Chapter 28 C. Reality (Die Wirklichkeit)

§142 Reality is the unity directly formed by essence and existence or inside and outside.The manifestation of real things is the real things themselves.The actual thing is therefore still essential in its manifestation.It can also be said that a real thing is essential only when it has a direct external existence. (Explanation) In the foregoing, Being and Existence have appeared as two forms of immediate things. Being, generally speaking, is immediacy without reflection and a transition to the other.Existence is the immediate unity of being and reflection, and therefore reality is also phenomenon, which comes out of ground and returns to ground.The actual thing is the posited being of the above-mentioned immediate unity, attaining the relation of self-identity; it is thus free from transition, and its expression or externality is its intrinsic force; in its externality In nature, it has returned to itself; its presence is only the expression of itself, not of others.

Note: Reality and thought (or rather ideas) are often ludicrously thought of as antithetical to each other.We often hear people say that there is no objection to the truth and correctness of a certain idea, but it cannot be found in reality, or it can no longer be realized in reality.People who say such things only show that they neither understand the nature of thought nor properly understand the nature of reality.For in this statement, on the one hand, thought is synonymous with subjective ideas, plans, intentions, etc., and on the other hand, reality is synonymous with external sensible existence.In everyday life, we do not take the categories and the meanings they signify so seriously, perhaps with difficulty, and it may often happen that, for example, the idea of ​​a certain scheme or a certain method of taxation Although it is very good and applicable, such things cannot be found in the so-called reality, and it is difficult to realize under certain conditions.But as soon as the abstract intellect grasps these categories, it exaggerates the difference between reality and thought, and sees a fixed opposition between the two, saying: In this real world we must banish ideas from our minds.For this view, we must categorically refute it in the name of science and healthy rationality.For on the one hand ideas or ideas are not merely hidden in our heads, nor are ideas generally so feeble that their realization depends on the will of man.Ideas, on the contrary, are fully functional and fully realistic.On the other hand, reality is not so dirty and unreasonable, as those blind, simple-minded, thought-hating practitioners imagine.Insofar as reality differs from mere appearance and is first of all a unity of the inside and the outside, it does not stand in opposition to reason, but rather is thoroughly rational.Anything that is irrational, that is, because it is irrational, cannot be considered reality.We can also detect expressions in accordance with this view in the general habits of cultivated language, such as the general refusal to admit that a poet or a statesman who has not made a real intellectual contribution and a solid performance is true. poets or real statesmen.

From the misconception just mentioned that the immediate and tangible is reality, we can further find the source of the popular prejudice on the relationship between Plato's philosophy and Aristotle's philosophy. up.According to this prejudice, the difference between Plato and Aristotle is that the former recognizes ideas and only recognizes ideas as truth, whereas the latter denies ideas and keeps in touch with reality, so he is considered the founder and leader of empiricism .But it should be noted that reality is undoubtedly the basic principle of Aristotle's philosophy, but his so-called reality is not the material that is directly presented at the moment as it is usually said, but the idea as reality.The point of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, to be precise, is only that he thinks that Plato’s idea is just a kind of potentiality (δJDαβιs), but Aristotle and Plato both admit that only idea is truth. He is different from Plato's point is that the idea is essentially a kind of driving force (EDEρEIα), in other words, it is the "inside" that is completely developed from the "outside", so it is the unity or reality of the inside and outside, which is the meaning of emphasis here. Yes, a veritable reality.

§143 Reality, as a concrete category, contains the preceding categories and their differences, and is therefore their development.Those categories are therefore defined in reality only as an illusion (Schein), a postulate (§141). (a) As identity in general, reality, first of all only possibility, is a self-reflection which is posited as an abstract, non-essential essentiality as opposed to the concrete unity of real things.Possibilities are indeed essential to actuality, but this only shows that actuality is at the same time only possibility. (Explanation) Perhaps it is because of the importance of the possibility-category that Kant regards it, together with necessity and actuality, as the three categories belonging to the form. "Because these categories do not add anything to the concept as an object, but only express the relationship between the concept and the capacity of knowledge." In fact, possibility is the empty abstraction reflected by itself, which is what was said before" "inside", but now it is defined as the sublated, merely posited, external "inside".A possibility like this can undoubtedly be posited again as a mere pattern, as an abstraction without content, or, more specifically, as something that belongs only to subjective thinking.On the contrary, actuality and inevitability, really speaking, do not refer to forms or forms that exist only for other things. In fact, on the contrary, inevitability and actuality are also postulated, but they are not postulated abstractly. It is not determined, but a concrete thing completed by itself.

Since possibility is first of all opposed to concrete reality and is only a mere form of its own identity, the rule for the category of possibility should simply be: "Everything that does not contradict itself is possible"; and as such In other words, everything is possible, so to speak; for abstract thought can give any content to this form of identity.But it can also be said that everything is equally impossible. Because in every content (the content must be concrete) its determination can be regarded as a specific opposition and therefore also as a contradiction. —Therefore nothing could be more vain than a statement about this possibility and impossibility.Especially in philosophy, it is not necessary to say: "This is possible" or "Here is another possibility", or, as it is often said, "This is conceivable".I am especially willing to advise historians not to abuse those categories which have been indicated to be false in themselves.But in most cases, Kongshu's sharp mind always likes to speculate on possibilities out of thin air, and speculate on quite a few possibilities.

Note: At first in the imagination, we always think that possibility is a richer and wider category, while actuality is a poorer and narrower category.So people say: Everything is possible, but it cannot be said that what is possible is therefore also actual.But in fact, that is to say, in terms of thinking, actuality is a broader category, because actuality as a concrete thought contains possibility within itself as an abstract link.This can be seen even in ordinary consciousness, for when we speak of the distinction between the possible and the actual, when we say: "This is only the possible," we already feel that the actual is higher than the actual. possibility.Ordinary people always think that what is possible is conceivable.But the conceivability mentioned here just refers to conceive any content in the form of abstract identity.

Since any content can be conceived in abstract form, it is now only necessary to separate a content from all its many connections to conceive a possible thing.So anything, even the most absurd and unconscious, can be seen as possible.It is also possible that the moon will come down to earth tonight.Because the moon is a separate body from the earth, it is as likely to fall to the earth as a stone thrown in the air will fall to the earth.It is also possible for the emperor of Turkey to become pope.Since he is a human being, he may convert to Christianity, become a Catholic monk, and so on.Talk about possibility like this is mainly to play with the principle of sufficient reason in the way of abstract form.According to this, it can be said: anything is possible, as long as you find a reason for it.The less educated a person is, the less aware he is of the specific connections of objective things, the more he will rush into all kinds of empty possibilities when he observes things.For example, in the field of politics, all kinds of "road news" that politicians conjecture are examples of this possibility.Moreover, in practical life, malice and laziness often lurk behind the category of possibility, thereby evading certain obligations.To such irresponsible behavior, the law of sufficient reason just mentioned can be applied in the same way.The wise and experienced man, far from being deceived by the possibility (just because it is only possible), insists on grasping the reality, but the reality does not mean the specific existence of the present here and now.In daily life, there are quite a few proverbs, which are enough to express contempt for abstract possibilities.For example: "One sparrow in the hand is better than ten sparrows on the roof."

Moreover, what is considered possible is also for the same reason considered impossible.For each content (contents are always concrete) contains not only different but also opposite provisions.For example, we can say that there is nothing more impossible than "I am".Because "I" is not only a pure self-relation, but also a connection with other things.The same can be said of any object in the natural or spiritual world.It can be said that matter is impossible, because matter is the unity of attraction and repulsion.The same can be said of the impossibility of life, law, liberty, and above all a true triune God.For according to the principles of the abstract intellect of the Enlightenment, the concept of a triune God is ideologically contradictory and should be denied.Generally speaking, this is due to the abstract and empty intellect playing with the abstract and empty forms.And the task of philosophy with respect to these questions is simply to show the emptiness of these statements.

① Whether a thing is possible or impossible depends on the content, that is to say, on the totality of the individual moments of actuality, which in its development reveals itself as necessity. §144 (β) But the actual thing is itself only the external concrete, the inessential immediate, in so far as it differs from the possibility as its own reflection.In other words, actual things, as such immediate things, in their original (§142) Insofar as it is a simple immediate unity of inside and outside, it is an unessential external, and therefore at the same time (§140) a mere internal or an abstract self-reflection; can be considered a mere possibility.An actual thing becomes a contingent if it is placed on an equal footing with mere possibility.Possibility, conversely, is mere chance itself.

§145 Possibility and contingency are the two links of actuality, that is, inside and outside, as two simple forms posited, and these forms constitute the externality of real things.They have their own reflection as the ground of their essential determination in the actual thing or content which they determine.It follows, then, that the finiteness of the contingent and the possible is based on the separation of the determination of form from its content.So whether something is contingent and possible depends entirely on the content. Note: Possibility is only the mere immanence of actuality, and because of this it is only external actuality or chance.Generally speaking, chance means that the basis for the existence of a thing is not in itself but in other things.Reality appears in front of people's consciousness, mostly in the form of chance at first, and this chance is often confused by people with reality itself.But the contingent is only a one-sided form of the real—the side that reflects the other or that side of the real that is regarded as a mere possible.Therefore, we think that the accidental thing means that this thing can exist or cannot exist, can exist in this way or can exist in that way, and that whether this thing exists or not, exists in this way or in that way, does not depend on itself, but depends on others. based on things.In a nutshell, on the one hand, the task of cognition is also to overcome this contingency.On the other hand, in the sphere of practice, the purpose of behavior is to transcend the accident of the will or to overcome willfulness (WillkuBr).Likewise, especially in modern times, chance has often been exalted too much, and chance has been given a value it does not deserve, both in nature and in the spiritual world.First of all, as far as nature is concerned, people often praise nature mainly because of its variety and richness.This richness, apart from the display of the ideas contained in it, affords us no higher intellectual interest, and these vast and varied repertoires, organic and inorganic, offer us only a kind of It's just a sense of chance in the blur.In any case, those individual species of animals and plants of all kinds, which are governed by the external environment, and the changeable state of wind and cloud, are not worthy of our higher praise than the whims and paranoid caprices of the mind. Estimate.Admiring this changeable phenomenon is a very abstract mental attitude, which must be surpassed to gain a more precise insight into the inner harmony and regularity of nature.

It is especially important that the contingency of the will must be properly valued.When we speak of freedom of the will, we mostly mean mere willfulness or arbitrariness, or the contingent formal will.It is true that arbitrariness as the faculty of determining this or that is undoubtedly an important moment of free will (which is itself free according to the concept of will); but arbitrariness is not freedom itself, but above all a a form of freedom.The true free will, which includes in itself the superseded capriciousness, is fully aware that its content is firm for itself, and at the same time knows that its content is entirely its own.The will that remains in the capricious stage, even if its decisions are, in their content, consistent with truth and justice, still has the illusory feeling that it could still have decided otherwise if it pleased.If we take a closer look, we can see that as long as self-will contains contradictions, its content and form are opposed to each other.The willful content is given from outside, not based on the will itself, but on the basis of being aware of the external environment.As far as the content of this giving is concerned, freedom lies only in the form of choice, and this superficial choice is only a form of freedom, so it can also be regarded as a subjective and imaginary freedom.On a final analysis, it will be seen that the same external circumstances, which cause the will to make arbitrary decisions, must also be regarded as the cause of the will's just one decision and not another. From the above discussion, it can be seen that although contingency is only a one-sided part of reality and therefore cannot be confused with reality, as one of the forms of ideas, contingency still has its place in the world of objectivity.First, chance has its special role in nature.On the surface of nature, chance, so to speak, has a free play, and we must admit that there is no such task as is sometimes mistakenly given to philosophy: that is, to pretend that you want to find out that it can only be this way, and it will not be that way. reason.Similarly, contingency also has its place in the spiritual world. As mentioned above, the will contains contingency in the form of will, but at the same time it is regarded as a link that is sublated.But with respect to the mind and its activities, as with nature, we must forewarn not to be misled by well-intentioned efforts to seek rational knowledge, trying to point out the necessity of a phenomenal world which is markedly accidental, or as such Ordinary people often say that it is necessary to give a priori structure to the phenomenal world.In the same way, in language, for example (although language seems to be the body of thought), chance still undoubtedly plays a very important role, and the relationship of chance to art and legal institutions is the same.The task of science, especially philosophy, can indeed be rightly said to be to recognize the latent necessity from the illusion of contingency. This does not mean, however, that accidental things belong only to our subjective representations, and therefore need only be completely excluded for the sake of truth.Any scientific research, if it is too one-sided to adopt the tendency of rejecting chance and seeking only inevitability, it will inevitably be criticized for empty "tricks" and "stubborn pedantry". §146 In detail, the above-mentioned externality of real things has the following meaning: as far as the direct reality and identity of itself are concerned, contingency is essentially a presupposed existence, but this presupposition It is a fixed existence, that is, something that has been sublated, so it is an externality that exists there.Thus this external, specifically existing contingency is a presupposition, whose immediate presence is at the same time a possibility and, in its determination, sublated, so Contingency is the possibility of another thing, and it can also be said to be the condition of the possibility of another thing. Note: Contingency, as a direct actuality, is at the same time the possibility of another thing, but it is not the mere abstract possibility as we talked about at the beginning, but the possibility of existence, and This possibility of being is a condition.What we say, the condition of a thing, has two meanings. The first refers to a kind of existence, a kind of existence, in short, it refers to a kind of direct thing.The second refers to the destiny that the immediacy itself will be superseded and another thing will be realized. —In general, the immediate actuality itself is not what it should be, but a fragmented and finite actuality whose fate is to be annihilated.But reality has another aspect, namely, its essentiality.This essentiality is first of all its inner aspect, but the inner aspect, as a mere possibility, is also doomed to be sublated.This sublated possibility is the rise of a new actuality which presupposes and conditions the original immediate actuality.From this we can see the alternation contained in the concept of condition-the condition of a thing seems to be completely simple and unbiased at first.But in fact that immediate actuality contains within itself the germ of transformation into something else.This otherness is at first also only a possible, and then it sublates its form of possibility and turns into actuality.The actuality thus emerging is inherent in the immediate actuality it consumes.In this way, a completely different form of thing is produced, but it is not a different thing, because the latter is the essential development of the preceding immediate actuality.In the latter emergent reality, those conditions that were sacrificed, overthrown, and consumed achieve union with themselves. ——The process of the development of realistic contradictions is roughly like this.Reality is not only what has always been, but, as essential being, is the sublation of its own immediacy and thus achieves a mediation with itself. §147 (γ) When this exteriority of actuality develops in this way into the circle of the two categories of possibility and immediate actuality, which mediate each other, it is, in general, true possibility.Furthermore, as such a circle, it is a whole, and therefore content, a substance determined in and for itself.In the same way, according to the difference between the two categories in this unity, it is the concrete totality of the form itself, that is, the immediate self-transformation from the interior to the exterior and from the exterior to the interior.This self-movement of form is activity (TaBtigkeit), that is, substance proves itself as a real ground, which sublates itself into actuality, and puts the contingent actuality, or those preceding conditions, into reality. To be confirmed is to confirm the self-reflection or self-sublation of an accidental reality or condition as another reality, a substantial reality.If all the conditions are met, this substance must be realized, and this substance itself is one of the conditions, because the substance is originally only a presupposition as an internal thing.Developed reality, as the alternation of inside and outside as one, as two opposite movements of inside and outside united into one movement, is necessity. (Explanation) Inevitability can indeed be correctly defined as the unity of possibility and reality.But such an empty statement would make the determination (or category) of necessity appear superficial and thus difficult to understand.Necessity is a very difficult concept, and it is so difficult because it is the concept itself, but the moments contained in the concept of necessity are still considered to be real things, and these real things can only be considered at the same time as things that break up in themselves. , Transitional form.Therefore, in the following two sections, each link that constitutes inevitability will be developed in more detail. Note: When we say something is necessary, we always first ask why?We always think that the necessary thing must be set up, it is a premised and mediated thing.But if we stay in the mere intermediary process, then we have not understood the true meaning of necessity.It is only something derived through mediation, whose existence depends on other things, not on itself, and so remains only contingent.On the contrary, the necessity we are trying to achieve, that a thing is a thing through itself, may be said to be mediated, but at the same time it can sublate its mediated process and contain it in itself. within.Therefore we say "it is" to a necessary thing, and we regard it as a pure self-relationship, in which its dependence on others is thus freed. It is often said that necessity is blind.This may be said to be true, if it means only that in the process of necessity the end or final cause has not yet consciously arisen. The necessary process begins with the actual existence of isolated and disjointed situations that are separate and unrelated to each other.These situations are an immediate actuality that collapses in itself, and through this negation a new actuality takes place, and here we have a content that has a double form: on the one hand as the inner answer of the already realized substance, on the other hand. On the one hand, as the content of isolated and diffuse situations, these situations seem to be a certain content, and at first it feels as if they are such a certain content.The latter content is empty in itself and is thus transformed into its own negation, thus becoming the actualized substantive content.These immediate circumstances dissolve themselves into conditions for the formation of something else, but at the same time they are preserved as content of a higher substance. We then say that out of those circumstances and conditions something else arises, and therefore we call the necessity of such a process blind.On the contrary, if we try to consider purposive activities, here we have already recognized a purpose as content, so this activity is not blind, but informed.When we say that the world is governed by providence, we mean that there is a purpose or providence generally valid in the world, determined in advance independently and autonomously, so that the things that come out of it are the same as before. That which is known in advance and which corresponds to the intended purpose. In any case, we must realize that the view of the world as determined by necessity and belief in providence or divine providence are not mutually exclusive.According to thought or theory, the basis of divine providence, as we shall hereafter show, is conception.The concept is the truth of necessity, which contains within itself a sublated necessity.Conversely, the same can be said of necessity as the underlying concept.Necessity is blind only so far as it has not been understood.Therefore, it would be absolutely absurd to denounce as fatalism the theory which regards the understanding of the inevitability of human events as the subject of philosophy of history.It can be seen from this that the true philosophy of history has the meaning of proving that the way of heaven is not happy or that the world is in line with the will of heaven.Many who wish to honor God by rejecting the necessity of Providence actually reduce Providence to a blind, irrational pretentious partiality by these abstractions.Ordinary religious consciousness often speaks of God's eternal and unchanging command, which includes an explicit recognition of necessity as the essence of God.Because man has his own special opinions and desires when he is separated from God, and most of them are emotional and willful, so he will encounter such things that the results of his actions are always inconsistent with his original intentions and desires. Wishes are completely different.Contrary to man, God knows what his will is. In his eternal will, he is never influenced by any accident, whether external or internal. get done. In general, the idea of ​​necessity is of great importance for our dispositions and actions.When we regard the events of the world as inevitable, it seems at first sight that we are in a position of complete unfreedom.As is well known, the ancients recognized necessity as destiny (Schicksal).On the contrary, the modern view regards necessity as a consolation (Trost).Consolation means that if we give up our ends and interests and accept the dictates of necessity, we do so because we expect some kind of compensation for our actions.On the contrary, fate cannot give comfort.But if we look closely at the ancient people's beliefs about fate, this view of fate will not only not give people unfree intuition, but is enough to show people free insight.For, as has been said, unfreedom is based on the inability to overcome a firm opposition, that is, because what is thought to be so and what actually happens is in contradiction with what ought to be and what should happen.On the contrary, the attitude of the ancients was this: because something is so, so something is so, since something is so, so something should be so.Here they find no opposition, and therefore feel no unfreedom, pain, or sorrow.This attitude towards fate, as stated above, is undoubtedly without consolation, but this attitude does not feel the need of consolation, because here subjectivity has not yet reached the infinite meaning.This point of view is of decisive importance when comparing ancient and modern Christian attitudes, and must be given special attention. If the subjectivity we understand refers to the pure and limited direct subjectivity, and the accidental and capricious content with private interests and special preferences, generally speaking, it is what people call "person" (Person) to distinguish it from "Thing" (Sache) (In the emphatic sense of the word "matter", as we usually correctly use the word, saying that it is a question about "things", not about "people"), then we must not Praise the quiet attitude of resignation to fate of the ancients, and admit that this attitude is more noble and valuable than the attitude of modern people.Because modern people obsessively pursue their subjective goals, when they are forced to give up the desire to achieve them, they can only comfort themselves with the prospect of another form of compensation.Again, the term subjectivity is not limited to that bad, finite subjectivity opposed to objective substance or thing (Sache).On the contrary, in real terms, subjectivity is inherent in objective things, so unlimited subjectivity in this sense is the truth of objective things themselves.Seen in this way, the consolation point of view of modern people has a newer and higher meaning.And in this sense, Christianity can also be regarded as a religion seeking comfort, and it can even be said to be a religion seeking absolute comfort.As is well known, Christianity contains the doctrine that God desires salvation for all.This clearly declares that subjectivity has an infinite value.As for the comforting power of Christianity, it is because in Christianity God is recognized as absolute subjectivity.But since subjectivity includes the link of particularity, our particularity should not be simply regarded as an abstract thing that must be completely denied, but must be recognized as something that should be maintained at the same time.Although the gods of the ancient Greeks were also considered to have personalities, the personalities of gods such as Zeus and Apollo were not real personalities, but only imaginary personalities. The product of itself does not know itself, but is only known.The defect and weakness of this ancient god can be found in the religious beliefs of the Greeks of the time.According to their beliefs, not only people, but even gods are also considered to be governed by fate (destined or assigned fate).This fate, one must conceive of as an unrevealed necessity, must therefore also appear as wholly impersonal, egoless, and blind.On the contrary, the God of Christianity is not only the known, but fully the self-knowledge.He is not merely an idea in man's mind, but an absolutely real personality. For the detailed development of the points mentioned here, I have to refer to religious philosophy, but it is necessary to draw attention in passing now, that is, what happens to a person if he can understand the old saying that "everyone is his own destiny." It is indeed very important to bear the spirit of "the master of the world".This means that all mortals do not suffer for themselves.The opposite view is to complain about others, blame the unfavorable environment, or shift responsibility to other aspects for everything that has happened to oneself.This is the point of view of unfreedom and at the same time a source of dissatisfaction.Conversely, if a person admits that the perversity he has encountered is only the result of his own evolution, and that he alone bears his own guilt, then he will stand up as a free man, and he will not believe that what he has encountered is not There is no wrong.A man who has no peace in life, and is dissatisfied with his lot, encounters many misfortunes and misfortunes, and the sole reason for this is that he has a wrong idea that others have harmed him, or are wrong.It is true that there are many things that happen to us every day that are undoubtedly accidental.But chance encounters are also based on human nature.As long as a man is conscious of his freedom, the misfortunes he encounters will not disturb the harmony of his soul and the peace of mind.Therefore, the view of necessity is the view that determines people's satisfaction and dissatisfaction, that is, determines their fate. §148 The three links of necessity are: condition, substance, and activity. (a) The condition is (1) set first.As something merely posited, the condition is only connected with the substance, but being antecedent it is self-contained, an accidental, external condition, though not connected with the substance. , and actually exist; but with this contingency, since at the same time it is connected with the substance as a whole, the presupposition is a complete circle of conditions. (2) These conditions are passive, used as material of substance, and thus enter into the content of substance; as such, they are also consistent with this content, and already contain in themselves the entire determination of this content. . (b) Substance is likewise (1) something that presupposes.So far as it is posited it is only an immanent possible, so far as it is prior it is an independent content. (2) By means of conditions, substance acquires its external existence, and it also achieves the fulfillment of its content determinations, which exactly correspond to those conditions, so that it (substance) relies on These conditions justify themselves as substance, and it can likewise be said that substance is produced by these conditions. (c) Activity is likewise (1) substantive for itself (such as a person, a character), and at the same time it is only possible because of various conditions and substance. (2) Activity is a movement that transforms conditions into substance and substance into conditions, that is, to the side of existence.或者也可以说，活动仅是从各种条件里建立其实质（实质本来是潜在于这些条件里）的运动，并且是通过扬弃诸条件所具有的实存，而给予实质以实存的一种运动。 就这三个环节彼此各有独立实存的形态而言，这种过程就是一外在的必然性。——这种外在的必然性是以一种有限制的内容为它的实质。因为，实质是一种具有简单规定性的整体；但这整体既然就它的形式说来是外在的，那么它因此就其自己本身来说，以及就其内容来说也是外在的。并且实质的这种外在性，即是实质的内容的限制。 §149 因此必然性自在地即是那惟一的、自身同一的、而内容丰富的本质，这本质在其自身内的映现是这样的：它的各个差别环节都具有独立的现实的形式，同时这种自身同一的东西作为绝对的形式，即是扬弃其自身的直接同一性使成中介性，并扬弃其中介性使成直接性的活动。——凡必然的事物，都是通过一个他物而存在的，这个他物，则分裂而成为其中介作用的根据（实质和活动），并分裂而成为一个直接的现实性，或一个同时又是条件的偶然事物。必然的事物，既是通过一个他物而存在的东西，故不是自在自为的而是一种单纯设定起来的东西。但这种中介〔过程〕正是对其自身的直接的扬弃；根据和偶然的条件被转变成直接性，经过这样的转变，那设定起来的东西便被扬弃而成为现实性，而实质也就同它本身结合起来了。在这种自身返回里，必然的事物就绝对地存在着，作为无条件的现实性。——必然的事物之所以是这样，是因为通过一连串的情况作为中介而成的，换言之，它是这样，因为一连串的情况是这样，而在一种情况下，它是这样：未经过中介，那就是说，它是这样，因为它是这样。