Chapter 11 Chapter nine

From the late 1950s to the early 1960s, British intelligence achieved successes in operations Swallow (Egypt) and Palisades (France).GCHQ draws up a huge list of all targets, divided between domestic and foreign priorities.MI5 was responsible for gathering information on all national embassies in Britain, including the location of code rooms, details of incoming and outgoing cables, and estimates of whether a target could be "swallowed" or "fenced".MI6 did the same abroad, conducting detailed technical reconnaissance of targets on GCHQ lists.Without the valuable assistance of the post office abroad, they had to rely largely on the traditional methods of espionage to carry out their work.

After Operation Fence, a plan was drawn up to decipher the codes of most European countries, starting with Germany.However, after great efforts, the operation was called off because the German machine shielding was in excellent condition.We then managed to place a sounding microphone behind the cipher machine at the Greek embassy in London.Greece was an extremely valuable target because of their enormous support to the Cypriot partisan leader Colonel Grivas during the state of emergency in Cyprus.We did the same against the Indonesian embassy during the conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia, breaking Indonesian codes throughout the conflict.

For MI6, the most memorable radio interception operation was against the Russian cruiser Ordzhonikidze.MI6 was still determined to scout the warship, despite the unsuccessful use of "Big Bomb" Crabbe at Portsmouth last time.In 1959, the ship was in the docks of Stockholm for repairs, and MI6 knew that the Swedish Signals Intelligence Service planned to take action against her.The head of MI6's local substation suggested to the Swedes that Britain was willing to provide advanced technology for assistance.The Swedish Signals Intelligence Agency maintained a nominal neutrality, but in fact it maintained an informal and secret relationship with the British Government Communications Headquarters, so Sweden was grateful for the British offer of help.

I went to Stockholm in 1959 to lay out the plan for Operation "Swallow" on the Ordzhonikidze's cipher machine.Disguised as a Swedish engineer, I arrived at the dock in the dead of night, accompanied by two strong SIGINT technicians, and two men from Communications Headquarters.We hid in the warehouse opposite the Ordzhonikidze. The "swallowing" equipment had already been sent to the upstairs studio. We climbed to the studio and stayed in this small room for five whole days.It was a hot summer day and the temperature outside was in the ninety degrees Fahrenheit.The roof of the warehouse was made of corrugated iron, and we almost suffered from heat stroke in the heat. Fortunately, there were some extremely strong lagers in the refrigerator, which made us feel a little relieved.Although we heard some code noise, we were never able to decipher the code, but both MI6 and GCHQ considered the operation a success.

"Like the Mounties," MI6 representative Pat O'Hanlon yelled, grinning, at a later meeting of the Radio Transmission Engineering Committee, "we can get whoever we want." The results of technical reconnaissance continued to increase, and the operations carried out on the basis of these technical reconnaissances also expanded. The scale of the "raftman" and "swallowing" operations also expanded significantly.In 1960, the Radio Transmission Engineering Committee, composed of technical staff from MI5, MI6 and Communications Headquarters, was established with the main task of coordinating work.The committee meets fortnightly, sometimes in Chelter South and sometimes in Leconfield Hall.I was the first chairman of the committee, although Ray Frawley volunteered to run the day-to-day business and soon took over the reigns of the committee.Ray Frawley, the GCHQ officer, was vigorous, self-determined, with a flair for management, not the narrow-mindedness of some of his colleagues at Cheltenham.He oversees documentation and provides technical resources and staff to the heads of various operations.In addition, he is responsible for receiving extremely important instructions from the ministers in charge.

The Radio Transmission Engineering Committee was one of the most important committees in the British intelligence community in the post-war period.In the late 1960s, a new generation of electronic computers appeared, and the committee made great efforts during this decade to ensure the success of the cryptanalytic work of GCHQ.More importantly, it cleared the barriers separating MI5, MI6 and GCHQ.The British intelligence community was again working as a coordinated whole, as it had been during the war, and was therefore more successful than before. At the end of the 1950s, there were also some important advances in research work.When I joined MI5, the main forum for scientific research was the Colemore Committee.Once a year MI6 invites a dozen of the most prestigious scientists from outside the secret world to meet once a year in a secure conference room in the Carlton Terrace Building.In return, MI6 treated these men to an elaborate lunch in the hope that these prominent figures would serve as unofficial scientific advisers to the secret service, to provide them with guidance, ideas and connections.The first time I attended a Colemore Committee meeting, I immediately saw that it was a complete waste of time.Discussions in the morning will be loose.After some beer, gin, and the best claret, hardly anyone on the committee thought much about complicated scientific issues.After a tiring day, Peter Dixon led everyone to the city for another supper.Late at night, they were sent to a low-brow nightclub in Soho.To put it more civilly, the show performed here can be called "yellow song and dance".I'll never forget Dick White's ugly face as he forced a smile on the drinking-blushing sophisticates around the table.He shared my feeling that such an approach would not solve the deep scientific problems facing MI5.

The Colemore Commission was somewhat useful as a public opinion-making body.I realized from the outset that MI5 needed to develop a thorough in-house research programme, which would require appropriate human and financial resources.It strikes me as utterly ridiculous that the Treasury Department, with the flick of a pen, pouring vast sums of money into weapons research, should resist appropriating the small sums needed to modernize the secret service. Shortly after I joined MI5 in 1955, I went to Sir Frederick Brundritt and asked him to help me secure the necessary funds.He sympathizes with that.He suggested that I first conduct a thorough survey of the current state of technological advancement in the KGB, and then write a report outlining the areas where MI5 and MI6 were deficient, so that my application might be approved.

I went to my colleagues in MI6, and the H Branch Technical Section soon realized that they lacked intelligence in this regard.I decided to make a comprehensive study of the reports of all German scientists.At the end of the war, they were forced to go to the Soviet Union and work in Soviet government laboratories for several years as the price of freedom.These scientists are what are known as the "Returned Dragons."Their reports provided much information on the status of Soviet rockets, jet aircraft, and nuclear research, areas in which the Russians were eager. I visited Defense Scientific Intelligence and asked General Strong if I could study the files.I was taken to a house in Northumberland High Street where all the material on "The Return of the Dragon" was kept.These dozens of hundreds of books are covered with dust.It never occurred to MI5 and MI6 to organize the material for their own use.It's just astonishing.

It took me a few months to sort through the "dragon" material, and it didn't take long for it to become clear.There were many "Dragon" scientists who were instructed in detail to do technical intelligence work for the KGB-controlled laboratories outside Moscow.I made a list of the names of the "Dragon" scientists I would like to meet with, most of those briefings in the past have been conducted by general military personnel in the UK and US who have no scientific training and are very ignorant when it comes to intelligence gathering, I'm sure I More information can be obtained from these scientists.

When I went to Germany in 1957, I was met by Peter Dommerson, MI5's senior representative in Germany, who arranged meetings for me at British Military Intelligence Headquarters in Hanover and Gladbach in Munich.In the 1950s, most intelligence officers liked Germany, where it was the front line and the work was free and easy.Kodomesen was disgusted by the deepening tension in Berlin, and he was convinced that the Russians would soon attempt to annex West Berlin. The meeting was difficult, with many scientists trying to court Britain and the United States.I try to ask as many technical questions as possible, and their comments are obviously pandering to me.It is not denied that they suffered a lot during their imprisonment in Moscow and many of their friends died.But it is also impossible to forget which side they worked for during the war.

Among the scientists who met for the first time, one was the one who developed "that thing", which was the "thing" that Americans discovered in 1950 in the national emblem on the wall behind the desk of the US ambassador to the Soviet Union.I'm glad that he's talking about how "that stuff" works exactly as I predicted that day in Marconi's Nissen-style trailer.But when I questioned him again, I couldn't help feeling that MI5 in the 1950s was haunted by frustration.We know that the KGB has deployed something that is only just showing up in the British research arena. In early 1958, I sent the report on the "Dragon" scientists to MI6 for approval.Brundritt urges me to do this: It carries more weight if the application for the grant is made jointly by both bureaus.The report was countersigned and sent to the Defense Policy Research Council, of which Brundritt is chairman.The report caused a general shock in the committee. No one had ever described the KGB's more advanced aspects than the West before.In my report I confirmed that the KGB, through the efforts of the "Dragon" scientists, had achieved significant technological advantages in certain areas, especially in electronics and surveillance equipment, including the use of infrared systems, which enabled them to took the lead. Thanks to Brundritt's foresight, and through the efforts of his specialized committees, technical research work was carried out.I have been a member of this committee since 1949.We have to add more manpower and material resources to make it a formal organization and further enrich the research plan.I submitted yet another joint MI5/MI6 report known as the "Technical File" (that's the name of the KGB erection!).In this report, I describe the areas where progress is needed and emphasize the development of advanced electronic technologies.As a result of the "Dragon" papers and the "Technical Papers," technical research by the intelligence community in general, and by MI5 in particular, took on a higher priority in the DPRC.Unfortunately, the committee rejected the idea of ​​special funding for the intelligence community, and they wanted to make up for it by incorporating our needs into existing defense research programs.I still have to beg around, but at least the climate is changing. In 1958, when "technical papers" were being considered, Hollis introduced me to a man named Victor Rothschild.This man worked for MI5 during the war and did a huge job in keeping MI5 modern (he was awarded the "George Medal" for defusing bombs).He maintained close relations with many officials, especially Dick White.When I met him, he was the director of research at Shell Oil Company, controlling more than thirty laboratories around the world.When Hollis told him I had been appointed MI5 scientist, Rothschild expressed an interest in meeting me and invited me to dinner at his elegant flat in St James's, London. No one has impressed me more than Rothschild.He is a talented and intelligent scientist and a member of the Royal Society, proficient in botany and zoology, and has a strong interest in studying the structure of sperm.He was far more than a scientist, and he associated with people in politics, intelligence, banking, civil service, and abroad, all legendary figures.The British ruling group is like a seamless imperial robe, and this imperial robe often uses the needle of Rothschild to lead the thread. Rothschild was fascinated by my plans to modernize MI5 and gave me some of his suggestions.I soon learned that he was interested in the trivia and intrigues of the secret world.We quickly exchanged stories of those wartime colleagues he still remembered, talking late into the night.For the first time since I left his home, I couldn't help but feel that great things were possible with him behind him. Rothschild offered to give some of Shell's laboratories to MI5 and began several technical developments, including the development of a special lubricant primarily intended to protect long-term buried equipment.After this lubricant was developed, it could be widely used in MI5 and MI6.Rothschild suggested that I go to Sir William Cook, vice-president of the Atomic Weapons Research Group, and ask him for funding.I am also very familiar with Cook, and Rothschild is his close friend. Rothschild's timely lobbying made my meeting easier. Cook listened carefully to my narration of my request.The basic idea of ​​my counterintelligence approach is to develop technical methods to defeat the communications of Soviet spies.Among the cover methods of espionage, communication is the only breakthrough point that is easily breached.Because the spy always has to send and receive messages with his superiors.I explained to Cook that the Rafters had given us our most valuable weapon—knowledge of Russian radio communications.But we still urgently need new technologies to break through their physical methods of communication, such as steganography and particle technology.Dead letter delivery.If we make progress on these fronts, it can greatly increase our chances of success in counterintelligence. "Let's address some of these issues right away," Cook said.He picked up the handset and called one of his senior scientists, Dr. Frank Morgan. "Frank, I'm sending someone to work with you on a new project. I'll explain it to you when he gets here. You'll be glad he's just what you want." It's typical Cook generosity.He gave me the two main technical officers and some junior staff as well as funding equipment for MI5 to use alone.I have thirty people in the Atomic Weapons Research Group.The research group covered all costs for two years.Afterwards, the Defense Policy Research Council agreed to continue funding by the research group.Frank Morgan is a most rare and valuable talent, he solves problems with enthusiasm and vision.In two years, MI5 achieved far more success than could be dreamed of in the United States at the time. Steganographic techniques are the same everywhere in the world. The spy first writes the fake letter for cover, then spreads a special colorless chemically treated carbon paper, writes the cipher text on the carbon paper, and then puts a kind of Chemical particles are sprinkled on the letter paper so that only the recipient can reveal the encrypted text.Most of the disclosing agents reveal the traces left by the chemical carbon paper on the letter paper, so that the ciphertext can be recognized.Only by using the corresponding revealing agent can the ciphertext be revealed.Morgan invented a universal revealing agent, which uses radioactivity to avoid the possibility of being discovered by leaving traces when checking confidential letters. Particle technology is another method by which a spy in a foreign country can secretly communicate with his superiors.This method is to reduce the photo to a size that is invisible to the naked eye and can only be seen under a microscope.The particles are generally hidden under postage stamps, or on top of punctuation marks on typed letters, or in the seal of envelopes.Morgan used the neutron activation method to discover photograms of particles. The third method of espionage communication is dead letter delivery, and it is also one of the most commonly used methods.The spy leaves a package, such as a roll of developed film, at a pre-designated location for his superiors to pick up later, and the two never meet.The KGB often gave their spies specially prepared empty containers that could tell if they had been surreptitiously opened.Morgan developed a soft X-ray technique that would allow us to examine suspicious containers and learn what was inside them without opening them or damaging the undeveloped film inside. The last of Morgan's four projects was the development of a series of X-ray methods for opening advanced combination safes.These methods proved to outperform Jagger's lockpicking techniques.Morgan's X-ray device could read the safe's combination of numbers from the outside, allowing MI5 to open any safe in Britain. Despite advances in technology and research, MI5's counterespionage record in the 1950s remained pathetic.After Dick White became director in 1953, he realized that there was a big flaw in this area.Most of the wartime officers who were capable of running double agent cases left MI5, either retired or, like White, were promoted to senior leadership positions.Most of the people who replaced them were mediocre former colonial policemen with little experience in counter-espionage.During the war, Britain overwhelmingly fought against German intelligence, and now it was about to switch to a new war with the more sophisticated and more numerous Russian intelligence services.The group found it difficult to adapt to this transition.White established a new counterespionage division, D.He asked me to give them mainly scientific and technical advice, but progress was slow.For an extended period of time, the people in D Office resented my access to their secrets, and they continued to indulge in their technical ignorance.I remember when I used Ohm's law to explain some technical issues, a case officer said: "Come on, Peter, old friend, I don't need to know Ohm's Law, I'm just looking at the big picture." "My God," my lungs were about to explode, "every student knows Ohm's Law!" Chief of Division D Graham Mitchell is a smart guy, but he's weak.His policy was to carefully copy wartime double-agent techniques and recruit double agents whenever possible.He ran a vast spy network in the Russian, Polish and Czechoslovakian settlements.Whenever MI5 was notified or discovered that a Russian was approaching a student, businessman or scientist, they encouraged the approached person to associate with the Russian so that we could monitor the development of the case.Mitchell was convinced that a double agent would eventually be accepted by the Russians and placed in the heart of the illegal working network. A double-agent case is a time-consuming kind of hide-and-seek.One of the KGB's favorite tricks was to give the double agent a bag of money or an empty object (which we could inspect at the time) to drop off at the dead letter drop.Once such a thing happens, Department D will be paralyzed by the fatigue battle, and the surveillance team will be sent to the dead letter delivery place to guard day and night, thinking that some secret spy will come to pick it up in person, but in fact, no one will come at all. take.If it was money, the KGB officer who had handed it over to the double agent would have taken it himself.I had my doubts about the double-agent case policy, but they told me seriously that these were KGB training procedures, mainly to test the reliability of agents, and patience paid off. In effect, the Russians aimed to use the double agent case to fool MI5, to identify our case operatives, to distract us from their real operations. MI5's professional skill standards are lurid.The KGB must have known that we had a large number of double agents by listening to our surveillance communications systems.However, the investigators of Division D were also very clumsy. Before meeting their double agents, they hardly used other means except the most backward anti-surveillance technology.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a special department that provides "chicken feed" for MI5 (that is, secret materials for double agents, so that they can take them to the Russians to show their loyalty to the Russians). "Chicken Feed" includes totally unbelievable fake secret material about weapons we don't have, policy documents we won't implement, etc.I was skeptical of the whole "chicken feed" scheme at D, pointing out that only real secrecy would convince the Russians, which they thought was totally impossible. Another major area of ​​activity at D is the immigration area. D Branch's Spy Management Squad runs a large spy network, using spies in London to recruit other spies in these spy countries.This option was particularly attractive to MI5.Immigrants were easy recruits, so MI5 and MI6 could compete directly for intelligence on recruitment, much to the chagrin of MI6.In fact, in the early 1950s, these immigrant circles had already been fully infiltrated by the KGB, or by the intelligence services of its Eastern European countries.These immigrant circles, like double agent cases, distract us and expose our spymasters. The intelligence community had changed dramatically after the war, but MI5 remained at the level of the past, continuing to copy wartime double-agent techniques.Not only did it lack well-trained investigators, but more importantly, it no longer had the code-breaking advantage it had over the Germans during the war. Throughout the 1950s, MI5 struggled to avoid the most obvious counterespionage problem facing Britain at the time - Soviet penetration of the British ruling establishment in the 1930s.The nuclear espionage trials of Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs in the late 1940s and the defection of Burgess and McClain in 1951 illustrate the recruitment of "Stalin's The extent of the British" is obvious.Anyone who has had access to the relevant documents knows that there was a general sense of disillusionment among the British intellectuals of the thirties who came from well-born families.Russian intelligence exploited this sentiment and managed to recruit some key spies, at least some of whom remained loyal to the Soviet cause after the war. The defections of Burgess and McClain left a huge scar in MI5.Although Philby and Brent were also suspected, they denied it, and the two cases were quickly shelved.There was only one way to go, and that was to conduct a large-scale, in-depth investigation of the two diplomats' networks at Oxford and Cambridge.This scheme presents a certain degree of difficulty in investigative work, and most of Burgess and McClain's friends have now risen to fairly high-profile positions, not only in the intelligence community but also in the civil service .All those involved were doing their best to suppress news of the defection of the two men, and if word of the investigation got out, it would create a politically awkward situation.Moreover, a large number of investigations may lead to more people fleeing to Moscow, with disastrous consequences.No one wants to touch this difficult problem.After 1954, work in this area virtually ceased altogether, apparently thinking that the new censorship regimes then in place were considered sufficient to keep the country safe, as if locking the fox into the henhouse. One man who stood up against this negligent policy was Arthur Martin, a former Army signal officer who had joined MI5 right after the war.He quickly proves himself to be a talented and intuitive case worker.He successively handled the investigation work of two cases of Fuchs and McLean.He has a right-hand assistant named Evelyn McBarnett, she is a young female research officer.Martin had one great advantage in his exploration of counterintelligence work: he had never been to public school.When news of a serious leak at the British embassy in Washington came out, it was customary to search for the culprit among the clerks, cleaners, and secretaries, but Martin believed at the earliest stages that the culprit was a high-ranking diplomat.He insisted on an investigation, but McLean's defection derailed his investigation. In the wake of the defection, Martin pushed MI5 leadership to approve an urgent investigation into the entire complex web of communism infiltrating Cambridge University in the 1930s, subject to his request to meet with Philby, Burgess and McLean's social relations staff , almost all were rejected.He fought this deplorable policy for two years, and finally went to see Dick White, the head of the Security Service, and said he intended to resign to work for the newly formed Australian Security Intelligence Organization. White spoke highly of Martin's abilities, and he persuaded Martin not to go to Australia, and advised him to go to Malaya as a security liaison officer for MI5 until the weather in D Division was better.This was important work, and Martin played a leading role in a series of successful counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya.After he left D, counterintelligence work was clearly affected.In almost a decade, MI5 lost its ablest, and perhaps most volatile, officer. In 1956, after Hollis became director, a new chief of D, Martin Furnival Jones, was appointed.He trained as a lawyer and joined MI5 during the war.On the surface, he comes across as orthodox and quiet, with a lack of vision and life that makes him easy to underestimate.He has natural leadership skills, has a well-organized logical mind, and is receptive to new ideas.What stands out the most is his sheer determination - not to mention ruthlessness - that makes him an excellent counterespionage chief.He realized that the main problem facing MI5 was the massive Soviet bloc intelligence operation in Britain.For example, there are 300 Russian intelligence officials in Division D whose mission is to monitor and confront, but there are only 11 people in Section 1, four of whom are secretaries.We're lost, never knowing whether we're after a spy or a spy's shadow. One of the decisions Jones made was to reassign Martin back to Leconfield Hall from the outside and put him in charge of Czech and Polish affairs in D Division II.In 1959, he was transferred to Section 1 of Division D, in charge of anti-Soviet spies.Despite his often rough manner, Jones appreciated Martin's talents and his stubbornness to make the most of them.After Martin entered the first department, he took immediate action, and quickly resumed and strengthened the active counterintelligence investigation work of the first department.Because of his work on communications signals during the war, he could subconsciously grasp the importance of new technologies like the Rafter.For the first time, I found that a very qualified person listened to me sympathetically and made some changes according to my vision.We quickly became close friends.We're going to set up an index of sources at A, recording people and things that might be of use to MI5.So, we distributed the form inside the Security Bureau and asked everyone to fill it out.After several months of work, we finally built an index.If a case officer needs a nurse, or a plumber, or needs access to a company's files, or a locked garage, they can look it up in the index instead of wasting time looking for it. We have introduced action analysis in the method of modifying the order of battle.The idea, first proposed by Terry Guernsey, Chief of Counterintelligence in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, was to investigate the known movements of all personnel at the Soviet embassy and establish a comprehensive concept of their operations.In this way, it was possible to obtain important information on the identities of KGB officers. However, the most drastic changes are in the Operations Section.Michael McCall is the leader of this section, he is a great counterintelligence specialist and investigator.Martin and McCall used the Operations Division as a real battleground.Although our strength was much smaller than that of the Russians, we adopted an offensive attitude, constantly changing tactics, with the goal of disrupting KGB activities.The KGB used to predict our actions thoroughly in advance, and some of our plans were reckless, such as picking the pockets of all known KGB officers on the streets of London, hoping to collect scraps of intelligence.Although this method was unsuccessful, it enabled the Russians to feel that they were being attacked for the first time in many years.Also, there are some more meaningful modifications.The Soviet immigration spy network was without a doubt the most heavily infiltrated by the KGB, and was later disbanded.The approach taken in double agent cases was even more aggressive: investigators accompanied the double agents to meetings with their KGB superiors and warned KGB officials that if they were caught recruiting British spies again, they would report to the Foreign Office and deport him.McCall and his men began a daring attempt to recruit KGB men to serve as our spies.Although unsuccessful, we hoped that this change in tactics would sow the seeds of suspicion in the Russian embassy in Kensington Gardens. McCall has a knack for executing these new strategies.On one occasion, a technician who was building the new Bofors shells at the Royal Arsenal told MI5 that he had been approached by a KGB officer to provide samples of the new shells.McCall arranged for the factory to create a fake cannonball, filled with sand, to look as if it was actually loaded with gunpowder.When the double agent handed the shells to the Russian in a South London park, McCall immediately jumped out of the bushes and told the Russian that he was getting himself into a lot of trouble by blatantly carrying Britain's top-secret weapons. Sure to be declared persona non grata.KGB officers fear expulsion, partly because it would cost them the prestige of working abroad, but more importantly because it would mean failure.Any failure would naturally make their own counterintelligence officers suspicious.McCall also paints a picture of a burly London policeman taking the hapless Russian to a secret dungeon for torture and torture.The KGB officer trembled uncontrollably after hearing this. "Don't shake that shell, for God's sake," roared McCall, "it'll set the fuse on it." The Russian dropped the bomb and flew out of the park as if being chased by a shrew.The next day, he flew back home. In fact, the foreign ministry is notoriously reluctant to support it.We have repeatedly demanded the deportation of Russians we caught who were recruiting or directing spies, but most of the cases were rejected by the Northern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was in charge of Anglo-Soviet relations.From time to time I also attend such meetings of the Northern Division, giving technical reports on what certain Russian diplomats have been up to.Meetings always follow a pattern: MI6 representatives are always opposed to expulsions, they are afraid of retaliation from Moscow; It's about blah blah blah.Courtney Young once whispered to me as I emerged from the palatial committee office with him: "I've never seen such a breeding ground for cold-blooded animals!" Since the Foreign Office did not support it, we had to rely on unorthodox means of warning the Russians to stay away.At about the same time we received numerous reports from the surveillance teams on how the Russians approached them.One watcher said that he was in a tavern when a KGB officer came up to him, handed him an envelope containing a large sum of money, and talked to him about getting him to provide information on MI5's work. McCall decided to take an immediate action.He called the office of the resident KGB chief in the Soviet embassy and asked to arrange a meeting.At the time he was using the pseudonym McLeary, known to all Russians.He walked into the Soviet embassy with the air of a high-ranking official, warned the Russians not to approach the British monitors again, and sternly threatened diplomatic intervention.实际上这种于预是不大可能被批准的。麦考尔对自己这次虎穴之行感到很有兴趣，克格勃头子对他的到来表示热烈欢迎，并和他一起在一株巨大的叶兰下共饮午茶。俄国人对他的部下如此不谨慎地在外国领土上进行间谍活动表示怀疑，但还是同意了调查这事，看看是不是有人太积极了。 “也许英国安全当局弄错了，近来这里的交往事务太多，那么多的国家，那么多的大使馆，那么多的外交人员，有时很难肯定谁为谁工作……” 以后再也没有发生过俄国人接近监视员的事了。 一九五九年夏，正当D处的情况发生改变时，蒂斯勒案件又复苏了。这使我们的头脑里布满了疑云，陷入一片混乱。这件案子的重新发端是因为那个年青的男护士突然又重新活动起来了。我们当年在克拉普汉姆追踪“粗暴”信号就是因为他被俄国人招募过去的缘故。他的俄国上司这次给了他一只提箱，要他存放在家里。箱内装着一部旧的第二次世界大战时的无线电装置，这使我们立即怀疑整个事情又是一次游戏：想把我们从伦敦引诱出来。可我们没有依据证明俄国人已知道我们已把那个护士转变过来，因此我们决定进行跟踪。D处一科派了监视队连续不断地对那个护士在米德兰的家进行监视，与此同时，伦敦的其他监视活动全部停止。我安排监视总部播发俄国人和捷克人离开肯辛顿公园内的使馆的指令，使他们认为我们还在跟踪他们。 监视队离开伦敦三十六小时以后，监听他们通讯的俄国接收机也停止了工作。托尼·塞尔把这个情况告诉我，我立即感到非常可疑，过去蒂斯勒事件以后所进行的几次试验都没有得到什么确切的结果。六个星期以后，我们回到了伦敦，深信那只箱子是一个骗局。我安排了特别“筏夫”行动来核查俄国人究竟在什么时候重新使他们的接收机工作的。 第一个星期一的上午，我们没有对任何俄国人进行跟踪。下午两点半我们开始跟踪一个捷克外交官，不到半小时，俄国人的接收机就开始活动了，对着监视队的频率进行监听。我把“筏夫”的印刷记录给琼斯和霍利斯看了。这些材料首次给人一种确切的感觉：军情五处内部存在着为俄国人提供情报的人。霍利斯和琼斯听了以后大为震惊。俄国人最近对我们监视员进行接近的举动，证实了霍利斯的看法：如果有人走漏风声，那么这个人肯定在监视队内部。可在麦考尔拜访苏联大使馆以后，我们认为没有俄国人再接近监视员了。为了查出走漏风声的人，我们做了更多的“钡餐”试验，没有发现什么情况。一九五九年底，在知道蒂斯勒揭发情况的几个官员当中产生了一种要把此案进行最后一次解决的想法，哪怕要进行更为广泛的调查也在所不惜。十二月份，霍利斯把我叫去，他告诉我，说他打算停止对监视队的调查。 “我敢肯定，以前我们对蒂斯勒的结论是正确的，”他告诉我说，“我想我们该结束这事了。” 他彬彬有礼，可语气却很坚决。我认为把令人忧虑的事公开出来的时刻到来了。 “我确实认为，先生，我们应扩大我们的调查范围。泄密者有可能就在安全局的上层。” 霍利斯听到此话后并没有什么明显的反应。 “这是一个非常微妙的问题，彼得，”他平稳地说，“这会对安全局的士气产生可怕的影响。” “那也不一定，先生。我想你会发现，大多数官员都希望做点什么事。如果我们这里被渗透，尤其是在高一级的层次里，那么大部分人做的工作岂不等于浪费时间。” “这简直不切实际。”他回答说，语气也变硬了。 我指出，D处一科有调查小组，它可以轻松地担负这项工作。霍利斯最后抑制住了自己。 “我不准备对这个问题进行辩论，”他厉声地说，“我不可能同意接受任何行动，这会导致在安全局建立享有特权的盖世太保。” 他在档案上写下“此案到此为止”几个字，并签上了他的名。这一切都意味着我们之间的会晤结束了，然而，这个癌肿仍留在那里继续生长着。