Chapter 12 chapter Ten

"The sniper revealed that the Russians had two very important spies in Britain: one in British intelligence and one in the Admiralty." This was reported by CIA officer Harry Roman to MI5 and MI6 officials in a conference room on the fourth floor of MI6 headquarters on Broadway Street in April 1959. "Sniper" was an anonymous intelligence agent who had written to the CIA in German earlier in the year, providing many details about Polish and Soviet intelligence operations. Roman said: "It can almost be said that he worked for the Polish intelligence service. His German was a bit irregular, but the information he provided about Poland was a top-level internal secret."

The "sniper" (whom MI5 gave him the codename "Laviniji") referred to the two spies as "Lambuda 1" and "Lambuda 2".We don't know much about "Lambuda II".He had worked in Warsaw in 1952, when the Polish Intelligence Service discovered that he was doing black market transactions, so they took the opportunity to coerce him into spying.But the information about "Lambuda 1" is very meaningful. "Sniper" described his situation in detail in a letter that allows us to agree that he had seen three MI6 documents. The first document is Poland's "watch list", which lists in detail the objects that MI6's Warsaw branch believes may be developed.The second document is the part about Poland in MI6's "R6" file; "R6" is the annual report issued by MI6 to each sub-station, and the content is a comprehensive report of the original intelligence collected by MI6 by country and region.The third document is part of the MI6 "RB" file. The "RB" file is also an annual report issued by MI6 to various branches stationed abroad, and is used to report in detail the recent scientific and technological research and actions of MI6.

The MI6 outposts in Warsaw and Berlin were the most likely to leak this vital information.We made a list of people in these two sub-stations who had access to these three documents, and there were a total of ten people.After we reviewed their files, we ruled out the suspicion one by one.Among those under investigation was a man named George Black, a young MI6 officer who was well regarded by his superiors and had played a vital role in the Berlin tunnel operation.MI5 and MI6 analyzed his file and agreed that Black could not have been a spy.In this case, how to explain this leak?The best answer is that MI6 may have been compromised two years ago when the Brussels safe was stolen.Unfortunately, however, there are currently no records that allow us to know exactly what was stored in that safe before it was stolen.The investigation proved that the "sniper" could only see one or two documents in the safe at most, because it is absolutely impossible for three documents to exist in one safe at the same time.In the spring of 1960, after the ten MI6 officials who had seen the three documents were examined and cleared of suspicion, MI5 and MI6 informed the Americans that the safe had been stolen Provided intelligence to what the "snipers" called "Lambuda 1".

In March 1960, the "sniper" suddenly sent a piece of further information about the "Lambuda II".This "Lambuda II" appears to have been named Huiton.According to "sniper", he was developed as a spy by the Soviets when he returned to London to work in the Naval Intelligence Agency, and then engaged in illegal activities.Harry Holden is the only one who fits the above situation of "Sniper".He had worked for the Portland Underwater Weapons Group in Dorset and had been in Warsaw in 1952, before he joined Naval Intelligence.When D Branch went to the MI5 archives to check Holden's file, they were taken aback. They found that Holden's name had been included in the list of suspects.Years earlier, Horton's wife had told security officials in Portland that her husband had abandoned her to hook up with a girl on the base.She also said Houghton met foreigners frequently and often traveled to London to meet a foreigner she did not know.In addition, Holden also has a lot of money stashed in the garden shed.

The security officer reported the situation to the Admiralty Security Service and expressed his belief that Horton's jilted wife was probably falsely accusing her husband.The Admiralty forwarded the report to C Branch of MI5, and the case has since been run by a young officer named Dunkham Wegg.Weig went to the archives to check Holden's files and found that the above-mentioned incident had not been filed.So the official came to a conclusion, agreed with the judgment of the first security officer and refuted Horton's false accusation, and then he reported the case to the director of Division C.Soon, the director gave Portland a formal reply: report the results of the investigation.The case was thus closed.

Hollis and Jones, then Chief of C, were embarrassed by the accusation that Holden was a spy.But before they had time to defend, there was a new development in the case.This time the investigation was conducted by the Polan Section, the Second Section of D Division. During the investigation, they found that Horton always took his girlfriend Ethel Gee to London once a month.Surveillance teams who followed Horton's trip to London in July saw Horton meet a man on Waterloo Road and hand him a travel bag before taking an envelope from the man.They immediately set their sights on the man Holden had met with and followed him until he got into their car.It was a white Spitwick.Based on visual observations, the surveillance team concluded that he might be a Polish intelligence officer stationed in London.But after they investigated the car's license plates, they discovered that the car belonged to a Canadian named Gordon Arnold Lonsdale, who operated rental jukeboxes by profession.The surveillance team was sent to the Polish embassy to recheck the Polish official.When they came back, they really said that they had made a mistake just now.

Lonsdale was closely watched.Lonsdale has an office in Waldur Street and a suite of rooms in a white building near Regent's Park.Both locations were bugged, and a visual observation station was set up nearby.In fact, Lonsdale is just a playboy who often travels abroad and courts many beautiful girls, but those girls value his money and appearance. The next time Holden and Gee are in London is early August.Holden met with Lonsdale again, this time in a café near the old Victoria theatre.The surveillance team kept a close watch on them, and even sneaked close to the table next to them to eavesdrop on their conversation.Lonsdale told Horton and Gee that he was going to the United States to discuss business, so he would not meet them in September, but he believed that he would definitely come back to meet them on the first Sunday in October.If not, he will appoint someone they know to meet them on his behalf.

On August 27th they followed Lonsdale again.They followed Lonsdale's apartment on the sixth floor of the White Building all the way to the Midland Bank in Great Portland Street.They discovered that Lonsdale had deposited a box and a brown paper parcel at the bank, and soon Lonsdale disappeared.After obtaining the consent of the chairman of the Midland Bank, the chief of the Security Bureau broke open the safe kept by Lonsdale.On Monday evening, September 5, they took boxes and paper packets from the bank and brought them back to MI5's laboratory in São Paulo.Winterborn and I spread out the contents of the box on the table, and examined it carefully.After some hard work, we finally meet The Real Guy - the complete toolkit of a professional spy.In Lonsdale's kit were two miniature cameras, a Minox and a Praktila, specially designed for duplicating documents.There was also a roll of photographed negatives in the Minox camera.We developed the roll of negatives, re-shot it, and put it back in camera.The photos, which seem to have nothing to do with espionage, show Lonsdale posing with a smiling woman in a city—which we later determined, after much analysis, to be Prague.There is also a book on how to learn to type in the box, and we know that it must be related to secret writing.I examined the edges of each page with a thin beam of light, and found that it was riddled with tiny indentations; it was these pages that Lonsdale used as his cryptic carbon paper for writing invisible cipher texts.We sent this book to Dr. Morgan of the Atomic Weapons Research Group, and it was of the utmost importance in promoting his new method of detecting steganography.

The thing that interested us the most was a Ronson brand lighter in a wooden bowl.We X-rayed the lighter using Morgan's method and found that the bottom of the lighter was empty and contained many small items.We used rubber suction bulbs and tweezers to pinch these things out, and it turned out to be two tiny one-time pads.One of these is the present one, and on the folded page there is a list of map references based on the London atlas used by our surveillance team. Since Operation Raftman, I have been studying how to gather intelligence on secret Soviet radio communications.So when I saw Lonsdale's cipherbook, I knew right away that it was a Soviet cipher.It wasn't some Polish intelligence agent doing it, it was a KGB operation outright.If we copied his cipher book and followed the signal, we could use the Lonsdale-Moscow radio communication to break the Moscow cipher.Unfortunately, there was no signal plan in Lonsdale's box, so we have no way of knowing when and how often he listened to the Moscow radio, which receives countless telegrams every week.At this time, "The Rafter" gave us an important breakthrough.We set up a base in a suite next door to the White House in Lonsdale, listening with Rafters.Perhaps this way we can find out when and how often Lonsdale listened to the Moscow radio on his receiver.

However, it was quite difficult to copy the codes in the Lonsdale code book without arousing his suspicion.We can't decipher Lonsdale's communications without touching every page of the cipher paper.We have learned from the Radio Transmission Engineering Committee that the Swiss Intelligence Service has recently discovered a discarded KGB one-time pad.So I immediately called MI6 and asked them to ask the Swiss if they could lend me the codebook.They readily agreed.I drove to London airport to be greeted by the RAF plane escorting the codebook.This codebook is very similar to Lonsdale's codebook. There is a thin layer of glue around the edge of each paper, which is used to stick the pages.We scraped off the glue, tested it, and found it wasn't made in the West, but the technicians at the post office said they could fake it too.

On Saturday evening, September 17th, we went again to the Midland Bank to collect the case and take it to St. Paul.We carefully tore apart the cipher book page by page, took pictures and copied them separately, and then put the originals on a special binding frame, clamped them tightly, wiped the edges with our own imitation glue, and glued the cipher book again. it is good.We put the case back at the bank early Sunday morning, to be picked up by Lonsdale. A few days later, I got a call from Tony Sale.You could tell he was anxious from the sound of his voice. "You should hurry up and see the 'Lionbeard' recording." "Lion's Beard" was the code name for the continuation of Operation "Raftman" against the Soviet embassy.I hailed a taxi and headed straight to Kensington Park.After getting out of the car, I sneaked into the security building on the next street.Searle was already waiting for me in the hall, and he handed me a sheet of paper from the "Lion's Beard" recording, with many holes in it. "Can you guess what this is?" he asked, pointing to two bursts of receiver activity at the embassy in September. "How many days did this happen?" "It seems to be September 6th, which is a Tuesday; and the other time was last Sunday, the 18th," he replied. "My God!" I exclaimed, "it's the day of our bank action!" During these two trips to the bank to fetch Lonsdale's box, we did not send many watchers.With pain and disappointment, I took the record paper back to Leconfield Building, and checked the specific time of the Soviet receiver's activity with the watcher's action time recorded by the four divisions of Division A, and found that the "Lion's Beard" record and The records of the four departments in Department A are completely consistent.The Soviets must have guessed that we had taken action against Lonsdale. I went through all the "Lionbeard" records from two or three years ago and checked them carefully, trying to see if the Soviets had used the receivers on Saturday afternoon and Monday night.I found that, except for these two visits to the bank, the Soviets never used the receiver between midnight and five in the morning. I gave these files to Jones, and we went straight to Hollis' office together.After hearing our report, Hollis was not surprised. He agreed with us that the evidence of the leak was conclusive.He directed Jones to conduct an urgent investigation of the surveillance team.We agreed that Lonsdale was an outlaw of the KGB.Hollis advocated that the case be transferred from D-Second Section to D-Secretary Section 1, which was in charge of anti-Soviet espionage, and Martin would be responsible for handling it. On the face of it, the best test of whether Lonsdale has caught our suspicions about him is to watch him go abroad.We agreed that if he has not returned to the UK, it proves that he has heard the news, and if he comes back, it means that he does not know that we are spying on him.Lonsdale told Horton that he would try to come back to meet them on October 1st.Jones' investigation of the watch team fails again, raising tensions at Leconfield House.Holden arrives in London, but no one meets him.Several days passed, and Lonsdale was still missing, which made Jones very anxious.By October 17th, officers at the Observatory opposite Lonsdale's office in Waldur Street noticed Lonsdale entering the building.We spared no effort and followed up with all our strength. In the tense atmosphere, the growing mystery was finally solved. Lonsdale quickly resumed his old life: running the jukebox, meeting Holden, meeting other pretty women.He did not return to his own apartment in the White Mansion until early November.Where he lived during this time has remained a mystery.Every evening he walked west after leaving his office in Waldur Street.Since Lonsdale's return, Arthur and I have kept a tight grip on the movements of the watch team.We are sure we will never repeat the same mistakes again.Overt surveillance and the use of radios in all operations must cease.Jim Scaddon was furious at this violation of his control.He had never heard of "The Rafter," so he didn't know why radios were banned.He ran to Jones, but Jones told him emphatically that there was nothing wrong with it. Arthur and I were well aware that it was impossible to follow a trained and experienced agent like Lonsdale anywhere without him noticing.We therefore envisioned a flexible approach.Every night we had a team of watchers follow him, but only for a short distance, before slipping away.The next day another team of monitors changed and followed him where the previous team of monitors had left him, and followed him for a short distance.As he continued in this way, the distance between his Waldur Street office and his destination continued to increase.The whole operation took two weeks.We mobilized our wives and volunteers from the office to assist the watch team so we could never show the same face twice.Finally we followed up to 45 Cranly Gardens, Ruslip, West End.Apparently, Lonsdale lived in the small house with the owner of the family.The couple, Peter Kroger and Helen Kroger, are New Zealanders.They opened a small bookstore specializing in American classics.We set up a fixed observation post on the opposite side of the house and waited, judging that neither husband nor wife had spotted us. In mid-November, Lonsdale unpacked his suitcases from Midland Bank and moved back to his flat in the White Building.We immediately sent Arthur Spencer, a technician from Communications Headquarters, to the adjoining suite to monitor the Rafters.For the next three months, Spencer barely left the apartment.We also placed a non-contact bug on the AC power supply of the Lonsdale receiver, connected to the buzzer on the earphones.Spencer wore the headset all day, so even if Lonsdale turned on the receiver in the middle of the night, Spencer would be woken up by the buzzer in the headset.As soon as the buzzer sounded, Spencer switched on the Rafter receiver, tuned in, looked for the Lonsdale frequency, and immediately reported to Communications Headquarters on Palmer Street.Palmer Street headquarters received the signal, and immediately sent the signal to Cheltenham headquarters.There, a cryptanalyst named Bill Collins used the copied Lonsdale's one-time code book to decipher the telecommunication, and sent the deciphered code back to the Argentine who was waiting in Leconfield Building, London, using a special cipher telex line. Arthur and me. Collins, however, was never able to decipher the first telegram Lonsdale received.There is no indicator group in the message this time, and the indicator group is a group of non-encrypted signals, in other words, a group of non-encrypted signals composed of one-time pads.The recipient must match all the signals with the one-time code book before they can decipher it (it was not until Lonsdale was arrested that we discovered that the indicator group of this group of messages also used the code, that is, using his real date of birth ). Arthur and I guessed that perhaps Lonsdale knew that his codebook had been compromised and switched to a new one brought from abroad.There was only one way to do it now, and that was to sneak into his apartment and check his lighter carefully to see if he had used the code book he kept inside.So Winterborn and I broke into his apartment on the Lonsdale to Suffolk for the jukebox business.The suite was shabby and small, barely big enough for a bed.We opened the lighter and found the code book was still there, just torn out a few pages, which means he still has the code book.I looked it over and realized that Lonsdale had used more lines than needed to translate the telegram from Moscow.As long as you use a few more lines to look down, you can accurately translate the telegram. Over the next two months, we successfully monitored Lonsdale's biweekly Moscow cables, most of which were sent to Horton, a KGB agent code-named "Shah of Iran."The cable also instructed Lonsdale what to do with Holden, what questions to ask him, what documents to get from him in Portland.There are also some private cables from Lonsdale, which tell him about his wife and children in the Soviet Union, and that he has been working secretly abroad for five years. go home. On Monday, January 2, Hollis chaired a full review of the case.Arthur was urging us to let it go further, he had an intuitive feeling that Lonsdale was an extremely important outlaw and that he was only associated with Holden as a spy.Also, we don't know anything about the Krogers except that soon after Lonsdale moved in, the house was fitted with high-quality Chubb locks, and even the windows were locked.What is even more puzzling is that it is also locked where it connects to the roof.Based on the information we have gathered, Lonsdale is most likely a member of a vast spy network.Both Jones and I agree with Arthur's analysis.Hollis agreed to contact the Admiralty (whose secrets Horton had betrayed) and asked them to leave Horton alone for three months.The Admiralty granted Hollis' request.In order to take as little risk as possible, Arthur decided to stop all public reconnaissance and only use "rafters" to intercept Lonsdale's radio communications, trying to catch more spies from them. However, two days later, our plans were ruined.Cliff Crumb, the CIA officer in charge of liaison with MI5 at the U.S. Embassy in London, sent Hollis a confidential letter.The letter warned MI5 that the "sniper" had told the CIA that he intended to defect to the United States the next day, January 5.Hollis called us into a meeting again.Now there's really only one course of action left: If Sniper defected, Horton, Lonsdale, and even the Krogers would all be alarmed by his defection.We must capture them before they retreat.Coincidentally, Horton and Lonsdale will meet on Saturday, January 7, and as usual, Lonsdale will listen to Moscow's telegram in the early hours of that day. Are you calling the police on him? A great deal of preparatory work was required to arrest these men, and I have not slept for three days in order to arrange it.Holden's case handler, Charles Elwell, was ordered to go to Portland and conduct a search of Holden's residence as soon as he learned that the arrest had been made.Bill Collins had come down from Cheltenham and was at the headquarters in Palmer Street, waiting for the telegram from Moscow and set to work on deciphering it as soon as it arrived.The Special Operations Service was standing by outside the Lonsdale suite, ready to arrest Holden as soon as Moscow called and told him to go into hiding. On Friday night Arthur and I stood guard all night in the operations room on the third floor of the Leconfield Building.The room was so cramped, and the walls were painted that nasty brown paint, that at first glance it looked like a prison cell.An iron bed stood against the wall, and in the center was a small table.The ground is strewn with wires.There were several telephones on the desk leading directly to Special Operations Headquarters, Communications Headquarters, and the Director.A small loudspeaker went all the way to Lonsdale's suite in the White House, and whenever there was sound in the suite, it came through instantly. Arthur leaned over the table, smoking one cigarette after another.Winterborn was nervous and excited, and he said little.Jones, with his shoes off but his pants on, leaned back on the bed.He is the director of Division D, caring for his subordinates and insisting on fighting with everyone.He also went to the tavern in the "Shepherd's Market" and bought some sandwiches for everyone to eat.We drank scotch and smoked cigarettes to pass the time.The ashtray was gradually filled with cigarette butts. Lonsdale brought a girl back in the night after a carefree evening in the city.We listened attentively.They were flirting at this time, and their obscenities came from the speaker, so I quickly turned off the speaker.When their room was quiet again, I asked Arthur how many years Lonsdale would be in prison. "I think at least fifteen years," he said. There was a look of pity on Winterborn's face.He is a devout Christian.At this time he thought that a person's life was about to be destroyed, and he should not gloat.I poured myself another glass of whiskey. I murmured, "I can't help but think of his wife and children..." They all knew what I was referring to.Like me, they've all seen the Lonsdale cables we intercepted.These telegrams talked about the joys and difficulties of the family, about not being able to reunite on birthdays, and about the children's longing for their father.Although Lonsdale is a spy, he is also a human being after all, and he always has emotions.He, like other men far from home, must have been desperate for domestic pleasures, and his search for a new love was only a hopeless remedy. "He's not like Horton, he's not a traitor. He's just like us, but he just wants to complete his mission." Jones, in a fit of rage, sprang up from the bed and shouted, "Shut up! He did it of his own accord. He could have been a diplomat. He knew the dangers of doing it. It's his own doing." .” I will not speak, but we are all brooding because we have become so familiar with the situation in Lonsdale in the past two months. The next morning, Lonsdale woke the girl up and advised her to go first.He said he had urgent matters to attend to.Indeed.After the girl was gone, we heard him take out the radio, find out the code book, and prepare to receive the signal from Moscow.A few minutes after the radio rang, Lonsdale deciphered the code on paper.From the fact that he took a bath with a relaxed expression and hummed Soviet songs, it can be seen that the Soviet Union did not warn him.A few minutes later, the green phone on our desk rang.It turned out that Bill Collins reported the content of the telegram to us. Collins said that the telegram was a routine report to Lonsdale about work and family conditions, and there was no trace of alarm. We immediately informed the Special Service that we were ready to arrest Holden as soon as Lonsdale received the mail package from him.At five o'clock the Special Operations phone rang. "The last act is over!" The last act is our nickname for Lonsdale.Lonsdale will soon be sent to prison. Winterbourne went straight to the White Flats and searched the Lonsdale flat while Arthur and I waited for news of the arrest of the Krogers.Seven o'clock came, and we were all exhausted, but very happy.We were in a car on the way to Ruslip at the time.When we arrived at Cranly Gardens, there was chaos and police everywhere.They did whatever they wanted, searching the apartment aimlessly.I tried to stop the cops, but to no avail.A policeman pulls out a plastic bag full of chemicals.Arthur protested what they were doing, to no avail. "I'm sorry, sir. I think this is the evidence," said the policeman. "This is a criminal incident. If your people want to see it, they have to go through the normal channels..." The police operation was led by Detective Inspector George Smith.Smith, who was in Special Operations, had a reputation for elevating himself.Beforehand, we had emphasized to him that news of the arrest of these spies would be blocked for forty-eight hours, so that it would be in our interest to monitor the Moscow radio broadcasts.But within hours of the arrests of the spies, rumors spread in Fleet Street that an important espionage ring had been cracked, and Smith boasted to some reporters that he himself had played a vital role in the operation.Since then, Radio Moscow has never sent any signals. The police fumbled through the apartment, which was full of spy tools.Two different codebooks were hidden in the lighter, which was identical to the one Lonsdale usually used.There are also three different programs for listening to Moscow radio signals and steganographic material, as well as particles made with lead acid and Cysan.In order to destroy the evidence, Mrs. Kroger tried to dump the detailed records of the spy meeting in her handbag into the toilet, but was discovered by a highly vigilant female policeman in time.She immediately stopped Mrs. Kroger from selling the stolen goods.During the search, the police also found a plan to listen to the signals of Moscow's high-speed telecommunications, which most interested us.In a burning jar we found a vial of magnetic iron oxide, which was used to print Morse code from high-speed telecommunications onto slips of paper so that it could be read without having to transcribe the Morse code into complex on the tape recorder, and then read at a slower pace.This is a new technology.We now understand why the Kroger family was not listening to radio communications in the months leading up to the arrest. It was near midnight when the police left the building before we were allowed to search the ruins.They also left two young policemen watching us warily.We searched the house for nine days and finally found a receiver in a void under the kitchen floor, along with cameras and other radio equipment.Each piece of equipment is wrapped in moisture-resistant pockets that are sealed on the outside.Apparently they plan to keep the equipment for a long time. The next Wednesday, Hollis called everyone back into his office to congratulate everyone on the success of the operation.The new D was tested under the leadership of Jones and Martin.For the first time since Maxwell Knight smashed the Woolwich Arsenal conspiracy in 1938, it was the first victory over the Soviets.Like the success of Swallow and Palisades, the Lonsdale case depended largely on a new technology that I had developed with GCHQ and the Atomic Weapons Research Group. "Raftman", X-ray technology and the technology of copying codebooks allowed MI5 to handle the case smoothly.I am very proud of the success of this operation, because for the first time I played such a large role in the counterintelligence struggle, and also let the leaders of MI5 know what was possible.At the meeting, everyone thought that the work of the launch engineering committee was too heavy, and suggested that its work should be distributed to two units. The "Squad" was responsible for taking action against cryptographic targets at home and abroad, while the "Counter-Squad" was responsible for all counterintelligence work of the Launch Engineering Board, such as Rafters. Hollis asked me to draft a detailed report on the role of new technology in the Lonsdale case and to encourage similar new technology in future counterintelligence efforts.I went to Central Crown Court in London, where Lonsdale, the Krogers, Holden and Gee were all on trial.Holden and Gee, pale and anxious, looked around the walls of the courtroom from the dock. Lonsdale and Kroger, however, were indifferent to the trial.The Krogers whispered, whispered, or handed each other small notes; Lonsdale remained silent until eventually he told the court that his activities had nothing to do with the Krogers.But the Americans quickly recognized the Krogers. It turned out that they were Maurice Cohen and Lonna Cohen, who were involved in the Rosenberg nuclear espionage case. Now the FBI is looking for them everywhere.This discovery was embarrassing to me, because a few months before the arrests, I had met Al Belmonte of the FBI's A Branch in Washington and briefed him on the progress of the case.At that time, he suspected that the Krogers were the Cohens, but I didn't pay attention to it, and as a result, I didn't investigate in time.Lonsdale's identity is even more mysterious.It took us a year to learn that his real name was Conan Trofimovich Molodi, and that his father was a famous Soviet scientist.He himself was an experienced KGB officer under the pseudonym Gordon Lonsdale. The real Lonsdale was a Finnish Canadian who died of illness in 1955. I did a careful analysis of the Lonsdale case and asked GCHQ for some Soviet spy files involving secret radio broadcasts, like the Lonsdale case file.They provided me with a hundred loose-leaf copies.These materials first listed the personal details of the spy—when did he start his spy career, when did he end it, what was his goal, which department he served, etc. A list of incoming telegrams, including the number of times, the number of sets, various details of the use of the code system, and the date when the code was changed, etc. I organized the material and divided it into two categories: one for the KGB and one for the GRU.Then it is subdivided according to the types of spies: single person, long-term lurker, illegal spy who actively contacts one or two assistants, and resident liaison officer of the illegal spy group, etc.After distributing these materials, I was surprised to find that different types of spies have different communication methods.We could tell what kind of spy he was from the radio communications they each used.In other words, we can also determine what kind of spies they are by analyzing the number of groups and the length of the message in their telecommunications.For example, a single latent spy received very few telegrams, and a single GRU spy received not too many telegrams, and the KGB resident illegal elements received the most telegrams.The most important type of espionage is the resident illegal elements of the KGB, who receive a total of five hundred to one thousand telegrams per month. It soon became apparent to me that the Lonsdale case was quite different from the others I had studied: in this case there were many, sometimes two, sometimes even three, ways of communicating, whereas in the other cases not so much.But there was only one person who provided information to Lonsdale and Kroger—Horton.的确，霍顿的地位非常重要，他能够收集到英美潜水艇探测系统的重要情报，但他为什么不直接用朗斯代尔却要通过克罗格夫妇呢？ 单从表面上看，这桩案件就会涉及到其他间谍。克罗格夫妇住在美国空军基地附近的鲁斯利普，我们发现，朗斯代尔曾在东方研究学校读过书，他所学的那些课程正是英国军官和军情六处的实习员所学的。 毫无疑问，朗斯代尔是一名在英国的常驻非法间谍。于是我对他十月份从莫斯科回到伦敦后所收到的电讯进行了认真的统计。他平均每个月从莫斯科收到三百组到三百五十组电讯。这使我感到疑惑不解。其他常驻非法间谍每月平均收五百到一千组电讯，而且一般总超过五百组，那么朗斯代尔所收的电讯为什么这么少？少在哪里？朗斯代尔的呼号是三位数，如果广播有电文，就包括一个“1”，如果没有电文也就没有“1”了。我向通讯总部询问，他们是否可以找到与朗斯代尔八月离开英国以后和朗斯代尔十月回到英国以后所收到的长度相似的电文。通讯总部找了一段时间，终于找出了一个称为“连续性”时期的电文。那是在六年前，当朗斯代尔刚刚踏上英国土地的时候。 这段时期的电文的组数是五百到一千，这正是常驻非法间谍所收到电讯的组数。一九六〇年八月，电讯突然中止了，因为朗斯代尔回莫斯科去。我们没有找到那时的密码本，因而也就无法破译他的电文了。但如果朗斯代尔的电讯量是五百组到一千组之间，那么为什么他回来以后突然减少了呢？这仍然是个谜。 然后我又去研究克罗格夫妇的通讯。他们的通讯更加令人费解。他们所收到的大部分通讯都是与他们自己有关的，他们似乎仅仅是朗斯代尔的助手，同其他任何间谍没有联系。但很明显，他们替朗斯代尔保存了某些通讯，例如他们的密码本几乎同朗斯代尔的一模一样，也藏在打火机里。我又计算了密码本里的组数，发现正好与朗斯代尔十月份回国后少掉的那些电讯组数相等。看起来，苏联人在朗斯代尔回来以后就把发给他的信号分开了，而“伊朗国王”（霍顿）电讯仍在原先的线路上，我们已经破译了这种电讯。至于其他的电讯——也许也包括下达给霍顿手下的间谍的电讯——都划分到克罗格夫妇的线路上了。苏联人认为这样不仅安全而且能在拍发消息时使用高速发报机，从而躲过我们的监听范围。 这种变化说明，朗斯代尔已经知道，他在白色公寓的套间里用打火机里的密码本收听莫斯科电讯的事情已经败露，但如果他感到害怕，那为什么不用新的密码本呢？而且，如果苏联人担心他已暴露，又为什么不让他回国呢？ 我又对逮捕前周末发生的一系列事件作了分析。从逮捕前那个星期五开始，到下一个星期一的中午，我一直派人监听苏联使馆内的外交接收机。使馆最后一次发报的时间是星期六上午十一点，这是在逮捕之前。下一次的发报时间是星期一上午九点。虽然我们粉碎了一个重要的间谍网络，在伦敦的苏联间谍显然没有同莫斯科取得联系。当然这只能说明苏联人事先已经知道我们要下手了。 另外，我还查核了苏联在伦敦的情报官员周末的活动。星期日傍晚，当这伙人被捕的新闻在电视上第一次报道时，一个叫柯罗文的克格勃常驻非法间谍和克格勃常驻合法副主任卡皮柯夫正在一起吃晚饭。探针话筒录下了他们谈话的全部内容。从话筒中，我们可以推断出他们正在聆听这则新闻，既不评论，也没有同使馆联系。 接着我重新回想了案子刚开始的情景，并发现了一件惊人的事，它使我相信苏联人事先一定听到了风声。案子开始时是由D处二科主办的，当时我们还在怀疑朗斯代尔是个波兰间谍。我查对了各种记录以后发现D处二科没有一个人知道“筏夫”行动，他们不知道苏联人正在窃听我们监视队的无线电。因此在这个案子移交给阿瑟之前，他们仍然使用监视队在七八两个月里对朗斯代尔进行了十七次跟踪。 自从“狮子胡须行动”以后，军情五处就对所有监视队的通讯进行了录音。我曾做过一次试验。我曾把二科第一次跟踪朗斯代尔时监视队的通讯录音带交给了阿瑟手下的研究员伊夫琳·麦克巴尼特，同时还交给她一本监视队用的伦敦地图册，要她根据他们的无线电通讯在地图上标出监视队的行动路线。麦克巴尼特过去从未做过这种工作，也没有分析通讯信号的经验，但她只用了三个小时就圆满地完成了任务，而且一点疏忽也没有。既然她都可以分析监视队的电讯，那么对经验丰富的苏联人来说当然就更容易了。他们肯定是在我们开始对朗斯代尔进行盯梢时就知道了。 我写报告的时候，“狙击手”已经安全到达华盛顿附近中央情报局的一幢保安楼了。他说自己在波兰情报局工作，真名叫迈克尔·戈林涅夫斯基。在他提供的情报中有一条非常模糊的线索，使得朗斯代尔一案在人们心中留下了一个疑问。他向中央情报局透露，七月的最后一个星期里，波兰情报局的一位高级官员告诉他，苏联人在中央情报局里有一个代号为“猪”的间谍。戈林涅夫斯基还说，他最初的任务是协助查找这个间谍，但他已经察觉到有人正在怀疑他，于是便在圣诞节时叛逃了。 “七月的最后一个星期”，“狙击手”在汇报中这样说。我反复琢磨这句话，想从中找到隐藏在它背后的意思。这句话看起来普普通通。我又重新查阅了有关材料。军情五处第一次发现朗斯代尔与霍顿会晤是在七月二日。十一日，朗斯代尔的身份得到确认。十七日我们就开始了跟踪。消息传到苏联人那边，需要一个星期，然后再传到波兰情报局又要一天。正好是七月的最后一个星期！ 在我所起草的文件中，朗斯代尔案件的报告算是最头痛的一份了。我的成功就要变成泡影。我还记得一九六一年五月间，我把这个报告呈上以后，在我的家乡，埃塞克斯郡附近的黑水河里驾船游玩的情景。呈现在我眼前的是一片宽阔的平原，晴空万里，白云朵朵，清新的空气和优美的景色使我暂时忘却了烦恼。但无论我怎样划船，无论我怎样调整船桅，总逃不了这样一个结论，那就是苏联人一开始就知道我们要对朗斯代尔动手了，但为什么他们把他叫回去以后又要派他来呢？ 惟一的解释就是有人泄密。如果苏联人在军情五处有内线，那么他一定会向他们报告“狙击手”的情况。只有这样才能解释为什么戈林涅夫斯基在七月的最后一个星期里受到了如此大的压力。诚然，苏联人和我们一样只能假设“狙击手”的真实身份。这样才能解释苏联人为什么会知道我们在银行的行动。一旦朗斯代尔暴露以后，苏联人就得把他召回莫斯科，但在我向上级报告了“狮子胡须”情报和琼斯开始调查以后，那个内线非常害怕，于是马上同苏联人进行了联系。这样苏联人必须在朗斯代尔和那个内线之间作出选择：是掩护朗斯代尔还是掩护那个内线。使军情五处停止对内部奸细进行调查的最好办法就是叫朗斯代尔回国。他们这样做，是希望在我们逮捕这些人之前能从霍顿那里榨取最后一点情报。在他回到英国之前，苏联人为了确保那个内线的安全，便把朗斯代尔手下的其他间谍转为由克罗格夫妇代管。如果真是这样，那苏联人就大大低估了他们的对手——新D处的先进程度了。虽然苏联人在许多方面占有优势，但最终还是失败了。我们俘获了他们最重要的补充成员克罗格夫妇。那个内线呢，很可能就在军情五处的高级官员中，并可以肯定，他不在监视队，也不在其他辅助部门。苏联人不会为了一个低级内线而付出朗斯代尔这样宝贵的人。在破获朗斯代尔案件时，总有人在干涉。这说明这位高级官员正在此案中起作用，他们都是军情五处的最高领导人。 一九六一年五月，我向琼斯呈交了报告。后来他又把我的报告交给了副局长格雷厄姆·米切尔，并在后面附了一张条子。条子上写的是：“请勿忘记，破获朗斯代尔一案是彼得·赖特的一项个人成绩。” 但几个月过去了，我却没听到一点他们对我报告的反应。在这段时间里，我和米切尔、霍利斯一起参加了许多会议，而且常常逗留得很晚。我心里总希望他们会同我谈起我的报告，但这只是我的假想，事实上什么音讯也没有。既没有会议记录和信件，也没有威胁和谈话。就像我根本没写过那份报告一样。到了十月，有一天傍晚时分，霍利斯请我到他办公室去。他坐在写字台后面，旁边是米切尔。 霍利斯摆出局长的架子，傲慢地对我说：“彼得，今天的讨论将由格雷厄姆主持。”然后，他翻了翻我的报告，满脸不高兴。我于是转过身面向米切尔，米切尔浑身是汗，竭力避免同我的目光接触。 “看了你的分析报告，”他说，“坦率地说，我并不很感兴趣。据我看来，间谍工作始终是很简单的……” 对他的这番话，我大不以为然。 “先生，如果需要，我将非常高兴向你们解释报告涉及到的所有问题。有的技术问题是很难用文字解释清楚的。” 米切尔继续讲下去，好像根本没听见我的插话。 “很简单，我们逮捕了三名苏联职业非法分子，并且对他们判了刑——这是我们几十年来第一次把苏联人送上法庭。我们逮捕的两名间谍都是十分危险的人，他们就隐藏在我国最机密的水下集团里。无论你怎么说，这都是一个伟大的胜利。如果苏联人有意让我们这么干，那对他们有什么好处？” 我向他们解释了报告中的问题，并向他们汇报了尚未解决的疑点，尽量避免主观推测。但米切尔却不同意我的论点。他质问我是怎么知道苏联人的活动和想法的？怎样能够肯定内部有人泄密？他认为那次银行行动可能只是巧合。他说，苏联人虽然有可能在窃听监视队的无线电，但却不会知道我们对朗斯代尔的跟踪。 “彼得，你知道，他们并不是万能的上帝！” 当我谈到无线电技术的变化时，米切尔很不高兴，说他不是统计学家。 “你在报告中说，还会出现更多的间谍，并且说苏联人是有意重新派朗斯代尔回来的。可是彼得，你怎么证明你的观点呢？” “先生，请不要忘记，你也没有充分的证据说明你所说的是事实。我们都是在假设。”我反唇相讥道。 这时，霍利斯插了进来：“是啊，但事实是我们已经把他们关起来了。” “可是关多久？蒂斯勒案件发生以后，我们就一直在想这个问题。我们每次都是有头无尾，结果过了一段时间以后，问题又重新冒了出来……” “副局长和我已经仔细研究过了，我想你一定也很清楚我的意思。” “你是否暗示我不要再进一步调查了？” “正是这样。如果你能对这事守口如瓶，我将不胜感激。安全局由于这次胜利，而名扬千里。彼得，你的名声也很大哩！我不愿意让那些不切实际的假想来破坏我们的进步。” 霍利斯冲着我微微一笑，然后削起铅笔来。我刷地站了起来，走出了他的办公室。