Chapter 16 Chapter Fourteen

While I had high hopes for it, investigating Mitchell was a hassle.For this matter, we had a big fight at the beginning and another big fight at the end. During this period, we did not investigate anything.I understood that if we were to get some clues out of this case before Mitchell retired, we would have to install bugs and use all the technical means at our disposal.Hollis has expressed strong disapproval of the bugging of phones in Mitchell's home, as well as of the use of technology to conduct sweeping surveillance.He said he did not want to let more officers in MI5 know about the case, let alone ask the Home Secretary for permission to wiretap or break into the Deputy Director's house.

Arthur reacted badly to such a blow, his temper was out of control.During a meeting in Hollis' office, he couldn't contain himself and lost his temper.He said that at such a critical moment, when dealing with such a major issue, those restrictions cannot be tolerated.He said in a threatening tone that he would go to see the prime minister in person, so that the prime minister would pay attention to this situation.Hollis was tactful in his response to any threat. He said he would take Arthur's opinion seriously, but he didn't change his mind. "I will not approve an expanded investigation under any circumstances!"

Arthur strode out of the room, obviously ready to make his threat a reality. That night Jones and I went to my club, Oxbridge, to try and find a way to avoid this doom.The relationship between Hollis and Arthur had deteriorated since Cumming's appointment as Chief of D.The Mitchell case is so tricky that if we show even the slightest hint of unrest within us, it could be a catastrophe. Jones was in a very bad situation.He knew as well as I did that he was going to be promoted to Hollis' second-in-command in a few months, but I could see that he sensed that Hollis was indeed putting up obstacles.

"If Arthur does something stupid, it will mean the end of MI5," Jones said, looking worriedly at his glass. I asked him if he could visit White privately and if he could put a little pressure on Hollis to change his mind.Jones looked at me with a distressed expression.He understood that he had been slowly caught between two opposing loyalties--to Hollis and to the investigators who worked with passion and difficulty.It was almost one o'clock in the morning and we still hadn't made any decisive decisions.Jones said that if I could guarantee that Arthur would not take any hasty action, he could guarantee to see White.I called Arthur from the club.It was late, but I knew he hadn't gone to sleep, and he was still drinking whiskey.I told him I was going to see him immediately, and I hailed a taxi and went straight to his apartment.

Arthur was in a terrible mood and had a violent attitude. "I think you're here to tell me you've decided to get involved too!" he said tartly. That night I sat down to drink again, unable to persuade Arthur to change his mind.He looked a little nervous and hopeless.Before the Lonsdale case, he had been overstretched and tired, and his mental burden had been increasing.His skin was dark, as if he had lost his youth.He fought stubbornly against the obstacles that stood in his way.I could see that the shadow of his deportation to Malaya in 1951 was still hanging over him. "At that time I should have fought, but I agreed to leave the security agency as if it was the best policy, but this time I don't think it is the best policy." He said.

He finally realized that Jones' approach made sense.A public break with Hollis would get us nowhere, and if it was up to Dick to persuade him, there was at least some hope that he might agree to some additional equipment requests. The next day I got a call from Jones saying he had spoken to Dick and we were all going to meet up next Sunday at his flat in Queen Annegate. "He wanted to see the report on the case before he could decide what to do," Jones said. White's apartment was behind MI6 headquarters on Broadway Street.I got there on time as agreed.Dick himself came and opened the door.He was dressed casually, wearing only an open-collared shirt and a tie-like scarf around his neck.

He invited us into his study.It was an elegant room, with books on all four walls, decorated in the style of the seventeenth century, with several famous paintings from the National Gallery on the walls, and a clear mirror hanging over the fireplace. "Let's have some tea, shall we?" He was eager to dispel the nervous look on each of our faces. "Now," he said, looking at Arthur, "you'd better give me your opinion..." Arthur explained that it would be better for me to explain the situation first, because I had brought the diagram illustrating the thirty-eight cases.We were busy for a while, and the chart was too big to spread out on the delicate little coffee table.Seeing this, Dick said:

"No, no, it's okay, put the chart on the floor." Within two minutes we were all on the rug, and we were beginning to touch upon that horrific sequence of events once again.The whole quiet and elegant Sunday afternoon was disturbed.I explained that I had submitted two reports, one on the Tisler case and the other on Lonsdale, and both had been rejected.Dick looked at me sharply, but made no comment. "The key is that we can't look at this issue unilaterally. The starting point for making these charts is to get a complete set of views to see if there is any basis for Russian intervention in these cases..."

"Sounds like a bad induction, but go ahead," he said skeptically. I told the cases one by one and explained why those five people were always mentioned. "Did you discuss this with Arthur at any point before you drafted your report?" said Dick, staring at me. "How could I possibly do that? I spend most of my time on the science council." Dick turned to Arthur: "You mean you both came to that conclusion?" Obviously, he couldn't believe it. Arthur took the bait and explained the problem requiring the use of the device.Jones has remained silent.At this point Dick asked him again what he thought.He hesitated, then resignedly joined in.

"Roger refused to expand the scope of the investigation. In my personal opinion, this is a mistake. We have neither tracking nor technical equipment to help, so there is little hope of finding the outcome of the case." Dick was impressed by Jones's cool, lucid analysis. "There are two factors here," he said after thinking for a while. "One is to conduct an investigation, and the other is that we will definitely be discovered when we conduct an investigation. The two are almost equally important." He told us to make some changes, he thought the investigation should be coordinated in the unofficial house and not in the government building.He suggested we use the MI6 security building on Loft Road near Sloane Square.

"I'll think about how to tell Roger tonight, you wait to hear his news." Yuk said. Jones informed us the next day that Hollis had agreed to use an MI6 surveillance team to assist in the case, but they were still not allowed to follow Mitchell to the other end of the London station where he would not be discovered. .He gave us permission to tell Winterborn about it and authorized us to set up a CCTV system behind that double-sided mirror in Mitchell's office.That afternoon we moved the precious archives to the second floor of the small stable-like building on Attic Road, which was unfurnished.From then on, this place became our headquarters for handling this case. Early in the Mitchell investigation, we revisited Philby's defection and made an important discovery.I asked the CIA to check their computer records to get an idea of ​​the activities of known Russian intelligence agents around the world.It turned out that after Flora Solomon's meeting with Arthur in London, KGB officer Yuri Modin also visited the Middle East in September 1962.We had long suspected that Modine had been Philby's boss in the forties, and that he had arranged the defections of Burgess and McLean.Further verification revealed that Modine had also visited the Middle East in May of the same year, shortly after Golitsin's three-episode exposure of the "Gang of Five" material was sent to Leconfield House.The CIA finally confirmed that Modine had not traveled abroad since the early 1950s.We interviewed Philby's wife, Eleanor, who said that in September, Philby cut short the family vacation in Jordan.Between then and his disappearance, Philby appeared nervous and often drank heavily.We clearly see Modine go to Beirut to alert Philby that his case is being re-examined.Obviously, after the KGB knew that Golitsin had escaped, it would take such precautions.Strangely enough, however, Philby didn't seem to care about it until Modine visited him a second time in September, when his case happened to be settled. We listened to Philby's so-called "confession" recording, which Nicola Elliott had brought back from Beirut.We spent weeks without being able to listen to this recording of the conversation, mainly because of the poor quality of the recording.This is typical MI6 style.They were using this poor quality mic in a room with an open window, and the traffic noise outside the window was very loud.We had to use the binaural hearing aid I developed, and asked Evelyn McBarnett and the young newspaper translator Anne Alluin to help (Anne was the best hearing translator), and made a hundred Eighty percent of the text is accurate.Arthur and I listened to the recording again one afternoon and compared it with the manuscript.After listening to this recording, no one would doubt that Philby was mentally prepared for a protracted battle with Elliott long before he arrived at the security building.Elliott told Philby that he had new evidence of Philby and was convinced that Philby was guilty.Philby, who had been denying everything for ten years, admitted that he had been a spy since 1934, without asking what new evidence Elliott had. Arthur was distressed by the recording, rubbing his eyes and beating his knees, listening to Philby's absurd gibberish.Philby said Brent was innocent and Tim Milne was not.But Milne was a close friend of Philby's and had loyally defended Philby for years.The entire confession, including Philby's signed written confession, was deliberately edited to confuse truth with lies and lead us into deception.I couldn't help thinking back to my first meeting with Philby.How I sympathized with him for his childlike appeal and stammer!I thought again of hearing his voice for the second time in 1955.He dodges, avoids answering the questions posed, tries to redeem the lost situation and win.Now Elliott was trying with all his might to overcome a man who for thirty years had used deceit as a second layer of protection.It didn't feel like a contest, but in the end the two of them would be like slightly drunk radio announcers, discussing the greatest treason case of the twentieth century with enthusiasm in public-school tones. "This is so poorly handled," Arthur lamented hopelessly, after listening to the recording, "that we should send a detachment, so that we may have a chance of interrogating him..." I agree with him.Neither Roger nor Chuck expected Philby to defect. On the surface, the coincidence of Modine's two trips, Philby's anticipation of Elliott's interrogation, and his concocted confession all point in the same direction: the Russians had an inside line in British intelligence, It monitors the progress of Philby's case.Only a handful of officials, mainly Hollis and Mitchell, had such access to the case. I decided to visit GCHQ to see if I could use Venona further to help with the Mitchell case. "Vinona" works in a large wooden house numbered "H72".The house was on a boulevard in the middle of the central complex of Communications Headquarters.In charge of the work was a young cryptanalyst, Jeffrey Sudbury.He is sitting in a small office in front of the house, behind him are a dozen foreign language experts working hard under the bright lights, looking for matching signals, hoping to sort out thousands of nameless number groups. come out with translation. Sudbury's office was filled with gadgets for analyzing codes, like a small zoo full of joy.One corner is stacked with "Venona" window indexes.There were trays of deciphered codes on his desk, which were sent to MI5 and MI6 after he approved them.Sudbury and I talked at length about how to facilitate the implementation of this plan.The main problem is that because "Venona" is still matched manually, the computer is only used to find a password for some special tasks.Most of the work was deciphering KGB and GRU channel codes, with staff using the communication channels to and from for coincident enhancements.In order to develop a comprehensive plan for matching with computers, it is necessary to use the new computers that have come out in the early 1960s, so that we can hope to find more matches. This is a huge project. There are more than 150,000 telegrams sent and received, only a few of which are perforated and can be processed and deciphered by electronic computers.This work alone is arduous, with each group of digits being perforated twice by the data processor to check the processed messages for errors and then computerize the first five digits of each message. The digit group is matched with the rest of the whole message.Tens of billions of calculations are performed on each message. When I discussed the project with Willis at the Science Council, he expressed doubts about its success.So Frank Morgan and I went to the Atomic Weapons Research Group to visit Sir William Cook again.I know that at that time, the research group had the largest electronic computer equipment in the country, which was bigger than the computer in the communication headquarters.I explained that we would need to borrow his computer for at least three months to find matches.Once the match is found, it is sent to the NSA and GCHQ for cryptanalysis and attempts to decipher the match.Cook was hugely supportive as usual.I told him Willis doubted it would work, but he ignored Willis' doubts. "This is one of the greatest contributions that the Atomic Weapons Research Group can make." He picked up the phone and said to the head of the research group's data processing group. "I want you to do something important right away. I'll send a Someone comes to you to give you details. You don't have to ask him what he does, you just do what he says..." It only took us two months to punch all the cables and do a reconciliation.In the next three months, the computer of the Atomic Weapons Research Group began to work for "Venona", six hours a night. At first it appeared that the AWRC's computerized planning would make a difference to the British Venona program.Not long after using the computer, we matched one of the telegrams for the week in mid-September.After partially deciphering this telegram, it was found that it was about "Stanley" again.The cable told him not to bring any documents that might make him "criminal" to his next meeting with Krotov.After that, there were a few understandable words in some undeciphered codes, referring to the crisis encountered by the KGB when it was working in Mexico.The telegram told Krotoff to talk to "Stanley" in detail, because the section of "Stanley" was in charge of Mexican affairs. When the cable was sent, Philby was chief of the Iberia section of MI6, covering many Spanish-speaking countries, including Mexico.It was a poignant moment, with conclusive evidence that Philby was "Stanley" coming just months after his defection.If we had deciphered the cables years earlier, we could have arrested him on his regular visits to the Observer in London.The cable deepened concerns about the integrity of MI5 and cast doubt on the 1954 decision to stop the Venona project.When we checked, we found that the officer who ordered the closure of the Venona program was the then Chief of Counterintelligence, Graham Mitchell. Sadly, this trivial material about Philby is the only real help the computerization program has brought to the British Venona project.Parts of the matched KGB cables to Mexico and elsewhere in South America interested the CIA and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.Mexico is the main place where the KGB sent illegal spies to North America.Most of the telegrams deciphered by the British "Vinona" plan are general telegrams, not telegrams sent to the KGB and the GRU. We need the latter. The cryptanalytic work in cabin "H72" was more intensive than before, but no new shortcuts were discovered. The stuff in Mitchell's MI5 record doesn't help us much.Born in 1905, he was educated at Oxford and became a journalist and later a statistician for the Conservative Party Central Office.This really astounds me, and I recall that when I argued the Lonsdale case with him, he said he didn't understand my argument because he was "not a statistician."He had come to MI5 through his connections in the Conservative Party, had done anti-fascist work during the war, and had links with the British Communist Party later on.From that point on he rose through the ranks: Chief of Branch F (Domestic Subversion) in the late forties, first Chief of Counterespionage under Dick White in 1953, 1956 Appointed by Hollis as deputy head of the British Security Service.Two things in Mitchell's life are truly amazing: one is his close relationship with Hollis, who were fellow students at Oxford and joined MI5 at about the same time, climbing successively complementary levels position; the second thing is that Mitchell is hardly a big deal, he's a smart guy, and White handpicked him to improve the D.But he failed to complete the task of improving Department D during his three years in office, and even thought of making the decision to stop "Venona", as if he intentionally caused failure. Close surveillance of Mitchell's office has been fruitless.I smeared steganography on his blotting paper and developed it at night to check what he had written.But nothing was found except his writings at work.MI6 monitors had been watching the CCTV 24/7.It's an unappetizing job.When Mitchell walks into the office every morning, he stands in front of the double-sided mirrors and picks his teeth with a toothpick.He repeats this before and after lunch, or before going home.It wasn't until the end of the case that I began to feel that what we knew best about Mitchell was the back of his tonsils! I arranged to do a "barium meal" test on him.I showed him the bound Soviet secret radio communication analysis, various classification and group calculation tables.These are the latest material, prepared for GCHQ.I went to the CCTV and saw Mitchell absently flipping through the report.Then James Robertson walked into Mitchell's office, a man who always played against me, who had done some anti-Soviet espionage work in the fifties.Robertson started talking about me.I was there when Robertson was at D, and he was never happy with me making improvements at D.He thinks that I am a novice in skipping grades, and I should learn to respect those who are older than me and those who are better than me, and don't rush to point fingers everywhere.He and Mitchell were discussing my radio analysis report, neither of them understanding what I was doing with it. "Damn Wright," said Robertson sharply, "he thinks he's good at everything. Wish he had his wings clipped!" Mitchell nodded sanctimoniously.I can't help but laugh a little bit at all the irony. But such moments of relief are rare.In this ruthless surveillance, people are watching and waiting for the person on the other side of the mirror to reveal themselves.Only once did I think we caught his evidence.One Friday afternoon, he started scratching on a piece of paper.His expression was very focused, and he scratched for about twenty minutes, and took out a note from his wallet for reference, and then he suddenly tore up the note and threw it into the wastebasket.Since the case began, Hollis has arranged for me to search Mitchell's office every night, and has instructed his secretary to keep Mitchell's confidential waste paper bag to be burned so that I can inspect it.That night, I found the torn note in the wastebasket and put the pieces back together.It was a map of Jobham Common, near where Mitchell lived, with dots and arrows pointing in all directions, with the letter "RV" in the center, and the locations of two cars, scattered across the park. Both ends of the road opposite the ground.This commons is run through the meeting place. For several days the house on Attic Road was empty.The whole focus of the case shifted to the place marked on Mitchell's map, but Mitchell had never been there, and no one else had. When I first started searching Mitchell's office, Hollis was on edge. "There are some very sensitive documents in there, Peter, and I want you to promise not to let them out." Hollis is particularly concerned about personnel reports and other embarrassing documents, not classified ones.Those documents were sent to the deputy director's desk because of work needs.He needn't have worried, because I wasn't expecting to find anything interesting in Mitchell's office, just to confirm my opinion that being Deputy Chief under someone as tyrannical as Hollis was the best thing in the world. One of the bad errands. For several months, Hollis met with me every evening after get off work.At first he expressed disgust at prying into the private life of a close colleague, but I never felt his sentimentality was genuine.He laughed when I told him the number of times we'd seen Mitchell pick his teeth with a toothpick on CCTV. "The poor guy should see a good dentist!" he laughed. I myself felt firm, even callous.I have waited many years for the opportunity to solve the penetration problem, and I have no qualms. It was through the nights I spent with Hollis that I got to know Hollis for the first time.I worked under him for nearly eight years, and we rarely talked to each other except for business.Although there are times when the relationship is tense, in general, our relationship is normal.We had a serious conflict between us in the late fifties.I was working with Winterborn in the second section of Division A, and there was a delegation from Argentina negotiating a meat contract with the British government.Hollis gave us the Ministry of Trade to ask MI5 to gather intelligence, and ordered that microphones be installed to eavesdrop on the Argentines.Winterborn and I were very angry about this, seeing it as a violation of the Finlater-Stewart memorandum, which limited MI5's mandate to matters related to national security. The rest of A2 Division shared our views, and we rejected Hollis's instruction.For hours, we all had a premonition that we were going to be fired en masse.But Hollis later rescinded his instructions and never spoke about the matter again.This was the only strike in the history of MI5, and it ended in a complete victory for the strikers! During the raid on Mitchell's office, Hollis occasionally spoke about his early years.He told me he had been to China in the 1930s and worked for British American Tobacco there. "Things there are terrible. Even a fool can understand what the Japanese are doing in Manchuria. It's so obvious that if we don't act, we will lose China." Like many old MI5 officers, he disliked the Americans with roots going back before the war broke out.He said that the Americans could have helped the Far East, but they refused to do so, and they clung to isolationism.France, having lost power in the Far East, would rather see the whole region sink than help us, and ended up ceding everything to the Russians. “They watched and waited,” he told me, “and they finally got China after the war when Mao came to power.” He rarely mentioned his family life, and many in the security service knew of his long-term affairs.He occasionally mentions his son Adrian.He was a very talented chess player, a great source of pride to Hollis (Adrian used to travel to Russia for chess tournaments). Once, when we were talking about the Mitchell case, I boldly stated my point: Regardless of the conclusion, it showed a weakness in our security.Hollis became angry when he heard this. "What do you mean?" he asked. I told him that our checks on new MI5 recruits were not as stringent as MI5 checks on the rest of Whitehall. "Look at me," I told him, "I haven't been vetted since joining MI5." The next day someone sent me some forms to fill out and it was never mentioned again.Soon, the review procedure was revised, and those who wanted to enter MI5 had to fill in the names of several more witnesses, one of whom was nominated by MI5. What stood out most in my evenings with Hollis was his endless bawdy jokes, the likes of which I had never heard before.When he wants to mingle with his men, or relax, in order to descend from the Olympian pinnacle of power, he uses these jokes as a means to that end.I once asked him where he collected so many stories. “In China,” he told me, “everyone drinks and tells jokes, it’s the only way to pass the time.” Earlier, I had decided to search a small desk in the corner of Mitchell's office, and I asked Hollis for the key. "That's Guy Liddell's desk," he said, "and it's been there for many years since he made the handover..." The desk had two drawers locked, and I asked his permission to pick the locks, which he granted.The next day, I brought my lockpicking tools and opened the drawer to examine it, but it was empty.But there were four marks on the dust that caught my attention, as if something had been let go and had just been taken away.I asked Hollis to look at the marks, and he seemed as puzzled as I was, especially since I saw scratches in the lock, as if someone had opened the drawer some time ago. Hollis didn't speak, and walked back directly to the door that Mitchell's office communicated with his office.I did the search all by myself. I secretly figured that since Hollis and I were the only ones who knew to open the two drawers, something must have been removed, and it was even entirely possible that it was a tape recorder.Why can't it be Mitchell?Because he didn't know it, only Hollis knew that the desk belonged to Liddell.Hollis took over the Deputy Commissioner's office, but didn't have the key to the desk?Someone like Liddell would leave the desk and take the key?Only Hollis knows, only Hollis... I looked up and looked around. Hollis was staring at me from the door.He didn't say anything, just stared at me, then leaned over his papers again. In the summer of 1963, when Mitchell was retiring, investigations had to run at full speed during the month, but the whole thing backed down hopelessly.Everything was too rushed, everything lacked planning.There was a deadline for completing the mission, and Hollis did not support it, so the secrecy of this operation became a problem.Mitchell had sensed that something was wrong. At first, he found that fewer documents were being sent to him, and Hollis limited his access to them.He then evaded the monitors and performed standard counter-surveillance actions.We saw on CCTV that Mitchell looked tense, as if in a depression.In his prime, he was a tall, lanky man, but he looked gray and his eyes were sunken and dull.If someone was in his room, he tried to pretend that everything was normal, but when he was alone, he seemed to be tortured. "Why did they do this to me?" he said mournfully at one point, staring at the door of Hollis' office. By the last month, the whole thing had almost become a farce.In this case, there is simply no chance of finding anything.Arthur and I got Hollis to authorize the interrogation of Mitchell in order to try to solve the problems of the case.Hollis refused to do such a thing.A few days later, without anyone noticing, he came to the building on Attic Road. "I went to see the Prime Minister," he said stiffly to the seven or eight people in the room. "I think an interrogation is unlikely." Out of the corner of my eye I saw that Arthur was going to have another fit. "If there was another defection at this stage, it would be a disaster," he said.He thanked everyone for their efforts and got into the waiting car that was parked there.It was typical of Hollis not knowing how to manage people. The room was full of experienced officials who were working like hell, but Hollis couldn't even stay with us for two minutes.Shameful work has been done, best leave it to the dirty crew to clean up! This is also a naive idea.The officer in charge of the MI6 watchdog, Stephen de Mowbray, was young, short-tempered, and overly sensitive.They were taken aback by Hollis' decision, seeing it as a brutal attempt to repress the interior, exactly what MI5 had condemned for MI6 in the Philby affair.In fact, even if the investigation is stopped, the fact that Mitchell's case has been filed will not be eliminated. A comprehensive report on the Mitchell investigation was written by Yoni Symonds, a senior D-1 officer who was in charge of the case's paperwork.Symonds' report outlines the entire process of someone exposing MI5's infiltration, and concludes that there is likely to be a spy in the upper echelons of MI5.The report also raises the obvious question of whether the U.S. could be made aware of the incident. Symonds' report was sent to Hollis and White.The two bureau chiefs conferred privately and called us for another "Sunday Afternoon War Conference."This time at the home of Hollis in Camden Place.Hollis and White were very different people, as can be seen in their homes.Hollis's home was an old downtown house with few books in it.He was wearing the dark pinstriped suit he usually wears to work.As soon as he led us into the dimly lit breakfast room, he got down to business.He told us that he wanted to hear from us, that he had heard that someone was considering whether to let the United States know about it.It was awkward to discuss something with Hollis, and he was doing it now out of reluctance, in a tone of impatience. Arthur said sharply that we must try to tell the United States immediately. If Mitchell's case is confirmed before telling them, I am afraid it will have a worse effect.Hollis immediately objected, arguing that this would damage the Allied relationship, especially after Philby's defection. "For all we know," I reminded Hollis, "the United States may be giving us access to intelligence data to help solve this case. We'll have to go to them, or we'll never get help." Then Hollis and we argued over the issue for an hour, growing increasingly angry.The others in the room—Symonds, Winterborn, and Jones—did all they could to keep everyone calm.Symonds said he felt there should be options, perhaps interrogating Mitchell, but also risking the case being considered closed.As for the United States, he said that he did not know much about the situation there, so it was difficult to express his opinion.Winterbourne, on the other hand, was firm and sensible, and he supported Arthur's opinion that it would be a greater disaster to keep silent now, when the case would be proved later.Jones finally couldn't help but get angry: “我们不是那种该死的公学，你们知道。我们都没有义务要向美国人去'坦白'。我们要以自己认为合适的方式来管理安全局。我希望你们当中的某些人记住这一点！” 可是，就是琼斯也承认有一个问题必须解决。他说他经过权衡，也感到应当告诉美国人，问题在于怎样去告诉他们。霍利斯也能看出他自己抵挡不住，便突然宣布他准备去华盛顿访问。 “等冷静以后再进行这项工作不是更好吗？”琼斯问道，可霍利斯坚决不改变主意，阿瑟也尽力使他动摇，可这只是浪费时间。 “我听了大家的争论了，我已经作出了决定。”他怒气冲冲地吼起来，隔着桌子，怒目注视着阿瑟。 霍利斯差不多立刻就动身去了美国。他向那里的约翰·麦科恩和胡佛扼要介绍了情况。美国中央情报局局长艾伦·杜勒斯在猪湾事件后被解职，由麦科恩接替了他的职务。不久以后，阿瑟紧接着也向美国联邦调查局和中央情报局进行了汇报，然而他却受到了很无礼的对待。美国人不理解为何把这案子毫无结果地搁下来。这里被人揭发出来的是二十世纪最危险的间谍之一，这个嫌疑者最近正要从西方最重要的反间谍岗位之一退下来，但却没有被审问过，这再次表现了军情五处在一九五一年所表现的那种无能。从某种意义上来说，美国是完全正确的。 霍利斯回来以后，坚持要解决这个案子。他命令西蒙兹写一份新的报告，并指示他在考虑这份新报告时不要找阿瑟和我合作。 米切尔案既然已交给了西蒙兹，我便回到了科学理事会。我回去以后才知道威利斯更改了一项规定。他认为科学理事会没有必要再插手政府通讯总部，要我与政府通讯总部脱离一切关系。我感到十分恼火。我知道，军情五处只有争取与通讯总部合作并利用他们的设备才不会倒退到一九五五年以前那种恶劣的境地。军情五处内部几乎没有人能真正地懂得通讯总部能为他们做些什么；与此同时，通讯总部也没有人想到他们能帮助军情五处做些什么。因此我认为这是一项重要的工作，应由科学理事会继续来做。可威利斯不动摇，要我离开“反小集团”，并和那些官僚们在一起。我只得像抓住一根救命稻草似的去找了霍利斯。我对他说我在科学理事会里呆不下去了。我告诉他如果可能的话，我想到D处去，或回A处去。米切尔案件使我尝到了搞研究的滋味，另外我知道D处三科科长的职位至今仍空缺着。出乎我的意料之外，霍利斯立即同意我去D处的三科，可是他要我答应他一个小小的条件，就是要让我先回科学理事会去，帮助威利斯完成一项特别项目，然后才能在一九六四年一月去就任新职。 威利斯的特别项目是我为军情五处所做的最有争议的工作之一。他要我对六十年代初投奔西方的另一个俄国叛逃者奥尼格·潘可夫斯基所提供的所有情报进行一次全面的研究。据我所知，这种工作在英国情报部门内部甚至只做过一次。 潘可夫斯基当时是军情六处这项王冠上的明珠，他是格鲁乌的高级官员，在一九六一年和一九六二年为军情六处和美国中央情报局当间谍，并提供了大量的关于苏联军事力量和意图的情报。大西洋两岸对此都非常赞赏，认为这是第二次世界大战以来对苏联的最成功的渗透。潘可夫斯基告诉西方，说苏联在古巴有导弹，由他提供的关于苏联核武器库的情报使美国敢在以后的古巴导弹危机中采取行动。由他提供的证据使美国识别出了在古巴的苏联导弹。可是到了一九六二年年底，潘可夫斯基同一个英国商人格雷维尔·温都被克格勃逮捕，并被判了刑。温是潘可夫斯基和军情六处的中间联系人，被判处长期徒刑（最后与朗斯代尔和克罗格夫妇交换回到英国），潘可夫斯基则被枪决了。 我曾参与过潘可夫斯基这起案子，那时该案子还在发展。他曾以苏联贸易代表团成员的身份多次访问过伦敦。在皇家山饭店向军情六处和美国中央情报局的官员作过一系列的秘密汇报。温特博恩当时因身体不好，长期休养。我便成了A处二科的代理科长。军情六处要我用技术方法对潘可夫斯基在伦敦的行动进行监视。我安排了监视员对他进行连续不断的监视，并安装了先进的话筒系统，把他和上级彻夜长谈时提供的所有情报都录了下来。 潘可夫斯基这起案子仿佛否定了军情五处有渗透分子这一事实。在米切尔案件中，阿瑟和我常常讨论这一点。假定军情五处上层有渗透分子的话，那么潘可夫斯基就应当是个打进来的间谍。因为从较早的阶段开始，几个高级嫌疑犯，包括米切尔在内，都知道他的事。我在安排“皇家山”行动时，霍利斯问我军情六处要见的那个间谍的名字，我告诉了他。卡明也问过，但我却没有告诉他，因为他不在可以知道军情六处行动的人员名单上。这引来一顿大吵，他挖苦说我翅膀长硬了，他怨恨我对他当时帮助我进军情五处所起的重要作用不知恩图报。 潘可夫斯基与我们所掌握的戈利金揭发材料很吻合。戈利金说，赫鲁晓夫在一九五八年十二月把克格勃头子谢罗夫将军调去负责格鲁乌，由亚历山大·谢列平接替谢罗夫来负责克格勃。谢罗夫是老式的贝利亚奴仆，脑满肠肥，不思烦恼，而谢列平比他灵活多了。赫鲁晓夫和政治局的结论是，不会同西方发生全面的战争。赫鲁晓夫想要知道怎样才能不战而胜，这个问题就交给了谢列平去解决。他进行了六个月的研究之后，在莫斯科召集克格勃驻世界各地的高级官员开了个大会，讨论如何使克格勃的工作方法现代化。据戈利金说，谢列平吹嘘说，克格勃在西方部署了许多亲信，因此他倾向于恢复使用过去国家政治保安总局的方法和“信任”方法来掩饰苏联战略意图的真正实质。 作为谢列平那次大会的结果，克格勃第一总局（负责所有国外行动）成立了D处，专门负责在战略规模上策划欺骗和假情报。D处处长阿加扬兹，是一位德高望重的老克格勃官员。戈利金说，他在一九五九年曾到D处去找过一位朋友，让他在D处帮他找份差事。那位朋友私下悄悄告诉他，说D处正在策划用格鲁乌搞一次大规模的假情报活动。但还无法马上进行这项活动，因为中央情报局对格鲁乌已经有了渗透，必须首先把渗透分子清除出去。几乎可以肯定，那个渗透分子就是波波夫上校。他是格鲁乌的高级官员，为美国中央情报局当间谍，一九五九年被抓获，在受尽折磨之后被处决。 实际上，戈利金再没有回过苏联，因为当时他正准备叛逃，所以对策划中的假情报细节再也无从了解了。他只知道这基本上是一次技术演习，第一总局动员了所有的人力和物力来参加这次演习。戈利金来到西方后，他猜测中苏分裂也是D处的计划，这个计划也被用来让西方步入歧途。那些赞赏戈利金的人如阿瑟相信（而且继续相信）这种分析。虽然我是早期英美情报界中积极支持戈利金的人之一，可我总是认为，潘可夫斯基行动比中苏关系分裂这种假设更为符合设立D处的动机。 在西方情报界，战略欺骗已不是什么时髦的概念了。这是因为这种概念的支持者，包括早年的我，把它推向了一个极端的地步。但是这个概念是经历了一个长期的强大的历史过程。布尔什维克政权早期通过格鲁乌和国家政治保安总局搞的“信任”行动对克格勃的工作产生了强大的影响，这些行动在克格勃工作中起了一个更为重要的作用。二十年代，布尔什维克政权受到了数百万流亡白俄移民的威胁。为了对付这种局面，现代俄国情报机构传奇般的创建人捷尔任斯基策划在俄国国内创立一个旨在推翻布尔什维克政权的虚假组织。这个被称为“信任”的组织吸引了在国外的白俄移民的支持，以及西方情报机构尤其是英国秘密情报局的支持。事实上，“信任”组织是被国家政治保安总局牢牢控制住的，他们能够使大部分白俄移民采取中立态度，并且使敌对情报活动也有所收敛，甚至还绑架和处决了库蒂波夫将军和米勒将军这两位白俄最高领导人。“信任”组织还劝说英国政府不进攻苏联，因为苏联内部力量会对当时的政权展开攻势的。 战略欺骗是西方情报史的一个主要部分，特别是战时所采用的双重间谍行动，这种行动曾使盟军能够在诺曼底登陆意图上迷惑了德国人。 从一九六三年英美情报平衡的情况可以看出，苏联毫无疑问地已具备了进行一次规模宏大的假情报活动的必要条件。首先，他们几乎从大战以来就掌握大量的在西方特别是在英国和美国的上层渗透分子。希斯、麦克莱恩、核间谍、菲尔比、伯吉斯、布莱克以及其他许多人，都向他们提供了他们需要进行欺骗的那些组织的详细情报。其次，有一点常常被忽视：苏联人自大战以来到一九五一年，就一直通过菲尔比和麦克莱恩对西方信号情报组织不断进行渗透；六十年代初又有美国国家安全局的马丁和米切尔的叛逃事件（一九六〇）；一九六三年又出现了杰克·邓拉普自杀事件；邓拉普是美国国家安全局的司机，他把国家安全局高级官员在他汽车里进行的几十次机密谈话的内容出卖给了苏联。 我在阅读潘可夫斯基案件的档案材料时，有许多理由使我相信，潘可夫斯基肯定是戈利金在一九五九年所了解到的欺骗行动的一部分。使我首先吃惊的是，潘可夫斯基投奔西方世界所选的时间太巧了。军情六处由于菲尔比和布莱克叛逃事件的打击，以及克拉布事件和苏伊士运河危机行动的失败，其士气很低，因此在六十年代初期迫切需要获得一次胜利。怀特尽力想整顿军情六处，他取消了副局长的职位，并开除了一些与辛克莱有着密切关系的高级官员，试图施行某种职业技巧管理，可他总是不怎么成功。他并不是一个极其富有天赋的行政领导。他在军情五处的成功主要是因为他对该机构及其人员很熟悉，而且对反间谍工作有一定深度的认识，倒不是由于他真正具有行政管理方面的眼光。 他调到军情六处之后，就失去了以前那些优势了，因而在他调进去以后的最初几年里，他只搞些权宜之计，而没有一种清楚的战略思路。最能说明问题的就是他决定让菲尔比仍然在中东指挥我们的间谍，虽然他也认为菲尔比本身就是个苏联间谍。我后来问他为什么要这样做，他说他仅仅是认为如果开除菲尔比，那是解决不了什么问题的，反而还会在军情六处内部引起更多的问题。回顾军情六处在六十年代初的情景，使我不禁想起了列宁对捷尔任斯基说过的一句名言： “既然西方的那些幻想家打着如意算盘，那我们就把他们所幻想的东西给他们吧。” 军情六处需要获得一次胜利，他们需要坚定获得胜利的信心。他们在潘可夫斯基身上终于获得了胜利。 潘可夫斯基案有三个地方使我产生了极大的怀疑。第一个地方是他被招募过来的方式。潘可夫斯基在一九六〇年底拜访了美国驻莫斯科大使馆，主要是安排与西方进行科技交流的事。但他进了使馆之后，立即表示愿意向美国人提供情报，美国中央情报局的人在他们的保安楼里接见了他。他对这些人说，他实际上是苏联格鲁乌的高级官员，为一个科技情报组织工作。该组织是由克格勃和格鲁乌共同控制的。美国人认定潘可夫斯基是苏联人派来引诱美国受骗的，于是拒绝了他的提议、我阅读档案那段时间，美国已经从另一个叛逃者诺森科那里知道了，他们与潘可夫斯基谈话的那间房子里曾秘密地装有克格勃的话筒。很清楚，俄国人也知道潘可夫斯基对美国人表示愿意当他们的间谍，即使潘可夫斯基是真诚地叛逃西方。 潘可夫斯基在一九六一年初，又作了另一次尝试。他在莫斯科找到一个叫范佛里特的加拿大商人，并约好到该商人的公寓里碰面。范佛里特在他的浴间与潘可夫斯基会面。为了避免他们的谈话内容被窃听，他们在谈话过程中把自来水龙头开着。其实并没有迹象表明范佛里特的公寓里装有窃听器，可潘可夫斯基和范佛里特都猜测公寓里装有窃听器。范佛里特与皇家加拿大骑警队有关系。苏联方面在后来对潘可夫斯基进行审问时所提供的证据是他与温之间的谈话录音。那次谈话也是在浴间里开着自来水龙头的情况下进行的。很清楚，苏联人对突破这种反窃听方面是有办法的。 潘可夫斯基的第三次尝试是成功的。他这次是找温，结果，军情六处和美国中央情报局却来共同指挥他。潘可夫斯基案引人怀疑的第二个方面是他提供的情报种类共分两种：一种叫“阿尼卡”，是直接情报；另一种叫“鲁比”，是反情报。 “鲁比”材料主要包括对格鲁乌驻世界各地官员的识别，差不多都很准确，但绝大部分人都是我们已经知道的。此外，并没有为我们提供识别在西方的非法间谍的线索，也不知道在过去或现在混进西方安全部门的渗透分子。我感到令人难以理解。他的职责与我的职权相似，在格鲁乌上层呆了几年时间，而且还经常与克格勃联系，但却对苏联在西方的情报人员的分布情况一无所知。我把潘可夫斯基提供的反情报和上次叛逃的格鲁乌官员波波夫上校进行了比较，波波夫在五十年代在格鲁乌内部为美国中央情报局当间谍时，一共揭发了近四十名在西方活动的非法间谍。波波夫后来被逮捕，并被处决了。 “阿尼卡”则不同，那是关于苏联军事系统最机密情况的文件，潘可夫斯基交给了我们几千份。可是有两点让人感到很奇怪：第一，他有时候交来的是原件。我认为，间谍交原件是非常冒险的，俄国人在查阅档案时肯定会发现文件的丢失。其次，潘可夫斯基所提供的情报当中最为重要的是他在格鲁乌导弹部队当高级指挥官的叔父给他看的文件。这个文件帮助了美国了解到俄国在古巴有导弹。潘可夫斯基说，他是在他叔父走出房间时复制了这份文件。这仿佛又一次使我认为，他不是一个现实生活当中的人，倒像电视里的詹姆斯·邦德一样的人。 第三个令人感到可疑的方面是我们指挥他的方式。我们对待这样一个如此重要的间谍的方式是极其马虎草率的。他提供的情报在当时是极有价值的，当时古巴导弹危机正好在发展。我们只拼命地从他那里挖出能得到的一切，却从来就没有任何打算要保护他，或把他留下来作为一笔长期资产。我在潘可夫斯基情报分发情况一览表上数了一下，在他活动期间，仅在英国就有一千七百人看过他提供的材料。军情六处、军情五处、政府通讯总部、联合情报委员会、各军种首领和他们的参谋，以及外交部和各研究集团等，都有被指定看潘可夫斯基提供的部分材料的人员名单，尽管能看到全部材料的人寥寥无几。当然，同一切间谍报告一样，这些情报上并不注明它们的来源。无论用什么标准来衡量，如此广泛的散发范围真是令人吃惊。这里提出了一个问题：保持高度警惕的俄国情报部门是否已经发觉了我们的行动？因为他们在一九六三年就曾表明，他们有坚定不移的信心对英国安全部门的上层进行渗透。 在莫斯科所作的安排也是超乎寻常的。军情六处让潘可夫斯基在莫斯科公园里把已冲好的胶卷交给奇泽姆夫人，她是军情六处驻莫斯科的官员罗里·奇泽姆的妻子。这样的交接活动进行了十几次，并且潘可夫斯基和奇泽姆夫人都早已发现克格勃对他们的行动进行了监视。在我阅读潘可夫斯基的档案时，我从布莱克的监狱汇报中得知，俄国人知道奇泽姆是军情六处的官员。有一件事我是可以肯定的：如果俄国人在伦敦指挥间谍的方式与军情六处在莫斯科指挥间谍的方式一样，那么军情五处尽管力量薄弱并受到习惯和法律的限制，也不会不发现潘可夫斯基的行动。 我散发我写的潘可夫斯基的报告时，迎来的却是愤怒的吼声。这个潘可夫斯基行动被冠以勇气与胆量称号，从表面上看这是一次了不起的胜利，因此当我发表不同意见时，人们就表现出极度的冲动。潘可夫斯基案件的经办官员哈里·谢尔戈德在军情六处的一次会议上，特地走到我跟前： “你知道指挥间谍是怎么回事？”他怒骂着说，“你跑到这儿来对一个勇敢的人的记忆进行损害，还指望我们相信你？” 当然，问题在于如果潘可夫斯基提供假情报这一事实成立的话，那么俄国人又为什么要派潘可夫斯基来充当提供假情报的间谍呢？我想，这个答案就在古巴政治和军备控制政治这两个方面。俄国人在六十年代初期，有两个主要的战略野心：一是想在古巴保住卡斯特罗，而当时美国正使用他们的各种力量和手段企图搞掉卡斯特罗；另一是苏联在加强和发展洲际弹道导弹能力时不想引起西方的怀疑。当时正值“导弹差距”的时代。害怕俄国人在核武器生产上超在前面的观点，正是约翰·肯尼迪在一九六〇年竞选总统时的政纲要点。肯尼迪许诺说他的政府要缩短这个差距。而苏联人则想方设法让西方相信，“导弹差距”是臆想出来的，如果真有什么差距的话，那也只能是苏联落后于西方这种差距。 美国害怕苏联的导弹能力的部分原因是因为情报方法上的问题。西方在这方面就像一个盲人。加里·鲍尔斯在一九六〇年五月被击落以后，UZ高空侦察机的飞行计划便被取消了，直到一九六二年底美国发射了第一颗卫星，才重新对苏联进行摄影侦察。当时西方的惟一的情报来源是利用潘可夫斯基这根线索和截听苏联在亚洲的火箭试验范围内往来的遥测信号和无线电通讯。 潘可夫斯基提供的情报的主要方面，是说明苏联的火箭项目并不像西方所想像的那样先进，而且他们没有洲际弹道导弹实力，仅仅只有中程弹道导弹。这个情报使肯尼迪心中有了底，当美国发现了苏联在古巴建造中程弹道导弹设备时，他才敢让苏联摊牌。对照潘可夫斯基的情报，美国人又看见俄国人在古巴安装了代表他们的工艺技术水平的火箭，更加对潘可夫斯基关于俄国人没有洲际弹道导弹的情报深信不疑。赫鲁晓夫被迫撤退，但他达到了他的主要目的——美国最终同意不去动古巴。 潘可夫斯基的情报后来又被另外两个叛逃者所证实。他们是在苏联驻联合国代表团工作的“大礼帽”和“费多拉”。他们在六十年代初就与美国联邦调查局拉上了关系。“费多拉”与潘可夫斯基一样，是个科技官员。两个间谍，尤其是“费多拉”提供的情报完全证实了潘可夫斯基的情报，即苏联的火箭技术明显地不如西方先进。“费多拉”还提供了关于苏联火箭加速表的薄弱环节的详细情报。 潘可夫斯基的情报以及“大礼帽”和“费多拉”的情报是一个关键因素，它使美国人在创造一个适合举行限制战略武器第一阶段会谈和产生缓和时代的气氛中充满信心。这正是潘可夫斯基的目的。他帮助苏联消除西方的疑虑达十年以上，使我们在苏联导弹发展的真正状态方面受了骗。 七十年代中期，气候开始发生变化，怀疑又产生了。卫星摄影侦察有了更大的改进。用复杂的方法对弹着点进行了测量，然后用这些测量数据对苏联的洲际弹道导弹的精确度进行了分析，发现苏联人的洲际弹道导弹的精确度比以前用遥测信号和无线电通讯所测出的要高得多。唯一的解释是苏联故意在他们的信号里掺了假，使美国的跟踪系统受骗。 潘可夫斯基保住了他的地位，被认为是军情六处在战后最为辉煌的胜利，与此同时，美国情报界各部门却正式认定“大礼帽”和“费多拉”是被派来诱惑我们步入骗局的。后来发现“费多拉”关于苏联火箭加速表没有过关的情报是假的，甚至有些证据表明苏联在他们的导弹上装了假的第三陀螺地平仪，使导弹看上去比实际的精度要差。 这一类的发现使人们对以前的裁军协议的效力产生了怀疑，并担忧美国对苏联导弹实力进行准确估计的能力。限制战略武器会谈终于在七十年代停止了，美国国防界日益意识到，现场视察在以后的任何谈判中是至关重要的。 现在西方的国防战略家们已经开始形成一致的看法，即认为西方在六十年代估计苏联导弹实力上确实过于自信。而苏联则利用了缓和时代的外衣作为掩护，进行了大规模的扩军；同时还认为潘可夫斯基在这方面起了某些作用的观点在今天看来不再像以前那样被认为是牵强附会了。 我第一次写潘可夫斯基一案的分析报告时，在此案中起了关键作用的军情六处驻华盛顿分站站长莫里斯·奥德费尔德（后来在七十年代当了英国秘密情报局的局长）告诉我： “这起案子的路还长着哩，彼得，还有许多帝王和大将正高高地骑在潘可夫斯基背上。”他说。他指的是那些因参加潘可夫斯基案而获得了许多荣誉的人。 这条路今天也许不那么长了。