Chapter 9 Chapter VII

Roger Hollis was never a man of prestige in MI5.He is stubborn and lacking in vitality, putting on an air of authoritative authority.I have to admit, I never liked him.Even those who leaned toward him doubted his suitability for such a top job.Like Cumming, he had formed a close friendship with Dick White in the pre-war days.Dick is a standout character, but likes to have some less able people working around him.I think this is a kind of lurking crisis, maybe he wants to use this contrast to highlight his talent.Hollis was far smarter and more capable than Cumming, especially in the bureaucratic arts.But I doubt that Dick might think him a man of vision and ideal.

Hollis believes that MI5 can only be a small-scale auxiliary security organization, collecting files, and carrying out some effective review and security work, and should not stretch its hands too far and intervene in anti-espionage work. in such a field.Counterespionage requires aggressive measures to achieve results, faces choices, and is prone to mistakes.I never heard Hollis comment on the implementation of major decisions by MI5, nor did he consider how MI5 could keep pace with the ever-increasing pace of intelligence warfare.He was not a man of this way of thinking, and he had only one simple purpose, lifelong and obsessed with it - to make MI5 and himself cater to Whitehall.This has to ensure that there will be no mistakes, and you have to pay the price of getting nothing done.

Hollis grew up in Somerset, the son of a bishop of Taunton.After Cliffe and Oxford, he traveled extensively in China before joining MI5 in the late 1930s.During the war, he served as the deputy director of Division F, in charge of Communist Party affairs.While Sillitoe was chief of security, Hollis was promoted to chief of Division C, responsible for various forms of vetting and security, such as sorting documents and installing security systems in all government buildings.Since he had stayed in Department C, he paid a lot of attention to the work of Department C after he became the director.

When Dick White succeeded Sillitoe as chief in 1953, he appointed Hollis as his deputy.On the face of it, it was a justifiable appointment, with Dick brainstorming and planning, and Hollis exercising an ability for practical administrative work that Dick lacked.As far as I know, he never struck me as an ambitious man during his tenure as Deputy Commissioner.He had risen to a position from which he had not expected, and had been White's stalker and confidant all his life.One important thing about this extremely mysterious person is well known, that is, he and his female secretary-general flirt with each other and flirt with each other.The girl was ambitious, and after White's sudden transfer to MI6, she moved into the chief's office with an overzealous enthusiasm that Hollis could not match.I suspect that Hollis was always aware of his own limitations, and that once he became director, he would cover them up with a harsh exercise of power, with the inevitable result that people would lose all the respect they had for his early days in office. A little favor.

Hollis took office at a time when relations between Britain's intelligence agencies were on the brink of disintegration, which is unprecedented.Relations between MI5 and MI6 have been tense since their earliest days.But in World War II, the two intelligence services, and the newly created Government Communications Headquarters (responsible for all forms of communications and signals intelligence), partnered for the first time in a coordinated intelligence bureaucracy (see , see The Secret Agency by Christopher Andrew).But within ten years, this close and effective relationship had all but collapsed.MI6 was hostile to MI5, seeing its involvement in the Philby case as an unjustifiable move, and the whole of MI6 considered it a disgrace that Aiden had appointed Dick White to succeed Sinclair. .

MI5 was without a doubt the least connected to GCHQ.During the war, MI5 had its own signals intelligence organization, the Radio Safety Service.In terms of cooperation in the double agent system, MI5 has a close relationship with this organization.The Radio Security Branch intercepted and deciphered the codes of the German intelligence service, the Abwehr, so that MI5 could catch German spies as soon as they set foot on British soil.MI6 later hosted the Radio Security Branch for MI5. B Branch was responsible for overseeing the screening of these spies, and those willing to cooperate with the British turned their heads and started sending fake radio reports to the Germans; those who refused to cooperate were executed.However, the success of using disinformation depends on how receptive the listening enemy is to disinformation.From Radio Security's radio intercepts and deciphering the enigma of German military codes, the "Milegema" Committee of Twenty, responsible for double espionage, would know exactly how much their deceit was affecting German military policy.

After the war MI5 lost their wartime intellectual essence and had lost interest in maintaining links with Signals Intelligence.Early in the war they ceded control of Radio Security to MI6.But the biggest obstacle is the Government Communications Headquarters. They are narrow-minded and block all forms of signals and communications intelligence.When I formally joined MI5 in 1955, contact with GCHQ was limited to meetings between an officer and a senior GCHQ officer every six months.In February 1956, I attended the first such meeting.The experience was unsuccessful.Both sides do not seem to realize that, as in World War II, on the one hand, GCHQ could play an important role in helping MI5 carry out its main mission of counterintelligence in the Cold War; The five are advancing in technology, and it is also possible that it will help Communications Headquarters.One of a series of suggestions I made was to try to check whether the Russians were listening to our radio surveillance communications.GCHQ representative Bill Collins, however, downplayed the active exploration of such committee work.

"I'll have to ask a question about that," he'd say, or, "I really don't think we have time for that." I complained to Cumming, but he didn't seem interested either. "That's their remit and it's best to let them run it." The MI5 officer in charge of liaising with GCHQ was Freddie Beeth, a very energetic D Branch counterintelligence specialist.His father is Welsh and his mother is Spanish, so he is very partial to rugby and has a changeable Latin character.He spoke fluent German and had been involved in the double-agent system during the war, serving as a double agent in Portugal and Spain.His communication with GCHQ was lost when Operation Pause began.It was an operation he was in charge of. It started in the early 1950s when GCHQ asked MI5 if they could get information on the diplomatic codes they were using in London. The intelligence personnel developed by Department D in foreign embassies managed to enter the password room to steal information.GCHQ hoped that Beeth's men would steal some scrap cipher tapes that they could use for codebreaking.Biss enthusiastically accepted the task, but in practice it was almost impossible. Most embassy cipher rooms, especially those of the Soviet bloc, were the most secretive places.The chances of an intelligence agent infiltrating the cipher room were slim.Still, Beeth scored a standout success with Operation Pause.He developed an intelligence officer working in the Czechoslovak embassy in Britain who was able to get the key to the master locker.Following Leslie Jagger's instructions, he printed a model of the key on plastic.It was a high-end Chubb brand lock. Jagger used high-quality plastic and measured the size accurately with a micrometer. Finally, he copied a key that could open the lock of the safe.The intelligence personnel successfully opened the safe and copied the newly delivered code book.At the time, these ciphers were not yet in use as the Czech diplomatic cipher.GCHQ deciphered the diplomatic communications of the Czech embassy for six months.Then the password was suddenly changed, and the intelligence officer was fired for unknown reasons.

Beeth hasn't accomplished much since then.When I got into MI5, I found that it was possible to use technical equipment to help "pause" operations, not the way of intelligence personnel.As Beeth himself admits, he's not a techie and it's hard to understand my opinion.He was the only officer allowed to keep in touch with GCHQ.If I want the people above to listen to my ideas, I have to make an effort on my own.Finally, I found Jobis out for a drink one night.I asked him if he would mind if I went to Cheltenham Communications HQ myself and talked to someone there. "Never mind, old man," said Beeth cheerfully. "You just go. I'm no good at this radio stuff. It's my remit to curb those human vices."

I made an appointment with an old friend from the Navy named Freddie Butler, who was a senior executive at Communications Headquarters.I explained to him that I felt that the link between MI5 and GCHQ needed to be rethought entirely.Butler arranged for me to meet Hugh Alexander and Hugh Denham, senior cryptanalysts at Communications Headquarters, bypassing Bill Collins. Alexander was in charge of Division 2 of the Communications Headquarters, which was in charge of cryptanalysis.He has a quiet but hard-working assistant—Denham.In the 1960s Denham finally succeeded Alexander.When war broke out, Alexander joined the pre-war predecessor of Communications Headquarters, Bletchley Park.He and Alan Thuring and Gordon Welshman were responsible for breaking the German wartime cipher.After the war, Turing went to the University of Manchester to engage in computer design, because of homosexuality, he was forced to commit suicide.Welshman went to the United States, specializing in the work of advanced electronic computers.Of the three, only Alexander remained alone at Communications Headquarters to do peacetime work.He was an excellent chess player and a formidable codebreaker.Although his work and hobbies are very thoughtful, he is still a calm tweed suit on the surface.I'm sure his health will eventually deteriorate from his overuse of the brain.Although he lived a peaceful life in the countryside all his life and never smoked or drank alcohol, he died of cancer suddenly at a young age.

I told Alexander and Denham that I had been ordered to take part in Pause and felt that MI5 could contribute more to GCHQ.I explained that MI5 had come a long way technologically since the Brundritt Commission was established in 1949, especially in the new microphones.I suggested that the intelligence needed for the "pause" operation might be obtained through technical means rather than through the use of intelligence agents.Using only intelligence personnel is now seen as doomed to repeated failures. "I'm not sure we'll be able to do anything concrete unless we have the opportunity to experiment. But I'm sure our new high-sensitivity microphones have the potential to get something out of the cipher. The ciphers are tested every morning by the ciphers. Adjust. Wouldn't it be helpful if we could hear the new password being put in?" Two cryptanalysts agreed with me, and I was nervous as I spoke.They felt very strange, because it was the first time they saw such scientists in MI5 in the intelligence community. "We'd be grateful for any help for Communications Headquarters," Alexander said. "Besides, we're novices compared to your organization. We haven't even built a house yet." He pointed out the window. Not far away, a team of construction workers was building another row of Nissen-style prefabs behind the main building of the communications headquarters. "Our problem is that the computer can't keep up," he continued. "We have a lot of ciphers to break right now, and we know how to do it, but we just don't have a computer powerful enough to take on the job. Of course, we'll have such a computer soon, but any help at the moment will be greatly appreciated." Let's create a shortcut." I asked Alexander, what is the main goal at present.He was embarrassed by my direct way of asking questions. "Well, of course, we have a lot of targets, and they're constantly being replaced, like JIC requirements and stuff." "Yes," I insisted, "but you have to choose the most important target at the moment. What do you choose?" Alexander moved his chair and exchanged glances with Denham. "It should be said that the most important targets were the Egyptians," concluded Alexander. "The Foreign Office has been pushing us for months to come up with some kind of code. What we have got is fragmented and piecemeal. Work, can't get anything new." It was the spring of 1956, and tensions between Britain and Egypt were rapidly deteriorating.Nasser initiated actions that led to the Suez Canal crisis at the end of the year. "What machines are they using?" "Hagelin," Denham replied.He was referring to a cipher machine made by the Swiss company Crypto AG.This kind of cipher machine was very popular in third world countries in the 1950s. I borrowed a Hagelin sample from GCHQ and took it back to London in the boot of my car.Jagger and I went to an MI5 safe room in Regent's Park to set up the machine and test it out to see if my theory matched reality.The Hagelin cipher machine was a keyboard system with a tape carrying the ciphertext coming out of one side.Its working principle is very simple, there are seven rotating wheels, as long as the AC power is connected, any character typed on the keyboard will come out automatically.The cryptographers at the embassy had to rearrange the words on the seven wheels every morning before sending the message.If we could eavesdrop on the cipher machines as they were being readjusted, I'm sure GCHQ could use those sounds to pinpoint the so-called "core location" of the cipher machines so there would be a way to break the code.Alexander and Denham explained to me that if we could get three or four sets of typesetting for a cipher machine, they could break the code. I installed a series of high-sensitivity microphones at various distances from the Hagelin machine, and mounted a probe microphone on the wall behind the machine, each connected in turn to an oscilloscope, which The recorded sound is transformed into an image.Jagger used a movie camera to capture the images on the oscilloscope's fluorescent screen.I opened the cover of the Hagelin cipher and carefully rearranged the wheels, noting both the old and the new arrangement.A series of fake password signals were sent out by the machine, rattling.I sent the results to Cheltenham for Denham's evaluation. We developed the reels of the movie, and the image on the oscilloscope was clear enough to give some clues as to how the Hagelin cipher typesetting was done.These images provide evidence of the typesetting of at least three of the seven wheels.I did a further experiment with a satyr rig, which was far less sensitive to sound than those mics.The sound of the wheels turning was also audible, but very indistinct.I sent the results to Cheltenham by courier.The next day Denham called me frequently to tell me: "Peter, it worked out great," he said.I could hear him agitated, his voice almost insane from the distortion of the jamming phone line. "The sound from the audio mic is ideal. We can use the images to figure out where two or even three wheels are inscribed. The one on the radio isn't very good. But I think with a little time we can figure it out." Come out of the hall of fame." The conversation was interrupted for a moment by a burst of static on the phone line. "When are we going to use it for action?" he yelled over the phone. "It can be used once it has been approved by the Minister," I replied. The next day GCHQ sent a man named Ray Frawley from the planners to London.A shrewd and practical man, Frawley served as a kind of bridge between brilliant intellectuals like Alexander and Denham and the sprawling communications headquarters.He is a radical atheist who believes that one day humans will be directly integrated with electronic computers, and those dangerous irrational phenomena will be eliminated forever.In the harsh years of the Cold War, anyone with such fantasies looked like a child.But we became close colleagues, even though I still insisted on irrationalism in my heart, believing that a sudden intuition or inspiration can solve the problem. As soon as Winterborn, Frawley, and I began to plan our move against Egypt, I realized that the easiest way was also the best way.I checked with the special investigation team of the post office and got a whole set of materials about the telephone installation in the Egyptian embassy.There is a phone that appears to be either in the cipher room or near it.We decided to install a special device on that phone with a microphone to intercept the cipher machine's voice.The post office broke the phone in the Egyptian embassy, ​​and we waited for the Egyptians to come to the post office and get someone to fix it.I made arrangements to pretend to be an engineer and go with another guy who was in charge of putting special devices on the phone.I'd like to take this opportunity to inspect the cipher room and see if there are any obsolete cipher materials lying around. The next morning, I went to Sao Paulo to meet the post office people, and then I took their car to the Egyptian embassy. The gate of the embassy was heavily guarded, and we were escorted from room to room.The cipher room was in an ancillary building, and the Hagelin cipher machine was rattling away.Three cryptographers were busy operating teletype machines, processing diplomatic cables.I carefully checked to see if there were any redundant code tapes, but everything here was in good order and very clean.A cryptographer came out and spoke to our escort, and after a while, he turned and went back to turn off the machine, and he came out again, walked up to me, and pointed to the phone.He couldn't speak English, so he had to gesture. I understood that he wanted me to move the phone to the cipher machine, so that I could be closer to his seat.I couldn't believe my luck at all, so I hurriedly extended the phone line.I turned slowly, with my back to him, so that another fellow engineer could put the small washer into the phone.It was an improved special device.I put the phone on the crypter's desk, not more than two feet from the Hagelin cipher.The cipher man knocked on the phone and grinned at me, and I smiled back at him, but I always felt that we were not smiling at the same thing. After I left the Egyptian embassy, ​​I hurried back to the eighth floor to monitor the voice coming from the telephone.At first it sounded like a burst of electronic jamming, but with careful tuning, the click of the Hagelin cipher machine became clearly audible.MI5 installed a special line to the Communications Headquarters. Every morning as soon as the cipher staff adjusted the machine, the Second Office of the Communications Headquarters would start to calculate the new typesetting situation and read the code directly.This working process is called "ciphering the cipher".From now on, the code name of this new technology of stealing cipher machine information and deciphering ciphers by using technical monitoring is "swallowing".This is an important breakthrough.Joint MI5 and GCHQ operations enabled us to read the codes of the Egyptian embassy in London throughout the Suez Crisis.The Egyptians used four different cipher systems around the world, and we use the "swallow" technique to get most of the intelligence in several other cipher systems.This operation against the Egyptian codes was a colossal achievement for MI5.At that time, MI6 made an effort to provide intelligence, but it was still clearly failing.According to Nasser's instructions at the beginning of the Suez Canal crisis, MI6's intelligence network in Egypt was almost wiped out, and all their personnel were arrested.MI6's only contribution was a clumsy attempt to assassinate Nasser. for hollis, who came to the directorship just as the suez crisis was reaching its boiling point, the move to break the egyptian code came at a time of perfect timing, giving him a solid record in his first few months in office .What a wonderful irony, judging by what happened afterwards: because it was I who gave him this achievement. The most important piece of information obtained from breaking the Egyptian cipher was the continuous briefing of discussions between Egypt and the Soviet Union in Moscow.The Egyptian ambassador in Moscow sent details of these briefings directly to the Egyptian embassy in London.The information obtained from this source convinced the British Joint Intelligence Committee that the Soviet Union was really saying that it wanted to intervene in the Suez crisis and sided with Egypt.One cable was particularly influential, detailing a meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and the Egyptian ambassador.The Russian side said during the meeting that they intend to mobilize the air force to confront Britain.The telegram was sent directly to the Joint Intelligence Committee and caused such an uproar that Eden was forced to withdraw his troops.Since all GCHQ intelligence was shared with its US counterpart NSA, I'm sure this intelligence also played an important role in US urging the UK to end the Suez crisis. Soon after installing the special device in the Egyptian embassy, ​​we pretty much lost the entire operation.As the Suez crisis deepened, Russia, eager to put Egypt in protege status, sent a team of Russian inspectors to the Egyptian embassy in London to see if there were bugs or microphones or anything like that thing.The Russians are happy to make such friendly gestures.At the same time, they also want to take this opportunity to get some useful information for themselves.Our fixed observation station at the entrance of the Egyptian embassy spotted them as soon as the Russian inspection team entered the building, so I was called to the eighth floor to monitor their movement in the code room.Resignedly, I heard them enter the cipher room.They checked the fuse box first, then electronically probed the walls and ceiling.These large detectors appear to be metal detectors.A Russian picks up the phone and begins to unscrew the bottom, and the microphone hidden inside pops and thumps.After a depressing silence, the sound of the phone being reinstalled appeared again.Winterborn let out a long sigh of relief. We knew at the time that the Russians had discovered the special device, and if they had found it, they would have removed it, but they didn't!Whether Russia knows about special installations or not, they obviously do, and pay special attention to such things, for example in their own embassies.So why did they ignore this thing in the Egyptian embassy?It could be that they didn't want to alert us, to let us know that they found the special device, so that we could continue to use it.They could, after all, transmit information to the Egyptians in London via their own Moscow-London coded line, so that we would not be able to decipher it.But I think there is another reason, and that is that the Russians want us to fully understand their commitment to the Suez Canal crisis in their communications signals, and they don't want us to think they are bluffing.It would be the best means of assuring that we take their attitude seriously if we were given information about Soviet attitudes through an unreproducible route, say, from a secret line.This was the first time I saw the complexity of deliberate Soviet intelligence leaks. After the Suez Canal crisis ended, I went to the Communications Headquarters to lobby again and put forward suggestions for future cooperation.But they seem to want to return the relationship between the two sides to the dead state of the past.Communications Headquarters is happy to harvest the results of "swallowing" technology, but is unwilling to increase help to MI5 in return.In short, they have nothing against MI5 working for them, as long as there is no reciprocity. I felt that GCHQ could play an important role in helping MI5 counter the Russian spy network in Britain by intercepting Soviet spy communications.The Russian intelligence service has always tended to conduct truly sensitive activities "illegally", using some intelligence personnel who are completely independent of the "legitimate" embassy intelligence officers.These men used their own radios to communicate with the Moscow center.I'm sure that if we put all our energy into tracking and listening to these communications, we'd have a breakthrough that would lead us all the way into the heart of Soviet intelligence.I asked GCHQ to provide MI5 with the kind of service we had received from Radio Safety during the war, namely continuous monitoring of illegal radio broadcasts to and from Britain.To me, this is just an extremely simple common sense, but the Communications Headquarters only gave one and a half radio stations to monitor these communications.Such an effort was a pity, and no amount of persuasion could induce them to give more help. Shortly after my first "swallow" operation against Egyptian codes, I went to Canada to plan "Earthworm".Towards the end of my trip, Terry Guernsey, Chief of Counterintelligence in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, asked me to look into a case they were handling.Not long ago the case ended suddenly and under mysterious circumstances.While researching the case, I discovered a detail that left me in no doubt that GCHQ would be forced to change its mind.Guernsey led me into a back room where on a table were three files marked "Crownstone" on the cover. The "Crownstone" case began in 1952, when a Russian entered Canada under a false name. This person was an illegal intelligence agent of the KGB, and the purpose of coming to Canada was to provide a cover for himself.In fact, his ultimate goal is to go to the United States.The KGB often sends their illegals to Canada first with a credible "legend" or fake identity before crossing the Canadian border to the US.The outlaw, known by the Mounties as "Gideon," fell in love with a woman shortly after he arrived in Canada.The move was totally against KGB discipline, and Gideon soon wavered about his mission. The Moscow Center ordered Gideon to get ready to go to America, but he managed to convince them that it was too risky.After the plan to go to the United States was aborted, he was appointed as an illegal KGB officer in Canada, responsible for the work of other illegal officers in Canada.The new job was tough. Gideon was not a hard worker, but spent a lot of time listening to radio communications and traveling all over Canada in order to gather intelligence.Gideon starts falling short of tasks and is reprimanded by his superiors.Finally, he decided to confess everything to his lover, and the two decided to join the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Guersey intuitively sensed the importance of the case, and his decision to recruit Gideon as a double agent rather than accept him as a defector seemed perfectly reasonable.Gideon was assigned to lead an outlaw working for the Russians involved in the Canadian Avro Arrow aircraft program.The Mounties had been monitoring Gideon for a year as if he were a laboratory guinea pig.The workings of Soviet outlaws are little known in the West, and Guernsey carefully investigates how the Russians used Gideon, how they instructed Gideon to gather intelligence, and how Gideon used the dead letter loophole.Most importantly, the Mounties intercepted all of Gideon's coded radio communications. All went well until the summer of 1955, when Gideon was suddenly called back to Russia by his supervisor for a detailed report.At first he was a little hesitant, but later he decided to go to Russia.But after he left, he never came back.Month after month, year after year, the Mounties waited for news that Gideon was alive, but everything came to nothing.After a while, the code Gideon had used appeared on the communications between Moscow and Canada, indicating that a replacement agent for Gideon had arrived in Canada.The case started with great promise and ended with nothing.Guersey was perplexed, but he was convinced that something serious must have happened throughout the course of the case, but it was impossible to ascertain what had happened, and little investigation was done.Bennett, his aide, believed that Gideon had been controlled by the Russians and was deliberately letting the case develop in order to deceive the Mounted Police. In the process of reading the file, I gradually saw that the case was full of traces of Russian intervention from the beginning, and I had nothing to say.Later, I saw another detail, and suddenly realized.Although Gideon was an illegal agent, the Russians still made him meet occasionally with a legitimate diplomat at the Russian embassy.It is certain that this diplomat is an official in charge of illegal work.The KGB probably thought Gideon was an unruly and unreliable agent, and the only way to ensure that he did not deviate was by talking to him face-to-face.All meetings were monitored by the Mounted Police.On one occasion, Gideon and his boss got into a big fight.It turned out that Gideon often missed the radio from Moscow, so he didn't respond.Gideon said he couldn't get a signal from his radio because of the bad weather.His KGB boss dismissed the claims completely, handing Gideon a detailed list of how many times and when he missed the Moscow broadcasts, and it was clear that he knew Gideon was lying.The Russian did not mention this fact, but it was clear to me that he must have been listening to the broadcast to Gideon inside the embassy. In order to understand this fact correctly, I have repeatedly read the report on this meeting.As I flipped through the paper thin pages of this file, I couldn't help but think that if the KGB Illegal Works Officer in Canada listened to the telegrams from Moscow, the KGB Illegal Worker in London would do the same .If GCHQ could be persuaded to take full measures against the Soviet embassy in London, we might be able to identify the transmission from Moscow, and even temporarily identify the official in charge of the illegal work.As long as his actions are linked to the telecommunications activity, we can place him under our full surveillance to catch him when he meets with his agents. As soon as I got back to London, I raised the issue with GCHQ.They listened patiently to my pleas for strength.But this is just my own action, and there is not much enthusiasm for it within MI5.Although the Communications Headquarters agreed to provide a few more stations to monitor the broadcast, it was not enough.I suggested to GCHQ that a major effort should be made to locate receivers within the Russian embassy, ​​as I had previously suggested to the surveillance team's radio work.Once again my request was seen as impractical, and the question soon disappeared in the dense jungle of the intelligence bureaucracy. The situation remained stalemate until a new case emerged in 1958 that completely changed the relationship between MI5 and GCHQ.The course of the case plunged Hollis, for the first time, into his internal crisis and the issues that have haunted him throughout his life. I was sitting in my office thinking about a microphone installation when I was called to Hollis' office.He was sitting in an armchair at one end of the conference table with some scattered files in his hands, his face was gray and drawn, and he asked me to sit in the chair opposite him. "I want you to help me with a problem," he said, handing me a file.I took a quick look and it was an intelligence report, written by an intelligence operative named Frantisc Tisler.The man was apparently a cryptographer at the Czechoslovak embassy in Washington, at the disposal of the FBI.The FBI sent MI5 the information he provided about British security problems.Tissler said that when he returned to Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1957, he ran into his old friend Colonel Pribyl, the Czech military attaché in London, who was on vacation in the Czech Republic.他们喝醉了酒，于是普里比尔告诉蒂斯勒，他指挥着一个在英国的重要间谍，叫林尼。此人正在设计一种模拟器，主要用于英国皇家空军的导弹项目。军情五处没有多久就弄到了林尼的情况。蒂斯勒的报告里附有军情五处档案室收集的林尼的个人档案：他是一个高级工程师，在苏塞克斯郡肖拉姆城的迈尔斯飞机研制实验室里工作，能全面接触到导弹的操纵详细情况及性能指标。 “先生，我看不出有什么问题。我们为何不把他置于我们的监视之下，在他下一次同普里比尔会晤时把他逮起来？” “就是这个问题。”霍利斯冷冷地说，并递给我另外一页纸。 这是美国联邦调查局局长胡佛写给霍利斯的一封信，是用胡佛私人的斜体字打字机打的，里面概述了蒂斯勒提出的另一个更为令人担忧的情况。他说，普里比尔告诉他，有一个俄国间谍隐藏在伦敦的军情五处里。普里比尔发现这一点时，他正坐在汽车里在伦敦街头上一边兜圈子，一边听取一名重要的情报员的工作汇报。他当时意识到有一辆汽车在跟踪他们，他估计是军情五处的监视车，于是用躲闪的行动来甩掉这辆车。为了急于保证不暴露这位重要的情报员，普里比尔决定去找他的俄国同行罗果夫上校帮忙。罗果夫说需要花一两天时间去核实。之后，罗果夫向普里比尔重新保证，说虽然有辆车跟踪，可后来那辆车放弃了跟踪，因为军情五处相信普里比尔仅仅是在教一位同事开车。罗果夫还说，普里比尔应该知道，军情五处的监视车队最近改变了策略，不再当外交官员们一离开使馆时就公开跟踪，而是在他们上了泰晤士河大桥后才跟踪，因为在那里进行反监视活动比较困难。 我看了这封信，立刻明白了普里比尔了解到的情况确实是真的。监视队的行动确实进行了改动，这是由于我的建议。这种改变是实行现代化计划的一个部分，皇家加拿大骑警队试验了这一设想，获得了一些成功，这项行动被称为“覆盖点”。难怪胡佛坚持要他的副手阿尔·贝尔蒙特亲自送信。贝尔蒙特拒绝在莱肯菲尔德大楼里与霍利斯会面，于是会面被安排在军情五处的一间保密室里。随后贝尔蒙特就诡秘地飞回了华盛顿。 “彼得，你看到我们的问题了吧？”霍利斯说，“如果我们对林尼采取行动，就有可能暴露蒂斯勒，可联邦调查局想尽可能长久地把蒂斯勒隐藏起来。如果我们用别的方法去调查这个案子，那么军情五处内部为俄国人传递情报的人就会暴露我们。但是不管发生什么事，我们都一定要查清这个渗透分子的真相。” 霍利斯告诉我，在过去的三个月里，马尔科姆·卡明和反俄国间谍的负责人考特尼·扬对监视队及其配套机构进行了大量的调查，认为情报是从那里泄漏出去的。但查到后来还是一无所获。最后，温特博恩说服了卡明，让他去劝霍利斯找我参加。 “彼得，你有什么主意？” “先生，只有勒死在切尔特南的那帮混蛋！” “对不起，我没有听懂你在说什么……” 我向他解释说，我早就在理论上提出过设想，即俄国人可能是通过截听和分析我们的监视系统的通讯来获得情报的。 “一九四〇年，在苏塞克斯开阔的高地上，我和我父亲就做过类似的事。我们跟踪信号，设法在英国舰队经过海峡时测算其航线。我敢肯定，罗果夫就是这样获取情报的。他们这么干相对来说比较容易，先生。他们自己的人四处走动，获得了许多记录。他们只需用这些记录来对照我们信号的方位，便可以得到许多东西。基本上来说，他们肯定始终知道我们在什么时候跟踪他们。” 我对他说，我不止一次地催促通讯总部进行一项试验，彻底调查俄国大使馆里是否有接收机针对我们的监视通讯进行工作。 “先生，恐怕通讯总部觉得干这种工作太微不足道了。” 霍利斯哼了一声。 “彼得，你能做这项工作吗？” “当然，我想我是能做的。我们要做的就是设法捕捉到接收机发出的射线。” 原理很简单，每个无线电装置都有一个振荡器，它把输入信号“压进”一种更容易滤波的固定频率里去。振荡器工作时总要发出声波，就是这些声波射线暴露了接收机的存在。 “先生，当然你是知道的，这是'信号情报'，”我说，“严格地说，我们是不被允许插手这样的事的。如果通讯总部发现了，他们可就要揪住我的小辫子去请功的……” 霍利斯向前俯着，若有所思，他用双手捂着脸。屋子里一阵可怕的沉寂。 “当然，如果我们让他们也参与，那就得把蒂斯勒送来的情报让他们也知道。”他最后说。这在白厅里要产生分工上的纠纷，霍利斯是十分清楚的。 “我总是要试一下的，”我大胆地说，“如果切尔特南方面发现了，你能为我撑腰才行。这样我们可以在几个月内设法搞清蒂斯勒所说的那个人。如果让通讯总部去干，那得花一年时间或更多的时间才能作出安排。” 霍利斯开始把档案归拢成一堆。 “我认为这是最好的行动方案，”他说，“随时和我保持联系，好吗？” 他直愣愣地看着我。 “彼得，你当然明白这对安全局是一种多么可怕的事，不是吗？我的意思是，如果是真的话，除了对华盛顿有影响以外，我们过去所做的大量的工作就是竹篮打水一场空。” “包括我自己所做的工作也前功尽弃了。”我辛酸地想，同时我为自己没能在监视队通讯问题上进一步敦促通讯总部采取行动而大为恼火。 我回到办公室后，立即与考特尼·扬取得了联系，让他把现有的情报送来，并详细说明俄国人战后在伦敦购置或运入英国境内的电子设备的种类。 研究了这些报告后，我对俄国人在使馆内使用的接收机的范围及种类进行了准确的构思。我计算出了他们振荡器发出的射线的范围约是200码左右。我们的固定观察站在这个范围以外，无法采取行动，A处一直忙了好长一段时间来研制一种能使无线电波穿透的流动车，其车皮是塑料的。我催着温特博恩尽快完成这项工作。两星期之内，流动车就装配好了，里面有电源和两台接收机，一台用来捕捉俄国人的振荡器发出的射线，另一台则用来加强与A处四科的频率的联系。 一九五八年三月的一天，我的助手托尼·塞尔和我第一次开着这辆流动车出去。我们得到允许把它开到肯辛顿公园俄国大使馆的前面，装着到它附近的一所房子去送东西的样子。我们坐在车里，手指交叉着，头戴着耳机，等候着放大器里发出的哪怕是极轻微的声音。我们来回兜了两次，都没有任何动静，只有静电干扰声。我们又开到贝斯沃特路俄国领事馆前面，打算从那里穿过。快到五号楼时，突然听到了微弱的信号声。我转动着接收机的旋钮，听到一阵尖叫，我想肯定是碰到了对方振荡器的频率了。我们驶过前门时，把车速放慢了，信号声音立即增大，当我们驶过领事馆向大理石拱门开去时，信号声逐渐减弱并消失。大使馆里肯定也有接收机在工作，但是不是对准监视队的频率的呢？ 在这以后的几天时间里，我们无论白天还是黑夜都在不同的时间里多次驱车出去，以便摸清大使馆在什么时候使用接收机，并查明与我们的监视通讯有没有关系。有一次，当我们经过领事馆前面时，一辆监视车碰巧从另一个方向开来，车上的监视员正用监视队的频率往监视总部发回信号。我们车内正对着领事馆接收机振荡器的那台接收机突然高亢地鸣叫起来。 “你想这是出了什么鬼？”我问塞尔。 他脸上充满了疑惑，抬起头来看着我。顷刻，我们两人都醒悟了过来。刚才过去的监视车正好为我们提供了我们所需要的证据。监视车用监视频率在离俄国领事馆如此近的地方进行通讯联络，这使得大使馆内的接收机振荡器的输入线路超负荷。振荡器的频率在超负荷的情况下会发生畸变，我们听到的鸣叫就是发生这种畸变时产生的声音。换言之，这证实了大使馆里的接收机是对准监视队的频率的。 这个新发现的代号叫“筏夫”，其含意是重要而丰富的。我们不仅毫无疑问地证实了俄国人在监视我们监视队的频率，同时还可以用同样的方法来检查大使馆里任何正在进行收听的接收机的频率。我们需要做的是向大使馆发射电波，并监听使馆内接收机振荡器超负荷时产生畸变时的声音。我从阅读“冠石”档案时就开始酝酿着这个设想，现在终于有了机会将其付诸实施。利用“筏夫”技术，我们可以查出由莫斯科传送给外地的非法特工人员的广播哪些正在被大使馆监听。从潜在的意义上来说，“筏夫”技术使我们在苏联非法通讯这个至今仍是秘密的世界里获得了一个彻底的突破。 但是，“筏夫”尽管证实了我们的监视通讯系统已成了俄国的一个重要的情报来源，但导弹间谍林尼的问题仍然存在。显然，只有在不让我们的监视队通讯系统暴露整个行动的情况下，才能对林尼案件进行调查。要让无线电沉默是不现实的。我决定采取一种最好的方法，即改变被指定参加行动的车辆的频率。我同国防部取得了联系，要求借用他们的一个军事频率，与监视队现行的频率相差七十兆周之多。这样，监视林尼的那辆车的通讯便会混入附近众多波段的军事通讯之中。我们首先必须在监视队的无线电装置中安上新的晶体，以便监视队能用新的频率工作。每台用于通讯的无线电装置都包含一块控制发射或接收频率的晶体。我不愿冒着让军情五处来搞这项工作的风险，只得私下地拜访了老同事肯普——马尔科尼公司研究部的主任，问他能否在大巴达城的实验室里为我制造这种新的晶体。我给了他一块晶体的样品，以便他能不走样地进行生产。我强调说，只能让他和他最亲近的助手知道新频率，并决定在晶体上标明一种与实际使用频率完全不同的假频率来作为一种额外的安全措施。只用了三周，肯普就生产出了足够的晶体，可供十几台发射机和接收机使用。我们让军情五处负责监视队无线电通讯的工程师把这些新晶体装上，这样可以不引起怀疑。 这个行动的代号是“情鸟”，其细节在军情五处内部也是严格地恪守秘密的，只有温特博恩和我知道正确的频率。新的无线电装置不得在俄国大使馆能触及的范围内使用。领事馆里的接收机仍然用“筏夫”监听，这样就可以记录下来我们对林尼采取行动时俄国人的反应。D处已经对林尼和他上司普里比尔的行踪进行了大量的分析。通过对这两个人的行踪的比较，我们发现他们经常碰头的地方是在布赖顿附近的南丘陵。我们安排了特别处进行行动，在他们下次接头传递秘密材料时逮捕他俩。 林尼去接头时，携有新频率无线电的监视人员一直把他跟踪到接头地点。他在那里等了两个小时，然后就回家了。可普里比尔却在同样的时间里呆在伦敦。以后，我们对林尼进行了传讯，想不到他竟把一切都坦白了，被判了十四年的有期徒刑。 从表面上来看，这件案子以成功而告终。可有一个细节却使温特博恩、我以及D处那些主办这起案件的官员们感到困惑，普里比尔为什么会失约不去跟林尼碰头？可以有许多原因来解释他为何没有露面。他在过去可不曾失约过。如果他事先已经知道要逮捕他的计划，其来源本可能来自监视队的通讯系统，而只能是有人向他通风报信。 在解决俄国人从监视通讯系统获得情报这个问题的同时，我决定采取另一次试验来解决是否存在两条腿的人作为情报源的问题。我作了安排，同时更换了所有的监视通讯的无线电中的晶体，并用“筏夫”监听俄国接收机，了解他们究竟在干什么。如果不在莱肯菲尔德大楼里记录细节，要进行如此大规模的调整，是不可能的。但我可以肯定，没有哪一个监视员能事先知道这个计划。 星期一的早晨，我们用“筏夫”对俄国人的接收机进行监听，并用以往的频率来跟踪俄国外交官。星期二和星期三，我们关闭了所有监视机器来安装晶体。我们告诉监视员们频率提高了两兆周，其实是降低了两兆周。星期四我们又开了机器，用新的频率来跟踪外交官。我们仔细地注视着“筏夫”的反应。我们告诉了监视员新频率的波段位置，让他们看看有没有俄国人在搜索我们新频率的任何迹象。俄国人确实是检查了他们的设备，仿佛是由于机器出了毛病。直到周末，他们仍停留在原来的旧频率上。 星期一早晨我们开机时，一切都面目全非了。一台俄国接收机已经在用新频率监听了，但不是在领事馆，而是在肯辛顿公园里的大使馆里。我们又步入了迷宫。要么这台接收机是从上个星期就在搜索监视队的新频率，只是我们的注意力放在了领事馆而没有察觉；要么就是有人在上个周末把新频率的事捅给了俄国人。可是我们认为前者不大可能。 我和负责反苏联间谍的考特尼·扬把整个调查过程进行了长时间的讨论，我们决定再进行一次试验。如果有人走漏风声，我们大家都会猜到这个人一定藏在监视队或其配套机构里。我们决定耍一个花招，行话称之为“喂钡餐”，也就是故意泄漏一点很重要的情报，如果确有两条腿的情报源存在，他肯定会把这个情报传递给俄国人的。 考特尼·扬此时正在负责一件双重间谍案。这个间谍的代号叫莫罗，与俄国海军武官卢拉柯夫海军少校有联系。我们决定采用一项直截了当的方案，我们把莫罗案件告诉了监视人员，仿佛他是一个真间谍似的。我们对他们说，特别处已经接到指示，将在第二天当莫罗在汉普斯特与卢拉柯夫碰头传递秘密文件时逮捕他。监视队要对莫罗和卢拉柯夫进行全面的监视。我们猜想，如果监视队内部有叛徒，他就会通知俄国人，俄国人要么不让卢拉柯夫去接头，要么通过某种方法去警告莫罗。 事实上，卢拉柯夫按时去接了头。他在汉普斯特德希斯附近的一条僻静的街上进了莫罗的汽车，并迅速和莫罗交换了包裹。两个人当场被捕。卢拉柯夫向我们亮出他的外交人员证件，然后被释放了，此后不久他便离开了英国。我们对莫罗的指控也就悄然撤销了。 乍看起来，卢拉柯夫一莫罗事件似乎证明了没有人渗透到我们内部来。可是，就像过去的每一次试验一样，这里面有令人忧虑的不一致性。 从过去的监视材料中看出，卢拉柯夫在与对方接头时所作的准备工作上是极有耐心的。过去他去赴约时，总要花上好几个小时在伦敦街上兜圈子，乘了出租车，又换乘公共汽车，进出地铁和商店，最后才去碰头。可这一次，他只是直接离开办公室，招手叫了一辆出租车直接去了约定的地点，甚至在汽车内的灯亮着的情况下交换包裹。任何对俄国情报部门熟悉的人都知道，这些举动完全是令人费解地偏离他们正常的职业方式的。 一九五八年底，我针对调查蒂斯勒揭发的全部情况写了一篇长长的报告，并把它交给了霍利斯。我把蒂斯勒从他那碎嘴的朋友普里比尔上校那里听来的一切情况，—一做了研究，并就俄国人如何得到这些情况，向霍利斯谈了我的想法。 我在报告中用了相当大的篇幅来谈“筏夫”技术。毫无疑问，我们是通过它来知道俄国人对我们的监视通讯进行了监听，这成了他们获取军情五处情报的一个重要来源，而且这种情况已持续了多年。俄国人的这种举动清楚地解释了所谓普里比尔“驾驶考测”的故事，同时又肯定了俄国人是怎样知道“覆盖点”行动的原因。尽管我们的通讯分析专家们怀疑，俄国人是不是单单依靠监听我们的通讯就能如此迅速地分析出我们是在泰晤士河大桥上开始跟踪他们的。可是，普里比尔未去与林尼接头，俄国发现我们监视队的新频率之迅速以及卢拉柯夫一莫罗事件等都可以对问题作出不同的解释。我们权衡了各种可能，结论是，俄国人除了通过监听我们监视队的通讯来获取情报以外，并没有两条腿的人这种情报源，可事实上这种可能性并没有排除。 在我把报告呈上去一两天以后，霍利斯通知我到他的办公室去。我进到他的屋子里去的时候，他弓着背正在看一份档案，并用一支自来水钢笔在上面写画。他并没有抬起头来看我，继续写他的东西。我站在那里仿佛是一个误入歧途的学童似的。这间办公室在狄克·怀特搬走以后并没有多大的变化，只是墙上又多了一副前任局长的肖像。霍利斯的写字台上放着一张他儿子的照片，旁边有三部电话，分别接通内阁办公室、国防部和军情六处。除此之外，再也没有表现个性的任何痕迹。 “谢谢你的报告，彼得。”霍利斯说。他仍然没有抬头看我。他同当年早些时候把蒂斯勒档案交给我看的时候相比，完全判若两人。危机已明显地过去了，他又重新眼睛向上了。他还在继续写。 “我给胡佛写了一封信，扼要地对蒂斯勒材料中关于军情五处有间谍的说法进行一次解释，”他接着说，“如果你能走一趟，向他们的技术人员报告一下这起案子的背景情况，如'筏夫'一类的事，我想这一定很不错。好好地利用这次旅行，好吗？到处走走，交交朋友。” 他抬起头来，突然笑了。 “我很高兴这次我们抢在他们前面了，干得棒。” 他回头又去忙那档案了，这意味着我们之间的简单会晤已经结束。我转身离开屋子。 “哦，彼得，”当我走到门口时，他又说，“你就只讲技术上的发现，好吗？我想我们不应该给胡佛留下一个印象，认为还有什么事情……没有解决。” “当然不能，先生，我完全明白。” 实际上在那时我并不明白，可我们已经首发命中了。