Chapter 18 Chapter Sixteen

When Arthur left, I was in the midst of a massive reconstruction in D-3.When I took over the section, it didn't have a clear purpose like I had asked it to.I believe that Section 3 should play a central role if MI5 is to uncover the conspiracy of the 1930s.An intelligence agency, especially a counterintelligence agency, has to rely on its own memory and sense of purpose, without which it can do nothing.But MI5 received in 1964 a mass of contradictory information from defectors and confessed spies that MI5 could not bear.There have always been so many so-so endings in the intelligence profession, and we are overwhelmed by the unsolved accusations and unsubstantiated questionable material piling up in the archives from the Thirties.We need a look back at that era, effectively actively scrutinizing everyone Philby, Burgess, McClain, Brent, Long, and Cairncross knew.

Despite the defection in 1951, it was puzzling how little we knew of the backgrounds of the former spies until 1964.The more general tendency is to regard spies as "rotten apples," "mistakes," rather than as part of a larger conspiracy under the special conditions of the thirties.The gulf within the Bureau between those who believe our intelligence agencies have been infiltrated and those who hold the opposite view is widening.Resonating with this is another similar split: some believe that Soviet penetration in the thirties was limited, while others believe that the scope of Soviet penetration was considerable and that Operation Venona The eight anonymous individuals mentioned are a strong case for this.Throughout the late 1950s, tensions intensified between the two sides as Hollis continued to make efforts to silence those like Arthur and me who demanded clarification.

For complex reasons, we have failed to adequately counter this conspiracy.Simply put, the little progress made in the examination of the two biggest suspects, Philby and Brent, combined with the kind of fear harbored by the British ruling establishment, warrants a huge investigation. Hard work is hard.By the time the defection occurred, many of those associated with Burgess and McLean had already become prominent figures in social life.It's one thing to ask embarrassing questions to a young university student, quite another to ask similar questions to a slew of civilians about to become deputy ministers.

To be honest, this is a manifestation of will decline.MI5 politicians and previous chiefs feared that further checks would lead to new defections or even more embarrassing scandals involving British political blocs, which in the 1950s was considered an unacceptable risk .To conduct an unimpeded investigation, MI5 inevitably had to show its cards, a dilemma that confronted all counterintelligence agencies.If you want to investigate, you have to take risks to contact and interview some people, so as the investigation intensifies, so does the risk of leaks and exposure.This contradiction is particularly acute in the investigation of the Soviet recruitment of spies at Oxford and Cambridge in the 1930s.Most of the people we wanted to meet were still part of the Oxford and Cambridge intellectual clique system.They are not required to pledge allegiance to MI5 or to keep our operations a secret, and it is frightening and disturbing that news of our activities would spread like wildfire.Faced with this risk, the various leaders of MI5 would never want to touch this difficult problem.We chose the method of secret investigation. In fact, open investigation is more effective.

Philby's defection and the confessions of Brent, Long, and Cairncross wiped out many reservations, but the fear of scandal among the British ruling circles remained as acute as ever.Hollis agreed to expand the three sections of D, and gave it a simple but long-term task-to go back to the 1930s and search files so that they could find clues to spies who were still active today.Examining an entire generation, weeding out as many clueless cases as possible, provided Britain's intelligence services with an accurate history for the first time.After Guy Liddell retired, he often came back to the office to play. He said to me a sentence, which I used as a guiding principle for the three departments of Department D:

"I bet that 50% of the spies caught in the next ten years already have files and clues in the file room. You can use these files and clues..." I'm definitely right.I thought about Holden, whose wife had turned on him; I thought about Black, and the clues about Black that "Sniper" had given early on, and Philby, and Brent.There is evidence for these, but no relentless pursuit has been carried out.Perhaps most surprising of all, I learned from my reading of the Klaus Fuchs file that after Fuchs' arrest, MI5 found that his name, his Communist background, and even his party card number Recorded in Gestapo files confiscated by MI5 at the end of the war.For whatever reason, the officials responsible for reviewing Fuchs were not informed.However, between 1945 and 1948, an official named Michael Sopol also worked on Fuchs' problems.He wrote in the file: Fuchs must be a spy.

Among the materials stacked in the archives, there are a few obvious places to look.The first is the Gestapo records.The Gestapo was an extremely effective counterintelligence agency that conducted extensive campaigns against and harbored information about European communist and Soviet intelligence agencies.It collected these materials at a time when our knowledge of Europe, owing to the conditions of the war, was scarce.It has the extremely precious information of the most important "Red Orchestra" in the Soviet intelligence circle in Europe. The "Red Orchestra" is a series of illegal intelligence networks controlled by the GRU in Germany-occupied Europe. They are loosely connected with each other and fully self-supporting in funding, but they are very brave and resourceful. The importance of German military operations The intelligence was what they sent to Moscow by radio.

For the British, the most important Gestapo records are the Robinson documents.Henry Robinson was a leading member of the "Red Orchestra" in Paris and one of the most trusted agents of the Comintern.He was arrested by the Gestapo in 1943 and executed.He refused to utter a word on his deathbed, but documents hidden under the floorboards of his room were discovered revealing the activities of the spy ring.The handwritten notes listed the names and addresses of forty or fifty individuals living in England, suggesting that Robinson was responsible for contacting the British "Red Orchestra" spy ring.After the war, Evelyn McBarnett did a lot of research work on the Robinson papers. The names are all pseudonyms, and some addresses are mailboxes, and some have been destroyed in the war.Another MI5 officer, Michael Hanley, also did extensive research in 1951, identifying and listing every known agent of the "Red Orchestra," which numbered 5,000.But since then, nothing has been written.Somewhere in all the material, I thought, there might be clues to interest us.

Another place to look is material records from defectors.Work is underway on the recent defections of Golitsin and Gorinevsky.There are still many clues in the information provided by the defectors before the war and the defectors after the war.For example, Walter Krivitsky, an official of the Soviet NKVD who defected in 1937, told MI5 that there was a spy from a prominent family who had studied at Eton and Oxford and later worked in the diplomatic service. department work.For many years it was assumed he was referring to Donald McLean, even though he had been educated at Gresham Holt and Cambridge.McClain did not match up with the man, and yet the revealing material was gathering dust in the archives.

This was followed by Konstantin Volkov's approach to the British Consulate in Istanbul.This person is a senior official of the Soviet NKVD.He offered Britain money in exchange for his list of Soviet spies in Britain.He gave the British embassy a list of official espionage departments.Volkov had the misfortune that his list landed on the desk of Kim Philby, who worked for MI6.Philby, who was chief of counterespionage at the time, persuaded a superior who disagreed to let him go to Turkey, saying that he was going to arrange Volkov's defection.But Philby delayed his arrival in Turkey by two days, and Volkov, who was about to defect, was never seen again.The Turks believe Volkov and his wife were flown away on stretchers.Among the spies Volkov provided was one identified as Philby himself.But there were several others who were never tracked down, like the spy Volkov said was working for MI6 in Persia.

Finally, there is the "Venona" material.It is the most reliable piece of intelligence to date on past infiltrations of Western security services.After Arthur left, I took over the Venona project and ordered another full review of the material to see if I could glean any new leads.This leads to the first case brought by the D Division III.Ironically, this is a French case, not a British one.From 1940 to 1941, the GRU "door hasp" material contained a lot of information about the Soviet Union's infiltration of various émigré organizations and national movements based in London in the early years of the war .For example, the Russians have an important spy in the heart of the Free Czechoslovak Service.The intelligence service directed its spy network in German-occupied Eastern Europe through couriers.The Soviet spy's pseudonym was "Baron", presumably the Czech politician Sedlec.This person later played a very prominent role in the Swiss "Lucie circle". In the case of MI5, the most serious infiltration was in the Free French government under Charles de Gaulle.De Gaulle's two assistants to the Communist Party, one named Andre Labarthe, was once the Minister of Civil Affairs; the other was called Muserier, who was in charge of military affairs and was an admiral.The two men continued to plot in London.MI5 had kept a close eye on these plots during the war in light of Churchill's intentions.While de Gaulle was in Dakar to liberate the region for a free France, Churchill ordered the arrest of La Barthe and Musselier.We broke a cipher in 1964 and it turned out that Rabarthe was a spy for the Soviet Union while the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was still in effect. The US "Venona" program also contained material for Soviet infiltration of Free France.The CIA didn't do much research on it, either because they thought the material was trite, or because none of them had a systematic knowledge of French history.While researching these materials, I discovered that another high-ranking statesman, Pierre Cote, Minister of the Air Force in Daladier's cabinet before the war, was also an active Russian spy. The discovery comes at a time of strained relations between French and British intelligence services.Anti-French sentiment within British intelligence was strong.Many officers in both departments had served in the war and the memory of France's capitulation was vivid.Courtney Young always claimed that when he returned from Dunkirk he formed a lifelong view of France.Even Blunt, with all his admiration for French art and style, hurled insults at French cowardice. The arrival of Anatoly Golitsin did little to help relations between the British and French intelligence services.Some of the most useful intelligence he provided concerned the Soviet infiltration of the French SIS (the British equivalent).Golitsin said that there is a spy group in the French Secret Intelligence Service, which is composed of the top figures of the bureau, called the "Sapphire Group".The deputy director of the bureau committed suicide by jumping out of a window shortly after Golitsin's defection.Angleton persuaded the CIA director to ask President Kennedy to write a letter to de Gaulle alerting him to the Golitsin revelations.But de Gaulle felt that the Americans and the British were manipulating Golitsin to slander the integrity of the French.Golitsin's confession led to the arrest and prison sentence in 1965 of Georges Bargue, a senior official of the French government.After that, French officials still insisted on this view. Further complicating matters was a double-agent case dubbed "Balloon" in which the French Counterintelligence Service and the British Security Service were working together. "Balloon" is John Paul Supotbo.He was an industrial chemist, a spy commanded by East German intelligence and the KGB, but Belgian security made him a double agent.He confessed that two of his spies, both working for the British Kodak company, had sent him details of confidential commercial processes.Belgium informed MI5 of the incident, and MI5 began an extensive investigation of the two Kodak employees.The two clerks were named Alfred Roberts and Godfrey Conway.Supotbo also told Belgium that there was an East German outlaw named Herbert Steinbreche who was in charge of spies in the French Concorde assembly workshop.The situation was reported to the French Counterintelligence Service, who then cooperated with MI6 to investigate. Unfortunately, the ending of both cases is full of farce.Conway and Roberts were arrested, but they were later acquitted.Most detrimental to Anglo-French relations, the Steinbreche investigation turned out to have been recruited by MI6 to include a French police chief whose precinct included those areas approaching the German border.He was a "bleached" spy, that is to say, MI6 deliberately hid everything about him from his masters, France, and thus used him for espionage among the French and German diaspora.France was forced to admit that Steinbreche's spies had obtained for the Russians full details of the Anglo-French Concorde's advanced electronic systems, and a high-profile row inevitably ensued. I approached Angleton and Louis Todra of the US National Security Agency, and after obtaining their consent, I provided the French counterintelligence service with "Venona" information, proving that Cote and Labarthe were Russian spies .They are old but still politically active.In my opinion, this is done as a matter of caution.I arrived at the headquarters of the French Counterespionage Service in Paris early in 1965, where I was met by Marcel Chalitte, the deputy director of the French counterespionage service.Charit was small and clean, and had joined the Counterespionage Service only after the war.During the war, he took part with great courage in the resistance movement led by John Morin.On the day Maureen was captured, he barely escaped the clutches of the Gestapo.Like all veterans of the Resistance, Charit likes to wear a pink silk sash with pride.He was a militant anti-Communist, but he admired Maureen, a dedicated Communist, more than anyone he had ever admired in his life.He mentioned the Resistance to me several times, and even in the sixties he couldn't help crying when talking about his past commanders. I explained that we had new information on the real roles of Cotes and Labalthe, and showed him the relevant coded translation of the "Venona" information.Shocked by this material, he immediately resolved to conduct a comprehensive investigation. "Don't you think they're too old?" I asked. Marcel fixed his menacing eyes on me. "You can't say a French politician is too old until you see him lying green in his coffin!" Tragically, Labarthe died of a heart attack during Marcel's interrogation, and Cote died peacefully.This exchange of information went a long way toward easing relations between the French Counterintelligence Service and MI5, making Marcel my partner for the rest of my career. The night I left Paris, he invited me to dinner.The service in the restaurant is attentive and the food is very good.Marcel was an obliging host who ordered bottles of the best claret and told me a litany of scathing anecdotes about the adventures of French intelligence.We discussed "Venona," and he kept fascinated listening to me describe the scale of our success. "They've given us some success recently, too," he told me.He related to me how they found a fuse box converted transmitter in the code room of the French embassy in Washington. "That thing is not the technical specification of a Western product, and its range is just within the house of the Russian military attache opposite." He said, in a typical French style, chomping on the oysters on his plate.I am alert.The "fencing" of the French embassy in London and Washington, D.C., was recently stopped after French technical teams began shielding the code rooms with metal plates and copper pipes.Apparently, the Russians also realized that it was possible to receive rays from poorly shielded machines.But, I think, at least the French haven't noticed our actions yet. Charité is clearly interested in the whole thing.He offered to give the fuse box to the Leconfield Building so they could inspect it.Still smiling, he asked me a question out of the blue. "And you, dear Peter, have you had any luck with the rays..." I listened to his question and immediately choked on the red wine. "No luck," I replied. Marcel filled my glass, obviously disbelieving every word I said.Like true professionals, we turned the conversation on to other matters and never discussed the matter again. Although the episode of the French is very interesting, the most urgent task of the third department of the D department is to study the "group of five".I'm asking Hollis to move the eight interrogators from Division D to Section 3 so that we can use them to interview everyone known to Philby, Burgess, Brent, and Cairncross people have a wide-ranging conversation.Hollis agreed, but directed that I must personally conduct every meeting deemed sensitive, which naturally meant a Lord, a Sir, a politician, a high civil official, or a suspected spy. In all, I met more than a hundred people.Labor politicians such as Christopher Mayhew and then Defense Secretary Dennis Healy refused to meet me, unwilling to discuss their memories of the Communist Party of the 1930s.But others, such as the historian Isaiah Berlin and the writer Arthur Marshall, were more than willing to help me.They met with me regularly to talk about their fellow students at Oxbridge.Berlin insisted that we meet at the Reform Club, thinking it would be best to talk about Burgess in the place where Burgess was most popular.He has a keen eye for Burgess' social network, especially those who have changed perspectives over the years.He also gave me a piece of advice on how to conduct my investigation. "Don't go to Bowler," he said to me, referring to Maurice Bowler, the eminent professor of literature at Oxford.Bowler, who is gay and a close friend of Burgess', was near the top of my list of people I thought would be helpful. "Why didn't you go to him?" I asked. "If you went to him, he'd be at every tutor's table in Oxford." I took Berlin's advice and didn't go to him. Marshall, "Artie," as they called him, knew almost everyone in Cambridge in the thirties, especially the secretive gay nets at Royal and Trinity.Artie has an uncanny memory for gossip, intrigue, and scandal, and most importantly, knows who in Burgess and Brent's circle sleeps with whom. Brent also liked to discuss the shady aspects of life in Cambridge in the 1930s.He was so interested in gossip that he took the trouble to tell me that he had voted against Edward Playfair (later Deputy Secretary of State for Defense) when he joined the Apostolic Society.Brent thought Playfair was very dull, and having met Playfair I disagreed with Brent's judgment.The most interesting story he told was about Burgess and Churchill's niece, Clarissa Churchill.Apparently, Burgess' superiors had given him the task of marrying Clarissa Churchill as a cover for his espionage.Burgess was intimidated by the task.First, he was a gay veteran; second, Clarissa Churchill was no prettier than her uncle; third, it was known that James Pope-Hennessy (who later became a famous writer) was infatuated with she. But Burgess would be screwed if he didn't play the game.Within a month, he was courting Clarissa Churchill, causing the other party's annoyance and anger.Hennessey is beyond irritated by Burgess' admiration for Clarissa.He came to Burgess' apartment one night with a pistol and threatened to shoot them both before trying to kill himself.Brent loved the story.Clarissa married Anthony Eden shortly thereafter and became Mrs. Evan.This makes us even more interesting. Soon, I learned that the "Group of Five" was the core of a series of closely coordinated espionage networks.Each spy network pledged silence, kept its secrets from the outside world.There is a secret gay circle, where loyalty to one's fellows takes precedence over all other obligations; there is the secret world of the Apostles, where bonds between the Apostles are forever strong; and Brent and Burgess's A gang of friends who aren't spies themselves, but they know or guess what's going on.They shared secrets and fought to protect them for years.These nets support each other, making our task of identifying the inner core more difficult. Many of the people I meet are annoying.It's ridiculous, I don't really care that they are spies, they make their own choices, and they should do it to the best of their ability.But those peripheral molecules are different.When I met them, they were overwhelmed by the decency of later life.However, in their proud and elegant conversation, there are hidden crimes and fears.They'll tell me it's my fault for raising the issue, not theirs, and let me put it aside.They said I was a McCarthyist and things were different back then than they are now.Of course, being a spy is wrong, but it was there for a reason.They are the "easy-goers generation," who seek political chic that resembles fashion catalogs.In the sixties they still kept the vow of silence they had made thirty years earlier.They don't like me.I read the inner secrets of the present British ruling circles when they were carefree youths.I know about their scandals and their plots.They also know that I know too much. One of the first tasks of D-3 was to re-examine an uninvestigated lead in the file after Burgess and McClain's defection in 1951.The lead was provided by Burgess and Brent's friend Glenway Rees.He had first known them at Oxford, worked in Military Intelligence during the war, and was a frequent visitor to Bentinck Street.Immediately after the defections of Burgess and McClain, Reese approached then-Counterintelligence Chief Dick White, saying he knew Burgess had long been a Soviet spy.He also said that Burgess had tried to recruit him before the war because he was disillusioned after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and refused to keep the relationship secret.Reese also claimed that Brent, Guy Liddell, ex-MI6 officer Robin Zana, and Stuart Hampshire (a great RSB officer) were all accomplices.But Blunt was beyond doubt a Soviet spy, and the charges against the other three proved flimsy. White disliked Reese, seeing him making such malicious accusations as grandstanding.The four were good friends, which was why he had difficulty agreeing with Arthur Martin's suspicion of Brent.Dick's opinion of Reese was hardened in 1956 after Reese published a series of anonymous articles in a high-circulation newspaper.Orgies and espionage were well-read news stories as they are today, and Reese's articles detailing Burgess's and his friends' erotic activities caused a stir at the time. But the color of Reese's testimony in 1951 faded after Brent's confession.Rees claimed he had abandoned his views on the Soviet cause before the war.I think it's prudent to at least re-examine whether he's lying, maybe just to satisfy himself.At first, he was very reluctant to talk to me.His wife accused me of being Gestapo-style, bringing up that dated thing after all these years.It was unfortunate what happened to them because of those articles.Rees was kicked out of academia when it became known that he was the author of those articles.Since 1956, they have struggled to get by, and the British ruling circles have shunned them.Reece finally agreed to see me, and he repeated his story, and he had no proof that the men he said were accomplices, but he said all of them were good friends of Burgess at that critical time before the war . The allegations against Liddell are patently absurd.Everyone in MI5 who knew him or knew him was convinced that Liddell was absolutely loyal.When he left MI5 he left behind what became known as his "wallflower" diary.Reading these diaries, no one would believe that he was a spy.But the accusations against Robin Zana suggest a comparison between him and Volkov's spies in the Middle East.Zana had worked for MI6 in the Middle East. I did research on Zana's archives.He was in charge of counterespionage in Persia for MI6 during the war.This is a difficult and dangerous job.The railway line to Russia, which was busy transporting important military supplies, was the main target of German sabotage.Zana is perfectly qualified for the job.He spends most of his time in the dark and speaks some regional dialects fluently.He operates in the dark and brutal world of Anti-Sabotage.After the war, his task was even more difficult.The Russians attempted to control the railway themselves, and Zana had to work near the Russian border, often risking betrayal and assassination by pro-German or pro-Russian Arabs.On the face of it, the fact that Zana was able to survive lends some credence to Reese's allegations. Zana left the intelligence community after the war to become a professor of ancient Persian at Oxford University.I asked him to meet at the "Quan Ling Building".Oxford had a strong relationship with British intelligence and I visited Oxford many times over the next five years.This meeting with Zana was my first trip to Oxford. Zana was short, wiry and wiry, with a polymath's absent-minded appearance.He poured me a drink and talked lightly about old colleagues in the secret world.As he talked, I pondered how I could strategically disclose to him the purpose of my trip.I decided not to worry. "I'm sorry, Robin," I began, "there's been a problem. We're pursuing some past allegations. I'm afraid there's an allegation directed at you..." At first he just laughed.At him?He protested.Of course, I must be mistaken.Have I verified his material?Which kind of accusation? I told him about Volkov and about the Persian spies. He slumped in his seat after hearing this.Judging from his reaction, he was maliciously retaliated by Reese, and he was mistaken. "I spent six years in the desert," he said feebly. "After Yalta, when everyone else went home, I stayed for two years. I didn't get any honor, but I think at least I got a certain level of trust.” Zana said it with only sadness, not rancor.He did it at all risk, only to be charged years later for it.It hurt him deeply.He gently wiped the tears from his eyes.I felt like a scumbag, like a policeman who broke bad news to parents in the middle of the night. Once Zanna sedated himself, he became a formidable scholar again.Of course, he understood why I came to see him.He recounted a brief history of his time with MI6.He thought hard for clues, trying to figure out who Volkov was referring to as the spy.We talked for hours, until the shadow of the spiers of the All Souls Building disappeared over the grass. "Can't think of an Englishman who would be such a spy," he said, tapping his foot on the floor as if it would spark a memory. "We don't have many people, I can vouch for everyone." He thought the man might be a general intelligence officer, not an intelligence officer.In the later stages of the war, MI6 and the KGB often used intelligence agents together, and it was obvious that this person might have been planted as an insider.There was a name that was quite fitting, Rudy Burger.After MI6 recruited him, he was caught by the Russians, released and rehired by MI6.This time period coincides with the time in the files Volkov saw in Moscow.It appeared that Hamburg might have been bought by them in prison, and they had given him the task of knowing everything he could about his English employer. (Rudy Burger was the first husband of "Sonia," who later became an outlaw in Britain and Switzerland.) Zana and I were friends when we broke up.But I feel guilty when I think about all the indiscretions I have done with the accusation.It fills me with anger when I think about the people who put allegations like this in their files for so many years without getting the problem right.As I drove back to London, I began to have doubts about the price paid to clean up these tailless trails.I thought, isn't it fair to bring these things up?After all, it's better to leave them undisturbed and resolved in the archives. For Christmas that year, Zana sent me a friendly Christmas card.A few years later, he died.I sent a wreath, eager to make amends; but I'll never forget the look on his face when I asked him if he was a spy.In that instant Oxford, the cradle of civilization, seemed to disintegrate around him, and he was back near the frontier, surrounded by enemies and betrayed alone. The last name Rhys gave me was Sir Stuart Hampshire.He was a brilliant codebreaker and analyst at the Radio Security Bureau, and a member of an elite team.That group once deciphered the handwritten ciphers of the German intelligence service and laid the groundwork for the double-agent system.After the war he worked in the Foreign Office and later embarked on a notable academic career as professor of philosophy at Oxford and Princeton Universities.Reese made the charges in 1951 without any evidence, based solely on the fact that Hampshire had been a good friend of Burgess in the 1930s.I learned from those I met that Hampshire was considered by his contemporaries to be left-leaning, but not a Communist.I was amazed that no one thought of talking to him about what he knew about Burgess. However, an extremely complicated situation has arisen in the Hampshire case.Although he had long since retired from the secret world, he was invited by Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend to conduct a study on the future of GCHQ.Ever since the NSA entered the Sputnik era, people have paid more attention to the rise of signals intelligence.The Americans are trying to get Communications Headquarters to share in the cost of spy satellites.The incoming Labor government faces a £100m annual overspend.Prime Minister Harold Wilson directed Trend to check to see if such a satellite would pay for it.特伦德同狄克·怀特商量，怀特建议让汉普希尔来做这项工作，因为他曾在无线电安全局工作过。我读了汉普希尔的档案之后，感到很吃惊，汉普希尔从来没有受到过审查，尽管还有里斯的指控。狄克·怀特认识汉普希尔已经有好些年了，他只简单地给霍利斯写了一封信存入档案，仅此而已。 对汉普希尔进行的调查耗去了许多时间。在此期间他任意进出政府通讯总部，还对美国国家安全局进行了一次为期六周的访问。在汉普希尔的报告里提出了许多基本问题。首先，鉴于日益增加的费用，英国是否有能力维持英美协议中所规定的由英方负担的那部分费用。英美协议保证了我们同美国进行许多的信息交换。第二，英国需要立即解决的问题是，英国是否要与美国一起研制新一代的间谍卫星；第三个方面是政府通讯总部应该在什么程度上支持“反小集团”活动。 简单地回答这个问题是：是，不是，是。我们一方面不能失掉英美协议中所保证的交换，另一方面，我们可以坚持，并不一定要为每一项新的技术研制付英镑。至于“反小集团”，汉普希尔是非常支持的，他要求进行改变的唯一工作是停止空中“筏夫”，其理由是投资效益不大。我当时对此是反对的，但后来又认为这是一项合理的节约措施，再说，英国皇家空军已开始讨厌我们所提出的要求。汉普希尔同我一起花了很多时间来讨论军情五处和通讯总部之间的关系。我竭力促使汉普希尔提出建议成立一个新型的无线电安全机构，它将由军情五处控制，独立于通讯总部之外，专门负责跟踪在国内的间谍无线电通讯。我想，根据汉普希尔的背景，他一定会欢迎这个设想。我还告诉他，这是一条惟一能保证我们得到所需要的设备的方法。汉普希尔没有同意，其结论是，这样的举动会遭到通讯总部和军情六处的强烈反对，这样就不大可能成功。他的这个结论大概是对的。 在汉普希尔完成他的研究之前，显然是不可能找他谈了。一九六七年我得到允许，来到美国普林斯顿大学，汉普希尔在该校担任客座教授。我对普林斯顿非常熟悉，我当科学家时，常常到那里去访问。鲁迪·康普弗，即那位发明行波管（在大多数微波线路上使用的无线电电子管）的科学家，曾经就普林斯顿的奇特的建筑向我作了一个很好的描述。他把它称为“冒牌的哥特式科兹沃尔德”。 我同汉普希尔谈了一阵，主要问他对伯吉斯还能回忆出些什么。他告诉我，说他现在想起来当初恐怕他也是伯吉斯要招募的对象，尽管他当时并没有意识到这一点。他描述说他和安东尼·布伦特是怎样一起去巴黎旅行的。有一天晚上，他们同詹姆斯·克卢格曼以及另一位艺术家本·尼克尔森一起吃饭。饭后，克卢格曼主持了一次长会，他们对汉普希尔的政治信仰进行了考察。 几个月后，他被邀请到伯吉斯在切斯特广场的公寓里与伯吉斯一起吃饭。两个都穷酗极饮。半夜两三点钟时，伯吉斯劝他为和平而工作。伯吉斯说，虽然这是一项危险的工作，但却是很值得的。他们还谈到了许多当时知识界的动乱，纳粹的威胁，谈到在学术研究中需要采用更多的马克思主义。汉普希尔当时以为这是邀请他参加左翼争鸣学会的前奏，这种学会当时在牛津剑桥的青年知识分子当中很流行，可伯吉斯并没有提出什么特别的建议来。“现在回想起来，”汉普希尔说，“也许伯吉斯正在试图招募我。” 我回到伦敦后同布伦特核实了这件事。他还记得克卢格曼的晚餐，并证实那是一次检验活动。但他说他并不知道伯吉斯的劝说，也不能肯定那次晚餐是在一九三五年还是在一九三七年。这些日期很重要，一九三五年，布伦特和伯吉斯仅仅只是共产党员；可到了一九三七年，两个都成了间谍了，因此任何招募工作都是为俄国人干的。我派了一个工作人员去看本·尼克尔森。非常幸运，他保存着记录他生活的完整的日记。为此，我们可以肯定，那次晚餐毫无疑问是在一九三七年。 我去见怀特，把汉普希尔的材料拿给他看。令我惊奇的是，为什么汉普希尔在伯吉斯一九五一年叛逃后，从未把他同伯吉斯有过来往的事告诉给军情五处。怀特也证实汉普希尔从来没有向他提及过这件事。我从汉普希尔回到伦敦后又去看他。他仿佛有一丝尴尬。他告诉我，说伯吉斯对他的接近之混乱，使他无法肯定其重要性。至于布伦特，他从来就没有思考过布伦特参加晚餐聚会与伯吉斯的接近有什么关系。布伦特在整个战争期间同狄克·怀特、盖伊·利德尔等人私交很深，因此汉普希尔认为布伦特是完全可以信赖的。不管怎么样，并不是只有他一个人要想结束这一章。 怀特和霍利斯选出来主持英美情报合作机密检查工作的人，竟曾经不知不觉地成了苏联的招募目标。这一发现使他们两人都陷入了极其尴尬的境地。他们知道，对汉普希尔进行的审查在美国人眼里简直是远远不够的。尤其在当时，美国对英国情报部门搭上的“守旧的老关系”极其反感，因而他们都不可能爽快地认输，汉普希尔案件就这样永远被小心地埋了起来。 招募汉普希尔的失败点明了克卢格曼在三十年代苏联情报人员招募工作的作用，这也是很有趣的。他是安排那次在巴黎的试探晚餐的主要人物。凯恩克罗斯也告诉我们，招募他的正是克卢格曼。在这以前，军情五处一直认为克卢格曼仅仅是一个公开的英国共产党积极分子，而不是一个秘密招募间谍的人或一个搜罗人才的人。很显然，如果我们说服或强迫克卢格曼坦白，他会把许多三十年代的事告诉我们。我知道克卢格曼是不会让军情五处直接靠近他的，因此我们就同凯恩克罗斯搞了一项交易。如果他回英国来同克卢格曼对质并说服他同军情五处的人见面以便讲出一切情况，我们就允许他回到英国。 凯恩克罗斯毫不犹豫地接受了我们的建议，在伦敦同克卢格曼见了面。克卢格曼是一个老头儿，阶级战争中坚韧的老战士，他正忙于写英国共产党党史，以作为他一生工作的最后遗嘱。他听了凯恩克罗斯要他去同军情五处的人见面时，便大笑了起来。凯恩克罗斯威胁他说，如果他不同意，他就要揭发他，克卢格曼听了以后完全不屑一顾。这次试验没有成功，凯恩克罗斯被迫回去继续过他的流亡生活。不久，克卢格曼就带着他的秘密进了坟墓。 还有其他许多拒绝让我们靠近他们的英国共产党忠实的公仆。鲍勃·斯图尔特和伊迪丝·杜德·哈特两个人都是作为信使与“五人集团”在一九三九至一九四〇年有过联系，我们对这两个人进行了试探。他们两个人都守口如瓶，他们都是纪律性很强的战士。我们很难找到突破口。公众很少知道军情五处在进行这类调查时所处位置的薄弱环节。我们不能强迫别人同我们说话，我们所做的每一件事几乎都要依赖于对方的合作，除非马上进行逮捕行动。譬如，布伦特告诉我们他知道有另外两名间谍，其中一个是在招募利奥·朗时被发现的，其实朗已经由布伦特在指挥。布伦特当时正在同那个招募间谍搞见不得人的不正当关系，双方就朗的问题都互不通气，这使得情况更加复杂化了。这两个间谍现在还活着，住在伦敦。他们在战争期间从事“幽灵”计划，后来他们离开了这个工作，开始了学术生涯。两个人都不同意与我们见面讨论他们与俄国情报工作的牵连。惟一的积极行动是对一名高级警长进行警告，这位警长与其中一个间谍是朋友。于是这两个人的关系便中断了。