Chapter 22 Chapter Twenty

Hanli is tall, with a red face, domineering on the surface, but shy inwardly.He had been seen as a potential director since he was promoted to head of Division C in 1960.He was of the right age, in his forties, with a quick clerical mind that endeared him to Whitehall.He also had a rough military look, which gave him a certain cachet on MI5 committees. He was the crown prince when the "Harriet" inquiry emerged - surely to succeed Jones, who was retiring in the early seventies. Unlike the always painful investigation of a colleague, Hollis and Mitchell were distant characters, close to retirement when suspicions mounted.But Hanley and I knew each other very well, we were contemporaries, and while not fancifully trying to be friends, we had worked harmoniously together on various committees for more than ten years.His career is in front of him, and his future is in my hands.

Patrick Stewart, Division One (Investigations) and I conducted the investigation.The first task is to establish a complete concept of Hanley's life.We trace his family background, his joining the Security Service and his subsequent career.Dozens of people who knew him were interviewed, all done under the pretense of routine positive scrutiny. The hardest aspect of the "Harriet" affair was that the investigation soon revealed that Hanley had a traumatic childhood after his parents' marriage broke down.His psyche was branded with such a strong sense of inferiority that he underwent a psychiatric session in the fifties.From his biography, he was a young MI5 officer at the time.Hanley told the Security Bureau about this at the time.

Hanley had seen a psychiatrist, which in itself was not surprising.Many senior MI5 officers have been consulted in various ways throughout their careers to help themselves bear the burden of professional secrecy.But our investigation inevitably touches on Hanley's old wounds, which may shed light on Hanley's motivations for espionage.Jones, Stewart and I discussed this issue.Jones personally wrote a letter to Hanley's psychiatrist, asking him to break his oath of secrecy.I visited the psychiatrist on Harley Street.He knew Hanley's profession, declared without hesitation that Hanley had a strong and strong personality, and knew how to deal with his early incompetence.I asked him if he imagined Hanley as a spy.

"Absolutely impossible," he replied with complete confidence. In Hanley's early life there was no sign of being a spy.Before the war, he was a bright and slightly left-leaning student model at Oxford.After the war he stayed at Oxford for a year to take his degree, after which he joined a searchlight regiment in the Home Defense Forces as a second lieutenant until 1945.It's important work, and it doesn't overqualify someone as talented as Hanley.Everyone who knew him at the time said he had a troubling inferiority complex and a lack of ambition as a result. The first point in his life that interests us is his decision in 1945 to attend a crash course in Russian at the Cambridge All-Services Language School.Both our own actions and that of Golitsin led us to learn that the school was a KGB recruiting site (but according to our sources, there was not a shred of evidence that Hanley had been involved with them).Russian classes introduced Hanley to Russians for the first time.Since then, his experiences seem to fit impossibly with Goriniewski's allegations.He had worked with a KGB officer in Budapest for the Allied Joint Intelligence Committee.This KGB officer was the one Goliniewski pointed out was recruiting mid-level spies.Later, Hanley returned to London and served as a liaison officer between the Ministry of Defense and the Soviet military attache, mainly dealing with returning personnel.During this time, he began dealing with MI5.After retiring in the late 1940s he applied to MI5 for a formal position, and later joined MI5 as a research officer on Russian affairs.His first assignment was to compile an index of the "Red Orchestra" spies.It was decades later that I discovered how invaluable these indexes were to the work of our D divisions.

Within two years, Hanley was transferred to Polanco (D Division 2), and his career took off.He first went to Hong Kong for two and a half years, then returned to Division E (Colonial Affairs Office), and later became the section chief of the second division of Division D. In 1960, as the director of Division C, he became a member of the committee member.His career was on the rise, yet there was a possible espionage profile in his background.A man who had suffered from childhood and harbored deep insecurities, was in constant contact with the Russians during a delicate period of his emergence.Perhaps he was as pugnacious as Blake, and the Russians exploited his deep-seated hatred until they were mobilized into mutiny.

The problem was that neither Patrick nor I believed it, even though on paper it seemed to fit Goriniewski's allegations.This is the exact opposite of the Hollis case, where we all instinctively believe the case points to Hollis, while on paper there seems to be no necessary connection. As far as Hanley is concerned, the "aggressive" theory is overdone.From the time he started his career with MI5, he was seen as an ambitious man.Despite his often intimidating demeanor, he is spoken of favorably by his peers and superiors.After his marriage he maintained a close and devoted relationship with his wife.Finally, there is this psychiatrist's certificate.

Espionage is a crime that leaves little evidence, so intuition, for better or for worse, always plays a large role in successful detections.When a counterintelligence officer encounters doubts, he often needs to grasp a background, a clue and a series of coincidences, which can be explained in different ways, and even, as Dick White once said, will lead to the apparition of God—that is, The moment when various facts are brought together into one conclusion.But Hanley's clues lead us one way, but intuition leads us another.The only way to solve this case is through an interrogation.We then submitted a report to Jones.He agreed.

When it comes to interrogation, most people imagine a brutal scene under bright lights: men in shirts torturing a sleep-deprived suspect with aggressive questions until he finally collapses and falls to the floor Drink up your tears and admit the truth.Interrogations in real life are much more routine.MI5 interrogations are methodical and usually take place between 9:00 am and 5:00 pm.There is a break for meals in between. Why do so many spies confess?The secret is to overpower the person sitting across the table from you.This was the secret of Skardon's success as an interrogator.Although we laughed at him years later for clearing charges for what we later learned were spies, Brent and the rest of the "Five" genuinely feared him.Of course, his superiority in the interrogation room was not based on intellect or physical strength, but mainly due to the debriefings Arthur Martin and Evelyn McBarnett provided him, leading people like Fuchs to believe that Scar Den knew them better than they knew themselves.It wasn't just the debriefing that helped Skardon, but the monitoring technology, too.In the Fuchs case, Scaddon believed Fuchs was innocent until they pointed out that Fuchs was lying.This information allowed Skadden to defeat Fuchs, though Skadden himself played a major role.His demeanor so epitomized the values ​​of the reasonable English middle class—afternoon tea and lace curtains—that it was impossible for those interrogated by him to see him as a representative of the evils of capitalism, and so they were from the outset. Lost balance.

But none of this worked for Hanley if he was a spy.He's an expert, and he's all too familiar with these tricks.Like Philby, he'll see the blow come.The only way to deal with an expert is to subject him to an extremely thorough examination.A complete account of the suspect's life and experiences has been prepared.Use it in an interrogation and let him go through the whole situation.If there are any deviations, omissions, or inaccuracies, ask about the holes.If the suspect is guilty, this pressure often leads him to further vulnerabilities until his covert work begins to reveal itself.

MI5's technique is an imperfect system, and like a jury trial, it is still a best practice.The beauty of it is that if one has nothing to hide and is resilient to the tension, one can clear one's name.Its disadvantage is that an innocent person often reveals his hidden weaknesses in a detailed investigation, making it impossible to continue working.It's a bit like a medieval trial: Sometimes it costs a lifetime to be innocent. Jones chose to preside over Hanley's interrogation himself, knowing it would be a difficult encounter, and with Hanley's fate ultimately in his hands, he felt he could leave the task to any official It's all unfair.But he made sure that Patrick and I could monitor the entire interrogation from our D1 workshop in Leconfield.

One morning, Hanley was called to Jones' office and told that charges had been brought against him and that he was to be tried immediately.The interrogation took place in the chief's office, with a microphone openly on the table, and the recording took place in the room where Patrick and I were listening to the interrogation.Throughout the first day Jones asked Hanley to talk about his life.Hanley does it with great honesty, sometimes painfully.He doesn't shy away from questions, and doesn't hide details about his life and inner emotions.The next day we told him the details of Goriniewski's allegations, and he was unshocked.He agrees that he fits the details of the charge, but calmly states that he is not a spy, has never been, and has never at any stage been co-opted by the Russians or anyone else, although he is in Budapest at least once a week with The Russian official who was accused of soliciting him met once. Hanley's interrogation demonstrated that covert intelligence was a profession of deceit and conspiracy, many of whom were of extraordinary character.Hanley is such a proud man who cherishes his accomplishments, those he feels are coming.One morning he was called in for a severe interrogation, where years of interrogation revealed his soul.All the while, he knew faceless colleagues were following him step by step, bugging his home, bugging in his office, bugging still.Most people can't bear this kind of pressure. Everyone who listens thinks he is an honest person all the time.Hanley was a tough guy, and our current interrogation system works, but he came through the fire unscathed. That evening Jones, Patrick Stewart and I came to my club, the Oxford and Cambridge Club, to discuss the trial.Jones sat down in a corner with a tall glass of Scotch.His eyes hurt.Whenever he was nervous, his eyes always hurt. "Are you satisfied?" he asked sullenly. "He's innocent," I agreed. Patrick didn't speak, just nodded. "You're going to tell 'fluency', of course...?" Jones said. At this moment, Hanli himself walked in unexpectedly.He and I belong to the same club, and we see each other often, but I never expected him to be here so soon after this ordeal.We sit in a quiet corner.He shuffled past us slowly, not noticing us, looking as though he had been hit by a huge shock, his normally ruddy face now as pale as paper. After the "Harriet" investigation ended, Jones sent me to the CIA and told them that MI5 held Hanley innocent of the Goriniewski charges.It was an extremely sensitive undertaking, and the CIA had long been prepared to attack the Mitchell and Hollis case, knowing Goriniewski's allegations and the fact that Hanley more or less fit them.Maintaining relations with allies is essential, but it must leave them in no doubt about the veracity of our conclusions. Jones didn't get along very well with the Americans, so he tended to leave these things to Michael Macdonald and me.Partly because of distaste for Angleton, partly because of remnants of upper-middle-class British anti-Americanism.Dick White shared some of these prejudices.Neither is rich, and Helms and Angleton don't hide the fact that they're well paid for similar work. Both of them had reason to feel deeply distrustful of Americans.Jones never forgave Helms and Angleton over the Gray-Cohen affair, and Dick White for his repeated clashes with the US military bloc in his counterintelligence work in Europe towards the end of the war And never got the understanding of the United States.When Sillitoe retired in 1953, the Americans foolishly attempted to block the appointment of Dick as chief. It boils down to one basic difference in attitude.Both Jones and White saw themselves as servants of the Crown, seeing their work as part of the orderly yet timeless fabric of Whitehall.They were insiders; Helms, Angleton, and Hoover were outsiders.There is a ruthless, lawless quality to the American intelligence community which makes much of the upper echelon of British intelligence uneasy.They were afraid of some disaster in the future and wanted to keep a certain distance, so the burden of communication inevitably fell on the shoulders of some officials like me. In 1968, I went to Washington to report to Angleton on the outcome of the "Harriet" case.We held a business-like meeting, and I outlined the process of the investigation and told Angleton that we agreed that Hanley was innocent.Angleton then took me to meet Dick Helms to explain my mission.Helms said he didn't want to hear any more, and if I said Hanley was innocent he would accept what I had to say.However, the clarification of Hanley's question did not solve the problem. After we left Helms' place, Angleton said he wanted to discuss with me that Gorinevsky was an insider. "Harriet" fits so well that it doesn't have to convince a skeptical man that the KGB orchestrated the charge to discredit him.Angleton and Helms had suspected that Gorinevsky had fallen back into Russian control shortly before his defection.Through repeated analysis of the information he provided, it was found that from Polish affairs to Russian affairs, the characteristics of the intelligence had undergone an obvious change. It seemed that the Russians deliberately took out their own information and fed them "barium meals" in order to prevent leaks. .MI5 also agrees with this analysis, and the main reason Goliniewski's mid-spy story has been ignored for so long is the clarification of the "Harriet" incident, which makes the mid-spy's authenticity and There is a big question mark over the veracity of Goriniewski's intelligence, especially the veracity of the information he provided after his defection.The mid-level spy story came out in 1963, Gorinevsky defected in January 1961, and in order for the KGB to spin up the details of the story as they did, they needed Hanley's The resume, the only person who can use his position to get this resume is Roger Hollis. But if Goriniewski had been converted, or was an unwitting tool of disinformation, what did it mean for MI6 and other spies the CIA controlled in Poland?Since the Great War, Poland has been the most consistent and effective position of the West in the actions of the Eastern Bloc.During the "Harriet" investigation I did some preliminary research on this question.I was amazed to discover that all the spies controlled by MI6 had long met in an apartment rented by a secretary in MI6's Warsaw branch, where more than ninety meetings were held.I am speculating that the reason why the Polish Intelligence Service and the KGB were not aware of these astonishing numbers of meetings was that they were planting fake spies on us.Once again MI6 was exasperated, as they had been in the Penkovsky case. The sudden influx of defectors in the early sixties led us all to believe that the defectors were being sent to deceive Western counterintelligence.Golitsin's central thesis is that the KGB waged a systematic disinformation campaign in which they sent fake defectors to the West in order to discredit him.Almost at the same time, Yuri Nosenko appeared on the doorstep of the CIA, distorting the clues Golitsin had provided about Soviet infiltration of American and British intelligence. Nosenko threw the CIA into chaos.He told them that he had seen the file of Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged assassin of President Kennedy.He claimed the KGB was not involved in the assassination plot and had no contact with Oswald in Russia, despite having worked at a top-secret UZ spy plane base shortly before his defection.Many CIA officials felt that there was too much coincidence in Nosenko's story, especially when it later emerged that he had lied about his rank and status in the KGB.But why send him?The CIA tried to break through Nosenko, using the kind of imprisonment and corporal punishment that MI5 had never tolerated, but even in 1967 they hadn't made the slightest progress in solving the mystery. Suspicion also deepened over CIA sources "Top Hat" and "Fedora," who refused to reveal their identities and continued to pass on information in their posts.They showed sincerity with Nosenko's question, as if trying to convince the Americans that he was real, and even strongly supported Nosenko's claim of a false rank.But if Top Hat and Fedora were impostors, what clues did they provide about the infiltration of British security services? "Fedora" had provided information pointing to Maltri, which led to Maltri's disastrous persecution, although he was later acquitted. Top Hat had delivered copies of documents detailing American weapons guidance systems to the Americans, which he claimed the Soviets had obtained from a British spy.After investigation, we captured Frank Bossard, an officer in the Missile Guidance Division of the Ministry of Aviation. He was arrested in 1965 and sentenced to twenty-one years in prison.If "Fedora" and "Top Hat" were the insiders inserted, the Russians would be prepared to sacrifice a large number of spies in order to keep their organization pure.It must also be said that without GCHQ's skill, we would not have been able to obtain evidence that Bossard was working for the GRU. We're in what Angleton calls "mirror wilderness," where defectors are fakes, lies are truths, truths are lies, and everything reflected dazzles you.The idea of ​​a fake defector is a hard one to accept unless you read a lot of history books and know how MI5 used the double agent system throughout the Great War, but now it's just an unfashionable theory.Few intelligence officers who lived through the sixties could not believe that we fell prey to Soviet defector tricks during that time.Some would argue and debate about the success of the trick, or the limits of its scale, but few would doubt that it was being played!And the Russians would only play it again if they had credible MI5 feedback on the tactic. Twenty years later, the truth of the past is still elusive.Gorinevsky, Penkovsky, Nosenko, "Fedora" and "Top Hat" - all with varying degrees of interference.I'm not saying everyone is a self-conscious fake defector, although "Fedora" and "Top Hat" certainly were, and even the FBI was forced to draw conclusions in the seventies long after I retired.But I think these fake defectors have been used at different times - with Penkovsky to influence our perception of Soviet missile technology; with Nosenko to influence US attitudes to the JFK assassination.I believe that Gorinevsky, "Fedora" and "Top Hat" were part of a systematic plot to disrupt the all-important Anglo-American intelligence alliance and to help the Soviet Union create Fake work on ICBM progress. Time for us to consider the key intelligence provided by these three defectors.Gorinevsky provided information to the middle-level spy at the end of 1963, almost three years after his defection.That's when Hollis went to Washington to report the findings of the Mitchell case to the FBI and CIA.There is no better way to open a gap in the Anglo-American intelligence relationship than to shed light on the undiscovered spy within MI5.Fortunately, Angleton's suspicion of Gorinevsky kept the story from creating the kind of violent conflict it might have caused, but in fact deepened the suspicion of Goriniewski and Hollis on both sides. . Immediately afterwards, "Fedora" made contact with the Americans and provided a clue that turned our attention to Maltri: the discovery of another nuclear spy was to create the greatest possible conflict between Britain and the United States. Tension guaranteed, though the KGB never dreamed that MI5 would handle whistleblowers as poorly as they did. Months later, as if part of a well-coordinated campaign, Top Hat led us to Bossard.Once again, American weapons technology is implicated, a natural implication that the US is using US military power to play an active role in protesting the weakness of the British security services.When we did an estimate of the damage done by Bossard, we concluded that the entire advanced American guidance system was effectively sold.Stuart gave Angleton a copy in advance, with a two-word memo attached to it, the content was very simple: "Help!" Fortunately for England, Angleton was able to protect us from massacres.But it was a tightly controlled affair, and few realize today that intelligence exchange between Britain and the United States was closer to a break in the early sixties than at any time since the Great War. On the evening of my return to London, Angleton and I went to eat at a small Chinese restaurant in Alexandria, where his son used to eat.The place has become one of Angleton's favorite venues when he feels the need to have a conversation.He told me that here we can be sure of no interference because the Chinese don't let the Russians in. Angleton is at the height of his powers, though he's starting to feel a sense of tension.For years, he has waged a shadowy bureaucratic war with the CIA's Soviet division to ensure the independence and expansion of his counterespionage empire.Against all expectations, he succeeded, and had virtual veto power within the CIA over all operations and personnel arrangements.He controlled Israeli affairs and bloated and overstaffed the CIA's Tel Aviv station.He made sure that all important communications with British intelligence went through himself, bypassing the London outpost.He even managed to create his own counterintelligence code, independent of CIA communications that he considered unsafe, although we all believed the real reason was to build his own kingdom. The Khazab meeting was his illustrious achievement.The best, most prominent, and most senior officers of Western intelligence would meet every eighteen months to discuss his proposed agenda—the Soviet threat, the role of counterintelligence—and to formulate life-or-death plans for the future. .In Angleton's mind, there was no reason why the Kazab meeting could not be the first decisive step in creating a Western joint intelligence command capable of challenging the Soviet bloc. The Kazab meeting fits well with Angleton's temperament.He seemed most at ease when grappling with the endless puzzles of "The Mirror Wilderness" in the ultra-safe, electronically cleared environment.I am very supportive of these meetings, they are very important. Gambling was a major feature of the Kazab meetings.A round of poker is played at the end of each meeting.Angleton was very good at the game, though I was able to blow him up sometimes.Horse racing is also occasionally used as a pastime.I remember Angleton being the bet booker for the Washington International Horse Racing Cazab Conference during the Kazab Conference in New York in the late sixties and early seventies, mostly guessing the first afternoon of the race from the world The condition of the horses from all over.Before the meeting, I asked Angleton to bet a hundred dollars on an English horse.The horse was ridden by Lester Pigott, the rider of the previous year's winner.The British horse wasn't very conspicuous, but the MI5 and MI6 gang were eager to be seen waving their flags, even in the most secret conference rooms.Soon one of them was betting five hundred dollars. That afternoon, Angleton gave a lengthy report on the Soviet Union's long-term disinformation technology.Most minds, at least on the British side, were drawn to the racetrack.An hour later, Angleton's secretary came in and handed him a stack of notes nervously.From it she gave him two notes, the first said: "How much will your house cost, Jim?" The second said: "The British horses won!" "My God!" Angleton swore, "I forgot to stop the game. That damned English horse won eleven to one." When we returned home that night in a small propeller plane from the CIA, Angleton walked slowly up and down the cabin, paying the bill with money from a wad of hundred-dollar bills service. "This is my sacrifice for the West..." he said as he paid. But the humor couldn't hide the fact that he had enemies all over the CIA—in the Soviet Union, among other directors who were jealous of his power, and among officials whose careers he had undermined.When Helms was director, he was safe, but the Vietnam War had rapidly changed the face of the CIA, and a growing political climate for detente had begun to undermine the foundations of Cold War skepticism on which his kingdom had been built. Cold War veteran Bill Harvey is gone, forced into retirement due to alcoholism.Angleton also drank too much, and his complexion became pale and haggard.His mood changed too, he became more withdrawn and his dry humor less and less.He seemed repressed, aggressive, increasingly mistrustful of others, and people turned against him. Drinking, smoking and fishing were Angleton's main methods of relaxation.Barry Russell Jones told me in amazement that he accompanied Angleton on a fishing trip to a creek he owned in Idaho and found Angleton buried under water every hundred yards. Get a Jack Daniel's beer so you don't run out of booze.Back in Washington, his entertainment was to grow exotic orchids (he was a world expert), to work leather, to strike gold leaf, or to make bait for his friends and admirers. Angleton and I talked until four o'clock in the morning.We researched and examined every possible scenario for defection.Who is real and who is fake?Who defected and who was sent?These clues are like poems etched in the minds of children.Both of us were worried.There are many things that depend on being right about the defector—for him, the assassination of the president was settled on that basis; for me, the next move was to hunt for rats, which also proceed on this basis.We ended up walking back from Alexandria to the Forty-fourth Street Bridge, and Angleton parked his car behind the Okinawan Monument near the National Cemetery.Angleton is full of patriotism, which is expressed in a unique way, that is, the reverence for the national flag, symbols of national traditions, etc., such as the Okinawa monument, fascinated him.He stopped and looked at it from afar.Cars drove past us one by one. "It's King's job," he murmured, one of the few times I heard him talk about his old friend Philby. If there had been a conspiracy to deceive the West with defectors in the early 1960s, we would have been easy to fall for.Throughout those years, London and Washington had a conscious policy of doing everything they could to attract defectors.They were seen as the secret weapon capable of disrupting the functioning machine on Dzerzhinsky Square.Part of this policy was born out of feelings of guilt.Early defectors like Guzenko and von Petrov, poorly rewarded for their services, were chilled by how they were treated.After they got a sum of money, they were kicked out and put into the cold palace. They had to rely on themselves to do their best to solve their livelihoods. Most of the defectors could not support themselves.This guilt also resulted in the deaths of Volkov and Krivitsky due to poor security arrangements.We feared that word going back to the east would further deter those from that side from approaching us unless we made a conscious effort to show the benefit of defecting. This policy was intensified when Golitsin defected.All measures to protect defection were approved.These measures are first of all huge compensation, but also include other aspects.I remember a special operation that started in the mid-sixties involving a high-ranking KGB officer named Sergey Gregorin (not his real name).This operation shows how far we are prepared.Gregorian had worked in Denmark, and the Danish intelligence agency routinely told us his identity, so we knew Gregorian for a long time.They also gave us some facts about him personally - especially his reputation for being with women.A situation report was circulated to D4, the Spy Management Section of D, and they were instructed to take note of Gregorin's indiscretions, since his wife remained in Moscow. Any Russian, especially a KGB officer, who is caught by the KGB security service, or "SK", when he comes into contact with women in the West, will suffer.In Gregorian's case it was entirely possible.A year later, a counterintelligence officer in D4 received the first tip-off.One of his spies, a senior executive of the Daily Mirror, used to meet Gregorian at dinners.The girlfriend of the person in charge said that Gregory had an affair with a friend whom she had introduced to Gregory. D Section 4 raised the matter at its weekly meeting with the Operations Section of D Section 1, at which it was agreed to monitor further developments in this matter.The counterintelligence officer was ordered to encourage his spies to pay attention to the developing romance. In the end, Gregorian ended that relationship with the girl.When he came across the woman who introduced him to girlfriends again, he asked her if she knew any other girlfriends. Department D immediately realized that our opportunity had arrived.If we introduced Gregorian to a girl of our own, we would be in a very good position to start a seduction operation.The plan was presented to Jones, who agreed, although the operation had to be kept secret from the Foreign Office because they might find excuses to dismiss it. D Branch 4 was ordered to find a woman suitable for the job.They had a group of high-end call girls who were specially used to seduce each other, and finally succeeded in introducing a girl to Gregorian at the banquet.He swallows the bait thoroughly and has sex with the girl in no time. Things started to come to a head.He was placed under intense surveillance and we analyzed all possibilities.From the surveillance, it was obvious that Gregorvin was interested in that girl purely for sex, and there was absolutely no chance of touching his heartstrings with his brain.This must be done decisively lure action. The various plans for a defection are complex and take weeks to prepare.首先要租一间房子，安装上双面镜和照相设备，然后安排好保安室和交通工具，以便保证格里高文决定叛逃后的安全。他有一个家在莫斯科，我们对这些情况都进行了核实，以便在他跟我们讲价钱时把他的家属也偷运出来。 The day has finally come. D处一科的科长亲自负责这次行动，格里高文和那姑娘来了。我们拍了十分钟的床上镜头，D处一科的人和军情五处两名壮实的官员用莱斯利·贾格尔的一把钥匙打开了门。 “有一个是我们的人……”一科的人说，那姑娘被迅速推出门外。 格里高文在这一时刻像是不知所措。一科的人指着镜子，这个克格勃人员向镜子里盯着看了一会儿，然后他明白了。 “我是个外交人员，”这个俄国人说，“我要求同大使馆联系……我有外交护照！” 他试图伸手过去拿他的裤子，我们的一个人把裤子踩着了。 “这可不是外交人员的行为，”一科的人说，他弯腰捡起内裤，把它扔给那个赤身裸体的俄国人。然后他又谈到正事上。 “让我们面对事实吧！你完了，格里高文。如果他们发现了，会把你遣送回去的……” 他沉陷于思考当中。 “你看来似乎更适合在西方。我们知道，我们调查核实过。在美国四年，在丹麦三年。现在伦敦，你反正不想回去，对吗？你为什么不投奔过来？我们会照顾你的。还有丰厚的养老金。你会很安全的。” 俄国人摆了一下手，拒绝了我们提出的条件。他再次要求同大使馆通话。 一科的人用了两小时试图说服他，并告诉他要考虑未来。他将被剥夺一切特权，丢人现眼地被送回莫斯科，在单调枯燥的西伯利亚边区村落度过自己的生涯。再也没有外汇收入，再也没有海外津贴。 “我是个外交人员，”格里高文不断这样说，“我要求同大使馆谈谈。” 他就像第二次大战中被俘的飞行员，只会背诵他的姓名、级别和编号。他是一个第一流的士兵，最后我们意识到他不会叛逃。我们把衣服还给了他，然后把他丢在肯辛顿公园附近的人行道上。数月的计划，数年的耐心等待全都白费了。 第二天早晨，一个匿名棕色包送到俄国大使馆，交大使亲收。里面装有格里高文在床上的一些照片。当天晚上，特别处看到那名克格勃人员被押送上了一架飞机。我们送了一份报告给军情六处的莫斯科分站，建议他们注意他，以便在他又想通了的时候设法进行联系。但我们再也没有听到有关格里高文的消息了。 叛逃总是夹杂着悲剧色彩。但最惨的案件要数年轻人纳简斯基的案件——一个改变了主意的叛逃者。此人在贸易代表团的船运组工作，我们早就识别出了他是一个克格勃的官员。他是一个言语不多的人，他惟一值得炫耀的地方是他妻子与苏联政治局的一位高级官员沾了点亲戚关系。他第一次引起我们的注意是因为我们的监视人员看见他在伦敦公园与一个姑娘见面。 起初，我们在姑娘身上花了许多功夫，监视人员跟踪到了她家里，知道了她在一个并不重要的政府部门里当秘书，没有接触过机密材料。迈克尔·麦考尔去找了这个姑娘，问她为什么要与一个苏联官员会面。她却坚持说纳简斯基在她身上没有间谍目的，他们是在谈恋爱，她完全不知道他与克格勃有关系。她说他一点也不像她想像中的俄国人，他是一个罗曼蒂克者，而且还很胆小，他常常谈起要在西方为自己创造一种新的生活。 D处一科（行动科）和D处四科又一次开会，考虑最好的行动方案。我们决定让那姑娘继续不动声色地同对方保持着关系。同时，我们计划了一个接近纳简斯基的方法。这项行动显然不能长期拖下去，那个姑娘已经处在极大的压力之下，似乎很快就会暴露自己。当然这还得有一笔相当可观的赏金。虽然纳简斯基本人只是一个低级官员，几乎可以肯定他是在伦敦任职期间被吸收的。但他有巨大的宣传价值。当时正是斯大林的女儿斯维特拉娜叛逃的时候，我们知道，一个俄国高级政治家的亲属向西方寻求避难会使俄国人非常难堪尴尬。 下一个星期天，纳简斯基将出差到哈尔维奇去。他要陪同当晚要起航的一些苏联海员回船。因此，他像平时一样向外交部申请批准离开八十公里的限区，这一限区是针对所有东方集团的外交人员的。麦考尔带了几个监视员坐在哈尔维奇码头外面的汽车里，等待着纳简斯基的出现。纳简斯基从车旁走过，麦考尔叫了他的名字，他迟疑了一会儿。 “我们知道那姑娘的事……”麦考尔低声地说，“我们知道你想留下来。快上车，我们可以谈谈！” 纳简斯基向大街的两头望了望，抓紧机会钻进了汽车的后座。麦考尔把车一直开到我在埃塞克斯郡的家。我们请他喝茶，尽量不多谈。我们已经逮住了鸟，重要的是不要使他惊慌。 “我听说你想加入到我们当中来……”我开始问，纳简斯基已经对周围的一切适应了，他点点头，开始还有些紧张，后来又稳定下来了。 “我们相信你已被吸收了？” He drank his tea in big gulps. “克格勃，你是指这个？”他用极好的英语问道。 “我们认为你是。”我继续说。 “你没有选择，”他突然悲伤地红了脸，“如果他们要你替他们工作，他们干脆就命令你，你没有选择。” 我举出我们能做的安排：会有安全保护措施，养老金，以后也许有工作，可以同那姑娘进行短时间的会面，但他得辛苦工作几个月。 “为英国安全局……我知道。”他说，面带着微笑。他知道这种花招，不管他是不是克格勃的人。 那天晚上，我们把纳简斯基送到温布尔顿附近的一幢保安楼里，里面布置了武装保卫人员保护他。十二小时以后，外交部收到了苏联大使馆提出的一项要求，询问他们是否有某位低级外交官员的消息，说这个官员是在从哈尔维奇的例行访问归来的途中失踪的。 外交部北方司已经由军情五处琼斯告知了有关纳简斯基叛逃的事。外交部对待这件事，就像他们对待所有可能激怒俄国人的事件一样，觉得应不惜一切代价加以避免。他们立即派了一位官员到那幢保安楼去与纳简斯基会谈，问他是不是自愿申请的，要不要同苏联大使馆任何人谈话。他肯定他的决定是自愿的，并且说他不希望同任何一个苏联人谈话。外交部把这个消息告诉了苏联方面。 纳简斯基的妻子动身去莫斯科马上就被人发现了。第二天，苏联大使馆要求外交部为纳简斯基的妻子作安排，以便她在苏联能够通过电话同他谈谈。起初，纳简斯基不希望同她谈话。我们对这种企图使一个已经非常紧张的人受到更大的压力的做法十分不快，但外交部要坚持外交礼节。 这次通话是在以后四天里俄国人坚持要求的许多次通话当中的第一次。主要是纳简斯基的妻子，当然还有其他的亲属，他们轮番地哭泣着请求他重新考虑他的决定。 “想想我们，”他们告诉他，“想想将落到我们头上的毁灭和耻辱。” 纳简斯基开始明显地动摇了。在白厅、外交部和军情五处已经发生了严重的冲突。我们不明白，为什么外交部要允许通话。俄国人却从不允许我们接触在莫斯科被逮捕的我们的人，如格雷维尔·温。可外交部根本不考虑我们的优势和纳简斯基的利益，只坚持外交往来上的一些细节。 “我们不能拒绝家庭人道主义的接触。”他们说。 第四天纳简斯基告诉我们他决定回去。这件事给他的家庭带来了太多的麻烦。麦考尔试图指出各种危险，但都没有用。他就像一个在手术台上的病人，在生与死之间徘徊。现在我们能感觉到他在悄悄离去。 “你坚持要回去？”在他快回去之前，我最后一次见到他时问他。 “我要干什么已经不再重要了，”他毫无表情地说，“我已经为我的家庭尽到责任了。” 宿命是纳简斯基惟一的庇护所。他是冷战当中许多不露面的牺牲者之一，他的一生被东西方面对面的两支秘密大军毁掉了。 但是，如果我们陷入了叛逃者提供的情报迷宫中，那也是我们自己的错，我们迫切需要有一条出路。安格尔顿为了使自己走向安全地带，他选择了对戈利金的盲目信任。然而只有一条路才行得通，那就是把迷宫的建造者请来，帮助我们寻找一条出路。虽然，我开始时是戈利金以及他的理论的狂热崇拜者，但到了六十年代末我开始对这一切产生了怀疑。 问题是戈利金对他的“方法论”的迷恋。他声称，如果让他接触西方情报部门的档案，那就会在他的记忆里触发联想，这种联想会引导他发现间谍。他的这个理论是，他在捷尔任斯基广场看到的情报有许多是删改过的，换句话说，这就是用伪情报源来保护为克格勃提供情报的间谍的身份，如果他阅读西方情报部门的档案时，他就可能抓住与他在克格勃档案室看到的材料相似的各点。 利用戈利金有两种方法：一是接受他的方法论，允许他支配反情报政策的整柄剑；二是继续从事那种试图从他那里淘出事实的金屑来的恼人的工作，例如在他所看的报告里的情报，一个间谍的大概住址，等等，然后再用反情报的正统方法对它们进行调查。 戈利金是极有用处的，西方反间谍机构成功地从他那里获得了这些有事实根据的线索。这就是我们怎样抓到瓦萨尔，怎样使马塞尔·查利特发现了乔治·巴格的原因。戈利金的政治情报也是一样。凡他坚持的所看到或听到的东西总是使你感到印象深刻而且真实可信。例如，毫无疑问，他参加过谢列平的那次著名的大会，会上建立了负责假情报行动的D处。但是，他根据自己知道的一点东西来推断并发展广泛的理论时，或企图把在他叛逃后发生的事与他的理论相吻合时，那么他的这些情报就是灾难，例如他那关于搞四十年假情报的伟大计划以及中苏分歧的说法就是这样。 戈利金在军情五处的支持者占大多数，我也是其中之一，但很快我就同他的广泛的理论决裂了，也不再严守他的方法论了。只有阿瑟和一些像斯蒂芬·德·莫伯雷那样的低级官员还在相信他的理论。莫伯雷在六十年代初担任军情六处驻华盛顿的联络官时，负责同戈利金联系。 但在华盛顿，情况就完全不同。安格尔顿把“方法论”的钩、线和钓丝锤都吞了下去，允许戈利金自由翻阅中央情报局的档案，胡乱指出叛徒。这样做常常使他的决定站不住脚，其结果必然是灾难性的；此外，还导致反情报工作出现极大的错误判断。一大批中央情报局的高级官员受到了不公正的怀疑，其事业遭到了毁灭。其中最引人注目的是苏联处处长戴夫·墨菲。由于戈利金的线索，如此之多的各种官员受到怀疑，到头来，情况愈来愈糟，以至于中央情报局决定用解散苏联处来作为排除这种怀疑的惟一办法，并用一批全新的官员来重新开始工作。显然，这是一条走出迷宫的路，但这并不能弥补全局士气风貌上的损失。 虽然军情五处避免了中央情报局的过激做法，但戈利金还是很不好对付的。他过分自大，认为对所有的叛逃者都要远远保持着距离，让他们自食其力，尽可能少地给他们反馈，使他们不能够对自己在情报部门活动中的意义作出评估。自从戈利金在一九六三年第一次来英国时，我们就向他敞开胸怀，我同别人一样对此负有责任。当米切尔案件开始时，经霍利斯和琼斯的同意，阿瑟和我把什么事都告诉了他。他甚至按照一个著名的契卡情报官员的名字，为米切尔案件选了一个代号“斯皮特斯”。他从一开始就知道我们在追捕一个高级间谍，因此他不可避免地要在给我们的情报上添油加醋。一九六三年有若干月是在紧张，而且几乎是歇斯底里的气氛中度过的，到处都弥漫着叛变的腥味。我们是怎样靠着他的理论带来了恐惧，这是显而易见的。 但毫无疑问，他对西方的渗透情况是知道的。英国、挪威和法国的记录都证明了这一点。但由于我们太性急，以致没法得到他所有线索的一个完全没有讹误的版本。我敢肯定，西方仍然在为此付出昂贵的代价。 一九六七年，潮头终于冲向了戈利金。第一次卡扎布会议在澳大利亚的墨尔本召开时，他应邀去讲话。所有到会的人都迫切期待着他的出现，因为在过去的五年里，有那么多的东西是从他那儿来的。戈利金像往常一样趾高气扬，他很快就西方情报部门没有正确地理解他的材料这个问题发表了长篇大论。 “我知道更多的间谍，”他叫喊道，“为什么你们不愿意同我合作呢？” 他着重谈了英国，他声称许多渗透还未被发现，只有他才能找出来。琼斯脸上带着微笑，这种笑是他专门用来对付那些讨厌的人的。他一贯憎恨在大庭广众当中张扬家丑。他最后终于耐不住了。 “你要什么？”他问道。 “档案……接触你们的档案。”戈利金回答说。 “好吧，你可以看——看你喜欢看的任何档案。我们倒要看你是否能给我们点什么东西。” 戈利金是在一九六八年春天投奔过来的。我最初敦促他直接过来，当时伦敦正是冬天。他阴郁地告诉我，他一生当中见到的风雪实在太多了。他被安置在布莱顿附近的一幢安全的房子里。麦考尔和他的妻子同他住在一起，为他理家并与他作伴。每个星期，我都要用公文包装一包档案，从莱肯菲尔德大楼送到他那里，以便他研究。 我第一次把材料给他时，曾警告他不要做笔记。琼斯和我都担心，在他的“方法论”背后的部分动机，是从西方情报机构里收集尽可能多的情报，为了某种未知的将来的目的。 “当然，”他傲慢地回答，“我是个行家，我懂这些。” 戈利金钻到军情五处最秘密的档案里过了四个月。迈克尔·麦考尔到格林·米尔斯银行取出了一万英镑的现款，装在一个小手提箱里，带去给戈利金。 虽然花了这么多的钱，但戈利金给我们提供的东西却少得可怜。琼斯曾要他摊牌。当然也有些有用的东西。他研究过“维诺纳”，并用他在克格勃那段时间的知识，补充了几组。他花了很长的时间来研究剑桥三军联合语言学校的档案，查看入学者的各种材料，看看有没有引起他注意的人。我们甚至还搞了一次声音测试，参加者是一些戈利金尤其感兴趣的人，主要看看戈利金能否从他们所用的习惯用语中发现他们有没有克格勃指挥官的俄语词汇。这个办法虽然很高明，但从未收益。最后，我们决定唯一能安全做到的事是关闭这所学校。 然而，在关键的领域里——他能否在渗透问题上弄点眉目出来——他完全是个失败者。他对斯克里普金的指控补充了一些细节。他的确有一套稀奇古怪的理论。他花了若干个星期研究“维诺纳”通讯，看看能不能帮助我们识别出未知的匿名者。有两个人特别使他感兴趣——戴维和罗莎——根据已破译的电文，这两个人显然在一起工作，大概是丈夫和妻子，或许是兄长和妹妹。戈利金要求把所有参与“维诺纳”通讯工作的军情五处的官员的档案都给他看。一天他宣布他有了答案。 “你们的间谍在这里。我的方法论发现了他们。”他阴沉地说，像法师一样用手指指着放在他面前桌子上的两份档案。我对这两份太熟悉了，是维克托和特斯·罗思柴尔德的。 “别荒唐到了极点，阿纳托尔，”我说，“维克托是安全局最好的朋友之一……你是怎么扯到这种结论上去的？” “他们是犹太人。戴维和罗莎是犹太名字……” 在我听来这就像克格勃的反犹太主义，我不禁想起如果这里是中央情报局，我是安格尔顿，那么维克托和特斯就肯定已经根据戈利金毫无根据的解释被列入间谍名单了。 戈利金“方法论”的主要问题是他解释档案时仿佛他仍然在克格勃一样。他查找搞错了的行动，或个别官员的错误。 “这个人现在在哪里？”他会问。 “还在原来的地方。”我会这样回答。 戈利金好几天都不说什么了，然后又宣布他敢肯定哪个人是叛徒。 “但为什么，阿纳托尔？” “因为在克格勃里，失败是一种严重的罪过。你不会再获得信任，这使人不快，也许这时他就想到转变。” 他从来不懂西方文化，由于未能一帆风顺地见到斯大林，他的事业失败了，因此被驱上了叛逃之路。他推测西方的任何一个人都会以同样的方式采取行动。 “但在西方不是那样，”我常常告诉他，“我们在这里不会那样干——只是在联邦调查局才会发生这种情况。” 戈利金会显得惘然若失。他是一个几乎没有幽默感的人。 “瞧，阿纳托尔，我们在这上面已研究了二十年，我们还不知道谁是间谍，你的猜测对我们一点儿帮助也没有。” 他看着我，又看看档案，仿佛要让我因为怀疑他而感到内疚。 “你知道什么，彼得，”他叫喊起来，“你没有像我那样在捷尔任斯基广场上呆过。” 如果不是他的虚荣和贪婪，他会是个真诚坦率的人。他像所有俄国人那样会有突如其来的悲伤。我记得，有一个下午，我把沃尔科夫的档案拿给他看，当他知道这个企图叛逃的人的档案最终落到了金·菲尔比的办公桌上的故事后，他开始哭了起来。 “你们怎么能这样粗心大意呢，彼得？”他痛苦地问道。他深知，要不是上帝的慈悲，他戈利金也会遭受同样的命运的。 麦考尔和我显得惭愧，但却没能辩解。 在他的停留期间快结束时，我们谈到了假情报以及我们档案室里千篇一律的情报。戈利金是一个人的影子，他曾用自己照相机般的记忆力和对细节的准确眼力迷倒了西方反情报界的出类拔萃之辈。他离开之前，交给我们一份厚厚的打字稿，这是他亲自用一个手指头在一台老式的奥利维蒂牌便携式打字机上辛辛苦苦打出来的。他告诉我，这是一部关于假情报的权威性研究。我把它交到档案室，我期待着他的每一个字的时候早已过去了，我甚至不高兴去读它。 我又见到戈利金时是在第二年的冬天，在纽约。我们在中央公园附近的一家意大利餐馆吃午饭。这是一个令人难过而又诡秘的场景，戈利金仍在谈他要建立一个专门研究假情报的研究所的计划以及他所发现的新线索，但他知道他完了。去年夏天，入侵捷克斯洛伐克又使得一批新的叛逃者涌入西方——像弗罗利克和奥古斯特。他们的情报虽然不那么耀眼，但更容易消化。戈利金知道他现在是一个事过境迁的人物，我想他能看出我是在安慰他。 他最近正遭受着不幸的折磨。他最喜欢的女儿成了西方最腐朽的事的牺牲品——吸毒——并且已经自杀了。这是一个可怕的打击，戈利金责怪自己。 午餐后，我们在冬天那明朗的阳光下一起走过中央公园。他要我去看看他在纽约州北部的农场，但我告诉他我得回伦敦，再没有什么可说的了。 “你想回家吗？”我们快分手时我问他。 “哦，不，”一阵不寻常的停顿之后，他才回答说，“他们不会宽恕我的。” 戈利金不怎么谈到俄国，但它显然在他的心中。 “想家吗？” “有时想……” 我们道别了。他穿过雪地走远了，脚下发出嘎吱嘎吱的声音，就像所有的叛逃者一样，戈利金感到寒冷。