Chapter 13 Chapter Eleven

While many in MI5 expressed doubts about the origins of the Lonsdale case, the U.S. intelligence community applauded the cracking of the case as a great victory. The illegal spy network had never been caught during its operation. cracked.To this end, Washington showed great interest in the Radio Transmission Engineering Committee. The NSA learned from GCHQ that the Launch Commission, after uncovering its work in the Lonsdale case, was jealous of the close relationship between MI5 and MI6 and GCHQ.Britain had many serious problems, but Washington was worse.Hoover was staunchly opposed to the establishment of the CIA after the war, so he remained hostile to the CIA throughout the 1950s.Most of the CIA's top officers graduated from prestigious universities, and they are unwilling to join forces with the less educated "shooters" of the FBI.But the two organizations have one thing in common, and that is to spare no effort to defeat the NSA.They think the NSA is not safe.Their speculation was finally confirmed: In 1959, two cryptanalysts from the National Security Agency defected to the Soviet Union, and as a result they betrayed many important secrets.

NSA Deputy Director Luis Todella has effectively led the agency for nearly two decades (the director rotates through the military).He knew very well that the real reason the FBI and CIA were fighting the NSA was that the NSA had taken control of Signals Intelligence.He also knew that both agencies were eager to challenge the NSA's monopoly.The CIA had already begun an ultra-secret signal operation code-named "Staff D," and the FBI was working on it.In May 1960, Al Belmont visited London.We were getting ready to deal with the Lonsdale case.I took him to Cheltenham and showed him how to break the Egyptian ciphers with Operation Swallow and the French ciphers with Operation Palisades.In fact, Operation Palisades was still in its infancy at the time.Belmont boasted greatly of our two operations, and immediately sent Dick Millen to learn from me the details of the "fence" technique.Soon, the FBI also used a similar operation to decipher the code of the French embassy in Washington, winning.

Todella was eager to create his own radio transmission engineering committee under the direction of the NSA.In October 1961, he invited Alexander, Denham, Frawley, and Phil Potts, the MI6 station chief in the United States, and me to Washington for a special meeting to discuss British code-breaking achievements.He also invited people from the CIA and the FBI in order to get them, too, to be briefed on the launch committee and hoped they would share in the benefits of working closely together. I knew from the start that this was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the British secret services to redeem themselves before their American counterparts.By 1961, the CIA was the intelligence authority in Washington, who believed that the former Anglo-American intelligence alliance was too sentimental in the relentless Cold War.But I think if we can demonstrate to them the technological achievements we have made since 1956, then we can convince them that we are worth dealing with.

Both Alexander and I knew that this was a gamble, and there was no guarantee that the Americans would give us some information in return at the meeting.Of course, they probably wouldn't do that, obviously due to security concerns.However, the potential payoff from the meeting was enormous, and it would at least remove the shadow of the Philby, Burgess, and McClain affair from Anglo-American intelligence relations.More importantly, both Alexander's program of code-breaking and my program of counterintelligence work required substantial American funding and support to be possible.As with the development of the atomic bomb in World War II, we should persuade the Americans and enlist their funding to carry out our plans.In the long run, we can benefit from the exchange of intelligence between GCHQ and the NSA, and eventually the flow of intelligence back to us.

The meeting was set to take place in a specially-secured conference room at NSA headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland.It was a glass building surrounded by power grids, and there were hundreds of antennas and receiving dishes on the roof, criss-crossing and bristling with branches.Using these devices, the NSA can communicate with thousands of surveillance stations around the world.The representatives of the NSA were Todella and his chief cryptanalyst, Art Levinson; the representatives of the FBI were Dick Millen and Leahy Whitman; the representatives of the CIA were Jim Angleton and a burly fellow named Bill Harvey.Harvey had just returned to Washington, he had gone to Berlin to run the tunnel operation and was now the head of Staff D.

Harvey was a legendary figure in the CIA, with his heavy drinking and cowboy temperament.Early in his career, he worked as an anti-Soviet spy for the FBI, but was fired by Hoover for drinking too much.So he immediately defected to the CIA with the valuable experience and technology he had learned in the FBI.The CIA was just opening, and he jumped at it, and managed to work with Angleton to turn his knowledge into reality.He became one of America's most influential go-getters in the secret war against the KGB.He spent most of the 1950s in Berlin, commanding spies, digging tunnels, and doing everything in his power to take part in the struggle against the Soviets.He believed that the Cold War was a real war, and one must be prepared to die.Had it not been for his brusque combativeness, he would have been a scheming, espionage-sensitive man who first spotted Philby after Burgess and McLean defected.Harvey's memory is even more outstanding. He remembers every detail of the defection and other cases decades ago.It was also his first comprehensive assessment of Philby's experience at MI6, pointing out the holes and inconsistencies in his résumé.Harvey kept his eyes on Philby while the others were skeptical, but the incident also aroused strong anti-British feelings in him.

The five-day conference got off to a rocky start.Todella was eager for a free exchange of ideas and a discussion of one or two experiments that the Security Service was doing to try and crack the codes of foreign embassies in Washington.He noted that the few studies could not go beyond the scope of the trial because of FBI regulations.Their counterparts at the CIA and the FBI are veiled and silent, neither willing to discuss technological developments in front of others or the Security Service, nor in front of us.Angleton was taking notes, while Harvey closed his eyes hostilely and rested, especially after lunch, he even snored.

On the first morning of the meeting, he yelled at the delegates: "We are here just to listen, we don't talk about our secrets in public." I read a long report on Operation Swallow against the Egyptians and detailed the progress made since then in the use of radio equipment to pick up code noise for deciphering and the use of new microphones for monitoring.Then I went into the details of Operation Fence.In the end a lively discussion ensued, and even Harvey stood up to listen to the discussion. The third day of the meeting, chaired by CIA Director of Programs Richard Helms, centered on the use of these new technologies to break Soviet codes.I have repeatedly pointed out that it is necessary to anticipate the new cipher machines that the Russians may develop, and to start immediately to find out how to deal with them.Some technical laymen were puzzled by my opinion, but I emphasized that this is what our Naval Research Laboratories did in wartime.At that time we made predictions about the new German torpedoes and mines, and it turned out that they had just produced torpedoes and mines and put them into use, and we found a way to deal with them.At the end of the discussion, both NSA and GCHQ agreed to immediately try to decipher the Soviet "Albatos" class cipher machine.

Alexander was very interested in using the new type of computer being developed in the United States for cryptanalysis. He believed in the theory of human engineering, which believed that it was mathematically impossible to arbitrarily arrange numbers on a cipher machine with electronic technology.Alexander believed that if a computer with sufficient energy could be developed, even the best code could be deciphered.Over the next decade, we developed an extensive research program investigating this area.According to the "Guardian" report in 1986, since 1980, bioengineering theory has brought a revolution to cryptanalysis as predicted by Alexander.

As we expected, representatives of the CIA did not disclose the status of their technical intelligence progress at the meeting.They left us with the impression that they didn't trust us.But we speculate that they have other reasons for not revealing their secrets to us.Harvey's "Staff D" seemed intent on violating the Anglo-American agreement.Under this agreement, the NSA must exchange all signals intelligence with GCHQ.If the Americans want to break codes without sharing the results with us, or if they want to take action against the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Nations, then Harvey's "Staff D" is their excellent accomplice.We dare say they are doing it now.

Regardless, the meeting was a milestone in the history of Anglo-American intelligence relations.For the first time in a decade, representatives of the six intelligence agencies sat down to discuss a range of issues related to cooperation at length.We carry out important joint research projects, especially in the field of computing.We have finally taken the first step in increasing mutual trust. Before I left London, Arthur Martin arranged for me to give the CIA a briefing on the technical aspects of the Lonsdale case, particularly the "raftman" technique.The officials in the Leconfield building were a little bit baffled by this, because although we had reported the Rafter technology to the FBI in the first place, the CIA hadn't heard anything about it.Hollis agreed to fully inform the CIA as soon as the Lonsdale case was over, since we had the first information about Lonsdale from their "snipers."Since the Langley headquarters was not yet finished, the debriefing was scheduled to take place after the Todella meeting in the Nissen trailer that the CIA was temporarily using.Nissen mobile home by the pool in Washington Center.Jim Angleton led me into a large conference room and gave me a podium to meet at least two hundred CIA officers. "Are you sure these guys are trained in signals intelligence work?" I asked Angleton in a low voice. "Peter, please go ahead, we are responsible for the security and confidentiality. Many people want to hear about this!" he said. I stood up, feeling a little nervous.To avoid stuttering, I speak slowly.I started by describing the Lonsdale case, and an hour later I was scribbling on the blackboard, explaining the technical details of Raftman's operation. "Of course, we consider the Rafter to be an important new counterintelligence weapon. We now know exactly when Soviet spies around the world listen to Moscow's secret broadcasts, and we can also measure the frequency of their transmissions... ..." The response to "The Rafter" was not good.Some people whispered and chattered.I later found out that the officers in the front row were in a strange mood, and with Harvey sitting on the side of the podium, I knew what was going to happen.Harvey turned sideways to Angleton and pointed in my direction angrily. I didn't know why they got angry, so I asked them, "Is there a problem?" "Yes!" A person shouted from the back row, "When was your 'raftman' developed?" "Spring of 1958." "What day is today...?" I stuttered again, and I couldn't answer for a while. "Let me tell you, it's 1961!" the man shouted. "What the hell is this alliance!" said another. I sat down hard and the people left and there was no more problem. Angleton and Harvey came over, and it could be seen that Harvey was very angry. Jim said to me in as gentle a tone as possible: "Look, Peter, it looks like this needs further discussion. It's probably inappropriate to discuss it on such a large occasion. Bill and I would like to invite you to dinner with us tonight. Let's find a safe place to talk." Before Harvey could speak, Jim pushed me away. That night, Angleton asked his technician, Joe Burke, to drive to the hotel to pick me up.He rarely spoke to me, probably on Angleton's order.We drove over the George Washington Bridge, passed through Arlington National Cemetery, and sped off into the Virginia countryside. "This is the new headquarters," Burke said to me, pointing to the right side of the countryside. There was nothing there except some trees, and it was getting dark. The car drove for an hour and finally stopped in front of a wooden house.The wooden house is set back from the road and has a large terrace behind the house.In order to prevent mosquitoes and flies, screens are filled around the platform, and there are several chairs and a table on the platform.It was late summer and early autumn, and the weather was very hot and humid.From the Appalachian foothills came the scent of pine trees and the chirping of crickets.Angleton came out from the platform and greeted me coldly. "I'm so sorry for this afternoon," he said, without explanation.We sat down at the table, and the director of the CIA's Western European division was there.He is polite, but rarely speaks.A few minutes later, another car screeched to a stop in front of the house.The car door slammed shut and Harvey was heard asking loudly where we were.He opened the screen door and stood on the terrace with a bottle of Jack Daniel's in his hand, and he could tell he had had some. "You bastard, let us tell the truth about this case," he yelled, and he slammed the bottle on the table so hard that it shattered. I knew immediately that this was a trap.Harry Stone, who used to accompany MI5 business when discussing business, was now recuperating in hospital with a heart attack. I turned to Angleton and said, "Jim, this is so unfair, I thought you invited me to dinner." "You are invited to dinner, Peter," he said.Then poured me some scotch in a cut glass. I replied bluntly, "I cannot be bullied like this by you." "Where's that," said Angleton calmly, "we just want to hear it again... Please start from the beginning. A few questions by the way." I repeat the Lonsdale case again.No sooner had I finished than Harvey couldn't hold back. He spattered his mouth and cursed: "You bastards, you are too unbelievable! You came here to ask us to pay for your research, but you kept the 'raftman' technology well hidden Imprisoned. It's been a long time..." I said, "I don't understand what you mean..." "You don't understand shit!" he growled. Harvey opened another beer. "Peter, the problem is our operations. We have a lot of people using HF radio receivers, and if the Soviets have rafters, they're going to be exposed..." Angleton said. "Do the Soviets have 'rafters'?" Angleton asked again. "Not at first, but certainly by now," I said, citing a recent case.MI6 sources in the Polish intelligence service said there was a joint espionage investigation between Poland and the Soviet Union.At the end of the investigation, while they were rounding up the suspect, the KGB drove a van to his apartment.He also revealed that the Soviets did not allow the Polish Intelligence Agency to see everything in the van, but he guessed based on various intelligence sources that the contents of the van were related to radio reconnaissance. Harvey sighed: "My God, our intelligence officers in Poland are all screwed..." "But we have sent these reports to your Polish office," I said. "Whoever this spy is, he is certainly not one of ours, so we presume he is one of yours. This at least serves as a warning to you." , it is dangerous to communicate with Poland by radio." The head of the Western Europe Division blushed and said, "We'll go check it out tomorrow morning." "Who else knows 'The Rafter'?" Harvey asked again. I told him that as we were developing it, we told everything to the FBI and the RCMP. Harvey lost his temper again. He slapped the table and shouted, "Canadians! You might as well tell the goddam Papuans!" "I'm afraid I wouldn't think that would be the case for Canadians, they are reliable members of the Commonwealth of Nations." "Hmph! You should also tell them to change to another cipher machine." Harvey said.Angleton was afraid that Harvey would reveal the secret of "Staff D" in a fit of anger, so he quickly kicked him hard under the table. We are fighting more and more fiercely.Their intimidation was clearly premeditated.They wanted to make me feel guilty, to entice me to say things that I would later regret.They said we provided you with "snipers" and hoped you would get something in return.We agreed to fund your research, but how do you reward us?Cursing and angry, Harvey talked about the weaknesses, mistakes and oversights that Americans have ignored since the war: Philby, Burgess, McLean; lack of leadership skills; unprofessionalism; Retreat; socialism keeps on the offensive.Angleton told me sullenly that if we wanted to get their intelligence, we had to respect America's status as a big brother in the British alliance. "Remember, you're a beggar here!" Harvey growled. I was not excited, just silently looking for opportunities to fight back.True, our counterintelligence work was not very good, but now that Arthur was back, the Lonsdale case was only the beginning.Furthermore, we do not have any obligation to report the "Raftman" operation to you. This is our confidentiality and we have the right to handle it ourselves. "And now I've come here and told you all of my life's work - 'Swallow', 'Fence', 'Rafter' - all of it. But when we had a meeting in your NSA, you sat with me Facing each other for five days, but you didn’t tell me anything. Can this be considered as an information exchange? In fact, you probably got angry because we were one step ahead...!" Now Harvey was furious, his face was purple like a turkey, and sweat was dripping from his temples.He unbuttoned his jacket, revealing the holster on his shoulder and the sharp pistol inside.His belly was round and big from the beer.It's four o'clock in the morning, and I've had enough of this, so I got up to say goodbye.I told Angleton that tomorrow's activities are all cancelled.I have a bad impression of what has happened.It is entirely up to them whether to make peace or not. Angleton came to see me at the hotel the next day without making an appointment.He smiled and apologized repeatedly.He blamed Harvey for his behavior last night. "He was drunk and thought he had to be bullied to know the truth. Now he believes you, he just thinks you're a threat to him." He invited me to dinner again.This time I was cautious and didn't dare to be careless.He said he understood how I felt and hoped I could understand him too.He also talked enthusiastically about funding our projects.The tension had finally dissipated.He offered to take me to Todra and convince him to get the support of the launch engineering board's counterintelligence force.The next day he sent a car to take me to Fort Meade.According to regulations, when visiting the National Security Agency, you must be accompanied by someone from the Communications Headquarters, so I had to go in through the side door and go directly to Todella's office on the top floor.We have lunch here.At lunch I recounted the Lonsdale case again, for the third time. Finally, Todra asked me what I could do with him.I said that although I had sorted out the illicit broadcasts from Moscow - which was certainly a major achievement - the main problem was that GCHQ did not adequately monitor Soviet stations.Since the Lonsdale case, we've made considerable progress in this area, but so far we've only had twelve or fifteen radio stations to intercept Soviet radio signals, which means we're just sampling monitor.If we want to make achievements in classification, we must monitor more than 90% of the Soviet radio stations.Todla was very interested in the prospect of the job and agreed to guarantee 100 percent monitoring of all illegal Soviet broadcasts around the world within two years.His words really counted, and after a while, the information continued to flow.The intelligence was sent to GCHQ, where it was handled by the "Anti-Clique" committee.A young cryptanalyst at Communications Headquarters, Peter Marychurch (now the top chair in Communications Headquarters), made an improvement on my elaborate taxonomy: he put thousands of Human computer to process, and then use the "sampling analysis method" to group the same telecommunications into a group.This method makes the classification more accurate.Over the next few years, it became one of the most important tools in Western counterintelligence. As I drove back to Washington, I was overjoyed at what the trip had accomplished.During this visit to Washington, I not only won the support of the United States for the Launch Engineering Board's "Swallow" operation, but also got their support for the counterintelligence work.If Angleton didn't mention Harvey, I almost forgot about the conflict with him. Angleton said to me, "Harvey wants to see you again." I am very surprised. "Nothing else, just asking for your advice. He's having trouble in Cuba, and I said maybe you could help him." "What happened after that night?" I asked. "He just wanted to test you to see if you could be trusted. You passed." Angleton is a typical man who sees the wind and the wind.He declined to elaborate further, saying only that he and Harvey had made an appointment for lunch in two days' time.He also said that in time I will understand. In 1961, when the CIA was entangled in the Cuban problem, the illusion of invading the Bay of Pigs had long been disillusioned.Angleton and I often talked about it because I had been involved in MI5's counter-insurgency operations against the Greek-Cypriot guerrilla leader Colonel Grivas in the 1950s.During my visit to Washington in 1959, Richard Helms and Richard Bissell, who were in charge of Southeast Asian affairs, asked me to share my counterinsurgency experience with senior officials.Clearly the CIA had plans for Cuba.Fidel Castro is building a communist kingdom in Cuba.Bissell later took over the Bay of Pigs operation. After the operation failed, Washington officials believed that it would not be long before Bissell would step down.Sure enough, the Kennedy brothers later dismissed all those responsible for the Cuban incident. Two days later, I arrived at the eating place on time.Harvey stood up and greeted me, welcoming me with a firm handshake.He was all dressed up, his old swagger was gone, and he never spoke of that night again.He's a tough guy, he doesn't forgive, and he doesn't expect forgiveness.He told me that he was studying Cuba and wanted to hear my opinion on the Cyprus operation. "Unfortunately, I did not hear your report in 1959," he said, without sarcasm. Soon after joining MI5, I became involved in the Cyprus problem.Bill Magan, then head of the Colonial Office, showed me documents about the escalating conflict.At that time the Greek archbishop of Cyprus, Macharis, was leading a vigorous movement demanding complete independence.The Greek government and the Hellenic Communist Party, as well as Grivas' guerrilla "Yokka", all supported this movement, while Britain, eager to keep Cyprus, a military important place, strongly opposed it.In 1956, the war situation was tense and imminent. Grivas' guerrillas of hundreds of people contained the British army of 40,000 soldiers. British policy towards Cyprus has been a total disaster.The Colonial Office attempted to conduct political negotiations in this poor security situation, relying on the military to maintain order.But to negotiate, Grivas must first be found and isolated, neutralized.The army conducted a large-scale search, but could not find Grivas.After reading the documents, I told Magan with confidence that MI5 would make a difference, and given time, we would find Grivas.The way we did it was to follow his communications the way we follow the Soviets now. Magan immediately took me to see Sir Gerald Templer.Sir Templer had successfully led a counterinsurgency in Malaya.He also advocated the use of intelligence to solve colonial problems.He enthusiastically supported my plan and agreed to speak to the Colonial Office on behalf of MI5.But the Colonial Office was stubborn, obsessed with its own security policy and kept MI5 out of the equation.And MI5 predicted that the Cyprus issue would undergo drastic changes, and they were unwilling to be involved as cannon fodder for others.Hollis, in particular, resolutely opposed the automatic participation in the colonies. He believed that MI5 was a domestic agency and could only send defense liaison officers to the army as their advisors, and it must not cross the line. In 1958, Grivas stepped up his actions in an attempt to dismantle the illusions of a political solution to the new Governor-General, Sir Hugh Foote.The army conducted another massive search of Grivas, this time in the Pajos mountains.Yet again, Grivas slipped through the net.Foote continued to press for a political solution, but the situation deteriorated so rapidly that he agreed to bring in MI5 to resolve the issue.From the start we faced a race to find Grivas before the Colonial Ministry. Magen firmly believed that there must be a lot of information about Grivas's whereabouts in the special branch of the local police, but no one seriously analyzed the information.The question now is how to get this information. "Yokka" has fully infiltrated the special branch of the local police. Once the MI5 officer who consults the file is exposed, it is very dangerous. We have already had an officer assassinated on a downtown street in Nicosia. Magan was a very remarkable man who had spent a long time in Northwest Africa and Iran and lived with the natives.He could speak their language and cook with cow dung on fire.He is very aware of the danger of terrorists, and he is unwilling to entrust such a dangerous task to his subordinates, insisting on going there himself.He had Colonel Philip Kirby Green, his liaison officer in Cyprus, as his assistant.Green looks very sturdy, but also upright, very heroic.He is also an amateur painter with a certain reputation.Soon I was also involved in the operation, taking care of the technical aspects.The code name for this operation was "Sunshine". To use "Sunshine" as the code name for the operation would be to taint the pretty word, since it was an assassination operation, but it was.The plan was simple: keep the soldiers focused on finding Grivas.We know that he will not surrender, that like two of his cronies who were recently surrounded by the army, he would rather be killed. On January 17, 1959, I arrived in Nicosia.I then immediately went to the Police Special Branch to study Magen's analysis of the file.Grivas was very organized and organized countless well-coordinated terrorist strikes and mobs in Cyprus.He must be in regular contact with his subordinates everywhere, and we estimate that "Yoka" will not communicate by telephone or postal system, although they have controlled these two organizations.After studying the archives, we found that their communications were all by messengers, and most of these messengers were women, and their main means of communication was public transportation.We set up a number of sighting and intercepting stations.From a comprehensive analysis, Limassol is the center of the guerrilla communication network.We also have observation posts in the villages of Elasa and Bologia, a few miles from Limassol, where we believe Grivas is headquartered. We first installed a secure phone bug at the Makarios mansion.We're sure that Makarios, and possibly "Yoka," sometimes used the phone.They thought it was safe to use the phone because if it was bugged, their inside line at the post office would definitely report it. We decided to also install a covert bug on the overhead wire leading to the palace, and use a radio transmitter to send the tapped signal to a receiver a mile or two away.The power used by this transmitter came from the telephone line.We have the help of John Wick, MI6's best technician, the man who actually bugged the Berlin tunnels.When Wick installed the bug, the police's feet were on his head.The whole operation is fraught with danger.Wick had to climb up the telephone pole in the dark, and Makarios' armed men and "Yorka" were patrolling under Wick's feet at any time.Wick drilled a hole in the top of the pole, put the electronic bug in it, and connected it to the telephone line to hide it.I stayed under the telegraph pole and gave him the tools.Every five minutes, we stopped and waited for the patrols to walk by, they could shoot at any moment.After two hours, we finally breathed a sigh of relief.The bug was finally installed successfully, and we were basically able to monitor Makarios. However, the real purpose of Operation Sunshine is to find Grivas.I'm pretty sure he also used a radio receiver to listen in on British Army communications and knew they were looking for him at any moment.So I decided to go both ways, a two-pronged approach.First we searched the antenna of his receiver, and then proceeded to install a receiver near him with a radio directional signal that would give us his exact location.We know that the Egyptians sold Grivas cheaply a large number of military weapons that the Egyptians confiscated from the British after the Suez Crisis.A Greek-Cypriot arms dealer was recruited by MI6, who bought a batch of receivers in Egypt.I modified the receiver, added a directional beam, and prepared to install it at Grivas's headquarters. The first part of Operation Sunshine went relatively smoothly.Green, Magan and I did some pre-battle reconnaissance in the Limassol area to see where the antennas were, which was a lot of risk.Disguised as tourists admiring the sights, we roamed the dusty side streets, the sun-baked markets and squares.When we passed by, the old people sitting in the shade of the trees watched us vigilantly, and even the children cast suspicious glances at us from time to time, and then quietly slipped away from the alley.I felt the sweat dripping down my back and had a strange sense of an invisible gun being pointed at me from behind the nearby terracotta roofs and ancient mausoleum walls. I was in the village of Yelasa and saw a church with a pointed iron on the spire of the pointed roof.At first glance it appears to be a lightning rod.The point was mounted on an insulator that was connected to the roof, and there was another piece of metal that remained buried in the ground.I took a closer look at the sharp iron with a telescope, and found that the metal plate was not connected to the sharp iron on the roof.Obviously, this is a modified antenna made of pointed iron.We tried to get closer to take a closer look.As a result, a group of children came running from nowhere. They were very angry and threw stones at us, so we ran for our lives.We ran here and there until we reached the village of Bologia.We just took a breath, but there were also a group of children who wanted to beat us.So I am sure that these two villages must be the center of Grivas. I set to work immediately, finding out the location of the directional radio waves.Operation Sunshine is estimated to take six months to complete.But just as we were all gearing up for a big fight, the Colonial Office scrambled to settle the Cyprus question at the Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House in February 1959.It was literally undermining us, and the whole Sunshine operation was ruined overnight.Magan flew into a rage, especially when he saw Grivas come out of the place we predicted.Grivas later flew to Greece and continued to put pressure on Cyprus.Ma Gen felt that this method was treating the symptoms but not the root cause, and there were still many problems that had not been fundamentally resolved.He believed that this short-term expedient of the Colonial Office was bound to have serious long-term consequences.Later facts also proved that Ma Gen's guess was correct. 在我们离开塞浦路斯前不久，马根和我突然又遇见了总督富特爵士，大家都很不安，不知说什么好。富特说他为自己最后摆脱了困境而高兴，并且向我们说明“阳光”计划不过是最后的解决办法，除非外交解决失败，否则不轻易使用。他似乎很难理解应当从一开始就把有效的情报工作探合在外交艺术里。回首往事，我坚信如果我们在一九五六年第一次向殖民部申说“阳光”计划时就动手，那我们一定能迫使格里瓦斯中立。那样，决定讲和条件的就是殖民部，而不是“约卡”，而这个凄凉悲惨而又美丽的小岛在过去三十年的历史也就完全不同了。 塞浦路斯事件使人们对英国殖民政策留下了长久的印象。过去，英国放弃殖民地时显得非常体面，那时我们不用武力而用情报手段击败军事叛乱，然后再以叛乱运动的政治领导为基础，通过政治谈判来解决争端，并用英国武装部队维持新政府。马来亚和肯尼亚基本上就是这样做的。现在这两个国家都安然无恙。 怎样在保证不让地方武装力量插手的前提下撤走殖民力量，这是一个根本的问题。换言之，就是怎样建立一个稳定的地方统治阶级？殖民部擅长搞那些复杂的、经典的民主模式——在这里起草一部宪法，在那里建立一个议会——这些东西却很少能够立住脚跟。塞浦路斯事件后，我向霍利斯递交了一份报告，陈述了我的想法。我说我们应当采用布尔什维克的模式，因为它是唯一已成功的模式。列宁比其他任何一个人都懂得怎样去控制一个国家，并保住这种控制权。列宁相信，统治阶级必须控制扛枪的人和情报部门，只有这样，才能防止其他军队或者阶级夺走政权。 现代苏联情报机构的创始人费利克斯·捷尔任斯基就是以这种思想为指导创立了“契卡”（克格勃的前身）。他一共设立了三个局——专门对付国外颠覆者的第一总局，专门对付国内谋叛者的第二总局和监视军队，确保没有人敢进行武装政变的第三总局。 霍利斯和军情五处的其他领导读了我的报告以后大为恐慌。他们认为这份报告是在“冷嘲热讽”，因而根本就没有把它送到殖民部备案。但如果回顾一下过去二十五年的历史，就不难看出，只有在奉行列宁原则的新国家里才能避免军事独裁。 一九五九年我在中央情报局作这个报告时，他们也激烈反对我的看法。赫尔姆斯直截了当地对我说，这简直是鼓吹在第三世界里实行共产主义。他盲目地以为我们在情报方面占有优势，而他们却没有这种优势。他还认为只有我们才是殖民帝国，而美国则不是；而且由于他们还面临远东和古巴那些国家的叛乱，因此惟一能够实行的政策就是依靠军事力量，武装解决问题，也正是这种想法终于使美国陷入了越南战争。 这种想法也是美国侵入猪湾的出发点和根据。两年后的今天，当哈维听到了我在塞浦路斯的经验时，觉得侵入猪湾和塞浦路斯事件有着惊人的相似之处：这两个地方都是小岛，都有一支领导得很好的游击队。当我谈到如果没有格里瓦斯，塞浦路斯游击队早就分崩离析了的时候，他更加吃惊。 “如果英国人遇到了古巴问题，你们怎么办？”他问道。 我不愿意受古巴问题的牵扯。在我去华盛顿之前，曾和霍利斯讨论过这个问题。他毫不隐瞒地谈到了中央情报局在加勒比海的失误。他对我说，应当尽量避免谈论这个问题。我很为难，如果我向安格尔顿和哈维提出建议，那么中央情报局就会把我个人的建议认为是英国官方深思熟虑的意见。这件事不需要多少时间，莱肯菲尔德大楼就会知道，因此，我必须向他们说清楚，我不过是私下谈谈而已。 我对他们说，我们会努力发挥我们在那里的一切有利条件——例如支持某个政治领袖等等。 哈维不耐烦地说：“这些我们已经做了，但他们全在佛罗里达州。猪湾事件后，我们在古巴几乎失去了一切……” 哈维想摸一摸我们的底，看看我们在那里究竟有些什么活动，因为英国在加勒比海地区拥有殖民地。 我对他说：“我怀疑英国方面在古巴地区有什么活动，伦敦的指示是不干涉古巴问题。你们可以去问问军情六处，他们也许会知道一点情况。” “如果你们处在我们的地位，你们会怎样对付卡斯特罗呢？”安格尔顿问。 “我们会孤立他，并且鼓动人民反对他……” “你们会打击他吗？”哈维插话说。 我停顿了一下，把餐巾叠好。侍者轻声地在桌间走来走去。这时我才清楚哈维了解我是否可以信任的目的。 “我们当然会打击他，但我怀疑是否真正需要这样做。”我回答说。 "Why not?" “比尔，现在这已经不是我们所管的事了。早在两年以前，苏伊士危机以后，我们就不管了。” 在苏伊士运河危机初期，军情六处曾订了个计划，想通过伦敦分站用神经毒气暗杀纳赛尔。艾登最初赞同这个计划，后来他变卦了，因为他又同法国和以色列达成协议搞一次联合军事行动。不久，联合军事行动失败，艾登被迫撤军并第二次执行暗杀计划。但这时军情六处在埃及的力量几乎全部被纳赛尔一网打尽，只得重新制订计划，借助埃及谋叛军官们的力量。可这个计划又遭到了惨败，主要是由于藏在开罗郊外的武器有毛病，不能使用。 “你参与了这次行动？”哈维问道。 “只是在技术方面帮点忙而已。”我如实说。 然后我又告诉他，当初找我商量行动计划的是军情六处伦敦分站技术组的约翰·亨利和彼得·狄克逊，他们是制定这一计划的负责人。他们两人和我都参加过军情五处和军情六处讨论情报部门技术研究的联席会议。这个会议是在波顿草原，即政府生化武器研究集团举行的。五十年代，化学武器研究是一个非常活跃的领域。我和军情六处的联合课题是研究引起幻觉的麦角酸二乙基酸胺在审讯中的作用，我们在波顿草原做了大量实验。有一次，我自愿提出做试验品。军情五处和军情六处虽然各自的目的不同，但都想尽可能多了解一些有关当时在波顿研制的高级毒剂的情况。我需要解毒剂，是为了在苏联人对英国叛逃者下毒时用，而军情六处需要这些毒剂却是为了自己在国外的行动。 亨利和狄克逊都和我谈过对纳赛尔使用这种毒药的问题，希望我能给他们一点忠告。显而易见，用神经毒气暗杀纳赛尔是最好的方案，因为这种毒气使用简便。他们告诉我，军情六处伦敦分站在埃及有个间谍，可以有限度地接近纳赛尔的某个总部。他们计划在通风系统内放一些神经毒气罐，但我指出这样做不仅需要大量的毒气，而且会造成大批纳赛尔手下的军官死亡，显然是一个很不实际的计划——军情六处的计划都是这样。后来亨利告诉我，艾登又否定这个行动了，这并不使我感到吃惊。他们不得不承认这件事比“巨型炸弹”克拉布事件更加糟糕。 哈维和安格尔顿又仔细向我询问了苏伊士运河危机中的那次行动。 “我局正在研究对付这类问题的新方法，并且还可以出售有关这方面的专业知识。”哈维向我解释说。 哈维一正经起来，嗓门就降低了许多，而且单调乏味，压抑的语调是一种华盛顿官员们所喜欢用的官腔。他用这种单调的官腔向我解释说，他们不仅需要能够随时改变身份的特工人员，而且也需要改善技术设备——按哈维的行话，就是要改善“运载工具”。他们特别感兴趣的是小型天文卫星，哈维知道，五十年代，小型天文卫星曾在苏联边境活动，跟踪过苏联火箭的发射信号，以前他们只是用无线电接收机进行追踪，后来改用了卫星。上司命令他们要不惜一切代价保住卫星。 我对他说：“比尔，他们从不自由雇用人员，你可以试着找一些退休的人，但得先和军情六处谈谈。” 哈维满脸不快，认为我故意不肯帮忙。 我问他：“你没有去找斯蒂芬森？许多老前辈说，大战时他在纽约干过这种工作。肯定雇用的是意大利人，那时还没有其他办法来区别德国海运间谍。据我所知，也许是意大利黑手党人……” 安格尔顿飞快地在笔记本上记下我的话，然后毫无表情地抬头看了我一眼。 我得意地继续往下说：“还有法国人！你找过他们没有？干这种事是他们的拿手好戏。你看他们在阿尔及尔和其他地方不是干得挺出色吗？” 安格尔顿又在笔记本上写了一阵。 哈维这时问道：“你们有没有特殊的技术设备？” 我告诉他，神经毒气计划失败以后，军情六处又研制了一些新武器。有一次，我到波顿去参观他们的烟盒表演。这个武器是爆炸研究与发展集团最新推出的。他们把一枚毒刺装在烟盒上随时可以发射。我们都穿上白大褂，个个神情严肃，由管理当地军情五处和军情六处工作的科学家拉德尔博士陪同，到波顿草原后面的牲畜场去实施观摩。一头拴着绳索的羊被牵到场地中央。羊的一侧被剃去了一片羊毛，露出粗糙的粉红色皮肤。拉德尔的助手掏出烟盒，向羊走去。羊受了惊，拼命奔跑，但被绳索紧紧勒住。我还以为毒刺没有射中羊呢！但过了一会，羊弯下了腿，不停地翻动着眼珠，而且口吐白沫。不久，羊就倒了下来，奄奄一息，几分钟以后就死了。穿白大褂的专家们围着死羊，谈论这项现代新毒剂的各种优点。此时此刻，两种感情第一次也是最后一次在我的心里发生了冲突，一种是对动物的爱，一种是对情报工作的爱。我感到对动物的爱比后一种爱更加伟大，同时我还意识到暗杀不该是和平时期的政策。 我只能给哈维和安格尔顿这么多帮助了。我觉得我已经对他们讲得太多了。一看到安格尔顿做记录，我就感到不安。他们的决心似乎很大，而且很有把握，认为这就是对付卡斯特罗的办法，还对我不能给予更多的帮助表示失望。 走上大街以后，我们互相道别，我还告诉他们：“找亨利或者狄克逊谈谈，他们知道的情报也许比我更多。”第二天，我将乘飞机返回英国。 哈维突然问道：“你没有对我们隐瞒什么吧？”茄克里的手枪又显了出来。我看出他又在想“筏夫”了。 我招招手喊来一辆出租汽车。 “比尔，我早就对你说了，我们早已退出那场游戏了。我们在联盟中不过是些小伙伴而已，记得吗？现在该你们承担责任了。” 哈维是个听了笑话笑不出来的人，安格尔顿也是一样。