.S. president to Beijing to further discuss fundamental issues in Sino-U.S. relations , the Chinese government is willing to receive it." The "fundamental issue in Sino-US relations" mentioned here mainly refers to the Taiwan issue.

Soon, a message from the US side came from Pakistan: Nixon was going to open a direct channel from the White House to Beijing, so as to "guarantee completely free decision-making" under the condition of absolute secrecy.Zhou Enlai understood it at a glance.After reading it, he commented: "Nixon wanted to adopt the method of negotiating in Paris (referring to the Paris negotiations on the Vietnam issue), and Kissinger secretly contacted him." The coup d'état overthrew the royal government led by Prince Sihanouk, and the American army then invaded Cambodia, which aroused the upsurge of the people of the three Indochinese countries to resist the United States and save the country.In order to support the people of the three countries in Indochina, the Chinese side postponed the China-US Warsaw talks for two consecutive times. At the end of June, the Nixon administration was forced to decide to withdraw American troops from Cambodia. In early October, Nixon said in an interview with a reporter from the American "Time" magazine: "If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I can't go, I want my children to go." Afterwards, Taking the opportunity of welcoming Romanian President Ceausescu's banquet, Nixon "intentionally" used the name "People's Republic of China" for the first time, and privately conveyed the "message" that the leader of Toro hoped for high-level contacts between the United States and China to the Chinese side.

On November 5 of the same year, when Zhou Enlai met with his American friend Edgar Snow, he clearly pointed out the "crux" that affects Sino-US relations: Sino-US negotiations have not resolved any problems since they began in 1955.In order to solve the problem, we must now talk about the Taiwan issue, that is, the United States has invaded and occupied Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait by force.All other issues are secondary.With regard to this issue, our attitude and approach to negotiations will not change. It is the US government that should change.Our doors are always open. A few days later, Pakistani President Yahya visited China and brought with him a message from Nixon about sending his senior aides to talk to Chinese representatives at any time and any place.Soon, similar information came from Romania.Although Nixon repeatedly expressed his willingness to hold high-level meetings with the Chinese side, he still avoided talking about the key issue of Sino-US relations that the Chinese side has stated many times-the Taiwan issue. On November 14, Zhou Enlai reiterated when answering Ya Haiya: Taiwan is an inalienable territory of China, and the resolution of the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, which does not allow outsiders to interfere.U.S. armed forces occupying Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are key issues of tension in U.S.-China relations.The Chinese government has always been willing to negotiate to resolve this issue, but after 15 years of talks there has been no result.Now, President Nixon said that he would move toward reconciliation with China.If the U.S. really has the desire and solutions to solve the above-mentioned key issues, the Chinese government welcomes the U.S. president to send a special envoy to Beijing for talks, and the timing can be negotiated by the Pakistani president.

Zhou Enlai made it clear here again: the high-level meeting between China and the United States must first discuss the Taiwan issue, and China will not make concessions on the Taiwan issue.In view of this situation, the United States, which has been trying to "bypass" the Taiwan issue, had to reply vaguely to the Chinese side: the talks between the representatives of the United States and China should not be limited to discussing the Taiwan issue... On December 18, Mao Zedong met with his old friend Snow.He told Snow: Nixon had long said that he would send representatives. He was not interested in the meeting in Warsaw and wanted to have an in-person meeting.If Nixon is willing to come, I am willing to have a talk with him, whether the talk is successful or not. On the 25th, the front page of the "People's Daily" published a photo of Chairman Mao taking a photo with Snow on the Tiananmen Gate tower, disclosing to the U.S. the "information" that Mao Zedong was in favor of high-level dialogue between China and the U.S.Nixon later recalled that Mao Zedong and Snow talked about welcoming him to China, "we found out after a few days."

In this way, the conditions for holding a high-level meeting between China and the United States have gradually matured, and a major breakthrough is waiting to be achieved. January 29, 1971 is the third day of the first lunar month.In the Xihua Hall of Zhongnanhai, Zhou Enlai was talking with the Chinese personnel who participated in drafting the meeting minutes of the China-Japan Table Tennis Association.After reading the minutes they drafted, Zhou Enlai frowned and criticized: "Kaji Goto's draft meeting minutes is already very good! Mr. Goto wanted to come to China very early on, and you are too demanding of such a friend It’s gone.” Then he said anxiously, “Don’t be so ‘Left’!” Kaji Goto is the president of the Japan Table Tennis Association and has long been committed to the friendship between China and Japan.In view of the fact that the 31st World Table Tennis Championships will be held in Nagoya, Japan, he made a special trip to China to invite the Chinese table tennis team, which is well-known in the world table tennis world, to participate in the event.The text proposed by Goto as the basis for the talks between the two countries' table tennis associations originally included the content that should abide by the "three political principles of Sino-Japanese relations", namely: first, oppose the "two Chinas"; second, strive to restore diplomatic relations; , Promote Sino-Japanese friendship.However, during the talks, the Chinese representatives insisted on including the Taiwan issue in the minutes, and advocated that the words "Three Political Principles" should be placed in the first article of the minutes.At this time, Sino-Japanese relations had not yet been normalized, and the domestic situation in Japan was relatively complicated. Goto felt embarrassed and hoped that the Chinese side could understand his situation.Due to the stalemate between the two sides, it was difficult to finalize the minutes for a while.Under such circumstances, Zhou Enlai called in the Chinese negotiators, severely criticized their actions, and pointed out: the talks depend on the target, and there is no need to raise the Taiwan issue here, and you should not make difficult problems for Mr. Goto. The "Three Political Principles of China-Japan Relations" is still put in the second article of the minutes as originally mentioned by the Japanese side. Under the direct guidance of Zhou Enlai, the meeting minutes of the China-Japan Table Tennis Association were signed in Beijing on February 1.Subsequently, the Chinese table tennis delegation was formed and formally registered for the 31st World Table Tennis Championships Organizing Committee. For a long time, the Chinese table tennis team has been cared for by Zhou Enlai.He has set up family banquets many times to entertain the players and coaches who have gone abroad to take part in the competition, and clean up the dust for them.He said: "I invite you to my house for dinner. I will pay for it, but you must bring your own food stamps." During the dinner, Zhou Enlai talked and laughed happily with everyone.After dinner, he sometimes plays table tennis with everyone. In 1965, the athletes of the Chinese table tennis team made another great achievement in the 28th World Table Tennis Championships held in Yugoslavia, winning 5 championships in a row, which shocked the world table tennis world. After the "Cultural Revolution" began, due to the serious damage to the sports industry and the cancellation of overseas competitions, Chinese table tennis players lost the opportunity to participate in the 29th and 30th World Table Tennis Championships. In October 1969, while watching a sports performance, Zhou Enlai asked the person in charge of the military management committee of the State Sports Commission and the military propaganda team of the sports academy to understand the athletes' thoughts, training, and living conditions.When I heard someone describe going abroad before the "Cultural Revolution" as "being emperor, repairing, and anti-carrying the sedan chair", engaging in "surrenderism" and "traitorism", and describing athletes who won honor for the country in international competitions as When he was a "revisionist seedling", he angrily retorted: "Going abroad to compete is to win glory for the motherland! Some people don't want patriotism, but we still need patriotism!" When talking about the current situation of sports teams during the "Cultural Revolution", Zhou Enlai was very Said with concern: Most of the famous athletes are locked up, just like labor models.Tell them to stand the test.The vast majority of athletes are good, cultivated by Mao Zedong Thought, and cultivated by ourselves. We should not deny ourselves.It is always a good thing to win glory for the socialist motherland and contribute to the country!Soon, Zhou Enlai inquired about the study and training of table tennis players, and proposed: we must train quickly and recover our skills. In mid-March 1971, the preparations for the Chinese table tennis team were completed. On the night of the 14th, Zhou Enlai convened a meeting of heads of departments such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Sports Commission to hear a report on the Chinese team's participation in Japan.At this time, there were two different opinions within the sports committee: whether to go or not to go, and the majority were not in favor of going. The reason was that there were several hostile forces abroad who wanted to disrupt the Chinese team's participation, and going there was very dangerous.Zhou Enlai pondered for a while and said: "How can we do it if we don't go? How can we not keep our promise?" Then, he patiently explained the reasons for sending the team to the competition, and said decisively: "We keep our promise and participate in the 31st World Table Tennis Championships. As he spoke, he took out his pen and wrote a report to Mao Zedong on the spot, pointing out: This time going abroad to participate in the competition has become a serious international struggle; our side proposes "friendship first, competition second", even if you lose, it doesn't matter, anyway prevailed politically.After finishing writing, ask the secretary to send out the report immediately. In the early morning of the 15th, Mao Zedong’s instructions were passed to the Sports Commission: “Do as we do. Our team should go, and prepare to kill a few people. It’s better not to die. One must not be afraid of suffering, and the other is not afraid of death.” From March 28th to April 7th, the Chinese table tennis team went to Japan to compete as scheduled. The "treasure knife" Chinese male and female players won four championships in one fell swoop, and their spirit remained the same as before.In just a few days, Chinese athletes also had friendly contacts with athletes from various countries including the United States, showing the spirit of "friendship first, competition second".As a result, the American table tennis team competing in Japan requested the Chinese side to visit China. On April 3, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Sports Commission wrote a report to Zhou Enlai on the issue of the US team's visit to China, thinking that the time was "not yet ripe".The next day, Zhou Enlai sent the report to Mao Zedong for approval.After repeated consideration, Mao Zedong made the decision to invite the US team to visit China on the 7th.Zhou Enlai immediately told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call the Chinese delegation in Japan and formally extend an invitation to the United States.When the person in charge of the Chinese delegation announced the symbolic news in Nagoya, it immediately caused a sensation, and major Japanese newspapers published the news on the front pages, reporting the "ping-pong diplomacy" between China and the United States.Zhou Enlai excitedly wrote in a report forwarded to Mao Zedong: "After the phone call passed, Nagoya spread the news that shocked the world. It surpassed the news of the 31st International Competition." The representative of the working meeting announced: "From today, we have launched a new diplomatic offensive, starting with the Chinese table tennis team..." The news quickly reached the White House.The masterpiece of "ping-pong diplomacy" directed by the Chinese side has won the admiration of the owner of the White House.Nixon later admitted that this was a "breakthrough in a way that the United States did not expect at all." A week later, Zhou Enlai received all members of the American table tennis delegation who had just arrived in China in Beijing.He said: "The people of China and the United States had frequent exchanges in the past, but they have been interrupted for a long time. Your invitation to visit this time has opened the door for friendly exchanges between the two peoples." During the meeting, American team member Glenn Cohen asked Zhou Enlai for his opinion on the popular "hippies" among American youth.Zhou Enlai replied frankly: "Nowadays, young people in the world are a little dissatisfied with the status quo and want to seek the truth. When young people's thoughts fluctuate, they will manifest themselves in various forms. However, all forms of expression are not necessarily mature or fixed." "According to human development Look, a universal truth must be understood by people in the end, just like the laws of nature. We agree that any young people have the requirement of this kind of discussion, which is a good thing. You must know it through your own practice. But there is one thing, you must find The commonality of most people, which can make the majority of human beings develop, progress and be happy." As the prime minister of a big eastern country, Zhou Enlai's hospitality, humility and wise demeanor made a good and deep impression on Americans who came to this "mysterious land" for the first time, and attracted the attention of public opinion all over the world. "Ping-pong diplomacy" achieved the dramatic effect of "a small ball pushing the earth", and accelerated the process of achieving high-level contact between China and the United States. On April 21, 1971, Zhou Enlai submitted the "Premier Zhou Enlai's Message to President Nixon" to the US government through the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan: "To fundamentally restore the relationship between China and the United States, we must withdraw from China's Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area. Use all the armed forces of the United States. To solve this key issue, only through direct discussions with senior leaders can we find a way. Therefore, the Chinese government reiterates that it is willing to openly receive the special envoy of the US President, such as Dr. Kissinger, or the US Secretary of State, or even the US President himself Come to Beijing to discuss directly." At the end of April, after learning of the "Voice Message", Nixon first responded to the Chinese side verbally, expressing his acceptance of the invitation. On May 17, the U.S. formally replied to the Chinese side through the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S.: President Nixon “is ready to have a serious conversation with the leaders of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing, and the two sides are free to raise their respective major concerns.”And proposed: "Dr. Kissinger will hold a secret preparatory meeting with Premier Zhou Enlai or another appropriate senior Chinese official. Kissinger will come to China after June 15." Although the United States is still avoiding the key issue of the Sino-US talks - the Taiwan issue, it understands that this issue cannot be avoided during the talks, and has made arrangements in the specific agenda for its visit to China, showing a positive and serious attitude.Under such circumstances, the Chinese side began to prepare for the guidelines for the Sino-US talks. On May 25, Zhou Enlai convened a meeting of core leadership members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study Nixon's oral reply.The next day, he presided over a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to discuss the principles of Sino-US talks.After the meeting, Zhou Enlai personally drafted the "Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the Sino-US Talks". The "Report" reviewed the evolution of Sino-US relations since World War II, estimated various situations that might arise in the preparatory talks with Kissinger and Nixon's visit, and formulated corresponding countermeasures. The core content of the "Report" is still the Taiwan issue, namely: All U.S. armed forces and special military installations should be withdrawn from Taiwan Province of China and the Taiwan Strait within a specified time limit; Taiwan is Chinese territory, and the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair, which cannot be interfered by outsiders; the Chinese people strive to liberate Taiwan peacefully; the Chinese government and people Resolutely oppose the activities of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan"; if the United States wants to establish diplomatic relations with China, it must recognize the People's Republic of China as the only legal government representing China. On the 29th, Mao Zedong approved the "Report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee on the Sino-US Talks".On the same day, China sent an export letter to Nixon, welcoming Kissinger to Beijing for a secret meeting with Chinese leaders. On June 2, Nixon was elated after receiving the message, saying: This is the most important letter received by the President of the United States since World War II. From then on, Zhou Enlai did a lot of work to prepare for the talks with Kissinger.He has held meetings with the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant departments many times to discuss the talks plan, study and analyze the situation of the US side, and make thoughtful and detailed deployments on issues such as protocol, civil aviation, security and confidentiality.When talking about the significance of the Sino-US talks, he said: This is the first important high-level meeting after the interruption of Sino-US exchanges for 20 years, which shows the complete failure of the US policy of blocking and hostile to China.In order to get rid of the passive situation, the United States had to let go of its usual arrogance and come to Beijing to have talks with us; it is not that we want something from them, but that they need something from us first.We should do this work well in the spirit of being generous, treating each other with courtesy, and being neither humble nor overbearing. At noon on July 9, Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Affairs Assistant, and his party, accompanied by relevant Chinese personnel, arrived in Beijing secretly on a plane of Pakistan Civil Aviation Company.Kissinger stayed in Beijing for 48 hours.During this period, the 73-year-old Zhou Enlai held six talks with the 48-year-old doctor, totaling 17 hours.The two sides focused on the Taiwan issue and the timing of Nixon's visit to China.Zhou Enlai reiterated: Taiwan has always been China's territory, and the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, which cannot be interfered by outsiders;Kissinger said: The United States recognizes that Taiwan belongs to China, and hopes that the Taiwan issue will be resolved peacefully; the United States will no longer be an enemy of China, and will gradually reduce the number of US troops stationed in Taiwan as Sino-US relations improve; the history of the US-Jiang Mutual Defense Treaty can be resolved.The two sides agreed that President Nixon would visit China before May 1972, and decided to use the secret communication channel in Paris between China and the United States in the future. In his later memoirs, Kissinger talked about the impression Zhou Enlai left on him during this meeting: "He is an outstanding historical figure. He is proficient in philosophy, familiar with the past, good at historical analysis, resourceful, witty and eloquent. Funny and above all. His knowledge of the situation, especially in the United States, but also my own background, is astonishing. Almost everything he says and does has a purpose." "Jane In a word, Zhou Enlai is one of the two or three people who impressed me the most in my life. He is gentle, gentle, patient, intelligent and quick-witted. When we discuss, he easily It just broke the essence of our new relationship, and it seems that there is no other wise choice." "China and the United States sought reconciliation in the early 1970s, which was determined by the world environment. But things came so fast and developed so It went smoothly because the Chinese Premier's brilliant character and foresight played a big role." On the afternoon of the 11th, Kissinger and his party returned to Pakistan by plane.Two days ago, Kissinger, who was "unsure and anxious" about this trip, finally breathed a sigh of relief at this time, thinking that the results of his visit to China "exceeded the original expectations and successfully completed the secrets he had undertaken." mission". On July 15, China and the United States simultaneously issued an announcement on Kissinger's visit to China, announcing the news of Nixon's visit to China.This announcement of less than 200 characters immediately shocked the whole world and became "one of the most unexpected diplomatic news in this century".However, this is only the first step.There will be several rounds of "confrontation" between China and the United States on the key issue of Taiwan. Three days after the China-U.S. Announcement was issued, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a "Notice" to all agencies stationed abroad on the issue of the principles of Sino-U.S. relations.The document reviewed and revised by Zhou Enlai emphasized that in dealing with Sino-US relations and other international affairs, "we will adhere to established principles and positions, and we will never trade principles for transactions."On the same day, when Zhou Enlai received the French parliamentary delegation, he further clarified the principled position of the Chinese government: China and the United States are not without obstacles in seeking to normalize relations between the two countries.The biggest problem between China and the United States is the Taiwan issue.He also said that as long as there are "two Chinas", "one China and one Taiwan" or similar forms in the United Nations, we will not go to the United Nations, and we will not go there. China is a founding member of the United Nations and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Western forces headed by the United States obstructed the restoration of the People's Republic of China's legal seat in the United Nations, making this seat stolen by the Kuomintang authorities in Taiwan for a long time.Over the past 20 years since the founding of the People's Republic of China, Zhou Enlai has unswervingly worked hard for the restoration of New China's legal rights in the United Nations. At the 25th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1970, the proposal to support the restoration of China's legal seat in the United Nations was approved by more than half of the countries for the first time, but it still failed to pass due to less than two-thirds of the majority.With the situation becoming more and more favorable to China, Zhou Enlai said to his American friend Snow: If the UN General Assembly approves our legal seat and expels Taiwan at the same time, of course we have to consider this. As far as the United States is concerned, due to the development and changes of the situation, it has become more and more difficult for it to manipulate the United Nations.This forced it to change its past policy, recognize that Taiwan belongs to China, and even expressed its support for the restoration of China's legal seat in the United Nations, but at the same time opposed the expulsion of representatives of the Taiwan authorities.The essence of this approach is to advocate "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" in the United Nations. On August 2, 1971, U.S. Secretary of State Rogers issued the "Statement Concerning China's Representation in the United Nations", publicly throwing out the "two Chinas" plan.Later, the United States, Japan and other countries proposed the so-called "important issue case" and "dual representation case" in an attempt to maintain Taiwan's seat in the United Nations. Zhou Enlai paid close attention to the situation of the 26th UN General Assembly. On August 21, he convened a meeting of heads of the foreign affairs departments of the party, government, and military systems to publicize the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuting the proposal of the US government.At the meeting, he asked the participants: Which countries did the United States hold meetings with in order to create "two Chinas" at the United Nations?Most of the foreign affairs cadres present at the meeting could not answer.Zhou Enlai criticized angrily: I am really annoyed!You don't read newspapers, nor do you read "Reference", the diplomatic front is not good.Then, he listed the names of these 20 countries one by one, and analyzed that: From this list, we can see the decline of the international status of the United States. From October 20 to 26, Kissinger came to China for the second time "to make basic arrangements for President Nixon's visit to China".Zhou Enlai, who had just finished dealing with Lin Biao's defection incident, ignored the tension and exhaustion that had lasted for more than a month, and devoted himself to the heavy diplomatic affairs with all his strength.According to the request of the US side, counterpart talks and related activities at various levels will be arranged at the same time.To this end, Zhou Enlai reviewed and implemented the various plans proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs one by one in advance. During the week of Kissinger's visit to China, Zhou Enlai held 10 talks with him. In addition to agreeing on the date of Nixon's visit to China and discussing other international issues, the two sides mainly exchanged views on the Sino-US joint communique of Nixon's visit to China.Beforehand, the United States did not say that it would issue a joint communiqué, and China did not prepare in advance.When Zhou En came to see the draft communiqué proposed by the US side, he expressed that he could not accept it, because the draft communiqué still followed the general joint communiqué, covering up differences between them and avoiding substantive issues. A communiqué of consensus.Despite this, Zhou Enlai did not deny some merits in the US draft.He instructed relevant personnel to draft counter-cases, and proposed: According to the method of agreement reached with Chiang Kai-shek in the past, each said his own way, and clearly wrote down the differences between the two sides. . After Mao Zedong's approval, the Chinese side drafted a "each said his own" communiqué, which left the US comments blank for their own writing.At first, Kissinger found it hard to accept that China's "sharp words" and "positions were put forward in the most uncompromising terms" on the proposal.But after calming down and studying carefully, it was found that this "ingenious" way could just solve their "difficulties".After repeated talks, the U.S. side finally agreed with the Chinese side on the drafting principles and basic content of the joint communiqué, and proposed amendments and supplementary comments. On the 26th, the two sides reached a preliminary agreement on the draft joint communiqué.In this way, this peculiar and "unprecedented" draft diplomatic communiqué created in accordance with Zhou Enlai's principle of "everything says its own way" became a successful masterpiece in the diplomatic communiqué, which made Kissinger feel again "Worthwhile trip". When Kissinger was about to leave China, something happened that he did not expect. On the night of October 25, 1971, the 26th UN General Assembly passed a resolution overwhelmingly, restoring all legal rights of the People’s Republic of China in the UN and immediately expelling the representatives of Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek clique from all UN agencies.Immediately after the vote was over, the United Nations conference hall in New York was filled with jubilation, and thunderous applause and cheers sounded from all sides, one wave after another, one after another, lasting for a long time.Representatives supporting China stood up, raised their hands and cheered in different languages: "We have won!" "Long live China!" After quitting the United Nations, he led a group of his men to leave the venue in despair.The news media commented: "In the absence of itself, China was blessed by more than two-thirds of the countries in the UN General Assembly, and was given the right to wave its giant hand to enter the UN, bringing about fundamental changes in the UN." Twenty days later, a delegation from the People's Republic of China appeared at the United Nations building.Among the speakers who took the stage to welcome the Chinese delegation, representatives from countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were the most eye-catching.Their passionate speeches expressed the sincere feelings of these countries for New China.In their minds, China, the most populous country in the world, treats them equally everywhere, which is in stark contrast to what some Western powers have done.For the leaders of some countries, this kind of sincere friendship was felt through contact with Zhou Enlai himself. After Zhou Enlai passed away in 1976, Myanmar President Ne Win said affectionately in his eulogy: As the leader of a big country, Premier Zhou "always treated people equally"; What a wonderful world it would be for a leader like Premier Zhou Enlai who can give sympathy and understanding spirit!" The rapid restoration of the new China's legal seat in the United Nations was beyond the expectation of the Chinese leaders.Soon after the UN General Assembly passed the vote, Zhou Enlai told an American friend: The UN vote that day was completely unexpected, not only by our expectations, but also by the United States.We didn't send a single person to the UNGA, and the sponsors were led by two countries on either side of the Mediterranean.So many countries have placed their hope in us, and we thank them. The next day, Zhou Enlai told the visiting Japanese guests: The whole world is paying attention to such an important event, and it is a fact that we are not ready.It shows a problem, that is, the baton of the United States in the United Nations is not working.The result of this vote was against the wishes of the United States, and also against the wishes of the Sato government of Japan, which has always followed the United States.We cannot but pay attention to the spirit of this vote, because it represents the aspirations of most countries and peoples in the world. The victory of New China at the 26th UN General Assembly was, in the final analysis, a victory for insisting on the principle that there is only one China in the world, that is, the People’s Republic of China; Taiwan" policy failed.This fact, in turn, prompts more countries to seek to normalize relations with China.For this reason, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai followed the trend, took advantage of the situation, firmly grasped this historical opportunity, and accelerated the opening of a new diplomatic pattern. On November 30, 1971, Xinhua News Agency was authorized to issue an announcement announcing that the governments of China and the United States had agreed that President Nixon would begin his visit to China on February 21, 1972.From then on, Zhou Enlai directly led and deployed various preparations for the reception of Nixon, including publicity and education, security and confidentiality, news reports, etc., and he personally studied the arrangements and implemented them one by one. In the history of Sino-U.S. relations, the first visit by a U.S. president to China is a major event that has attracted worldwide attention.Due to lack of experience, in the reception work, a slight negligence may have adverse effects internationally.Zhou Enlai first clearly stipulated the basic principles of this reception work. On December 2, he emphasized to relevant responsible persons who participated in the preparatory work meeting for Nixon's visit to China: We are a sovereign country, and nothing should violate our sovereignty.The reception of President Nixon must reflect the principles, work style and strict discipline of the proletariat.Be careful not to exaggerate or overdo it in external publicity.The general policy of the reception work determined by Zhou Enlai is: "neither cold nor hot, neither arrogant nor humble, treat them with courtesy, and do not impose on others." In early January 1972, Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, took the lead in sending a team to China to make technical arrangements for Nixon's visit to China.周恩来召集会议进行研究，原则同意美方提出的通过卫星转播尼克松在华活动实况，决定由中国政府出资买下供美方使用的通讯卫星，然后租给美方使用。周恩来说：在主权问题上，我们一点不能让。美方原来说他们自己带通讯设备，不要我们付费。我们说，这不行，我们是主权国家，我们买过来，租给你们用，你们付费。这样一方面维护了我们的主权，另外我们在跟他们使用时总能学到一点技术。 对来自美方的某些观点和提法，周恩来的反应更为敏锐。1月6日，他答复黑格转达的美方口信时指出：美方对中国的“生存能力”表示怀疑，并声称要“维护”中国的“独立”和“生存能力”的说法，令人惊讶。中国认为，任何国家决不能靠外力维护其独立和生存，否则只能成为别人的保护国或殖民地。社会主义的新中国是在不断抗击外来侵略和压迫的斗争中诞生和成长起来的，并一定会继续存在和发展下去。 周恩来这种既坚持原则、又适度灵活的纯熟的外交艺术，使一贯高傲的美方也不得不表示敬佩。 2月中旬，接待尼克松访华的各项准备工作基本就绪。周恩来密切地注视着这方面的宣传工作。19日，他对新华社的一则报道提出批评：你们今天写的尼克松启程来华的消息中，没有摘录他所讲的这样一段话——“当我们展望将来的时候，我们必须认识到中华人民共和国政府同美国政府之间存在巨大的分歧。将来我们之间仍将存在分歧。但是，我们必须做的事情是寻找某种办法使我们可以有分歧而又不成为战争中的敌人。”这段话说得最清楚不过了。为了弥补这则新闻报道的不足，周恩来把这段话中的最后一句，加进了他为尼克松夫妇举行的欢迎宴会的祝酒词里。 2月21日中午，尼克松总统和夫人、美国国务卿罗杰斯、总统助理基辛格等一行乘专机抵达北京。周恩来、叶剑英、李先念、郭沫若、姬鹏飞等到机场迎接美国客人。尼克松走下舷梯，将手伸向周恩来。当两只手握在一起时，全世界都看到了这一历史性的时刻：“一个时代结束了，另一个时代开始了。”周恩来对尼克松说：“你的手伸过世界最辽阔的海洋来和我握手——25年没有交往了啊！”下午，周恩来陪同毛泽东会见尼克松和基辛格。在一个多小时的会谈中，把此次中美高级会晤的“基本方针都讲了”，气氛认真而坦率。 晚上，周恩来在人民大会堂为尼克松总统和夫人举行欢迎宴会。席间，周恩来在祝酒词中说：尼克松总统应邀来访，“使两国领导人有机会直接会晤，谋求两国关系正常化，并就共同关心的问题交换意见，这是符合中美两国人民愿望的积极行动，这在中美两国关系史上是一个创举”。“中美两国的社会制度根本不同，在中美两国政府之间存在着巨大的分歧。但是，这种分歧不应当妨碍中美两国在互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利和和平共处五项原则的基础上建立正常的国家关系，更不应该导致战争。”“我们希望，通过双方坦率地交换意见，弄清楚彼此之间的分歧，努力寻找共同点，使我们两国的关系能够有一个新的开始。” 尼克松后来这样回忆他对周恩来的印象： “周的仪表给人的印象是待人热情，开诚布公，善于自制又显然充满激情。”“周的机敏胜过我所认识的任何一位世界领导人，而且明显地带有中国人性格的特征。”“他知识渊博，逻辑性强，坚毅，是世界上伟大的谈判者。他彬彬有礼，不是大喊大叫，而是用温和而简练的语言表达出坚定的信念——这比拍桌子、强加于人有效得多。我们从事最高级重要会谈的人都知道，理亏的人总要大声嚷嚷，而有理的人却语气温和，无需多说。” 尼克松在华期间，周恩来同他进行了五次会谈，主要就国际形势和双边关系问题交换看法。尼克松在重申美方对处理台湾问题的原则（即只有一个中国、台湾是中国的一部分，不支持、不鼓励“台湾独立”，逐步实现从台湾撤军等）的同时，又强调美方在政治方面仍有“困难”，希望在他第二届任期内完成中美关系正常化。周恩来一针见血地指出：“还是那句话，不愿意丢掉'老朋友'，其实老朋友已经丢了一大堆了。'老朋友'有好的，有不好的，应该有选择嘛。”又说：“你们希望和平解放台湾”，“我们只能说争取和平解放台湾。为什么说'争取'呢？因为这是两方面的事。我们要和平解放，蒋介石不干怎么办？”“我坦率地说，就是希望在你（下届）任期内解决，因为蒋介石已为时不多了。” 由于双方在台湾问题上存在的分歧，直到25日下午，中美联合公报中关于台湾问题的措词仍没有确定下来。这时，美方已在担心，如果公报不能发表，尼克松的访华成果就无法体现。在这种情况下，周恩来告诉美方：反正双方观点已经接近了，我们也报告了毛主席，说已商定要写最后从台湾撤军的问题，但还要设法用双方都能接受的最佳措词表达。基辛格马上表示：我们十分欣赏中方所表现的慷慨和公正的精神。当晚，周恩来出席尼克松总统和夫人举行的答谢宴会。由于公报尚未定稿，不一定能够发表，周恩来在宴会致词中只讲了中美之间的分歧，而没有讲共同点。 2月26日凌晨，双方对中美联合公报的内容基本谈定。经过一番文字推敲和修改后，在27日定稿。28日，中美《联合公报》在上海发表。公报里美方关于台湾问题的措词为：“美国方面声明：美国认识到，在台湾海峡两边的所有中国人都认为只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。美国对这一立场不提出异议。它重申它对由中国人自己和平解决台湾问题的关心。考虑到这一前景，它确认从台湾撤出全部美国武装力量和军事设施的最终目标。” 事后，周恩来详细回顾了《联合公报》的起草过程： 这是中美会谈中争论最多的一段。从北京争到杭州，从杭州争到上海，一直到27日下午3时半才达成协议。这段第一句话是基辛格贡献的，我们挖空心思也没有想出来。这样人民的意见也表达出来了，所以博士还有博士的好处。我们原来提“台湾是中国的一个省”，蒋介石也是这么说的，但美方坚持要改成“一部分”，因为他们国内有人反对。我们同意了，因为“一个省”和“一部分”是一样的。“美国对这一立场不提出异议”一句中的“立场”二字也是美方提出的。争论的一个关键问题是，我们要使他尽可能明确地承认台湾问题是中国人之间的问题。他们提出种种方案，要我们承担和平解放台湾的义务，我们说不行，你这样希望可以。我们要他承担从台湾全部撤军为最终目标。有人问，“美蒋条约”为什么不写上？你写上废除“美蒋条约”，他就要写上保持“美蒋条约”义务，这就不利了。军事设施都撤走了还有什么“条约”？所以抓问题要抓关键性的，有些关键性措词要巧妙，使他们陷于被动，我们处于主动。尼克松上台前17年，我们一直坚持两条原则，一个是在中美两国之间实行和平共处五项原则，一个是美国从台湾和台湾海峡撤军。这就等于取消了“美蒋条约”，让中国人民自己解决台湾问题。尼克松上台以后，情况有变化，时代也在前进。我们如果还是只有原则性，没有灵活性，就不能推动世界的变化。外电评论说，这个公报是个奇特的公报，双方的原则和立场截然不同。关于台湾问题的立场也不同，但也找到一些共同点。前面有11个共同点，台湾问题好像也是个共同点。但台湾问题还没有解决。所以这个文件是过去没有过的，所有外交公报都没有把双方尖锐对立的立场写出来。我们把分歧写出来，在国际上创造了一个风格。 尼克松也深有感触地回忆：会谈中，我们双方都不用外交辞令，不把我们的分歧轻描淡写，一笔带过。相反，我们不避免争论，而是把观点放到桌面上，分清哪些是分歧，哪些是共同点。对一致的地方，双方互相合作，这是和平谈判取得进展的唯一方法。有时候，写在文件上的东西，甚至签署了的文件都是不算数的。只有双方坦诚相见，才能取得真正的谅解。因此，上海公报是真正有历史意义的，是永存的。 这份来之不易的中美《联合公报》的发表，标志着中美关系开始走向正常化。为此，尼克松显得心情格外舒畅。在上海市为他送行的宴会上，他发表即席讲话说，此次访华的一周，是“改变世界的一周”。离开中国前，有点“飘飘然”的尼克松甚至还要国务卿罗杰斯当面邀请周恩来访美。对此，周恩来意味深长地回答：中美目前还没有建交，我这时访美，似有不妥。 此时此刻，周恩来正在考虑尼克松访华后给中国对外关系带来的一系列新的变化和应该采取的对策。