Chapter 8 chapter eight

Napoleon entered Moscow after a brilliant victory on the Moskva River; the victory was unquestionable.Because the battlefield is in the hands of the French.The Russians retreated, abandoning the capital.The rich food, weapons, equipment and countless wealth of Moscow City are all in the hands of Napoleon.The Russian army, half the size of the French army, made no attempt to attack for a whole month.Napoleon's situation was most brilliant.Attack and wipe out the remnants of the Russian army with twice as many troops, offer favorable terms of peace, and if the peace is rejected, march and threaten Petersburg, or even return to Smolensk or Vilna in case of setbacks, or simply Remaining in Moscow, in short, seems to require no special genius to preserve the splendor in which the French army was then in.In order to do this, it is only necessary to do the simplest and easiest thing, which is to prohibit the army from looting, to prepare winter clothing (in Moscow enough winter clothing can be obtained for the entire army), to collect food and grass in a proper way, according to the French Some historians say that Moscow has enough food for the army to eat for more than half a year.But Napoleon, whom historians hailed as the greatest of geniuses, the man who commanded the power of the whole army, did not do a single thing.

Not only does he do none of these things, but, on the contrary, he employs his power in choosing, out of all the paths open to him, the one which is more profound than all. Stupid and more pernicious paths.The roads available to Napoleon were: wintering in Mokos, marching towards Petersburg, marching towards Nizhny Novgorod, retreating north or south (the road Kutuzov later took), but, again I can't think of anything more stupid and harmful than what Napoleon did, that is, to stay in Moscow until the end of October, let the troops plunder the city, and then, wavering whether to keep the garrison, withdrew from Moscow. Approached Kutuzov without fighting, then turned to the right, approached Maloyaroslavets, lost the opportunity to attempt a breakthrough again, did not follow the main road taken by Kutuzov, but followed the The retreat of the ruined Smolensk road to Mozhaisk turned out to be nothing more foolish and harmful to the army.Even the most experienced strategist, even assuming that Napoleon's object was to destroy his army, could not conceive of another series of actions which, like Napoleon's, had absolutely nothing to do with any measures taken by the Russian army. ground, and utterly destroy the entire French army.

The genius Napoleon did it.But to say that Napoleon destroyed his army because he wanted to, or that he was stupid is like saying that Napoleon brought his army to Moscow because he wanted to, or because he was smart and talented, All equally unfair. In one case or another his individual actions are no more powerful than those of any one soldier.It's just that his personal actions conform to certain laws that phenomena follow in the process of formation. Historians tell us quite absurdly (only because Napoleon's actions did not turn out to be justified) that Napoleon's genius waned in Moscow.In fact, just as before, as in 1913, as in 1913, he exhausted all his ingenuity and strength to seek the best interests for himself and for his army.Napoleon's actions during this period were astonishing, not inferior to those he did in Egypt, Italy, and Prussia.We cannot know the extent of Napoleon's actual genius in Egypt (where four thousand years of history beheld his greatness), because only the French describe to us these great exploits of his.Nor can we judge without error his genius in Austria and in Prussia, since reports of his activities there are to be found in French and German documents; , the fortresses fell one by one before being surrounded, all this made the Germans have to recognize his genius and provide the only explanation for the war in Germany.But we, thank God, have no reason to admit his genius in order to cover our shame.We have paid the price for our right to see things straight, and we will never relinquish it.

His actions in Moscow, as everywhere, were astonishing and a display of his genius.During the period between his entry into Moscow and his withdrawal from Moscow, he issued one order after another, and worked out various plans one after another.The inhabitants of Moscow had run away, no delegation had come to see him, and not even the great fire of Moscow had alarmed him.He did not neglect the interests of his army, nor the activities of the enemy, nor the interests of the Russian people, nor the affairs of state in Paris, nor the diplomatic considerations concerning the imminent conclusion of the peace.