Chapter 21 Chapter Nineteen

Konstantin Volkov's list is the first case we investigated, and it is also a key investigation project conducted by the third section of D Branch to track down the second of the two foreign ministry spies mentioned in the list.I decided to ask Geoffrey Sudbury, the GCHQ officer in charge of Project Venona, to retranslate the entire document.Sudbury is fluent in Russian, not least because, through the "Vinona" project, he is familiar with the jargon used by Russian intelligence at the time of Volkov's attempted defection, which the original translator of the document did not understand These jargon, the original translator is an official of the British embassy in Turkey.

One item in Volkov's list particularly puzzled me. The original translation mentioned that he knew the files and documents of important Soviet spies in important institutions in London.There is a passage in the translation: "Judging by their pseudonyms, there were seven such spies, five in the British Intelligence Service, two in the Foreign Office, and I know, for example, that one of the spies served as a departmental leadership." When the material on the Philby case was first compiled in 1951, MI5 assumed that the last spy Volkov referred to was Philby, since he had indeed been a spy in 1945. MI6 is responsible for the leadership of counterintelligence.However, I learned enough Russian from the "Venona" project to discover that there were two words that did not appear in the original translation - a word "otdel", which means "place", followed by another One word is "upravalenie", which means "council" or "high office".In any case, there is no good reason why Volkov's passage must be referring to Philby.There were five spies in British intelligence, any one of whom could easily be identified as Philby.

A few days after I gave Sudbury Volkov's list, he called me excitedly, when he almost forgot to switch the phone scrambler. "The original translation is wrong," he said, "it's all in the language of the NKVD. The man who drafted this document was obviously a very high-ranking official who wrote carefully and possessed a wealth of professional skill and knowledge." .The real translation would read: 'I know, for example, that one of the spies is in charge of a section of the British Counterintelligence Service.' "In fact, I'd say the person's position is temporary. He's 'holding a role', not necessarily the role itself, which leads me to think he's an acting leader or something like that..."

"I didn't understand." I replied cautiously. "You still don't understand?" Jeffrey's shout came over the electronic noise. "The British Counterintelligence Service is MI5 not MI6!" The meaning is clear.If Sudbury is right, it's not Philby, and it's not Brent, because he's never been an acting leader of any kind.There was only one Acting Head of the British Counterintelligence Service somewhere in 1944-1945, and his name was Roger Hollis. The second allegation was that of what Igor Guzenko said was an MI5 spy "Eri".The first time I came across the name was in Annie Last's notebook, during an investigation into Mitchell. "Fluency" re-investigated the Eli case in great detail.Guzenko's Eli case is unusual in that it appeared in September 1945, at exactly the same time as Volkov's accusations of "surrogate leaders" and at the same time that we got the "Venona" program The breakthrough happened on the same day.

The gist of what Volkov said was simple. He said he knew there was a spy within MI5, and he knew about it from a friend named Rubimov.Rubimov worked with Volkov in the main cipher room of the GRU in Moscow in 1942.Eli's method of communication is the dead letter box, one of which is the crevice of the tombstone.Gutzenko said there was something about Eli in Russia, either in terms of his background, or because he had visited Russia, or because he spoke Russian.Eli was an important spy because he was able to take files from MI5 about Russians in London. Rubimov showed him part of the telegram from the spy code-named "Eri."Guzenko said that whenever Eli's telegram came, a woman in the code room would first read the translation of the telegram, and if necessary, it could be sent directly to Stalin.I invited to England a high-ranking ex-GRU official who had defected to the West at the end of the war.I asked him who the woman who read the telegram was, and he said she was Vera, who worked directly under him and was in charge of all GRU illegals in the West.However, due to confidentiality regulations, she never told him the identity of the spies she controlled.Alexander Foote, an illegal spy working for the GRU in Switzerland during the war, also depicted Vera (see his "Spy Handbook") as going to Moscow in 1945 before defecting in the late forties The female person in charge during the training.

The first problem with Guzenko's account is that since his first whistleblower in 1945, he has often changed the details. "MI5" became MI5, and this distinction is crucial.Theoretically speaking, "Military Intelligence No. 5" could refer to the five divisions of the Military Intelligence Bureau.Philby had indeed worked in Branch 5 of SIS (formerly MI5) in 1942.Another problem with Guzenko is that he was already an irredeemable alcoholic in the mid-sixties, and it is completely unreliable to ask him to recall events that happened twenty years ago.I asked the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to see Guzenko again, but they told us that Guzenko caused a lot of trouble for the Canadian authorities because of his greed for drinking and money.They were afraid that further contact with Gutzenko would exacerbate the problem, and there was a great risk that Gutzenko might spread the word about our purpose for meeting him.

I asked the RCMP if they had the original transcripts of Guzenko's interrogation, the best evidence of his accurate account of the Ery issue in the early days of his defection.But the mounted police officer guarding Guzenko was dead, and his records were not on file and almost certainly destroyed. Evidence in the archives of British intelligence only further complicates the veracity of Guzenko's story.After Guzenko's defection, MI6 officer Peter Dwyer traveled from Washington to Canada to hear from him.Dwyer sent a daily cable back to MI6 headquarters in London outlining Guzenko's confession.Dwyer's cable was handled by Philby, the chief of SIS's anti-Soviet espionage division, who had to face the pressing problem of Volkov's almost simultaneous contact with the British in Turkey in the second week. .Fortunately, he invited Roger Hollis, then a colleague of MI5, to go to Canada to meet Guzenko on his behalf.Was it a coincidence, we wondered, or did he know that Hollis was a spy partner and believed he could muddle the Guzenko case?However, we know from "Winona" that when Hollis went to Canada to meet Guzenko, the KGB did not know that the GRU had a spy in MI5.The clearest and most important material that Gutzenko has is that of the possible presence of spies in the atomic weapons development program, as detailed in the Hollis report, and the spies in MI5 Eli is pretty much a footnote.Hollis concluded that Gutzenko had no idea of ​​the organizational structure of British intelligence, that Gutzenko was mistaken, and the matter was buried.This is a wrong judgment.

However, Guy Liddell, then chief of counterespionage, kept this clue in his mind, speculating in his diary about Eli's possible identity.Strangely enough, I didn't know this until Liddell's old secretary gave me the diary and asked me to keep it, and Hollis ordered it destroyed.Once again, I stopped to think, was Hollis' order to destroy Liddell's diary an accident, or was it for some other reason? In 1965 we managed to decipher a new message from Venona, which changed Fluency's assessment of whether Eli was "a true list."The week in which we deciphered the "Venona" signal began on September 15, 1945, with the receipt of a telegram to Krotov in which the sender calmly It was discussed that he would take precautionary measures to protect the precious "Argentura" in light of the problems faced by his Canadian "neighbors".This is an apparent reference to Guzenko's defection in Canada last week.We already know that "neighbors" is a code word used by the KGB to refer to the GRU where Guzenko worked.The KGB had no reason to fear that any of his spies in Britain would be sabotaged by Guzenko.The GRU didn't know the KGB's secrets, and Philby was there anyway, watching every unforeseen development.

But by September 22, the end of a week of correspondence, the tone of the telegrams was noticeably different.That relaxed tone is gone.Krotov received meticulous and detailed instructions on how to work with his spies.Only the "jungle meeting" method can be used, and the meeting should be kept to a minimum, once a month if possible. We need to answer the question: Why did the Moscow Center suddenly become concerned about the implications of Guzenko's testimony?Gutzenko actually defected two weeks ago, on September 5th, and the GRU almost immediately made a preliminary estimate of the damage and made protection arrangements for those they feared would be betrayed by Gutzenko .On September 12, Peter Dwyer sent back to Philby at MI6 headquarters in London the details that Guzenko had told him in Canada, but a week later the KGB suddenly began worry.

The answer was in MI6 files at the time.On September 18-19 a telegram was delivered to Philby's desk.It is the first detailed account of Guzenko's account of a spy code-named Eli, and it may be the first time Philby has heard of a spy in "Situation 5."We looked up the original copy of the telegram in the sixties, and it was folded in four, with dirty edges around it, as if it had been kept in an inner pocket.Philby signed the telegram "HARP" (Philby's initials) two days after receiving the telegram.Apparently he took the telegram within those two days and showed it to his Russian superiors in London.None of the cables in the archives concerning the Guzenko case had been processed in this way.Apparently, it was this telegram that caused concern among the Russians as the "Venona" communications campaign drew to a close.

I am asking the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to conduct a search of all KGB communications from London to Moscow.We cannot understand the content of these communications.The only "Venona" match we have is the KGB from Moscow to London.Sudbury told me that GCHQ came across one noteworthy incident, a telegram sent on September 19-20.They were sure that it was an urgent telegram, because all telegrams on the same line had given way to it.The significance was clear—Philby sent the urgent cable the day after he received an MI6 cable about Guzenko's description of the spy Eli in MI5. Knowing that London had sent an urgent telegram to Moscow, we set out to find a reply to this urgent telegram.There was only one express telegram on the line from Moscow to London.We have never been able to read the telegram with certainty.It was dated on the last day of the "Venona" communication week, and as it was sent by express, it arrived in London a little earlier than the other telegrams.At the end of 1965, Sudbury and I doggedly captured the telegram.We guessed that this telegram was a reply to Philby's telegram.We use this guess as an aid to deciphering.The deciphered telegram reads: "The leader has agreed to discuss with the neighbors Stanley's materials on their affairs in Canada. Stanley's data is correct." I still remember us sitting in our office in Sudbury staring at the translation.It makes absolutely no sense.At first I wondered if we had made a mistake, but Sudbury checked the translation with the other side of "Venona", and the telegrams back and forth were completely understandable, and there was nothing wrong with it.Philby was a top KGB spy when the cable was sent and had been MI6's counterespionage chief for the better part of a decade.Moscow seemed to have doubts about Philby's intelligence, or why would they need to verify it?What was Stanley's data that got the KGB into this mess? Only one explanation can clear up these doubts.The KGB must have been unaware of the spy in Situ 5 commanded by the GRU, and when Philby relayed the news about the spy and the threat Guzenko posed to him, the KGB had to take "leadership," namely With the consent of the Politburo, consult with the "neighbors" GRU and ask them if they have such a valuable person in London.It was only when they learned that the GRU had such a spy that they realized that London might have an intense hunt, so they sent back a message confirming Stanley's data, followed by an emergency order to increase security. Who is Keli?where does he workHe was clearly not Philby or Brent, who we knew were never under the GRU's command.I've asked every Russian defector in the West what does the phrase "Situ 5" mean?Everyone was sure it was MI5, not SIS5 or any other organization.Whoever Eli was, he must have had access to the Russian files, so it is certain that he was in Branch F, which was dealing with this material, and the senior official in Branch F at the time was Roger Hollis, so the same Doubts were cleared by the accusation of Volkov's "surrogate leader". "Fluency" spent several years trying to solve the mystery of three connected threads: Volkov's "acting leader", Guzenko's "Eri" and "Vinona's" eight anonymous.All three clues came up that week in September 1945. Was it Mitchell or Hollis?Both, or neither?The similarities between the three leads are mysterious. Both the "acting leader" and Eli pointed to the same two people, but the first charge was against the KGB and the second against the GRU. "Venona" had eight spies; Volkov's list mentions seven in London, two in the Foreign Office, and five in British intelligence.McClain had been in Washington for a year, so he could not have been one of the two Foreign Office spies.Burgess was presumably one of them, since he was working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information Division at the time.Among the others, the most likely seemed to be what Krivitzki called "Eton and Oxford" Foreign Office spies.When McClain was on the brink of capture in 1951, Philby used the Foreign Office spy to divert MI5's attention from McClain. But what about the five spies of British intelligence?One was Philby;Since he was in Germany in September 1945, he could not have been one of the eight anonymous "Vinos".One of Volkov's spies left - "Acting Leader" is still unsolved, and there are four "Venona" Anonymous, one of them is presumed to be "Acting Leader" and the other is Volkov Said second foreign ministry spy. Fluid's third charge is the Skripkin case.This is what Yuri Rastavorov, the second secretary of the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, told us. In fact, he was a lieutenant colonel in the KGB.British Naval Intelligence contacted Rastvorov in the autumn of 1953 and began to discuss his defection with him.Rastavorov finally agreed to come, but on the condition that he go directly to the British colonies, such as Australia, instead of returning to Britain.He said he was reluctant to return to Britain because he knew British intelligence services had been infiltrated, but he did not elaborate further.Naval Intelligence arranged for an RAF Transport Command plane to fly the KGB officer from Tokyo to Singapore, where it was intended to hand him over to the joint MI5/MI6 agency (Far East Security Intelligence Service ).Rastavorov was unaware of these plans.Unfortunately, when the plane taxied to the end of the runway, a snowstorm hit Tokyo and the plane could not take off.While waiting for the blizzard to die down, he learned from chatter among the crew that the plane was bound for Singapore rather than Australia.Startled, he escaped the plane, ran to the American embassy, ​​and defected to them. Later, the CIA reported that Lastvorov provided further details of what he believed to be the reasons for the infiltration of British intelligence, saying that his friend, Lieutenant Skripkin, had been in the Far East with the British in 1946. Contacted and offered to defect.Skripkin planned to go back to Moscow first, take his wife with him, and defect the next time he went abroad.But when Skripkin returned to Moscow, the KGB became aware of him and two officers pretending to be in MI6 came to meet him, so he exposed himself and was executed after a trial. When we searched for Skripkin's materials in the archive room, we found that there was indeed a file of him, and there were also copies of two reports from the Far East Naval Intelligence Service on Skripkin's defection. May 1946, the other July 1946.The two reports were stapled together and sent to MI5 by the Far East Security Intelligence Service in early August.The files were handled by Hollis, then Deputy Chief of Division F, and a junior officer.Hollis directed the junior officer to file the document and place it in the archives.The file sat in the archives until Rastavorov told about Scripkin in 1954.After the files were recovered, MI5 naturally believed that Philby was responsible for Skripkin's discovery. When Fluency re-examined the case, several new circumstances were discovered.First, when Golitsin defected in 1961, he asked what we knew about the Skripkin case.He said he had worked on the case in 1946, when he was a junior officer working in the counterespionage section of the KGB First Directorate.He remembered that the report came from London, definitely not from the Far East, at the end of 1946, when Moscow was covered with snow.Golitsin tells without prompting how two KGB men posing as MI6 officers deceived Skripkin, and we asked Golitsin to describe two documents he had seen, Golitsin Surprisingly accurate.The first document, he said, was about the trials of Skripkin and his assessment of his value; the second was a brief description of his future plans, including his address in Moscow for contact. .Golitsin also said he was sure the documents were stapled together when they were copied by the spy remake. The second new fact discovered by "Fluency" is that when Nicola Elliott interrogated Philby in Beirut, he asked him if he had betrayed Skripkin, and he completely denied having done so, offering him After many details, he still didn't know the case.This is most curious, since we presume that Philby would claim credibility in the case in his own interest, and perhaps this time Philby was telling the truth. I arranged for a full survey of the entire distribution of the two Skripkin documents to see if I could uncover anything new relevant to the case, and the results were instructive.That May report was sent to Naval Intelligence (Hong Kong), Far East Security Intelligence in Singapore, and Naval Intelligence in London.They put the report in the Naval Brief, distributed it within Naval Intelligence, and routinely sent a copy to the Naval Section of SIS R, which in turn passed it on to Section 5 for filing.An extensive search of MI6 records revealed that Philby was never on the list of people to whom the document was distributed. The July documents were distributed through the same channels, except for the Far East Security Intelligence Service in Singapore.They decided to staple the two reports together and send them to MI5, as usual, on August 8.Only then did MI5 learn about it for the first time, and only there were the two reports stapled together, exactly as Golitsin recalled.The man who betrayed Scripkin must have been in MI5 and not MI6.Philby was ruled out, and Brent had left MI5 a year earlier, so the finger was once again directed at Roger Hawley, Deputy Director of F, who handled the Skripkin file at the time. s. With the general scope of the "fluency" charge clear, I embarked on the most dangerous job I've ever had.Without authorization, I began a "liberal" investigation into Hollis' background.I had to be careful, knowing that even the tiniest leak would inevitably lead to my firing.I visited the Baudrian Library in Oxford.I found from college records there that Hollis never got a degree, even though he entered the school in the twenties.He left school for unknown reasons after five semesters.It was a strange thing to do for a man who was so content with himself.I went to Worcester College, where Hollis had studied, and checked the records there to find out who had lived on the same floor as him.Hollis moved into Wellington Place in his fourth term, and I checked all the Oxford Listings listing the addresses of Oxford residents, and to find out who shared his building I even went to Collegiate Golf Association records were also searched for a clue to Hollis' personality. I don't have Hollis' work history, so I have to be blind.I knew from Hollis' conversation that he had been to China, so I went to the passport office to find out the dates of his arrival and departure from the UK.I went to the Standard Chartered Bank where Hollis worked before coming to China, and did a thorough research there, but there was nothing on record except a forwarding address to a bank in Beijing. I wanted to find some evidence of a secret life, or of an informal friend, or of an overt political activity.How everyone behaves in the world can be commented by his friends around him.So I made a list of people who were close to Hollis during the critical period of the late twenties and thirties.Two people in Oxford particularly interested me - Claude Coburn and Maurice Richardson, both left-wingers.When I checked Cockburn's file, I noticed that Hollis kept it throughout the Great War and never listed his friendship with Cockburn on it, as is customary for the intelligence agencies relationship, I suspect he has some reason to hide this friendship.Coburn had extensive contacts with the Comintern. There is a similar pattern in China.China was a hotbed of political activity in the 1930s, a place where the Comintern recruited.Winterborn told me that he knew an old retired colonel in Japan who had met Hollis when he was in China and lived with him in the same house for a year.Hugh asked me to call on him. His name was Tony Stables, a brash military officer who remembered Hollis well.He said he was never aware of Hollis's political views, but always assumed they were left-leaning because he was associated with a left-wing journalist, Agnes Smedley, who was a good recruiter for the Comintern ; there was another man named Arthur Ewart, whom Stables portrayed as an International Socialist. Another person interviewed (by Arthur Martin) was Jane Sizemore, who was responsible for getting Hollis into MI5 before the war.She was eventually transferred from MI5 to MI6, married an MI6 officer, and changed her name to Jane Archer.An unapproachable intellectual, she had run MI6's former communist affairs research unit.I used to go to her often for my D-3 investigations, and she was very helpful and told me that the investigations should go back many years.One afternoon, I brought up the subject of Mitchell and Hollis, both of whom had a close working relationship with her during the war.Jane was an old hand of the world and knew exactly why I was tempting her. "One of them could be a spy, don't you think?" I asked her. "Neither of them is trustworthy," she told me, "but if I had to choose who was more likely to be a spy, I'd pick Roger." In November 1965, Hollis himself called and asked me to come into his office.He is so casual, a change from his past practice.I had never been to his office without his private notice before.He greeted me warmly at the door. "Come and sit here." He said with a smile on his face. He brushed the imaginary dust off the couch and sat in an easy chair across from me.It's also odd that Hollis usually sits in a straight-backed chair.Hollis, eager to keep the meeting casual, chatted unnaturally about his impending retirement. "Hard times," he said, "pensions are small, everything costs money..." "What is your arrangement?" "Oh, I want to go to the country. I've got a little place there. Get out of it all right away. Play golf, go for a walk . . . things like that." He giggled. "It's kind of fun to think that my picture will be up there in a few weeks," he said, looking up at the portraits on the wall looking down on him.The portraits vary in attitude: Kyle's rigid military stance, Petrie's pompous poise, Sillitoe as a hunched and shrugging police officer, Dick's relaxed charisma. Hollis turned his head to face me, bent forward, put his hands on his knees, and smirked for no reason. "Peter, there's just one thing I want to ask you before I go. I want to know why you think I'm a spy." I must think quickly.If I lied to him and he found out I was lying, I was screwed that day, so I told him the truth. Hollis was natural about it.About ten years ago, when he and I discussed Tisler, we had a confrontation.Now that this confrontation is out in the open, it sits on the table between us like an inanimate thing.It seemed like there was nothing more to say in the face of the suspicions that had been bred by all the secrets of the past. "It's all based on those past allegations, sir," I told him, "and the threads that lead to the case. You know what I mean by post-war failures, it's a process of elimination. First Mitchell, now you." "Oh, yes—but surely you're watching new developments...?" "Yes, past charges, sir." I spent an hour telling him Volkov's list, the retranslated telegram, Guzenko's Eli, and Scripkin's report. "Well, Peter," he said, smiling kindly, "you've handcuffed me, haven't you? . . . " I wanted to interject, but he turned the palms of his hands towards me and told me to keep silent. "All I can say is that I'm not a spy." "But sir, what conclusion can I make before the Fluency meeting? Nothing at all..." "I might be able to find the notes from the interrogation of Guzenko..." he said uncertainly. "To be honest, I really don't recall Skripkin, and Volkov..." He tapped the edge of the chair he was sitting on with a sharpened pencil, clicking against his teeth. "I don't think you're right about Volkov. Why did Philby go all the way to Turkey? He should have checked first." He sighed, as if it was all a thing of the past. "'Fluency' is useful, isn't it...?" he asked suddenly. "I think so, sir. I think the work is long overdue." "Yes, I thought you'd think so... Macdonald's not so sure—well, I think you know that." "He got the reports and I think he read them." "Oh yes. I'm sure we've all read it," Hollis replied. "It's fascinating. All the history. Better shake the spider off the pipe than nothing." He smirked again for no reason. "Well, thank you for your frankness, Peter," he said, rising from his chair. "I've got to get on with my work. It's nice to talk to you, but..." He shuffled stiffly and went back to work.The two of us, like two actors, exited on opposite sides, our roles played out. I never saw Hollis again.Within weeks, the new director, Martin Furnival Jones, had moved into that office.The first decision he made was to remove the portraits from the wall and hang them in the reception room. “This kind of work doesn’t need an audience,” he mumbles when I ask why he’s doing it. Jones, a man of few words and great determination, was well suited for the job.He was sure he faced a major problem—the scale of the Soviet offensive, in terms of the meager numbers of Soviet intelligence officers in London relative to his few.His tenure as director was to wage a campaign to expand MI5 and cut the Soviet diplomatic staff.He had some success with the first, and he ended up winning with the second as well. Jones' first mission was anti-Soviet espionage.When he took over, the whole way of dealing with the problem changed.Whereas before I had to be persistent to get approval, with Jones I could call him or go see him and get a decision on the spot.He unreservedly supported the investigations of the three divisions of D, and readily approved all important interviews.He has never shied away from passing valuable judgments on cases such as Watson and Proctor.If the evidence convinces him, he will act.Jones is a man who doesn't play tricks. On the surface, he looks like a typical British gentleman, but in fact he is very stubborn.This left him with few friends in Whitehall, but it was the kind of character that was indispensable to intelligence agencies. It makes me sad that he named Anthony Simkins as his deputy.Simkins was probably my least favorite person in MI5, and he felt pretty much the same way about me.I know I'm going to be in trouble once he's appointed Deputy Commissioner.Simkins is a lawyer.A few years ago, he and I had a heated argument.He was the head of the C division at the time, where he had some modest success.I was then appointed to lead a joint task force, which included MI5, MI6, the Foreign Office and GCHQ, to check the technical security of the British embassy in Moscow because it was responsible for intercepting local There was a fire in the radio room of Soviet communications.The findings made it clear that not only did the Soviets set the fire on purpose, but that they had access to the radio room for some time.The Soviets were identifying changes in our radio receivers every night, so they knew what we were intercepting.The Soviets who cleaned the embassy even simply removed the pin on the safety door lock and drove straight in. In the course of this investigation, I also solved another mystery on Volkov's list.Volkov claimed that the Soviets could read the cipher used by the British Foreign Office in Moscow.McClain must have sold all the ciphers he had access to in the Foreign Office to the Russians.However, Foreign Office records show that the British embassy in Moscow used one-time pads during and immediately after the war, so McClain cannot be blamed. Remembering what I did with "that stuff" in 1951, I'm pretty sure the Soviets must be using a hidden microphone system, we ended up finding two microphones buried in the lime slabs on the roof of the code room .During the war, the embassy's one-time password communications were routinely handled by two people, one reading the message and the other translating it into code.The Soviets simply recorded the original text with their microphones.建筑研究实验室干得非常出色，使我们能够确定埋藏话筒的时间可能是在一九四二年。当时大使馆在古比雪夫。 工作小组的报告认为，它发现了大使馆内的安全令人吃惊地处在一个持续异常的水平上。委员会的每一个成员都同意一项极为重要的意见，就是要求专门确定一个军情五处的官员来负责大使馆的安全工作。我把这份尖锐的报告交给了当时的副局长琼斯，请他批准后再送外交部。琼斯建议我，出于礼貌应把它给西姆金斯看一看，他好歹还是负责安全保卫的C处处长，从技术上讲，工作组触及了他的范围。我拿一本复制件给西姆金斯看。令人吃惊的是，他在几小时之后就气势汹汹地通知我上他的办公室去。 “你不能把任何类似这样的东西送给外交部，”他说，仿佛我把调查工具作为礼物送给教皇似的。 “为什么就不能？”我问，“该让这帮混蛋尝尝滋味了。整个地方是一片混乱！” “啊，对不起。那是外交部，国家最重要的一个部门，你没有资格把这样的报告送去。我反对批准它！” 他用一支蓝色铅笔把报告乱画一气，令我震惊。我把报告拿给琼斯，让他看看西姆金斯干的事。琼斯哼了一声，告诉我用打字机打好，原封不动送走。 “该死的外交部，”他咆哮着，“我碰上了他们这该死的运气……” 报告送走了，军情五处年青的官员托尼·莫申也被派到了莫斯科。从那时起，我便知道西姆金斯是我终生的敌人。 琼斯接任局长不久，“流畅”工作组向他和秘密情报局局长狄克·怀特提交了第一份报告。报告分为两个部分，第一部分分别列出了二十八项我们认为是可调查的真清单的指控，但这些指控并没有归纳到任何一个已知的间谍身上；报告的第二部分是以记叙文的形式写的指控情况，从一九四二年古曾科的埃里指控开始，到一九六二年戈利金的情报为止，暴露了或多或少的渗透连续性。这份报告被分别送到了两位上司手里，可半年以后这份报告才得到重新讨论。他们让我们重新提交我们的新发现，只列出我们认为是可以进行调查的指控，并根据我们的判断列出最符合指控里的怀疑对象的名单。 “流畅”工作组决定，应该调查古曾科的埃里和沃尔科夫的“代理领导人”。由于这两起指控在时间上颇为接近，因此对它们应该同时考虑。怀疑对象的名字被清楚地打印在纸角上。没有头衔，也没有等级，只是一个名字：罗杰·霍利斯。 我们报告中所包含的第三起指控是戈林涅夫斯基的“中级间谍”，它同前两起针对霍利斯的指控一样具有潜在的破坏性。“中级间谍”的故事开始于一九六三年十一月。过去都知道是“狙击手”的戈林涅夫斯基终于同意与军情五处的人见面，以澄清他在波兰写的匿名信中的指控的一些细节。以前，由于我们没有抓到“兰布达一号”乔治·布莱克，戈林涅夫斯基不愿意同任何一个直接从军情五处来的官员见面。现在布莱克在监狱里，于是戈林涅夫斯基会见了具有半个波兰血统的波兰科科长。 当军情五处同戈林涅夫斯基见面时，中央情报局怀疑他正患有精神病。他开始产生幻觉，认为他自己是沙皇的后裔。尽管如此，他对情报的回忆仍然是惊人地准确。一天上午，在同他进行会谈时，他宣称要讲出他以前从未讲出过的一个故事。他说他在过去没有提及它，是因为英国人在追捕布莱克的事情上搞得一团糟，但是他知道军情五处内部有一个中级间谍。 五十年代时，戈林涅夫斯基和他的一个朋友以及他过去的上级就是否叛逃去西方进行过一次严肃认真的讨论，很难在英国和美国之间作出抉择。他们三人都一致认为英国较好定居，因为英国有大量的波兰移民。由于军情六处有“兰布达一号”，他们显然不可能去接近军情六处。戈林涅夫斯基向其他两个人建议，通过在伦敦的移民与军情五处取得联系，他知道这些移民被军情五处的D处监视着。戈林涅夫斯基的上级说这个计划同样危险，因为他知道俄国人在军情五处内部也有一个间谍。 这个间谍是克格勃负责军队情报的第三总局招募的，第三总局被允许留用这名间谍，而不按照通常的做法把他转给第一总局，因为他对第三总局太重要了。这个间谍曾在英国军队服过役，被招募时还保留着英国官员的级别。戈林涅夫斯基认为招募工作是在东欧进行的，并说出了进行这项工作的俄国克格勃上校的名字。该间谍为俄国人提供了很有价值的反波兰间谍的情报，大概他是在军情五处的波兰科工作。 还有另一个细节，五十年代中期，英国成功地把波兰总理汉克运到了西方。结果在华沙进行了一次调查，是由当时克格勃的头子谢洛夫将军亲自主持。由于某种原因，克格勃没有事先得到有关汉克运出的警报。戈林涅夫斯基知道这是因为该中级间谍被“冻结”了，或者是因为他受到怀疑，或者是因为他在国内失去了联系，或者干脆因为他的神经脆弱。这个间谍显然被冻结了两三年，五十年代末才恢复了在波兰科的工作。以后，当戈林涅夫斯基一九五九年在莫斯科询问他在第三总局的一个朋友是谁负责招募这名间谍的以及这项行动是否仍在进行，他的朋友对他甚至知道这种事感到吃惊，并奉劝他不要多嘴。 “这是一件非常秘密的事，”他说，“我奉劝你把这一切都忘掉。” 戈林涅夫斯基的指控非同一般地详细，但由于自一九六三年底以来，反情报工作十分繁重，加之对戈林涅夫斯基的信用又有怀疑，因此在“流畅”工作开始之前，这起指控没有被好好地调查过。我们把指控分为七项单独的指标，然后给每一个符合其中一项标准的怀疑对象打分。军情五处特别符合戈林涅夫斯基的中级间谍的怀疑对象有八人，其中确切符合各项标准的有一人。他的名字叫迈克尔·汉利，是C处的处长，一个最有可能成为琼斯的继任者的人。 单单是因为他是公认的“完全符合”，“流畅”一致建议根据戈林涅夫斯基的指控对汉利进行调查，并为他取了一个代号叫“哈里特”。 又过了半年，才对“流畅”的第二份报告进行讨论。下班以后，在琼斯的会议室又开了一个会，参加者有：我，安妮·奥尔尤因，帕特里克·斯图尔特，伊夫琳·麦克巴尼特，安东尼·西姆金斯，以及琼斯。这完全是军情五处的一次内部讨论，因为“流畅”这三件突出的案子都是军情五处的事，而不是军情六处的事。 这个会议开头就出现冷场。琼斯在桌子上放了一瓶苏格兰威士忌，室内的灯在房间里投下清晰的影子。琼斯来回走动着，用牙齿咬着他的烟斗。 He turned around. “你们真的认为这些人是怀疑对象吗？”他问道，“你们意识到了你们所说的话的含义吗？……” “我当然意识到了，”我说，但还是被他那种态度动摇了。 “真是荒唐，”他喃喃地说道，一边指着有关霍利斯的几页纸，“你不可能指望我接受……” 他把报告扔在办公桌上。 “还有完没完，彼得——你给我送来一份报告说我的前任，甚至我的继任者很可能都是间谍。你想过没有？你有没有停下来去思考一下，如果我们根据这些建议采取行动的话，会造成什么样的后果？从这当中恢复过来要花十年时间，即使到头来什么事也没有。” “我坚持我们所写的东西，琼斯。还有，'流畅'工作组的每一个成员也坚持。我可以向你保证，如果还有其他怀疑对象，你也会被告知的。” 西姆金斯坐在桌子的另一头。我感到他此刻正非常恼怒。他要向我扑过来，但此时琼斯正在询问，他不许别人打搅。 “你们多年来一直要把这记进履历里——你和阿瑟，不是吗？你想过没有这种东西会使罗杰怎样？” “在他快退休之前，我同他谈过这件事，”我告诉琼斯，“他对此非常平静。” 当我描述了我同霍利斯的最后一次冲突后，琼斯听了大吃一惊。 “他一定是个硬汉子。”他冷冷地说。 终于，西姆金斯看准了机会。 “这简直荒唐，”他尖着嗓门喊道，他那公学口音拖到了极点，“人人都知道你和马丁老抓住罗杰不放。你到处批评外交部，这个人，那个人，然后四处指责，散布谣言，八方投毒，这太放肆了。如果要对罗杰提出什么批评的话，那就是他对你太放任了。” “我要的是真理，安东尼。”我说，竭尽力量保持礼貌。 “真理！你并不懂得它的含义。你得学会尊重别人！这是恶意的诽谤！这个人的脚还没有迈出局机关的门，你就对他的名声进行侮辱。他在安全局三十年，为它所做的事是你一辈子也赶不上的。” 幸好，帕特里克·斯图尔特为我壮了声势。 “充分发表意见，这很好，安东尼，你只是刚刚才接触到这件事。” 他抓住他轮椅两边的扶手，手指关节都变白了。 “我们当中有些人为这个问题斗争了若干年，这并不容易。这虽不轻松，但我们感到一定得这样做，至少当我们完成了如此艰难的报告时能期望有一点理性的辩论。” 但西姆金斯决心继续对抗。 “那美国人呢——你也在那里放了毒。我在那里的时候，他们所要谈论的全是该死的渗透。这真不能容忍。我们将会被全世界当成笑柄的。” “当菲尔比叛逃、布伦特坦白时，你不认为我们是笑柄……？”我回击道。 琼斯用力地咬着他的烟斗，偶尔停下来划根火柴点烟斗，仿佛他不在听这场时起时落的争吵。过了半个小时，他突然插了话。 “好了，这是我的决定。我肯定你能同意，彼得，我们必须把中级间谍的问题作为重点来解决。如果他存在的话，他仍然在这里。” I nod. “嗯，我要求对汉利引起注意。”他用手背拍了一下报告，“他是完全符合的人，美国人知道这项指控的全部内容。我还要让你们对那些得高分数的人加以注意……我要一查到底，然后把结果告诉美国人。至于其他的”——他此刻在注视着我——“我不改变我的看法，这是荒唐的……” 琼斯宣布散会。大家匆匆地走了出去，留下他一个人担负着安全局的烦恼。他是教皇，正试图调解一个分裂的教会的分歧。